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We are pleased to present our special Symposium Issue on the National Parks.
This issue features contributions by some of the foremost experts in the fields of
Park Service history, Park Service management, and natural resources and envi-
ronmental law. The issues facing the Park Service are examined from many var-
ied viewpoints: the law professor, the historian, the political scientist, and the
federal agency employee all offer their perspectives and solutions.
In the lead article of this issue, Robin Winks examines the National Park
Service Act of 1916, and the contradiction inherent in the Service's dual man-
date: both to conserve, and to provide for the present enjoyment of, the national
park lands. The tension between these goals is most apparent in conflicting man-
agement policies and is reflected, in varying degrees, in each of the articles in
this issue.
Federico Cheever examines the consequences of the mandates given to the
Park Service and Forest Service, and their role in the decline of agency discre-
tion. Professor Cheever describes the effect of these contradictions on both inter-
nal agency function and the perceptions of lobbying groups, the courts, and other
government agencies.
The articles that follow each discuss a different challenge to the Park Service
as it enters its ninth decade. John Freemuth discusses the development of the
ecosystem management paradigm and the difficulties surrounding its implemen-
tation as the policy of the Park Service. George Cameron Coggins and Robert
Glicksman have produced the definitive work on national parks concessions law,
tracking the development of the Park Service's policy toward concessionaires,
and thoroughly examining the criticisms of, and proposed changes to, that policy.
Robert Fischman opens his article with the trenchant observation that the
"bright fame" of the Organic Act's preamble "has blinded many scholars to sev-
eral hundred sections that follow it in Title 16."' His thoughtful analysis of the
level of statutory detail in those succeeding sections, as it relates to pollution
control law, follows.
Eric Freyfogle argues that both the scientific and legal means exist to im-
prove the condition of national parks waters. The primary obstacle to effecting
this "repair," he argues, is the lack of a unifying, long-term strategic goal for
these efforts. In the next article, Jan G. Laitos notes the emergence of recreation
as the dominant use of the national parks.
We are fortunate to be able to close our Symposium Issue with perspectives
from two people intimately familiar with the issues raised by these articles.
Deborah Williams, Special Assistant to the Secretary for Interior for Alaska, of-
fers an informative look at the special challenges facing the Park Service's larg-
est holdings. Finally, Gina Guy, Regional Solicitor for the Department of the
Interior, shares her views on lawyering for the Park Service.
We are deeply indebted to Professor Jan G. Laitos for planning this Sympo-
sium Issue. The Denver University Law Review would also like to thank Judge
John Kane, former Editor-in-Chief of the Review, for his advice; as well as Kent
Holsinger, Chad Cummings, Chad Henderson, Gregoria Frangas, Alan Garber,
and Professor Fred Cheever. Finally, this issue would not have been possible
without the commitment and effort of distinguished contributors.
S. Tarek Younes, Editor-in-Chief
'Robert L. Fischman, The Problem of Statutory Detail in National Park Establishment Legislation and




The essays in this volume validate the truth of Justice Holmes' maxim
that the "life of the law has not been logic but experience." Contrary to leg-
end, the National Park idea did not emerge full-blown when Congress created
Yellowstone Park as a public "pleasuring ground" in 1872. The concept we
honor today is a component of our national experience which offers many
insights about the evolution of American democracy and American law.
Any policy that expresses elements of a nation's ethos changes over time.
The concept of nature preserves first proposed by George Catlin, Ralph Waldo
Emerson, and Henry Thoreau was simplistic and vague. None of these vision-
aries realized that laws embracing conceptions of public ownership and man-
agement of specific lands would be imperative if their dreams were to be
fulfilled. Nor could they envision that the managers of such reserves would
face complex problems of stewardship as they confronted pressures from park
patrons, the findings of future scientists, and the intrusions generated by the
machines of modem technology.
It is important to remember that the laws which created the first National
Parks in the West did little more than fix boundaries and set forth hortatory
recitals about the purposes for which these reserves were created. Since most
of the initial parks were located in remote wildernesses, for a half century the
Congress saw no need to appropriate funds to protect or manage these lands.
John Muir, the founder of the Sierra Club of California, had long argued
that the parks would never be treated as inviolate sanctuaries unless there was
"legislative interference." The Organic Act of 1916 met most of Muir's speci-
fications. This landmark law was rooted in tenets of resource management
developed by the nascent conservation movement, and it provided a legal
foundation which enabled our park system to become a model for other na-
tions.
However, the most important issue facing the Congress involved the need
to provide clear guidelines for park stewardship. With what can only be de-
scribed as masterful evasion, the authors of the 1916 Act passed the buck by
fashioning the now famous use-but-do-not-impair dictum which, to this day,
bedevils the decisionmaking of American park managers. (Professor Robin
Winks's analysis of the effect of this "contradictory mandate" provides a valu-
able centerpiece to this volume.)
A period of relative quiet followed until the 1960's when a tidal wave of
events brought changes that made park management more complex, enlarged
the reach of the nation's legal system, and fostered the emergence of a new
discipline called environmental law. In 1961 when I became Secretary of the
Interior there were no environmental lawyers and environmental law was not a
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subject taught in law schools.
A list of the developments that altered the matrix of policymaking and
changed the politics of conservation must include:
0 Leadership in Washington that enlarged the mission of the Park
Service by adding a necklace of National Seashores and Lakeshores
to the System. In the process of creating these new parklands Con-
gress wrote statutes that described in detail how these new areas were
to be administered.
0 The publication in 1962 of Rachel Carson's seminal book. Silent
Spring introduced fresh insights and values that quickened ecological
thinking and became the spearpoint of what was soon described by
Americans as the environmental revolution.
• When it approved John F. Kennedy's Cape Cod National Sea-
shore legislation, Congress broke the hidebound "not a scent for scen-
ery" policy and began appropriating hundreds of millions annually to
acquire lands for parks in all parts of the country. This was a move
that, in due course, stripped the "Western" label from the National
Park System and led to major additions to that system located east of
the Mississippi river.
* The acceleration of environmental action brought to the forefront
new, vibrant citizen organizations like The Nature Conservancy, and
sparked the creation of aggressive national environmental law groups
such as the Environmental Defense Fund and the Natural Resources
Defense Council.
0 A landmark decision by the United Stats Supreme Court gave
aggrieved groups of citizens access to the courts where they could
force government agencies to enforce existing laws and challenge
decisions made by wrongheaded federal officials.
0 The enactment of a National Environmental Policy Act, with its
requirement that government that government entities prepare envi-
ronmental impact statements, instituted a planning process which
revolutionized decisionmaking in federal agencies and, in effect, gave
environmental lawyers power as citizen "Attorneys General" to com-
pel public officials to carry out mandates embedded in the growing
body of environmental laws.
* During this same period, big increases in visitation and the grow-
ing impacts and intrusions of mechanized forms of recreation (pollut-
ing autos, dune buggies, helicopters, airplane tours, etc.) confronted
harried park administrators with complex decisions about (a) allow-
able "uses" relating to the carrying capacity of particular parks; and
(b) methods to faithfully implement the "maintain unimpaired" in-
junction in the Organic Act of 1916.
The essays in this volume convey the message that the conflicts over the
policies that determine the quality of stewardship that prevails in our National
Parks are not abating. Indeed the available evidence tells us that our national
treasures are beleaguered today by myriad threats. Auto emissions damage
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trees in Sequoia. Oil, mining, and logging companies encroach on the borders
of some parks. Geothermal development outside Yellowstone poses a threat to
geysers inside. Tour companies, cruise ships and air charter firms hard-sell
parks to increase their profits while noisy overflights of the Grand Canyon are
marketed in Las Vegas as a break from blackjack.
Meanwhile, the Park Service has its own troubles. Never adequately fund-
ed, it now has a $2 billion backlog in deferred maintenance and infrastructure
needs. In the age of ecology, good science is the backbone of good manage-
ment, but the Service's science program remains an embarrassment. Some
poorly paid summer rangers now qualify for food stamps. And intrusions by
heavy-handed members of Congress and by political hacks in Washington
demoralize the agency's dedicated and competent staff.
Now, perhaps more than at any time in history, our Park Service needs
strong leadership, assiduous, ardent support from the American people, and
levels of funding that will enable it to meet the challenges that lie ahead.





SOME THOUGHTS ABOUT THE VALUE OF A
PROFESSION
ROGER G. KENNEDY*
We who are lawyers and conservationists have in recent years overvalued
adversarial jurisprudence, I think, and undervalued the law of community. It is
time to give more energy to law as a binding force, more emphasis to equal
rights within a system of ordered liberty. Lawyering may more often be gener-
ous and affirming. It may be participatory and deferential, rather than manifest
that invidious cleverness which has rendered good causes too often unappeal-
ing.
I do not suggest that the law of community should be smug or indolent.
When equal rights are violated, idiosyncratically or systematically, when the
social compact is betrayed or ruptured, we should take to the streets, we
should sue, we should deploy every shrewd device to call to conscience the
better sense of the community. But conscientious environmentalists must learn
to be more respectful and to build alliances.
Reinhold Neibuhr is a good mentor no citizen should be treated as if he
or she were unworthy of being heeded. Nor should any citizen, however rich
or celebrated, be accorded disproportionate power or credence. The implicit
ground of the law of community is that none of us are either so depraved or
so exalted either to be dealt out of the great game of civil life, or dealt extra
cards.
In the eighties, our sense of law as a binding force frayed and unraveled.
Litigation became the first resort, not the second; sustained ameliorative effort
became unappealing to ardent spirits. The calvary raided, and the infantry
stayed home. The institutions of conservation, the patient conservators and
protectors, such as the National Park Service, suffered. The physical assets
they tended were allowed to deteriorate disgracefully, as their antagonists and
predators gained converts while their leaders were muzzled and too many of
those who should have been their friends were content with one-liners, photo-
ops, thirty-second spots and spasms of heroic litigation. The cause of conser-
vation suffered as feeling good replaced doing good. The long-sustained, ardu-
ous, complex process of leaming science, leaming the law and managing in
accordance with experience, seemed to many bright young things too much
trouble and boring. Professionals-people who go to the trouble of doing
* Director, National Park Service. B.S., Yale University, 1949; J.D., University of Minne-
sota, 1952.
574 DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:3
things over enough time so as to learn what works and what does not-were
undervalued, while celebrities danced out a choreography of clever haste on
television.
It is time, I think, to interest ourselves again in process, in honest consul-
tation and discussion, in listening, in striving for consensus (yes, even for
consensus) so that change will become internal to organizations and will en-
dure. There will always be a role for the calvary-or, if that reference seems
hopelessly antiquated-for the stukas. But they should be more respectful of
people slogging around on the ground, bloody and muddy and very tired, but
getting up every day to get back to the uncelebrated, unglamourous, and the
lasting. It is on the ground that one learns about the care of the earth.
And here's a pitch-while we solicit a little more respect for the profes-
sionals--especially for the professionals in the National Park Service-I sug-
gest to young lawyers: think about this line of work. It has its satisfactions.
And they last.




Historians concerned with the National Park Service, managers in the Park
Service, and critics and defenders of the Service, frequently state that the Or-
ganic Act which brought the National Park Service into existence in 1916
contains a "contradictory mandate." That "contradictory mandate" is said to
draw the Park Service in two quite opposite directions with respect to its pri-
mary mission; the contradiction is reflected in management policies; the inabil-
ity to resolve the apparent contradiction is blamed for inconsistencies in those
policies.
The apparent contradiction is contained in a single sentence of the pream-
ble to the act. That sentence reads, in addressing the question of the intent of
the Service to be established by the act, that the Service is
to conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the
wild life therein [within the national parks] and to provide for the
enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such means as will
leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.'
This paper is an attempt to determine the intent of Congress with respect to
the Act of 1916. It is the work of an historian, not a legal scholar. The histo-
rian recognizes that the intent of the whole of Congress in passing an act, and
the intent of the individuals who framed that act, do not perfectly coincide;
that intent must nonetheless be interpreted as individual; that intent changes;
and that the law of unintended consequences looms large in any legislation.
A MOMENT FOR CONTEXT
The National Park System of the United States is unique among the
world's systems of government preserves. Because of this uniqueness, refer-
ence to attitudes, legislation, or management practices elsewhere, even if legal-
ly admissible, is of little help in understanding the American National Parks.
One says of "little help," however, rather than of no help, precisely because
the system's unique characteristics may be brought into focus best by a com-
parison with park systems elsewhere. Consider these aspects of the system's
uniqueness.
* Randolph W. Townsend Professor of History; Chair, Program in Environmental Studies,
Yale University.
1. 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
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The Unique System
The National Park System of the United States is the world's largest, both
in the number of units (375 as of June 1997) and in total land area. Thus,
legislation passed with respect to the Park System, beginning with the National
Park Service Act signed by President Woodrow Wilson on August 25, 1916
(also referred to as the Park Service's "Organic Act"), whether generic to the
system as a whole or specific to an individual unit, has more extensive appli-
cation than any other park system in the world. Such legislation influences, is
affected by, and is of concern to all Americans.
The National Park System of the United States is the most complex, the
most carefully articulated, and thus the most specific system in the world.
There are twenty-one types of units (national park, national monument, na-
tional preserve, national reserve, national seashore, national lakeshore, national
historical park, national battlefield park, national military park, national bat-
tlefield, national battlefield site, national historic site, national memorial, na-
tional wild, scenic, and/or recreational river, national parkway, national scenic
and historic trail, national memorial, national recreation area, national scientif-
ic reserve, national capital parks and a miscellany of units grouped simply as
"other") that are administered directly by the Park Service.! Several units
exist in forms of partnership and loose affiliation, and three programs (national
historic landmarks, national natural landmarks, the national registry of historic
places) are run by the Park Service with respect to properties that, in general,
it neither owns nor administers. Despite the care with which these various
types of parks are designated, and the high degree of specificity that applies to
the laws creating specific units, all are governed by the Organic Act.
The National Park System of the United States is genuinely national, for
there are units in all but one state and in all dependencies. In some nations,
such as Australia, areas designated national parks are in fact administered by
state and local authorities. In some nations, such as Canada, resources adhere
to the individual province, so that national park legislation may be substan-
tially compromised at a more local level, as in the province of Quebec.
The National Park System of the United States is the world's most intel-
lectually elegant system, for it has grown, and in more recent years has most
consciously been added to, by the application of a National Park System Plan
to which a series of Theme Studies is central. These Theme Studies, ranging
over a number of subjects, both with respect to natural areas and to cultural
and historical experiences of significance to the nation as a whole, have been
conducted with care and imagination, with both Park Service professionals and
informed non-governmental experts involved. While Canada, and to a lesser
2. Omitted from this list of types of units are (a) units with slight variations in title which
are, despite those variations, clearly of one of these types; (b) seven properties administered
through the National Capital Parks but not in fact included in those parks, such as the White
House, and (c)-quite confusingly-several national recreation areas, one "national volcanic mon-
ument," and three national monuments which, despite the use of titles generally specific to the




extent New Zealand, have imitated the Theme Study approach to the evalua-
tion and designation of potential Park System units, neither has applied this
approach so fully. While at times a unit may be added to the U.S. System
through more local political pressure, the overwhelming body of units reflect a
close awareness on the part of the Park Service of Congress's desire to adhere
to Theme Studies and to carry them out expeditiously.
The National Park System of the United States also has the warm support
of the American people, who clearly cherish the system even when they do
not fully understand it. This has not always been the case, of course, and any
given unit may at some point have been the object of hostility, especially
locally, but there can be no doubt that by the 1970s the system was embedded
within a vigorous, growing, wide-spread public sentiment for conservation and
protection of the environment. This sentiment has not abated, and the public
brooks little compromise with what it understands to be the System's mission.
The same may be said of National Park Systems in few if any other countries.
To be sure, public-and thus legislative-awareness of this mission has
changed across time. For example, the initial campaign for the creation of
national parks was strongly supported by the tourism industry, most particu-
larly by railroads and, soon after, by automobile associations. At the time of
passage of the Organic Act of 1916, the railroad was a power in the land, the
only feasible means of mass transport to the great Western parks, while the
automobile was being admitted to parks in ever greater numbers. The goal of
the Park Service created by the act was to "preserve, forever unimpaired, the
sublime beauty, dignity, and nobility of national park landscapes";3 the Or-
ganic Act was silent on issues of biological preservation as we would under-
stand the term today. But then, so too was the Constitution of the United
States initially silent on such issues as privacy or anti-trust goals, though lan-
guage was present by which courts would, in this century, find implied consti-
tutional intent.
Acts Subsequent to 1916
Whatever the intent of Congress in 1916, with the enactment of the Na-
tional Park Service Act, Congress may change its intent by subsequent acts.
The Act of 1916 is examined in its full legislative history in the material that
follows. But first, a sense of context requires some comment on the manner in
which Congress added to the intent of the original act.
That intent has been Congressionally modified by two types of acts. There
are broad-ranging acts relating to natural resources which impact upon the
national parks, and there have been specific acts, notably those of 1970 and
1978, that have extended the discussion of the purposes of parks. Of the first
type of act, there have been four above all that apply to the national park
system. The Wilderness Act of 1964 created a National Wilderness Preserva-
tion System, prohibited all commercial activities, motorized vehicles, perma-
3. Richard West Sellars, The Roots of National Park Management: Evolving Perceptions of
the Park Service's Mandate, J. FORESTRY, Jan. 1992, at 16, 17.
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nent roads, or development of any kind within designated wildernesses, and
provided that portions of National Park System units might be so designated.
The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968 designated segments of rivers as part
of a system in which waterways were to be maintained in or returned to a
pristine state. (Subsequently a designation of Recreational River was added.)
The Clean Water Act of 1972 set as a national goal the elimination of all
pollutant discharges into waters and making waters safe for fish, wildlife, and
people. While the deadline mandated by Congress was relaxed, the act contin-
ues to apply within national parks. The Endangered Species Act of 1973 de-
fined endangered and threatened species and required the government to draw
up lists of these species and to acquire lands and waters necessary to their
protection. As many national park units function as wildlife preserves, the act
has direct application to the parks.
Additionally, a series of acts relating to natural resources broadly, notably
the National Environmental Policy Act, the National Forest Management Act,
and the Federal Land Policy and Management Act, are also relevant to the
parks. The last two acts require the U.S. Forest Service and the Bureau of
Land Management to coordinate their resource management plans with other
agencies, including the National Park Service. These acts quite obviously tilted
the 1916 mandate toward a more compatible interpretation of the Park
Service's responsibilities. To be sure, none of these acts defined the key word
"unimpaired" in the 1916 act, but taken together, they provided a functional
definition that went beyond "preserve unimpaired" virtually to call for the
restoration of the ecological integrity of the National Parks.
National Park Acts of the 1970s
Congress went some distance toward functional definitions in two park-
specific acts in 1970 and 1978. In an amendment to national park legislation,
Congress declared that National Parks "derive increased national dignity and
recognition of their superb environmental quality through their inclusion ...
in one national park system preserved and managed for the benefit and inspi-
ration of all the people."4 Clearly here Congress was holding National Parks
to an "increased" or higher standard of protection, this higher standard was
based on the maintenance or achieving of superb "environmental quality," and
each park benefitted by being included in a system that benefitted all: that is, a
threat to one was a threat to all. Further, Congress now called for preservation
and management that would benefit and inspire "all the people," thus by im-
plication ruling out management decisions that would redound to the benefit of
only "some of the people": interest groups, local parties, one might argue even
historically vested bodies that lacked clear national significance.
In 1978, Congress reaffirmed the Organic Act and declared that parks
must be protected "in light of the high public value and integrity" of the park
system in a way to avoid "derogation of the values and purposes" for which
4. National Park System General Authorities Act, Pub. L. No. 91-383, § 1, 84 Stat. 825
(1970) (emphasis added) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § la-I (1994)).
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the parks, collectively and individually, were created.5 "High public value" is
somewhat subjective and clearly changes over time; by the use of this crite-
rion, Congress appears to have instructed the National Park Service to manage
parks in relation to public sentiment and, in effect, sociological jurisprudence.
By this standard in 1978 Congress gave a powerful mandate to the Park Ser-
vice, a mandate which would prohibit actions that could have the effect of
"derogation" of park values. Virtually all commentators at the time and since
have concluded that the 1978 provision added to the Park Service's mandate
to protect ecological values.
Of course, the amendments of 1970 and 1978 apply to actions, not to
inaction. That is, where an invasive activity, practice, or structure already
existed, was the Park Service required to take action to eliminate it, or to
mitigate its effects, or was the Park Service merely required to brook no future
intrusions? In some measure the answer to this question requires site-specific
knowledge, since national parks clearly are meant to be held to a higher stan-
dard than other, nearby, surrounding, or environing federal lands and one must
know what those standards are, and thus what the specific threat, incursion, or
compromising situation may be. Does, for example, an historic ditch that con-
veys water from, across, through, or into national park lands, for the benefit of
private persons or municipalities, now require removal? That such a ditch
requires mitigation there can be no question, under the expectation of parks
being held to higher standards; that a local ditch, used for irrigation, would not
meet park criteria is abundantly clear; that such a ditch impairs the "values
and purposes" of parks also seems clear in the context of modem sensitivities
and the legislation of 1970 and 1978. But neither act directs the Park Service
specifically to remove such a ditch. Absent such instruction, a question is, may
or should the Park Service do so?
Historic Structures within National Park Units
Today, more than half of the 375 units of the National Park System are
primarily cultural/historical in their purpose, and there is likely to be greater
growth in the future of such parks than there will or can be of natural/scenic
reserves. Further, public awareness of historical structures, and public concern
for their protection, has grown at least as rapidly as public awareness and
concern for specified sites within the natural environment. It is not, therefore,
a digression to comment briefly on how the Antiquities Act of 1906, and other
legislation relating to historical preservation, would bear upon an historic ob-
ject within a national park that had been set aside primarily for natural and
scenic purposes. The example already proposed, an "historic ditch," may be
used.
Might a ditch on park lands be an "historic object" in the meaning of the
Organic Act, and thus entitled to consideration for protection on that ground?
If the ditch were present in 1916, surely the answer is yes; if the ditch were
5. Act of Mar. 27, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-250, § 101(b), 92 Stat. 166 (codified as amended
at 16 U.S.C. § la-1 (1994)).
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constructed after 1916, the answer is far more ambiguous. However, on either
side of the date of the Organic Act, management would not be required to
protect the ditch either as a structure or object or in its historic use unless it
clearly met certain criteria.
In August of 1916 the Department of the Interior was responsible for
twenty-one national monuments and one archaeological reservation. Of these,
nine were defined as being primarily of historical significance, and therefore
these units may be taken to suggest what Congress meant at that time by an
"historic object." Of these units, five were purely archaeological in their intent
(e.g., Chaco Canyon, Gran Quivira). These ancient ruins would more com-
monly be referred to today as "cultural" rather than "historical." One unit,
Dinosaur National Monument, was set aside for the fossil record, that is, for
paleontology rather than history as commonly understood. Only three units
provide any functional definition of what Congress may have had in mind
when it referred to "historic objects" in 1916: El Morro, a great rock on which
Spanish, Mexican, and American explorers had inscribed their names;
Tumacacori, the ruins of a significant mission church near the Arizona-Mexico
border; and Sitka, site of a Tlingit village in Alaska. These were quite major,
visible, and substantial sites. Clearly an historic ditch, no more than an historic
cabin, was envisioned by Congress in 1916 as automatically embraced by the
act.
Whatever Congress may have had in mind in 1916, the Historic Sites Act
of 1935 provided criteria for the protection, selection, or conservation of "ob-
jects" that qualified for the attention of the National Park Service, so that
thereafter decisions with respect to the protection of historically-used struc-
tures, or other alterations of nature within a national park, could be made on
the basis of relatively clear principles. The Act of 1935 built upon the Antiq-
uities Act of 1906, and it specifically required that to be of significance under
the Act a site, building, or object must:
1) Be associated with and now be the "primary tangible resource" that
illustrates, recalls, or characterizes "individuals, groups, events, processes,
institutions, movements, lifeways, folkways, ideals, beliefs, or other patterns or
phenomena that had a decisive impact on or pivotal role in the historic or
prehistoric development of the Nation as a whole." By this criterion, an irri-
gation ditch-to continue with the example chosen-would be worthy of pro-
tection provided it were the "primary tangible resource" illustrative of the
process of irrigation, or of a folkway that hinged upon the practice of irriga-
tion, provided that the ditch in question were, indeed, "primary," "tangi-
ble"-for which read, retaining its substantial integrity as a structure-and
relating to the Nation "as a whole." Thus a ditch that served or serves local
purposes would not qualify, while a ditch that served wide-spread purposes
illustrative of national growth would qualify, provided it were the "primary"
(best surviving or most important) example illustrative of irrigation.
2) A ditch might qualify provided it were a "masterpiece of type," or
had a "pivotal influence" in the later development of its type of construction
as an aspect of "technological or engineering design." Thus the Park Service
could recognize different stages in the development of irrigation, and protect
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more than one ditch, provided each was an exemplar of a stage of develop-
ment that transcended local use. This would require passing a test of integrity,
or primacy, and finally of significance to the development of a particular ap-
plication of engineering that had national impact.
3) A ditch might be protected if, in its structure, it provided "informa-
tion" that was "essential to professional or public understanding of human
development," such information not being obtainable by example elsewhere;
and
4) The ditch would have to "possess an exceptionally high degree of
integrity of form, material, and setting."
These criteria were subsequently expanded so that, in 1996, they number
six. To the four stated above, one must add that such an historic place, site,
structure, or object may be designated if it is a) representative of some "great
idea or ideal of the American people" and/or b) is "associated importantly
with the lives of persons nationally significant."
There are also negative criteria. Ordinarily reconstructed structures do not
fall under the act. Nor do structures that have achieved significance within the
last fifty years. Nor do structures, even though they may have integrity, which
have been moved from their original locations, unless the structure is histori-
cally significant for reasons of architectural merit.
There are two programs under which a site already within a national park
unit can be formally designated as historic: the National Landmarks and the
National Register.
There are now nearly 2,200 National Historic Landmarks. While one
might argue that historic structures within a national park's borders automati-
cally are entitled to special consideration, the fact that several structures that
are inside park boundaries have been designated independently as National
Historic Landmarks suggests that to guarantee preservation, or to cause the lo-
calized setting aside of criteria relating to natural preservation within a park
that has been created primarily for landscape/scenic/wildlife purposes, such
structures need be given the highest consideration only if they meet the sepa-
rate Landmark criteria. In other words, historic structures that do not meet
such criteria may be removed-or not-depending upon management deci-
sions relating to the overall purpose of an individual park as stated in that
park's enabling act.
Within Rocky Mountain National Park, for example, twenty-three struc-
tures or sites (including the old Fall River Road) had been placed on the Na-
tional Register of Historic Places as of 1988.' There is no requirement that a
structure be nationally significant to be placed on the National Register, for
"properties significant to the nation, a state, or a community" may be nomi-
nated by states, federal agencies, and others. There are well over 50,000 places
on the Register, including over 900 within units of the National Park System.
6. See HISTORY DIVISION, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INT., CATALOG OF NATIONAL HISTORIC
LANDmARKs (1987).
7. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE HISTORIC PRESERVATION OFFICERS, U.S. DEP'T OF
THE INT., NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES, 1966-1988 (1989).
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In this way the Park Service has honored its obligation, as stated in the Organ-
ic Act, to recognize historic objects.
However, the continued presence of an "historic object" may militate
against the primary purpose of a park unit, and unless that object is judged to
be of National Landmark status, the Park Service may override the preserva-
tion of the historic object in the interests of the park's primary purpose. Nor
does placement on the National Register assure any form of protection, local,
state or federal; indeed, some two percent of National Register places have
been destroyed.
The "historic object" reference within the Organic Act of 1916 has be-
deviled historians and non-historians alike. Within the original national parks,
those "historic" objects overwhelmingly were fences and gates used to control
grazing, ditches and other structures to effect irrigation, or cabins used by
hunters, foresters, and recreationists prior to the creation of a unit. The ques-
tion has arisen often-most dramatically in Grand Teton and Olympic national
parks in recent years-as to whether any or all of these three categories of
"objects" either require protection, or may receive protection, under the Organ-
ic Act. The conclusion is that such "objects" do not require protection, and
that the burden of proof is on the advocates of such protection, given the crite-
ria relating to national significance, integrity, and "exhibit" value.'
Contextually, in addition to considering the impact of post-1916 natural
resource legislation, of acts specific to the national parks, and of acts relating
to historical preservation, on the Organic Act of 1916, one must consider one
other aspect of the intent of Congress: how the meaning of language changes.
One need not belabor the point here beyond observing that in usage and
meaning, terms like "conserve" and "preserve" have functionally changed
across time. Thus, the use of such terms in legislation subsequent to 1916 may
not have precisely the same connotations as these words had at the time.
8. In fact, few irrigation ditches would be likely to qualify in future for protection under
these criteria, since the Park Service has, for example, already designated its choice of eight Na-
tional Historic Landmarks with respect to the sub-theme of irrigation under the broad theme of
engineering. Roosevelt Dam in Arizona, the first major project completed under the Reclamation
Act of 1902, was designated in 1963, and in the citation of designation was meant to stand for the
entire Salt River Irrigation Complex; San Bernardino Ranch, also in Arizona, designated in 1964,
commemorates and illustrates ranch irrigation through the use of springs; the Folsom Powerhouse,
in California, was designated in 1981 in recognition of the first use of high-voltage alternating
current from a hydroelectric generating plant (1895); the Columbia Historic District, also in Cali-
fornia, was designated in 1961, in part to include millraces and sluice boxes relating to gold min-
ing; the Old Mission Dam, near San Diego, was demarked in 1963 to commemorate the first ma-
jor irrigation-engineering project on the Pacific Coast undertaken by Spanish inhabitants; the
Carlsbad Reclamation Project, dating from the 1880s, was designated in 1964 to commemorate the
earliest extensive irrigation project built by private enterprise, and to honor the inhabitants of the
Pecos Valley for their achievements; and Bonneville Dam and adjacent structures were honored in
1987 as the best example of a water diversion project. The Espada Aqueduct, in Bexar County,
Texas, was designated in 1964 as the only remaining Spanish structure of its type in the United
States. It is now part of San Antonio Missions National Historical Park. With this articulation of
sites illustrative of the theme of irrigation, it is difficult to imagine that a case could be made for
the national protection of other structures or objects relating to the more-or-less routine transport
of water in the 19th- or 20th-century West.
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CREATING A NATIONAL PARK SERVICE: THE ACT OF 1916
The National Park Service was created by Act of Congress in August,
1916, and President Woodrow Wilson signed the Organic Act on August 25.
The act was the result of some six years of discussion, intense lobbying by a
variety of interest groups, and growing public concern. The leaders of the
campaign to establish a Park Service were, in the House, Congressmen Wil-
liam Kent and John Raker, both of California, and in the Senate, Reed Smoot
of Utah. Congressman Kent had the close advice of Frederick Law Olmsted,
Jr., son of the founder of American landscape architecture and creator of Cen-
tral Park. Stephen T. Mather, a wealthy borax industry executive (who later
would become the first full-time Director of the new National Park Service
created by the act) was heavily involved, as were a number of recreational,
outdoor, tourist, and automobile associations, of which the American Civic
Association was the most important.
These advocates spoke of most of the thirty-seven parks that then existed,
as well as the wide range of park proposals pending before Congress, in terms
of scenic reserves, often invoking a comparison with Switzerland, which it
was invariably argued had capitalized on its natural scenery more effectively
than any other nation. Both railroad and automobile interests advocated more
consistent administration of the existing parks in order to protect them more
effectively, and also to make certain that accommodations and campgrounds
were held to a consistent standard for the public's pleasure. While the rail-
roads wished to bring spur lines to the borders of the parks, they seldom ar-
gued for actual entry. Automobilists wished to see roads to and within the
parks upgraded so that visitors could tour the parks in greater comfort. All
spoke of "scenery" with respect to the principal natural parks, though with a
variety of qualifiers, and all referred to the need for preservation of that scen-
ery while also making the scenery accessible for the "enjoyment" of the pub-
lic. Thus, any discussion of Congressional intent in 1916 involves some under-
standing of what was meant at the time by "scenery," as well as the specific
references to it in hearings, debate, legislation, and the correspondence of the
key legislators.
In 1915-16, during the Congressional session which enacted the Organic
Act, there were twenty-one members of the House Committee on the Public
Lands, eleven of whom had served on the Committee in one or more previous
Congresses and had experience with earlier omnibus park bills. Of these mem-
bers, some were silent throughout, speaking neither at hearings nor in debate.
The papers of sixteen of these members have survived. Debate, and the
members' papers, make it abundantly clear that the key members in the
House, with respect both to the Organic Act and to specific national park bills
during this time, were Congressmen Kent and Raker, Congressman Irvine
Lenroot of Wisconsin, who was a watchdog preoccupied with scrutinizing all
bills for their financial impact on government spending, and Congressman
Edward T. Taylor of Colorado, who was an advocate of the bill that created
Rocky Mountain National Park in 1915 and who saw the two acts as closely
related. While other members spoke on occasion, their concerns were to clari-
fy matters relating to grazing, roads, or fire protection, and almost never did
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any Congressman other than these four speak to general principles of preserva-
tion and protection or to matters concerning water. Indeed, many key members
of the Committee, who were active with respect to other matters that came
before it, were silent on the Organic Act of 1916. Their papers are also silent:
in the hundreds of Volumes of manuscripts in the Carl Hayden Collection at
Arizona State University, for example, there are frequent references to national
parks from the 1930s forward, but the collection is, except for a single docu-
ment, utterly silent on the act of 1916. To cite a second example, the papers
of Congressman Addison T. Smith of Idaho, now in the Idaho State Historical
Society in Boise, are "a dead collection" on any matters relating to the public
lands.9 Thus, in the House one best focuses on Congressman Kent, whose bill,
H.R. 8668, was ultimately enacted (with slight modifications) as H.R. 15522,
and whose papers are voluminous.
The story is similar in the Senate. While several Senators spoke with
respect to their final bill, S.9969, which was offered by Senator Smoot, almost
no one took up broad questions of the language of the bill. An examination of
the surviving papers of all members of the Senate Committee on the Public
Lands and Surveys for 1915-16 reveals that only Smoot was closely attentive
to the legislation. His papers, most particularly his diary, in the library of
Brigham Young University, supplement his public remarks.
The preamble, or "statement of fundamental purpose" for the Act of 1916,
was drafted by Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr., at the request of Congressman
Kent. Thus Olmsted's views, though he was not a member of the legislature,
are also important to understanding Kent's intent. Fortunately, his papers sur-
vive at the Library of Congress (and, to a lesser extent, at the former Olmsted
offices and studios in Brookline, Massachusetts).
The governing sentences of the National Park Service Act of 1916 read as
follows:
The service thus established shall promote and regulate the use of
the Federal areas known as national parks, monuments, and reserva-
tions hereinafter specified by such means and measures as conform to
the fundamental purpose of the said parks, monuments, and reserva-
9. The Hayden manuscripts are typical of those of members of the House Committee. In
1915 he was involved in an International Irrigation Congress but saw no need to mention this
subject when discussing the Rocky Mountain National Park Act that year, and his papers are silent
except for a copy of Enos Mills' What We Owe to Our National Parks. In 1916 Hayden was fully
engaged in speaking out on women's suffrage, the European war, and prohibition; if he ever spoke
in public on the Organic Act, there is no record of it in his papers. When Hayden did refer to
parks, the content of his papers is typical for the time: in 1913 he apparently agreed that an ar-
chaeological site near Phoenix should be saved because it was a commercial asset, and he appar-
ently agreed with the Phoenix Board of Trade in its demand for auto roads along the Grand Can-
yon. The Smith Collection contains a clipping file on Good Roads and nothing on parks. The
Papers of James Wickersham, in the Alaska State Library in Juneau, show diary entries for the
months in which the Park Service Act was discussed, and though Wickersham comments on other
bills to come before the Committee on the Public Lands, he is quite silent on the Organic Act. See
Hayden MSS (on file with AriL.jna State University (Tempe) box 607, folder 20, and box 631,
folders 13 & 14); Addison Taylor Smith Collection MS (Idaho State Historical Society, 22 finding




tions, which purpose is to conserve the scenery and the natural and
historic objects and the wild life therein and to provide for the enjoy-
ment of the same in such manner and by such means as will leave
them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.'0
It is this language which requires explication, and it is the path to this lan-
guage, beginning with the first suggestion that there should be a National Park
service or bureau, that requires tracing if we are to understand Congressional
intent.
Taft and Ballinger Recommend a Bureau
Beginning early in 1910 the American Civic Association had declared the
need for a special bureau, most likely within the Department of the Interior, to
administer the nation's national parks, of which by then there were eleven,
with a twelfth to be added in May. (There were also eleven units with other
designations.) There also were by the end of that year seventeen national mon-
uments, under the administration of the Department of the Interior or the De-
partment of Agriculture, and the Association wished to see common principles
of administration applied, certainly to the parks and perhaps to the monu-
ments. In his annual report for 1910, the Secretary of the Interior, Richard
Ballinger, recommended that Congress should create a "bureau of national
parks and resorts" in order to assure future generations competent administra-
tion of the parks." This statement was immediately taken up by the Ameri-
can Civic Association though never again was there reference to "and resorts"
in relation to a bureau's prospective title.
This did not mean that some of the parks were not seen in some measure
as resorts, of course, but rather that those groups lobbying for creation of more
parks, and more consistent administration of them by a central bureau, pre-
ferred different terminology. The lobbyists often referred to the parks as "the
nation's playgrounds," as "havens of rest," as places where the public might
enjoy solitude, recreation, and "a sense of good health." To some, however,
"resort" carried a somewhat undemocratic connotation, while "play-
ground"-which was universal, for the people-became the preferred term at
the time. In all the lobbying, Congressional hearings, and debates to follow,
emphasis remained upon ways of bringing benefits "to the people," and the
only analogous discussion to "resorts" vs. "playgrounds" would occur in 1916,
when the automobile was seen by some, as it was being admitted to the parks,
to be an instrument of the rich. By the time the Kent bill was before Congress,
most members spoke little of the parks being resorts, and virtually all used as
preferred language, "the nation's playgrounds," a term also used by the Ameri-
can Civic Association.
Secretary Ballinger was in the midst of a major scandal at the time he
10. 16 U.S.C. §1 (1994).
11. Bills to Establish a National Park Service and for Other Purposes: Hearing on H.R. 434
& H.R. 8668 Before the House Comm. on the Public Lands, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1916) [here-
inafter Hearing 1916].
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made his recommendation. The primary student of Richard Ballinger's land
policies, James Penick, Jr., has argued that the scandal that surrounded
Ballinger in his last months, prior to his resignation on March 1 1-usually re-
ferred to in standard textbooks as the "Ballinger-Pinchot" controversy, in
which Ballinger lost, at least in the eyes of the public (and of historians sub-
sequently), to Gifford Pinchot, the dynamic director of the U.S. Forest Ser-
vice-was not in fact a scandal so much as a clash between theories. Ballinger
ran the General Land Office-the primary agency for disposing of the public
domain-according to nineteenth-century principles while new theories of land
management had, by 1907, won over a large public who believed that private
individuals ought not to be able to control essential public resources such as
water power. Penick astutely observes that "[t]he same generation which
would soon sanction immigration laws to protect the genetic purity of the
American population and would support a National Park Service to protect the
heritage of natural beauty awoke somewhat earlier to the revelation that the
material wealth had been acquired by a few men who used their great eco-
nomic power to exploit the farmer and laborer."' 2 These people, associated
with the Progressives though not necessarily Progressives themselves, felt the
General Land Office had "abetted [a] great betrayal."' 3
"These people," largely middle class, wished to see the grand scenery of
America preserved virtually as a patriotic act. They did not want any of the
natural scenery within the national parks to be used to private ends. A shift
"from the general to the particular" had occurred, so that there was an in-
formed public ready to argue the merits of damming the Hetch Hetchy Valley
in Yosemite National Park, for example, as there were those who were pro-
moting a National Park Service to be concerned with the integrity of all parks.
On February 11, 1911, when President William Howard Taft sent his
special message on conservation to Congress, he omitted any reference to
"resorts" altogether, recommending the establishment of a bureau of national
parks, as essential to the "proper management of those wondrous manifesta-
tions of nature," which were, he said, "so startling and so beautiful that every
one recognizes the obligations of the Government to preserve them for the
edification and recreation of the people.""' He thus combined the inspiration-
al, educational, and recreational purposes of the parks in a lockstep that would
become fixed in the minds of park proponents. On February 12, 1912, Taft
spoke in public, listed some of the national parks (to which he added the
Grand Canyon, which was then a national monument), and declared that in
"consideration of patriotism and the love of nature and of beauty and of art" it
was essential to spend the money needed to "bring all these natural wonders
within easy reach of our people."' 5 A bureau would improve the parks' "ac-
12. JAMES PENICK, JR., PROGRESSIVE POLITICS AND CONSERVATION: THE BALuNGER-
PINCHOT AFFAIR 24 (1968).
13. Id.
14. President William Howard Taft, (Feb. 11, 1911) in Hearing 1916, supra note 3, at 4.
15. Taft's address on parks appears in A Bill to Establish a National Park Service and for
Other Purposes: Hearing on HR. 104 Before the House Comm. on the Public Lands, 63d Cong.,
2d Sess. 6 (1914) [hereinafter Hearing 1914] (introduced by Congressman Raker).
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cessibility and usefulness," he concluded. 6 These were common themes at
the time, for parks were likened to "nature's cathedrals" through which the
United States, a raw young country, matched in splendor the great human-built
cathedrals of Europe (a commonplace comparison, especially for Yosemite),
and in which nature imitated the colors of art (usually said in reference to
Yellowstone or the Grand Canyon). Such messages made clear that the
President regarded, and believed that the American people regarded, the parks
as symbols of the nation and thus of vital importance. However, Taft's words
did nothing to define standards of protection, much less of administration. This
would be left to Congress.
President Taft's concern had grown directly from the first major confer-
ence devoted specifically to national parks, held at Yellowstone in 1911.
There, in a park policed by the U.S. Army, where different concessionaires
charged different prices for transport from different entrances, where hotel
facilities were deemed on the whole inadequate and automobiles were not yet
permitted, a number of interested parties, including members of the House and
Senate, spoke of the need for national parks to serve the nation's health, pre-
serve its great scenic wonders, and provide for recreational outlets for the
people. Nature was compared to architecture, Providence (and at times God)
were invoked, and most speakers believed that these wonders were intended
for human "delight."' 7
The Hearing of 1912
The first substantive discussion of the purposes of a National Park Service
or Bureau occurred during the House hearings on H.R. 22995 on April 24 and
25, 1912."s During the discussion much was revealed concerning what, in the
eyes of individual members of the House and in the mind of the Secretary of
the Interior, Walter Lowrie Fisher, national parks were meant to be. The hear-
ing moved expeditiously, with significant questions being fed to the Secretary
by Congressman Raker, who clearly was committed to the creation of some
type of professional service. Though the hearing was ill-attended-of twenty
members of the House Committee on the Public Lands, only ten were present,
and but half of these spoke-it brought forth several basic points.
After noting that the Secretary of Agriculture, James Wilson, approved of
the proposed Park Service, while offering some amended language to the bill
calculated to put greater distance between parks and national forests, the Com-
mittee called upon Secretary Fisher, who in his prepared statement gave six
reasons why a bureau or service was desirable. (In subsequent discussion he
elaborated upon some of these and added two additional reasons.) Interesting-
ly, his first goal was to establish criteria for national park status and to hold to
16. Id.
17. The background to the post-1911 bills is explored in Donald C. Swain, The Passage of
the National Park Service Act of 1916, Wis. MAG. HIST., Autumn 1966, at 4, 4-17.
18. A Bill to Establish a National Park Service, and for Other Purposes: Hearing on H.R.
22995 Before the House Comm. on the Public Lands, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. (1912) [hereinafter
Hearing 19121.
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these criteria in the face of local pressure (in which he included political fig-
ures and associations). 9 Reverting to this point later, Fisher observed that
there were among the now twelve existing national parks three that were not
of national significance (while he did not name them, correspondence at the
time makes it clear he had in mind Platt National Park in Oklahoma, Sullys
Hill National Park in North Dakota-both ultimately demoted or abol-
ished-and the Hot Springs Reservation in Arkansas). The twelve parks in-
cluded duplications, were an "accumulation," and were not all of equal signifi-
cance. A bureau would give the Department added strength in resisting future
inappropriate proposals."0
Fisher also cited as justification for a bureau the need for coordination in
policy and funding. Lacking a bureau, any experience gained in one park was
of little practical use in another park (here he spoke of the need for an engi-
neer who could formulate and apply common policies with respect to roads
and bridges, and the development of such "incidental power" from the natural
waterfalls as could appropriately be developed for lighting hotels and roads
without interfering with scenic values). He cited the need for continuity and
consistency in granting leases for accommodation, in order to avoid the chaos
inherent in policies that ranged from no provision for granting leases through
ten- to twenty-year leases (and one instance-Mount Rainier National
Park-where the enabling act was silent on any time limit)."' Finally, a bu-
reau could set administrative and management policy on a range of problems
in order to assure visitors some common standard of experience, whether in
hotels, campgrounds, or transport. As something of an afterthought, Fisher
added in closing that a bureau would make possible "scientific" determinations
(he cited the question of the effect of the use of oil on roads within the parks)
not then available.2" Under questioning, Clement S. Ucker, the chief clerk
then responsible for the parks, pointed out that the intention also was to bring
the existing national monuments and the Casagrande Ruin (as then spelled)
Reservation in Arizona under the proposed bureau's jurisdiction. 3
Throughout testimony, Fisher, Ucker, and those Congressmen who spoke,
reflected a desire to see the lands administered by the proposed bureau viewed
as being unique, nationally significant, and a coherent whole rather than an
"accumulation." When discussing the "automobile question," Fisher noted that
"to help the scenic beauty of the parks," they ought "to be kept properly" and
asserted that there was "a park point of view": "The Forest Service, for in-
stance, in its regulations, treats of the matter only from a timber point of view
and not from a scenic point of view at all."" One important goal of manage-
ment was "not to destroy the scenic effect." Congressman Raker concluded, in
response to a colleague's observation that the parks were "simply large areas,"
that "you do not find any on earth that contains the scenic beauty and gran-
19. Id. at 4-6.
20. Id. at 17.
21. Id. at 7-9.
22. Id. at 10.
23. Id. at 12.
24. Id. at 13.
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deur and necessity for preservation as in those national parks."'
What Is Scenery?
This hearing in 1912 was typical of discussion to follow. For the most
part, both members of the House and wimesses from the executive branch
restricted themselves to mid-level generalities. No one asked probing questions
about precisely how scenic values were to be preserved or, indeed, what scen-
ery was. Nonetheless, three generalizations emerged. Parks were to be held to
a higher standard of preservation because of their grandeur and (with monu-
ments) scientific values than were other federally-administered lands; this
would best be achieved through a separate bureaucracy which would under-
stand these different needs and values; and while roads, accommodations, and
other man-made intrusions were necessary in order to enhance the recreational
purposes of the national parks, such physical objects were to be subordinate to
the preservation of the "scenery." Never, however, was scenen, rLimed, for
clearly all believed they understood its meaning.
There is no doubt that Congress wished to protect the scenery of the na-
tional parks. (Protection is not, of course, preservation, a word more common-
ly applied through the Antiquities Act of 1906 to national monuments, espe-
cially of an archaeological nature.) Though "scenery" is to some extent subjec-
tive, one should note that the word has certain agreed meanings which have
not changed substantially. "Scenery" is "the aggregate of features that give
character to a landscape"--a definition that allows for scenery to fall well
short of "grandeur" and which thrusts a significant burden onto "landscape,"
which is defined (somewhat circuitously) as "a section or portion of scenery,
usually extensive, that may be seen from a single viewpoint."'26 This sense of
"scenery"--that it represented a viewpoint, or perspective, that was wholly to
be determined by humans-is reinforced when one notes the second definition,
"the painted backdrops on a theatrical stage."" When Peter Roget first pre-
pared his now famous thesaurus in 1853, he noted as synonymous terms for
"scenery" the words "view," "scene," "sight," "prospect," "outlook," "look-
out," "vista," "perspective," and "landscape."' (Other terms, such as "pan-
orama" or "waterscape," are products of the twentieth century.) One may
argue, then, that if one may assume those who used the term "scenery" in
conjunction with "protection" knew the value of the words they chose, they
intended that priority should be given to land that embraced several natural
features (an aggregate) that were capable of being viewed from some point,
whether road, trail, outlook, above or below, and that any alteration of timber
cover, water course, rock face, or naturally occurring floral or faunal presence
was to be avoided.
In 1911 the Century Company had issued a new Dictionary and Cyclope-
25. Id. at 23.
26. THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1176 (Coll. ed. 1968)
(emphasis added).
27. THE AMERICAN HERrrAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1979).
28. ROGET's INTERNATIONAL THESAURUS § 446.6 (4th ed. 1911)
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dia which had become the favored reference of Congress. In addition to invok-
ing the words "aggregate of features or objects" and "character," this authori-
tative dictionary had added a definition of scenery which also included the no-
tion of the "picturesque or pictorial point of view."' Thus, no matter which
dictionary one might consult, "scenery" is tied to "a place," or "features";
involves more than one "object"; and derives special value from the "aggre-
gate" or conjunction of those objects, as viewed from some undefined but
nonetheless human vantage point.
The Hearing of 1914
The National Park Service bill was introduced again at the 63d Congress,
and as H.R. 104 it was the subject of another hearing before the Committee on
the Public Lands on April 29, 1914, at which the idea of a "scenic point" was
introduced by one of the speakers, Henry S. Graves, the Chief Forester for the
Department of Agriculture. 3 However, this hearing turned largely upon the
practical question of whether a separate service would reduce expenses, be
more efficient, and eliminate the need to use U.S. Army troops in some of the
parks, a practice against which the War Department was protesting. Well at-
tended, this hearing was particularly revealing on the army question but did
little to advance general definitions of parks; there was no discussion of natu-
ral resources or of the meaning of protection. Congressman Raker again made
the running, referring to the parks as "playgrounds," embracing the widely
held language of the good roads, health, and recreation interests that were
pressing both for a uniform service and for additional parks.3
President Taft's statements were placed on the record. He clearly felt
there should be more national parks; equally, he wanted a bureau so that the
parks "may become what they are intended to be when Congress creates
them."32 He made no effort to suggest what that intention was, since quite
properly this was a matter for the legislative branch. Raker was the only mem-
ber of the Public Lands committee who appeared to be concerned with the fact
that there was no clear definition of the purposes of parks beyond being in
themselves "great natural wonders" preserved for the benefit of the people,
and he introduced to the hearing an address by Secretary Fisher made the
previous year in which Fisher remarked that while he did not wish to intrude
upon the terrain of such men as J. Horace McFarland, the President of the
American Civic Association, or Senator Smoot, who had spoken strongly
about the need for parks at the 1911 Yellowstone conference, he nevertheless
found "there is no consistent theory of legislation with regard to the national
parks."33 Fisher addressed himself to the concerns he had laid out in the 1912
29. DIcTIONARY AND CYCLOPEDIA VIII, 5385 (1911).
30. The Papers of Henry S. Graves are in the Yale University Library Archives. Though rich
and relatively extensive (53 boxes), they contain no topical files on national parks. They do cover
the period under scrutiny here, 1910-16, and were searched on all points on which Graves is men-
tioned hereafter.
31. Hearing 1914, supra note 7, at 75.
32. Id. at 6.
33. Id. at 7.
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hearing, adding two additional reasons for creating a park service: the need to
protect the public and enhanced effectiveness in publicizing the parks. He
commended the great railroads, and the Northern Pacific in particular, for their
enlightened practices in promoting but not penetrating parks.34
Thus, little that was new emerged from the 1914 hearings, except for the
revealing comments of Adolph C. Miller, assistant to the Secretary of the
Interior, who after much praise for the soldiers who patrolled Yellowstone and
Yosemite parks, and some battering by members of the committee who feared
the growth of another expensive government bureaucracy, found that his most
persuasive case appeared to be in demonstrating that the public did not like
the presence of the army in the parks.3" "Military rule," said Denver S.
Church, Congressman from California, "spoils the scenery and makes cold
water taste flat. '3 6 Miller did make it clear that the parks were faced with
requests that a bureau could best resist, citing the case of an effort by the
power and electric company operating in Sequoia National Park to change the
location of their conduits and intakes, moving nearer a waterfall, that ought
not to be permitted if a move was to the "detriment" of the "scenery of the
park," a judgment best made on the spot by a trained individual.
The Department of Agriculture, which administered the national forests
and the national monuments within forest boundaries, was a consistent sup-
porter of the 1914 and 1916 national park service bills. Here the commonly
held notion that Interior and Agriculture were in opposition to each other is
quite untrue. Graves had been dubious about national parks prior to 1914, but
he had changed his mind by then. He reasoned that a separate park service,
which could hold to higher standards of protection and scenic values, taking in
only areas of truly national significance, would in fact protect the forest ser-
vice in its holdings, since so many proposed parks were in Forest Service
lands but were not of national significance. As Graves said, the Grand Canyon
should be a national park-thus he helped make clear the criteria, at least of
size and splendor, for inclusion in the system-while other areas (he named
Mount Hood, Estes Park-the current way of referring to what would become
Rocky Mountain National Park, or the Mount of the Holy Cross, all of "a
special scenic character") might begin as national monuments administered by
the Department of Agriculture and then, upon further study, become parks. In
short, a vigorous, well-managed, and clearly-defined system of national parks
would protect the forest department from poaching by local interests that
thought the name "national park" would bring in more tourists and more
quickly lead to good roads.37
Later, after a National Park Service was created, the NPS proved Graves
to be accurate in his prediction. Between 1916 and 1932 over thirty-five na-
tional park proposals came before the Park Service, and its Director, or the
Secretary of the Interior, declared with respect to twenty of these proposals
34. Id.
35. Id. at 74-75.
36. Id. at 75.
37. Id. at 79.
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that the areas in question were not worthy of national park status, leaving the
lands in the hands of those then administering them, usually the Forest Ser-
vice.38
The Hetch-Hetchy Factor
After 1913 discussion of national park bills, and of any bill to require the
application of uniform policies to parks, was constrained by bitter and recent
memories on all sides of the great battle over the Hetch Hetchy Valley in
Yosemite National Park. Many conservationists felt betrayed by President
Wilson when, in December, 1913, he signed a bill authorizing the building of
a great dam that flooded the Hetch Hetchy, thus infringing in the most basic
and dramatic way on a park and most clearly contradicting any rhetoric to that
point about scenic preservation and recreation being the highest values. Most
of the players in the Rocky Mountain National Park and National Park Service
bills were involved in these heated debates, and at times virtually coded re-
marks were made in hearings and in correspondence which, read in the context
of the Hetch Hetchy, carried more pointed meanings than they may appear to
do today." Certainly this was the case with Congressman Kent, who in fa-
voring the dam had lost the affection of "the father of national parks," John
Muir, and had gained the suspicion of the American Civic Association and the
Sierra Club. For Congressman Raker, the situation was especially difficult, for
it had been his bill that created the dam, and taken together with other efforts
on his part to bring water to his northern California constituents, he did not, in
fact, appear to most proponents of parks to be a firm friend. This may well
account for his emotional commitment to the park service bill, and especially a
somewhat remarkable outburst during the hearings of 1916,4 and surely con-
tributes to the silence of many members of Congress on water matters, in
particular, as they related to parks in 1914 to 1916.
Historians of public land policy for this period often detect four separate
and distinct political groups which, depending upon the issue at hand, inter-
acted in alliance. One, who called themselves the preservationists, were op-
posed to virtually any use of natural resources that would lead to their unnatu-
ral alteration. A second group, the "advanced progressives," advocated federal
development as opposed to state or private enterprise. A third group, business-
minded conservationists, were at the center of an emerging alliance between
commerce and conservation; they wished to see private business, and some-
times the states, directly involved in both development and protection. It was
this group that was most vocal on the national park issue, for they recognized
that a magnificent protected area might be of great local commercial value.
(Some subsequent scholars have referred to those who espoused such an alli-
ance, especially when they worked with the advanced progressives, as "utili-
38. These are spread throughout the National Park Service records in the National Archives
seriatim.
39. Hetch Hetchy is put into perspective by SAMUEL P. HAYS, CONSERVATION AND THE
GOSPEL OF EFFiCtENCY: THE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATION MOVEMENT, 1890-1920 (1959).
40. Hearing 1916, supra note 3, at 119-20.
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tarian-conservationists.") A fourth group simply opposed any federal regulation
of resources within the states, invoked arguments of states' rights, and are
usually referred to as the laissez-fairists.4"
The significance of the Hetch Hetchy controversy to understanding the
language used in discussing national parks subsequent to 1913 is that these
four groups changed positions respective to each other during the affair, pro-
ducing much bad feeling, and many who were involved in the bills of 1915
and 1916 had been burned over the Yosemite "violation," as some called it.
Kent, for example, had been thought to be in the first group and then moved
to the second; Robert LaFollette of Wisconsin had been so outspoken a mem-
ber of the second, he was expected to be a champion of subsequent bills but
remained largely silent on national park issues; Smoot, Lenroot, and Senator
Henry Lee Myers of Montana belonged to the third group and would ordinari-
ly have been opposed to President Wilson, but the war in Europe had muddied
alliances, and they frequently proved to be the most powerful voices of moder-
ate conservatism. Senators John F. Shafroth of Colorado and Clarence D.
Clark of Wyoming were ideological laissez-fairists on most positions, and yet
Shafroth would, after much soul-searching, support the Rocky Mountain Na-
tional Park and Clark would defend a no-grazing provision for Yellowstone.42
Again, the person most alert to the damage the Hetch Hetchy type of
controversy could do was William Kent. He had been a municipal reformer in
Chicago who, despite having moved to California, with a home in Matin
County, had remained active in Chicago politics until 1907. He disliked
crowded cities and ordinarily favored any bill that would provide parks and
playgrounds within the cities or would slow the pace of urbanization outside
them. With the Hetch Hetchy he found himself in conflict, for he did not want
to see a national park lessened and yet he believed that an assured supply of
fresh water to San Francisco would so enhance health as to outweigh his con-
victions about the psychological and spiritual benefits of solitude and nature.
As one scholar has remarked, "Kent was progressive except on the question of
progress itself' while J. Horace McFarland, President of the American Civic
Association, who opposed Hetch Hetchy, "was conservative except regarding
conservation. ' Thus Congressional discussions of both the Rocky Mountain
bill in 1915 and, more directly, the Park Service bill in 1916, were shaped by
memory of the wounds inflicted upon each other only a few years before, and
no one appeared to want to directly confront the question of whether, in the
41. On these groups see in particular ELMO R. RICHARDSON, THE POLITICS OF CONSERVA-
TION: CRUSADES AND CONTROVERSIES, 1897-1913 (1962).
42. These divisive woundings are discussed in Roderick Nash, John Muir, William Kent, and
the Conservation Schism, 36 PAC. HIST. REV. 423, 423-33 (1967).
43. STEPHEN Fox, JOHN Mum AND Hs LEGACY: THE AMERICAN CONSERVATION MOVE-
MENT 138 (1981). The Raker Bill to darn the Hetch Hetchy was proposed in the Senate by
Nebraska's "fighting liberal," George W. Norris. See NORMAN L. ZUCKER, GEORGE W. NORRIS:
GENTLE KNIGHT OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1966); RICHARD LownTr, GEORGE W. NORRIS: THE
PERSISTENCE OF A PROGRESSIVE, 1913-1933 (1971). Lowitt points out that Norris favored protec-
tion of scenery but that he felt the beauty of the Hetch Hetchy valley would be enhanced by a
lake with a dam the color of the surrounding mountains. Lowrrr, supra, at 23. This was in keep-
ing with the view, popular early in the century, that a "water feature," even if artificial, enhanced
a view.
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event of a conflict between good health through pure drinking water or good
health through protected and open spaces, they would favor one over the oth-
er. Kent, having seen the divisiveness of the issue, appears to have deliberately
avoided it.
Through their successive introduction, the Raker and Smoot bills to estab-
lish a national park service remained unaltered, save for one change in punc-
tuation which unlike such changes in diplomatic documents, had no apparent
significance. Congress intended to leave to the Secretary of the Interior the
actual task of determining policies which, by their nature, would more clearly
define what parks were to be. Section 4 of the bills consistently instructed the
Secretary to "make and publish such rules and regulations as he may deem
necessary and proper... for the management, use, care, and preservation of
such parks, monuments, and reservations [this word was retained throughout to
accommodate Hot Springs Reserve], and for the protection of property and
improvements, game, and natural scenery, curiosities, and resources there-
in." This remained the language of H.R. 424, introduced on December 6,
1915, on which the Committee on the Public Lands held hearings on April 5
and 6, 1916.
The Hearings of 1916
The House hearings of April, 1916, dealt with two bills, H.R. 434
(Raker's bill) and H.R. 8668, a new bill introduced by Congressman Kent.
H.R. 8668 differed from H.R. 434 in that it contained the significant preamble
quoted at note 2 above. The Chairman of the Committee on the Public Lands,
Scott Ferris of Oklahoma, perhaps sensing that victory could be achieved in
this session of the 64th Congress, let Kent virtually run the hearing, though
Raker also was present. Since his first attempt to sponsor a successful bill,
Raker had visited Yellowstone, several monuments and all the parks in Cali-
fornia, Yosemite being in his district and Lassen and Cinder Cone monuments
having been so prior to a revision of district boundaries. He entered a formal
written statement into the record in which he told of his long-standing interest
in the parks and endorsed the views of several men who had testified or of-
fered statements at previous hearings, including Secretary of the Interior Fish-
er, Chief Forester Graves, and J. Horace McFarland.' He also commended
the work of Rowland B. Grant, a conservation writer, and described the park
bill as his "pet project," as the matter uppermost on his mind. "[M]y whole
soul is wrapped up in this legislation," he told his colleagues, in an emotional
appeal to have the bill passed within the next few days.
46
Congressman Kent was no less concerned with speed, however, and being
a more seasoned politician and more popular colleague, he was both more
active behind the scenes and more effective in the committee. Remarking that
44. Hearing 1914, supra note 7, at 3.
45. Hearing 1916, supra note 3, at 93. On McFarland, see ERNEST MORRISON, J. HORACE
MCFARLAND: A THoRN FOR BEAUTY (1995) (see especially chapter 11).
46. Hearing 1916, supra note 3, at 120.
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he had no desire to have his name attached to the legislation, and bowing to
Judge Raker's primacy in having brought a bill to the House, he unsuccessful-
ly sought to put aside the single issue which all agreed had sidetracked
Raker's earlier bills: the question of costs. These hearings were better attended
than any previous ones on the issue, and as Kent noted privately, with war in
Europe and a national election fast approaching, it was now or never if this
bill-any bill, his or Raker's-were to be passed. Kent believed his position
was clear enough. What he wanted when he agreed to introduce a bill in place
of Congressman Raker's was a document that was "as short and uncluttered as
possible," knowing that this meant that language would not be provided to
clarify all future areas of conflict and ambiguity. The resulting act was only
two and a half pages long.47
The 1916 hearings substantially repeated the previous hearings, even to
the extent of reading into the record the text of those hearings. The Secretary
of the American Civic Association, Richard B. Watrous, as well as McFarland,
spoke, rehearsing the history of previous efforts to create a service and invok-
ing the spirit of John Muir, who had died two years before. Watrous more
than any other commentator argued that parks were a "business undertaking,"
that public ignorance kept them from being the profitable enterprises they
could be, and that Switzerland and Canada had well-organized park systems
which led to large sums of money for their governments as well as for private
enterprise.' Speaking first, he set the tone for the hearing, which overwhelm-
ingly focused on the twin financial questions, could the parks make money
and would a bureau be costly, by reminding the Congressmen that during the
recent international expositions in San Francisco and San Diego, to which
many thousands of visitors travelled from the East, perhaps 75 percent of all
tourists had chosen to go or return via the Canadian railroads because of the
existence of national parks in the Canadian Rockies, parks that were well
publicized by the Canadian Commissioner of National Parks, R.B. Harkin.
Watrous quoted Harkin approvingly when the commissioner declared that
parks "will pay not only in the strictly commercial dollars and cents way but
they will also pay in a still more important way-by adding to the efficiency
and virility of the nation."
Thereafter the hearing focussed upon the costs of maintaining the parks,
especially the expense of building and maintaining roads and the merits of
charging a fee to those who entered in automobiles, and on whether a bureau
would make for such efficiencies as actually to save the government money.
Congressman Ferris declared that the hearing would concern itself only with
"the general subject," and when it appeared that the committee might again
47. On the framing of the bill, see HORACE M. ALBRIGHT & ROBERT CAHN, THE BIRTH OF
THE NATIONAL PARK SERVICE: THE FOUNDING YEARS, 1913-33 34-45 (1985). This is a primary
source, being Albright's memoirs. He was present at the meetings in Kent's home. AIbright ap-
pears to have been the first administrator to refer to a national park "system." See DWIGHT F.
RETrIE, OUR NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM: CARING FOR AMERICA'S GREATEST NATIONAL AND HIS-
TORIC RESOURCES 13 (1995).
48. Hearing 1916, supra note 3, at 5.
49. Id. at 8.
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fail to report out a park bill, and especially when- there was a possibility that
some members would delay the bill by demanding more information on the
question of tolls, Kent spoke up vigorously to cut off discussion on the issue
until some future time when it would become apparent whether or not the
automobile would be the standard means of transportation to the parks. He
told the committee that the time had come to "get action" and that matters of
detail could wait.50
In the hearings only two new points were made. For the first time the
phrase "national park system" was used, involving the image of a systematic
inventory of the nation's grandest scenic landscapes and natural and scientific
curiosities, all to be combined (with the ultimate transfer of national monu-
ment properties then under the jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture)
within one efficient and consistent administration.5 Secondly, for the first
time the notion of the parks as great educational enterprises, places to which
the public could come to learn about nature, geology, fossils or sedimentation,
while also increasing their working efficiency, their health, and their patrio-
tism, was set out clearly, in this case by McFarland and by R.B. Marshall, the
Superintendent of the National Parks, a newly-created position. 2 The "great
parks are, in the highest degree, as they stand today, a sheer expression of
democracy, the separation of these lands from the public domain, to be held
for the public, instead of being opened to private settlement."'53 McFarland
read into the hearing the sentence Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr. had framed as
the preamble to Kent's bill and declared that this statement must "remain as it
is, unless it can be strengthened; it should never be weakened."'54
Olmsted's Statement of "Fundamental Purpose"
Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr. is important to understanding the language of
Kent's bill. The son of Frederick Law Olmsted, the great creator (with Calvert
Vaux) of Central Park, the person who had been one of the first to promote
the idea of a Yosemite National Park, and the "father of American landscape
architecture," the younger Olmsted had by 1916 long emerged from his distin-
guished father's shadow and was both a famed designer of major parks in his
own right and a member of the federal government's Commission of Fine
Arts. Olmsted shaped his language in conjunction with Kent, Raker, and oth-
ers. The key provision Olmsted originally wrote for H.R. 8668 read:
50. Id. at 76.
51. Id. at 56.
52. Id. at 54.
53. Id. at 53.
54. Id. at 54.
55. In 1911 Olmsted and McFarland had used this language:
That the parks, monuments and reservations shall not at any time be used in any way
contrary to the purpose thereof as agencies for promoting public recreation and public
health through the use and enjoyment by the people of the said parks, monuments and
reservations, and of the natural scenery and objects of interest therein, or in any way
detrimental to the value thereof for such purpose.
Letter from J. Horace McFarland, President of the American Civic Association, [hereinafter
McFarland] to Richard Ballinger, Secretary of the Interior, [hereinafter Ballinger] (Jan. 3, 1911)
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The fundamental object of these aforesaid parks, monuments, and
reservations is to conserve the scenery and the natural and historical
objects therein and to provide for the enjoyment of said scenery and
objects by the public in any manner and by any means that will leave
them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.
This would be very slightly altered in its final form, to state (as we have seen)
that the "fundamental purpose" of the parks was "to conserve the scenery and
the natural and historic objects and the wild life therein and to provide for the
enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such means as will leave them
unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations."56 Each signifier here has
undergone change since 1916; a linguist might argue that the change is some-
what differential between sections of the country, but none would argue that
change has not occurred or that such change has not tended in one direction,
toward a wider interpretation of the key words "conserve," "natural," "histor-
ic," "objects," "wildlife," and "unimpaired." As this last word set the only
actual standard (as opposed to purpose), it has been seen as most open to
attack, interpretation, expansion, and ambiguity.
What may we reasonably believe Congress, and those who framed the
legislation, meant by "unimpaired"? To stalk this question, one must turn to
the papers, first, of Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr., and then to those of Congress-
man William Kent, for it was Olmsted who had insisted that there must be an
overriding and succinct statement of purpose (today one would say "mission
statement"). Since he expected and hoped for substantial public use of the
parks, he was not content with leaving an area "unimpaired for future genera-
tions," but inserted the key words, "for the enjoyment of' those generations.
Herein lay an ambiguity and a potential source for future conflict. "En-
joyment" reasonably required access, and at the time roads, trails, hotels,
campgrounds, and administrative facilities did not seem unduly invasive. The
act cannot have meant that "unimpaired" was to be taken in its strictest sense,
particularly since the act included specific approval for certain inevitably
compromising actions: leasing for tourist accommodation was the most obvi-
ous example.
The Organic Act also contained a provision likely to affect natural re-
sources in parks. By reaffirming an act of 1901 that authorized the Secretary
of the Interior to permit rights of way in Yosemite, Sequoia, and General
Grant national parks, for pipelines, canals, ditches, water plans, dams, and res-
ervoirs "to promote irrigation or mining or quarrying, or the manufacturing or
cutting of timber outside the parks," the act of 1916 showed that public use of
the national parks might, when approved by the Secretary, extend to consump-
tion of some of the park's resources. Did the statement of "fundamental pur-
pose" temper this section of the bill?
(on file with the National Archives, R. Group 79, entry 6, box 783, 61st Cong.). Ballinger had
promptly accepted this language. Letter from Ballinger to Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr. [hereinafter
Olmsted] (Jan. 4, 1911) (on file with the National Archives, R. Group 79, entry 6, box 783, 61st
Cong.).
56. 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1994) (emphasis added).
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One should not make too much of this provision. First, it applied by name
to only three national parks, all in California, where water interests were pow-
erful and historically entrenched within and around the three parks in question.
That the act was silent on other parks may be taken to mean that the provision
did not-or at least did not readily-apply to them, unless specific legislation
with respect to a park mentioned such rights of way (the 1915 act creating
Rocky Mountain National Park did contain such a provision). Second, to the
degree that multiple use was peculiar to the mandate of the National Forest
Service, other language in the Organic Act of 1916, and most particularly in
subsequent amendments to that act in 1970 and 1978, clearly meant to provide
national parks with a higher standard of protection than in national forests or,
conversely, those acts were less permissive of the application of a policy of
multiple use. Third, across time the conflict between any grant of authority to
the Secretary to provide for multiple use and the language relating to "unim-
paired" and "for future generations" was interpreted by the courts to stricter
and stricter (that is, more protective) meanings of "unimpaired."
What did Olmsted mean at the time? We have a commentary by him,
written in 1937, in which he provides a gloss on his meaning. In the midst of
debate in Colorado over the Colorado-Big Thompson Project, a water diver-
sion plan that would bring water from the western slope of the Continental
Divide to the parched agricultural lands on the eastern slope, in part by the use
of a tunnel that would pass through, or under, Rocky Mountain National Park,
Olmsted wrote of what he deemed the "common sense" approach to the ques-
tion of impairment. 7 An editorial had appeared shortly before in the journal
American Forests, arguing that, were a decision made "to subordinate the
principles of National Park conservation to principles of economic exploitation
within the limits of the Rocky Mountain National Park," then the park would
lose the central value by which it was worthy of national park status, and that
the land should be withdrawn and transferred to the Forest Service as a Na-
tional Forest. The editorial further suggested that any diminution of the park's
natural scene should lead to the transfer of the entire park, not merely of the
portion visibly affected by the Colorado-Big Thompson irrigation project.
While Olmsted found this reaction excessive, it is instructive to note that
he had clear criteria in mind by which he would define a rational position on
the question of invasions of the park in relation to water needs outside the
park. First, he argued that a stand on "absoluteness" was not "sane" in a
"world of relativities," acknowledging that an absolutely unbending position
would lose support for the park since the Park Service would appear to be
opposing a goal that was "for the good of society." Second, he thought that an
unduly "academic conception" (in this case, of landownership "as extending
vertically from the center of the earth indefinitely upward into space") would
be, and would be seen to be, non-rational. Third, he specifically argued that a
tunnel a mile below the surface would not necessarily or invariably inflict
harm on the park; rather, the test to be applied should be one of the "probable
57. Letter from Olmsted to Bradford Williams (Oct. 22, 1937) (on file with the Library of
Cong., American Soc'y of Landscape Architects).
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degree of its adverse influences." Fourth, not content with so general an argu-
ment, he proposed actual criteria, in keeping with the original intentions of the
Organic Act, that should be applied when issues of this nature arose.
Olmsted proposed five criteria. 1) The burden of proof-"and thoroughly
well-considered and convincing proof -must rest upon the advocates of "any
enterprise for non-park purposes within the theoretical limits of jurisdiction of
a National Park"; 2) the enterprise must be of "real social importance from a
national [italics added] standpoint and is not to be practically attainable" else-
where; 3) the enterprise must not "endanger the value of the park for its
proper purposes to the slightest appreciable degree"; 4) the danger must be "so
slight and of such a nature that the land if subject to it in advance would nev-
ertheless have been wisely considered eminently suitable for selection and
permanent maintenance as a National Park"; and 5) the non-park purpose must
be "of so much more importance nationally than the purposes of the park" as
to justify the lessening of the park. Olmsted concluded that, while he was
open to reason, he did not find the arguments for the Colorado-Big Thompson
Project complete or convincing.
Of course, Olmsted's reasoning was not law (and this expression of his
view came over twenty years after he had drafted the 1916 preamble). Con-
gress and the President, in their wisdom, did in due course approve the Colo-
rado-Big Thompson project. 8
Congressman Kent's Views
What did the principal formal author of the National Park Act of 1916,
Congressman William Kent, say about it himself? Kent often is singled out as
the "father of the National Park System," and his views deserve some extend-
ed analysis.59
Kent was a Chicago businessman who had bought a home in Marin Coun-
ty, California, in 1899 and moved there in 1907. He was adding to an already
substantial fortune through land in California and in Nevada. A Progressive,
he had stood with Theodore Roosevelt in 1912, and after 1912 he was a
somewhat ambiguous independent supporter of Woodrow Wilson. Elected to
Congress in 1910, he brought with him a reputation as a conservationist, and
he quickly went on record in favor of public power. He wished to see the
nation's flooding rivers brought under control, advocated extensive irrigation
projects for California's Owens Valley, strongly supported public water power
projects on the Suwanee, the Susquehanna, and the Mississippi rivers, and was
an early proponent of the Tennessee Valley Authority. As he championed
public power, he also opposed private power, and he was particularly ambiva-
58. See C.W. BUCKHOLTz, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NATIONAL PARK: A HISTORY 188-91 (1983).
59. The Kent Papers are in the Sterling Memorial Library at Yale University. I have also
examined his correspondence with his son Sherman Kent, later director of the Office. of National
Estimates at the Central Intelligence Agency (these papers are under restricted access at the Yale
University Library), and inquired of the family, through Mrs. Sherman Kent, and through a grand-
son, whether any papers remain at the family home in Kentfield, California, to which the answer
was no.
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lent toward a bill put forward by his colleague on the Committee on the Pub-
lic Lands, Congressman Scott Ferris of Oklahoma. This bill, H.R. 16673, came
before Congress in January, 1915, to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to
lease to American citizens "for purposes of constructing dams, water controls,
reservoirs, transmission box lines" ".any part of the public lands... including
lands in. national forests, the Grand Canyon and Mount Olympus national
monuments, and other reservations, not including national parks" for a period
of fifty years. Kent vigorously opposed this bill, pouncing upon its reference
to the Grand Canyon, and even though Ferris added the provision that leases
were to be granted only if they were not inconsistent with the purpose for
which a national park or national monument was created, Kent remained ada-
mant. Water, Kent maintained, should belong to the people.'
A second consistent strain in his thought was revealed in his persistent
efforts to transfer to public ownership a large area of Mt. Tamalpais, in Marin
County. Kent owned much of the mountain and an outstanding grove of coast-
al redwoods that nestled in one of its valleys, and beginning shortly after his
arrival in California he had wished to see this land become a state park or, as
later phrased, national monument-the first national monument having been
created by executive action at Devil's Tower, Wyoming, in 1906-in part
because the growing population of Matin County was creating pressure for
more water, and he wanted both to protect the purity of the watershed and to
assure the towns of the county an adequate public water supply. In 1908 he
was successful in these endeavors, and his redwood grove became Muir
Woods National Monument. From 1903 forward he spoke of the need for
more national parks and the necessity to keep lands in or destined for parks
out of local politics.
Thus Kent favored the development of water power through public means,
the protection of watersheds, and the creation of national parks and monu-
ments to preserve scenic and natural areas. At Muir Woods he was insistent
on the highest standards of protection, and the early wardens, who were in his
pay, even kept local societies that had been accustomed to walking in the park
to "botanize"--the contemporary term for taking plants for educational purpos-
es, pressing them in "flower books," and identifying them-from picking wild
flowers. At Muir Woods, he wrote all was to be left natural, with no plants to
be removed and no naturally downed trees to be cleaned up from the valley
floor.6 He also proposed a park for Lake Tahoe, on which he was unable to
obtain effective support.
As a member of Congress, Kent was not dogmatic on the water issue,
save for his insistence on public power, and he was not invariably a supporter
of undisturbed wilderness even in national parks. After all, he was among
those who pressed for opening up Yosemite National Park to the Hetch
Hetchy reservoir, for he felt constrained to put the water needs of his Bay
60. William Kent Papers (on file with Yale University Library, R. Group 309, box 71, folder
125).
61. Id. (box 25, folder 499).
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Area constituents first.62 For whatever reason, he was silent on water issues
when both the 1915 and 1916 park service bills were introduced, though in
1913, during an early discussion of Rocky Mountain National Park, he ob-
served that scenic judgments were subjective and that he preferred a "mirror
lake" to a mud flat.63
Kent's views on what a national park should be had been made clear,
however, across several park proposals. In 1913 he had offered up a national
monument on the Middle Fork of the Feather River in northern California and
a Redwood National Park on the California north coast and in January, 1915,
he had come out strongly in House debate for the Rocky Mountain National
Park bill, declaring that the preservation of scenery is a "most valuable pur-
pose." He drew a distinction between national forest, national monument, and
national park land, asserting that a national park must be held "in a state of
nature" and that animal life must be "forever free from molestation." One
may reasonably conclude that this was still his view only a year later, as spon-
sor of H.R. 8668.
Kent's position thus seems clear. He promoted his own park bill because
he thought it, and not Raker's, would pass and also because it was the better
bill. It contained Olmsted's preamble and Raker's had none. In close touch
with President Wilson, Kent was cautioning him weekly on the need to keep
the United States out of the war that had broken out in Europe, and he intend-
ed to withdraw from the Congressional race in the first district of California
(though he postponed an official announcement until June to allow for an
appropriate successor to test the waters) because of ill health. Thus, he also
felt a sense of urgency in getting the bill to the President. For reasons of
health, Kent's focus on his bill clearly declined after it was reported out of
committee in May, but he could well feel he had made his position abundantly
clear already, and he knew that Senator Smoot would carry the bill in the
Senate.
During this time letters poured in from a wide range of constituents, orga-
nizations state and national, and fellow members of Congress, praising him for
his park bill. Examples of letters of commendation and support received in
March of 1916 alone include the Washington State Federation of Women's
Clubs, Seattle Daily Times, Fortuna (CA) Women's Civic Club, City Shade
Tree Commission of York, PA, College Women's Club of San Diego, the
Henry Street Settlement in New York City, The Appalachian Club, Tramp and
Trail Club, Erie (PA) Board of Commerce, Corona Club of San Francisco,
Twentieth Century Club of Berkeley, California Development Board, Hebrew
Educational Society of Brooklyn, Los Angeles City Teachers' Club, Miss
Haskell's School of Boston, National Magazine, American Society of Land-
scape Architects, South Bend (IN) Chamber of Commerce, Highland Park
Ebell of Los Angeles, and Herbert W. Gleason of Boston (a lecturer on
62. Id. (box 67, folders 83-85).
63. Id. (folders 86-91).
64. Id. (Scrapbook B, microfilm reel 4, §§ 8-10).
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parks).
65
Kent was particularly concerned with standards, and with the rumor that
the chief forester, Henry S. Graves, was opposed to his bill, and on this he
sought out assurances. Graves responded to Kent on March 17, declaring that
he fully favored the bill. The Department of the Interior was facing pressure
for economic use of natural resources in the parks and chose to meet this by
granting grazing privileges similar to the national forests. This would affect
the forests too, and as we have seen, Graves wanted to see a national park
service created so that a national park would be clearly distinct from a nation-
al forest, "almost wholly protective," set aside to preserve "exceptional natural
wonders," "segregated," for "exclusively ... recreation and scenic purposes."
The goal was to "preserve these areas in their natural condition." Congress
must, Graves concluded, be certain that national parks are "really distinctive"
and then hold them to a higher standard than other public lands, with the pro-
posed National Park Service to have "its own separate and distinct field.
'"
Nothing could have seemed clearer, and Kent and Graves were in agree-
ment that precisely because a higher standard was to be applied to national
parks, one must resist the growing demand at the local level to create parks
primarily to attract tourists. Graves noted that there were fifteen or more bills
pending to create new parks; many of the bills would not prohibit industrial
use and would authorize grazing, mineral development, the sale of timber or
the use of streams for water power. This must not happen, he said, and Kent
agreed. Late in 1916, Kent was unhappy with power companies in the Mono
Lake Valley for obtaining rights under the guise of irrigation, and for being al-
lowed to effect a change in the Yosemite Park line, to the loss of two mag-
nificent waterfalls.67
Had Kent intended any emphasis on recreational purposes for the
parks-one of the purposes to which Graves referred-he surely would have
said so, for at the time Kent was a Vice President of the Playground and Rec-
reation Association of America. Had he believed that he could leave interpre-
tation of the bill to the Secretary of the Interior, Frederick K. Lane, he surely
would not have written to Woodrow Wilson on July 24, when the bill was
soon to be on the President's desk, advising him that Interior was abandoning
sound policy. The Assistant Secretary, A.A. Jones, was not to be trusted, and
Lane himself "had broken down to a considerable extent in his conservation
policies. '
65. Id. (box 24, folders 468-72).
66. Letter from Henry S. Graves, Chief Forester [hereinafter Graves], to William Kent, Con-
gressman, [hereinafter Kent] (Mar. 17, 1916) (William Kent Papers, supra note 51 (box 24, folder
470)).
67. Letter from Wallis D. McPherson to Kent (Dec. 14, 1916) (William Kent Papers, supra
note 51 (box 25, folder 507)).
68. Letter from Kent to Woodrow Wilson, President, (July 24, 1916) (William Kent Papers,
supra, note 51 (box 25 folder 493)); see also William Kent Papers, supra, note 51 (folder 500).
Lane's views were, indeed, moving more toward commerce than conservation in 1916, but on the
national park bill itself he remained supportive. The sparse Lane Papers at the Library of Congress
do not help us here, nor does TiE LE'rERs OF FRANKLIN K. LANE: PERSONAL AND POLrTCAL
(Anne Wintermute Lane & Louise Herrick Hall, eds. 1922). Having had a heart attack, Lane was
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Until his death William Kent tracked the national parks. In 1922 he
marked a passage in an article by Barton Warren Evermann, that "National
parks should be maintained as natural parks and not be marred by artificiality
of any avoidable kind." In 1925, when a Senate Subcommittee of the Com-
mittee on the Public Lands held hearings on the national forests, Arno B.
Cammerer, Assistant Director of the National Park Service, appeared before it,
and Kent noted his remarks with approval. Cammerer asserted that the parks
"were established to be kept absolutely in their natural condition," except for
roads and hotels: it was, he felt, preferable to lose land and change boundaries
than to permit an incompatible act within a park. ° Reservoirs, for example,
were clearly incompatible, Cammerer noted, pointing out that Congress had,
by amendment to the Federal water power act of 1920, gone on record that
before any ditches, reservoirs, etc., could go into any national park, they
would have to be specifically authorized by an act of Congress. Kent appears
to have felt that his basic principles had at last been clearly recognized.
A Contradictory Mandate?
Several commentators on the National Park Service Act of 1916 have
concluded that the preamble, or statement of fundamental purpose, presented
the Service with a contradictory mandate. There are three possible sources of
contradiction: doubt as to whether the 1916 act applied to parks existing be-
fore that time; conflict between federal agencies; and ambiguities in the lan-
guage of the act. The first two possible sources of conflict do not arise, for
Congress was clear with respect to them. In the debates on the bill, Senator
Reed Smoot of Utah, sponsor in the Senate, specifically said that the bill was
intended to apply to the then existing parks.7' In the Committee Report ac-
companying the 1916 bill, Congress noted that there was not supposed to be
any conflict of jurisdiction among the agencies.72 Thus, if the new National
Park Service was handed a contradictory mandate by Congress, the contradic-
tion arose from the language of the bill, and in particular from its statement of
"fundamental purpose." Whether such a contradiction exists or not now re-
quires further examination."
not vigorous and would die in 1921. The only biography, KErrH W. OLSON, BIOGRAPHY OF A
PROGRESSIVE: FRANKLIN K. LANE, 1864-1921 (1979), is silent on parks. An unpublished M.A.
thesis that apparently shows access to additional materials, Henry W. Wiens, The Career of Frank-
lin K. Lane in California Politics (1936) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of California), has
been reported lost by the Berkeley institution.
69. Dr. Barton Warren Evermann, Conservation and Proper Utilization of Our Natural Re-
sources, Sci. MONTHLY, OCL 1922, at 293, 294 (emphasis in original).
70. William Kent Papers, supra note 51 (April 1925) (pamphlet file (copy)).
71. 64 CONG. REc. 12,151 (1916).
72. H.R. REP. No. 700, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1916).
73. Many standard books on the National Park Service, or in conservation or environmental
history, devote a paragraph or so to the act, usually in much the same language. When one pur-
sues these paragraphs through the references supplied, one finds a nearly infinite regression, each
leaning upon the previous secondary statement, most virtually devoid of any independent exami-
nation. For the most part these accounts pass over the actual framing of the bill and raise no
questions about Congressional intent, simply celebrating (in words attributed to Wallace Stegner)
"the best idea America ever had." Perhaps half the secondary works conclude that the preamble to
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These recent commentators ask, in one form or another, how a manage-
ment policy can both accommodate use and preserve a natural area. These
commentators, often in very similar terms, conclude that the Park Service was
presented by the act with a "fundamental dilemma," that the Service was
asked to attempt "harmonizing the unharmonizable," and that the dilemma is
not capable of either logical or historical resolution.74 None of these authors
appears to have examined the bills that led to the Act of 1916, the hearings,
the debates-that is to say, the legislative history-much less having sought
out and explored the private papers of the members of the Committee on the
Public Lands.
To accept the conclusion that the preamble presented the Park Service
with an inherent contradiction, that it is illogical, is to conclude that Congress
had no clear intent, that it either did not know what it was doing when it
posed a dilemma, that it did not care, or that there is no inherent contradiction
in the preamble. While Congressional acts undeniably contain unclear lan-
guage, and (when acted upon administratively) unresolved issues, it seems
unreasonable to so summarily dismiss Congressional intent when the act was
the product of well-informed men, especially Raker and Kent, both of whom
had studied the issue with care, one of whom declared the act to be his "pet"
and the other, by evidence of his correspondence, having spent much time
upon it; when the act was the last of a series, each of which had benefitted
from the clarification of hearings; when the co-sponsor in the senate, Reed
Smoot, confided to his diary that this act was one of the most important of his
accomplishments;75 and when such careful and scholarly individuals as Fred-
erick Law Olmsted and Robert B. Marshall had a hand in its language.
We have Raker's testimony to the importance he attached to this legisla-
tion. Though his papers apparently have not survived 6 in public hands, we
know that Raker (and Kent) met regularly in 1916 at the apartment of Robert
the act contains a "logical contradiction" (the words of Ronald A. Foresta in RONALD A.
FOREsTA, AMERICA'S NATIONAL PARKS AND THEIR KEEPERS 100 (1984)), or appears to. How-
ever, not one of these books or articles is based on an examination of the Kent, Olmsted, or other
relevant papers, and Swain's 1966 article, supra note 8, on which most of the recent writings are
based, is drawn almost wholly from the papers of Horace Albright, secondary accounts, and a
limited survey of Congressional Debates and Interior Department annual reports, with no reference
to Congressional Hearings or other manuscript collections.
74. Upon examination more recently, this conclusion is often cited to an unpublished
Master's thesis, Daniel McCool, The National Park Service: The Politics of Appropriations (1980)
(unpublished M. thesis, University of Arizona), which is in fact about funding rather than purpose;
or from political scientists and sociologists whose primary inquiry is into the theory of manage-
ment. A check of five frequently quoted articles shows that not one of the authors went beyond
what they construed to be the common sense meaning of the language, which they found on the
face of it contradictory. However, if one is to construe, deconstruct, or (as an historian) explicate a
text, one generally may not do so without going behind the text.
75. Diary of Reed Smoot (July 11, Aug. 6, 1916) (Reed Smoot Papers, on file with Brigham
Young University). See also his biographical sketch (which he himself wrote) in 35 THE NATION-
AL CYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 63-64 (1949).
76. The Congressional Information Office has found no papers. This writer called all major
depositories in California, the local historical societies of Susanville and Alturas (where Raker had
his law offices), the alumni office of San Jose State University (from which he graduated in 1884,
when it was a normal school), and a variety of repositories in Washington, DC, where he died in
1926, all without success.
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Sterling Yard, a journalist working for the United States Geological Survey in
Washington, and that the final bill was drafted by these men, joined by three
officers of the American Civic Association, McFarland, Richard B. Watrous,
and Henry A. Barker; by Enos Mills, Huston Thompson (the Assistant Attor-
ney General), Gilbert Grosvenor, editor of The National Geographic Maga-
zine, Emerson Hough, a leading exponent of reforestation, and Herbert Quick
of the Saturday Evening Post. Except for Mills, who was popularly dubbed
"the father of Rocky Mountain National Park," which had been created by act
of Congress earlier in 1915, these men were professional publicists, editors of
travel and outdoors oriented magazines, or officers of similarly inclined asso-
ciations. As noted earlier, McFarland and Watrous would testify at the 1916
hearings on the National Park Service Act. Yard had been editor of Century
Magazine and of the Sunday magazine of the New York Herald, but he had
recently come to Washington to be head of any future national parks informa-
tion office, and he was writing a booklet on the parks. (Stephen Mather, future
director of the National Park Service, had arranged for Yard to be employed
through the Geological Survey, since there was as yet no park bureau that
could hire him.77).
Once Kent agreed to sponsor a new parks bill, these men moved their
meetings to his home on F Street in Washington, where they met "fairly regu-
larly," according to the young Horace Albright," who was Mather's assistant
and a regular member of the group. He recalled Kent, McFarland, Marshall,
and Yard as the core group, with Olmsted, Grosvenor, Quick, Hough, Barker,
Watrous, and Mills present from time to time. Thus there was reasonable con-
tinuity of attendance at these meetings. It seems unlikely that such a group,
even though they wanted a simple and uncluttered bill and wished it in a hur-
ry, would allow a glaring contradiction to be part of the statement of "funda-
mental purpose" over which Olmsted labored, producing at least three ver-
sions. One must presume that the language was deliberate and that it is worthy
of the closest attention.
Not present at the F Street meetings was Stephen Mather himself. Mather
had brought Yard to Washington and had persuaded Albright to give up a
career in the law to be his assistant; a rich man, he paid both out of his own
pocket, an unusual but not illegal arrangement. Mather had taken pains to get
to know the people who ran the national parks, by calling a national park
conference for Berkeley, California, in March of 1915, and asking all park
superintendents to attend. He also had invited most of the concessionaires
from the parks and took with him from Washington several key players. One
member of the House Committee on the Public Lands, Denver S. Church of
Fresno, California, had attended. At Berkeley, Mather had spoken of the need
for a park service and had shared with Albright his sense that many of the
77. ALBRIGHT & KAHN, supra note 38, at 24; see also ROBERT SHANKLAND, STEVE
MATHER OF THE NATIONAL PARKS 100-01 (2d ed. 1954). I have examined the Mather Papers, in
the Bancroft Library of the University of California, Berkeley, but do not cite to them here since
all relevant quotations and statements drawn from them in Shankland, or Albright and Calm, are
accurate, and citation to the more readily available source is preferable.
78. ALBRIGHT & CAHN, supra note 38, at 35.
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superintendents, being political appointees, were not up to their tasks, a defi-
ciency a park service would remedy.
Mather also took the trouble to get to know the key members of the
House and Senate committees. He was on social terms with Congressmen
Kent, Raker, Carl Hayden, Addison Smith, and Louis C. Cramton of Michi-
gan, all members of the Committee on the Public Lands, as well as with Sena-
tors Smoot and Norris. He talked with them about the need for a service,
shared with them his philosophy of what the parks should be, and urged them
to move forward as quickly as possible with a new bill. Kent did so at a time
when Raker was ill, mindful of the fact that his California colleague was un-
popular and maladroit on the floor of the House, as well as disliked by the
House minority leader, James R. Mann, who came from Kent's former district
in Illinois. Thus the working group got behind Kent's bill quickly, knowing
that it had a far greater prospect of being reported out of committee than
Raker's bill did.
Finally, it was Mather who orchestrated the presence of powerful journal-
ists at the planning meetings on F Street. He took a party into Sequoia Na-
tional Park in July of 1915, including local newspaper editors, natural scien-
tists, the head of the American Museum of Natural History, the ranking Re-
publican on the House Appropriations Committee, the vice-president of the
Southern Pacific Railroad, photographers, magazine writers, and travel editors.
Following this visit to Sequoia and the Kings River and Kern River canyons,
Mather and Albright brought a number of national magazines into line, and
then promoted meetings at the Yard and Kent residences. Given this careful
preparation, it is also unreasonable to assume that Mather would have allowed
a "logical contradiction" to emerge from Olmsted's pen.79
Mather testified during the hearings of April, 1916. He frequently noted
that an act was needed quickly, given uncertainties in Europe, and admitted
that from his perspective the bill did not deal in detail with all matters of
importance.' He did not pronounce upon the language of the Kent/Olmsted
preamble at the time, though in 1918 he agreed with Secretary of the Interior
Lane that the parks "must be maintained in absolutely unimpaired form." If he
believed this in 1918, he surely believed it in 1916, and it seems reasonable to
conclude that, given the care with which he orchestrated the shaping and pas-
sage of the Organic Act, he believed that the statement of "fundamental pur-
pose" supported his view.8'
We also have the commentary of two men who were consistently present
at the meetings in Yard's and Kent's residences. One was Robert Sterling
Yard himself. Early in 1916 Yard compiled a lengthy booklet, Glimpses of
Our National Parks, which he wished to get into public schools.82 He told
79. SHANKLAND, supra note 68, at 83-99; ALBRIGHT & CAHN, supra note 38, at 24-26;
Swain, supra note 8, at 8-15; DONALD C. SWAIN, WILDERNESS DEFENDER: HORAcE M. ALBRIGHT
AND CONSERVATION 41-60 (1970).
80. Hearing 1916, supra note 3, at 11-25.
81. On this early period see also JOHN C. MILES, GUARDIANS OF THE PARKS: A HISTORY OF
THE NATIONAL PARKS AND CONSERVATION AssocIATION 12-16 (1995).
82. ROBERT STERLING YARD, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INT., GLIMPSES OF OUR NATIONAL PARKS
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Kent there was a great demand in Congress for this publication, with many
members wanting 2500 copies while he could provide each with only 25, and
he asked Kent to sponsor a rider to an appropriations bill that would make the
booklet a public document. Glimpses would be transmuted by Yard first into a
substantial book of photographs with modest text, National Parks Portfolio,
and then, with greatly extended text, into The Book of the National Parks.3
In the last Yard wrote that "[o]riginally the motive in park-making had been
unalloyed conservation"; indeed, he used the controversial language, that Con-
gress had said it wished to "lock up" certain places. 4 However, after the cre-
ation of great parks such as Yellowstone and Yosemite, local pride had led to
the enactment of units "better fitted for State parks" (this was with reference
to Sullys Hill, Wind Cave, and Platt national parks), so that "the modem peri-
od" had followed, the period of "definite policy" represented by the act of
1916, after which parks had to be of "distinguished company" and embrace
"the nation's noblest landscapes and sites."
85
Horace Albright, likewise present at the creation, is the only one of those
who helped to talk out the proposed bill who would later explicitly confront
the presumed contradiction in the act. In his memoirs, published in 1985, he
noted that contrary to some scholars' accounts Olmsted did not write the full
bill itself, though he was "responsible for the wording of the governing sen-
tence," and that all present wanted the bill "to carry a clear definition of what
the Park Service should be." They were aware of the "inherent conflicts be-
tween use and preservation," he wrote-he did not say "contradiction"-but
they were facing the political reality that this issue could not be resolved by
the organic act alone. 6
National Park Services files at the National Archives reveal hundreds of
letters written by many dozens of organizations and individuals in favor of the
proposed National Park Service Act of 1916. These letters invariably focus, as
we have noted, on scenic values, road access, the quality of accommodations,
and the notion that the parks were the nation's playgrounds. The most prolific
correspondents were the officers and members of the American Civic Associa-
tion; and, as we have seen, three of those officers, McFarland, Watrous, and
Barker were present, the first almost always and the others less frequently, at
the meetings in Yard's apartment and Kent's house when the bill was drafted
and Olmsted completed his statement of "fundamental purpose." Thus their
voices are also entitled to be heard on the allegedly contradictory mandate.
McFarland commended Olmsted's preamble. "There is no better service
we can render to the masses of the people than to set about and preserve for
them wide spaces of fine scenery for their delight," he wrote. 7 In truth,
(1916).
83. ROBERT STERLING YARD, THE BOOK OF THE NATIONAL PARKS (1919).
84. Id. at 24.
85. Id. at 24-26.
86. ALBRIGHT & CAHN, supra note 38, at 35. In particular, see Albright's exchanges with
Huston Thompson. Horace Albright Papers (Feb. 23, 27, 1916, March 26, 1964 (typescript inter-
view)) (on file with University of California (Los Angeles)).
87. Letter from McFarland to Olmsted (Oct. 13, 1910) (Frederick Law Olmsted Papers, on
19971
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
McFarland had first drawn Olmsted into the cause, and the language of both
the House and, even more, the Senate bills from the first proposal in 1911 had
been deeply influenced by McFarland's views. Further, McFarland appears to
have persuaded Secretary of the Interior Ballinger as early as 1910 that
Olmsted was "the man who ought to do the thing that is in mind with relation
to these national parks"--that is, prepare a statement of purpose." Ballinger
had sent that portion of his 1910 annual report in which he proposed a nation-
al park bureau to McFarland for comment, and the American Civic Associa-
tion had immediately begun a public campaign. At McFarland's urging,
Olmsted had submitted directly to the Department of the Interior his first at-
tempt at a general statement to accompany the first draft bill. The statement in
the draft read:
That the parks, monuments, and reservations herein provided for shall
not at any time be used in any way detrimental or contrary to the
purpose for which dedicated or created by Congress.
Olmsted said this was not adequate and added to the bare bones section
the additional proviso that the parks, etc., should not be used in any way
contrary to "promoting public recreation and public health through the use and
enjoyment by the people ... of the natural scenery and objects of interest" in
the parks. Olmsted was particularly concerned that the word "scenery" be
inserted in connection with "natural" throughout the document. Olmsted sent
copies of this correspondence to McFarland.89
McFarland told Olmsted that he regarded him as "the wisest man in
America" on park subjects, and that his "conception of what a park is... "
was most important.' He argued Olmsted's view at the Yellowstone Park
conference of 1911, in correspondence with Ballinger, and consistently each
year thereafter, seeing to it that Olmsted was always in a prominent position to
comment on, and thus help shape, the language of any subsequent bills. The
Olmsted Papers, the Marshall and Mather manuscripts, and the files of the
National Park Service are filled with letters from McFarland, showing that he
remained carefully in touch with each development. Surely it is unlikely that
McFarland would have allowed the final product of all this effort, the Act of
1916, to contain a "fundamental statement" of purpose which he thought was
weak or contradictory?
Indeed, McFarland made his position clear in a heated interchange with
file with the Library of Congress) [hereinafter Olmsted Papers).
88. Letters from McFarland to Ballinger (Nov. 10, 12, 16, 1910, Jan. 3, 1911) (on file with
the National Archives, R. Group 79, entry 6, box 783); Letter from Ballinger to McFarland (Nov.
11, 1910) (on file with the National Archives, R. Group 79, entry 6, box 783); Letter from
McFarland to Knute Nelson, Chairman, Senate Committee on the Public Lands (Jan. 4, 1911) (on
file with the National Archives, R. Group 79, entry 6, box 783); Letter from McFarland to
Ballinger (Dec. 22, 1910) (on file with the National Archives, R. Group 79, entry 6, box 23).
89. Letter from Olmsted to Frank Pierce, Acting Secretary of the Interior (Dec. 31, 1910)
(Olmsted Papers, supra note 78). This document, retyped, also appears in Olmstead [sic] Portfolio
(on file with the Bancroft Library, University of California (Berkeley)), and in the National Ar-
chives (R. Group 79, entry 6, box 783).
90. Letter McFarland to Olmsted (Sept. 5, 1911) (Olmsted Papers, supra note 78); see also
Olmstead Portfolio, supra note 80.
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Gifford Pinchot, the former head of the Forest Service, over the matter of the
Hetch Hetchy. Pinchot had implied that the initial framers of the park service
bill had a pecuniary interest in the parks and was reported to have said that
Interior was "where all the crooks are." This was an echo of his furious feud
with Ballinger, as well as a statement, about which he was equally direct,
concerning his conviction that the national parks should be administered by the
Forest Service, with parks to be "handled with the same government purpose
which must control" the National Forests. He also belittled McFarland's vi-
sion, suggesting that the American Civic Association simply wanted to apply
the methods of a city park to vast areas of wilderness, concluding that
McFarland did not know what a "park" was.9'
Pinchot's letter struck McFarland, who felt he quite clearly understood
what a park was, as arrogant and ill-informed. National Parks could not be
managed by individuals trained in "forest principles" only. The principles
governing national parks were quite different-he did not invoke the "higher
standard" argument in this response, as he would do later-and the National
Parks would not be safe in the hands of such a man as Pinchot. He attacked
Pinchot for having given up the "wonderful territory" of the Hetch Hetchy
Valley, violating a national park, without ever having personally viewed the
area. The implication was clear: that a Park Service was necessary to prevent
any future violations of this nature.'
To Chief Forester Graves, who he regarded as more sympathetic to a park
service, McFarland wrote that "a declaration of the real purpose of a National
Park" was important in order to correct misconceptions about a park as a
small or curried area. The purpose had to be "declared in unmistakable terms,"
and McFarland quoted Olmsted's draft.93 Of two Senate bills then proposed,
McFarland preferred the shorter one-this was Senator Smoot's bill-both
strategically and functionally, and he asked Smoot to insert in his bill, S.3463,
the section on purpose. Again, is it likely that a person of such persistence,
who regarded a general statement of purpose essential to any bill, and who
preferred a short bill with such a statement, would have thought the final lan-
guage used in the preamble to the Organic Act had created a logical contradic-
tion?
9 4
Other members of the House Committee on the Public Lands, and most
members of the Senate, were silent on the purposes of the Act of 1916,
speaking in hearings only to specific points, usually economic and financial, or
in debate in favor of the act or on whether grazing should be permitted in
parks. Edward T. Taylor of Colorado had made his views known the previous
91. Letter from Gifford Pinchot, former head of the Forest Service [hereinafter Pinchot] to
McFarland (Mar. 4, 1911) (Olmsted Papers, supra note 78).
92. Letter from McFarland 'to Pinchot (Mar. 6, 1911) (copy) (Olmsted Papers, supra note
78).
93. Letter from McFarland to Graves (Feb. 21, 1911) (R. Group 79, entry 6, McFarland file).
94. The bills were S.9816, S.3463, and H.R.32265, 61st Cong., 3d Sess. See Letter from
McFarland to Reed Smoot, Senator [hereinafter Smoot] (n.d.) (R. Group 79, entry 6, box 783);
Letter from McFarland to Olmsted (Jan. 18, 1911) (Olmstead Portfolio, supra note 80); Letter
from Richard B. Watrous, Secretary of the American Civic Association, [hereinafter Watrous] to
McFarland (Jan. 17, 1911) (Olmsted Papers, supra note 78).
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year during efforts to create the Rocky Mountain National Park, and he was
largely silent on the National Parks Act, other than commenting favorably on
the Colorado National Monument, created by executive act in 1911, which he
hoped might become Colorado's third national park, following Mesa Verde
and Rocky Mountain. Congressman Nicholas J. Sinnott of Oregon spoke up
only to express the hope that a proposed Park-to-Park Highway, which Ste-
phen Mather promoted during the 1916 hearings, would extend from Mount
Rainier through Oregon to California. While Congressman Irvine Lenroot of
Wisconsin was active throughout, he did not comment on general purposes or
standards, being primarily interested in the language that would assure the
Secretary of the Interior the authority to grant or deny leases. Congressman
Scott Ferris of Oklahoma, the chairman of the House committee in 1916, was
most interested in his own bill on water resources. Congressman Robert
LaFollette, usually vocal on any issue concerning the public interest, was plan-
ning to run for the presidency and appears to have attended only one of the
hearings. Floor debate was short, to the point, and no new light was thrown on
Congressional intent.
There is, as a final approach to the "contradictory mandate," the logic of
rhetoric. Many of those involved in framing the Organic Act, and certainly the
former judges, school teachers, and present Congressmen, were well accus-
tomed to the use of rhetoric, or the study of the effective use of language. As
rhetoricians, Senator Smoot and Congressmen Kent, Ferris,"' and Lenroot
were highly regarded. The classical education of the time-and Olmsted and
Raker had such an education-included rhetoric as a formal study. The princi-
ples of rhetoric held that, when listing two or more elements to an argument,
the most important be stated first, and when speaking in public debate, a sig-
nificant element of the argument which was not, however, the most significant,
should be stated last in order to allow for an "Attic fall." If the principles of
rhetoric were applied to the language of the preamble, then conserving "the
scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wild life" within a park
took precedence over providing for public "enjoyment," and there was no
contradiction between two elements of equal weight for the elements were not,
in fact, equal.
The Senate passed its bill on August 5. S. 9969, Reed Smoot's bill of
1911, was recycled in slightly altered form. While he was opposed to the
"socialism" of state promotion of water resources, Smoot was otherwise in
agreement with Kent on conservation matters. He wished to see more national
parks, in part because they preserved God's handiwork, in part because they
would bring visitors and better roads, and to that end he was pleased when it
was suggested that Mukuntuweap National Monument in the remote southwest
desert of Utah might become a national park, since he knew that dusty roads
deterred traffic. (In 1919 Mukuntuweap became Zion National Park.) Howev-
er, the Senate bill did contain one significant difference. At the insistence of
Senator Clarence D. Clark of Wyoming, who was fearful that references to
95. Congressman Ferris was a lay preacher. See his use of rhetoric in his scant papers, held
by the Museum of the Great Plains in Lawton, Oklahoma.
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grazing would mean that permits might be issued for Yellowstone, the bill had
no provision for grazing.
The need to reconcile the two bills meant further delay, though the public
band wagon mounted by McFarland and others had helped to carry bills for
three new parks-Sieur de Monts (later, Acadia), Hawaii, and Lassen Volca-
nic-while House and Senate conferred. Then the chairman of the Senate
public lands committee, Senator Henry L. Myers of Montana, and the House
chairman, Congressman Ferris, agreed to allow grazing in all national parks
with the explicit exception of Yellowstone. At the last minute a powerful
Congressman from Wisconsin, William Stafford, who opposed new bureaus on
principle, sought to bottle up the bill that had emerged from the conference
committee, and Kent was able to persuade him to stand down." Approval in
the Senate quickly followed.97
Explication of Text, 1916-1976
A recent historian of the national parks, Alfred Runte, has argued that
though Congress wished to create a "system" in 1916, there was still relatively
little awareness that this system involved more than setting aside lands that
had little or no prevailing economic value. Known as the "worthless lands"
thesis, Runte's argument is that Congress had not thought through such terms
as "unimpaired" or "enjoyment" largely because it imagined the parks would
not be the objects of commercial or industrial threats, since they were basical-
96. The papers of Clarence D. Clark, at the University of Wyoming, consist only of
scrapbooks. On Clark, see Albert G. Anderson, Jr., The Political Career of Senator Clarence D.
Clark (1953) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Wyoming). No Myers papers have survived
save for fugitive letters in the papers of Montana Senators Thomas J. Walsh and Burton K.
Wheeler at the Montana Historical Society in Helena and his death certificate at the Western Heri-
tage Center in Billings, Montana. There is a sketch of his career in the Billings Gazette of No-
vember 12, 1943. All efforts to locate the papers of Senator William Stafford failed.
In addition to the major collection of Smoot papers at Brigham Young University, there are
Smoot papers at the Library of Congress and at the Library of the University of West Virginia. An
article, the title of which offers promise-Thomas G. Alexander, Senator Reed Smoot and Western
Land Policy, 1905-1920, ARtz. AND WEST, Autumn 1971, at 245, 245-64--proved to contain only
passing references to the national park bill. The best biography is Milton R. Merrill, Reed Smoot:
Apostle in Politics (1950) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University). The other Sena-
tors who served on the Committee on the Public Lands and Surveys, or who spoke on the floor of
the Senate, were Colorado's John F. Shafroth and Charles S. Thomas, California's James D.
Phelan and John D. Works, and Thomas J. Walsh of Montana.
The writer was unable to examine the papers of the Coloradoans, Edward T. Taylor,
Charles B. Timberlake, John F. Shafroth, and Charles S. Thomas. The Taylor papers, at the Colo-
rado State Historical Society and the University of Colorado, were examined for him and revealed
nothing of relevance. Two collections might prove of value: the Thomas papers, which consist of
15,000 items, also at the Colorado State Historical Society, and the papers of Burton L. French, a
Congressman from Idaho, who interested himself in the act though he did not attend the hearings.
This last collection is at Miami University in Oxford, Ohio.
With respect to the NPS Act, the Papers of Woodrow Wilson, at Princeton University, are
silent (Arthur Link to writer, telephonic communication).
97. WnLAM C. EvERHART, THE NATIONAL PARK SERvicE 19-20 (1972), states that before
1915 only a "scattered few members of Congress" could have spoken on the national parks for
longer than five minutes. In 1916, debate in the Senate was almost nonexistent, but debate in the
House showed that a number of members had formulated views on what parks should and should
not be.
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ly worthless in economic terms, and that impairment was thus not likely to
occur, or if it did occur, such impairment would relate almost entirely to pro-
viding for "enjoyment," not to other issues.9"
Certainly there is some truth in this statement. Wild lands were, by 1916,
coming to be valued, but few people conceived that there would be any seri-
ous scarcity of them, and some people of exquisite urban sensitivities still held
to the view to be found in Jane Austen's Pride and Prejudice, that mountains
were "horrid." Years earlier Frederick Law Olmsted (Sr.) had, while manager
of the Mariposa Estate and a frequent visitor to the Yosemite Valley, advocat-
ed the construction in that valley of graceful arched bridges in the manner of
Central Park in order to humanize the landscape; he hated "the wilderness &
wild," he wrote to his wife. In the 1890s, Senator Richard F. Pettigrew of
South Dakota said that Mount Tacoma (now Mount Rainier) "with its perpet-
ual snow and... rocky crags" was a "worthless land."
In this sense, and for the 1890s, Professor Runte's "worthless lands"
thesis is correct, though his argument tends to ignore the fact that by 1911
many in Congress attached economic value to park proposals for tourist pur-
poses and that others understood that as technologies changed, as old minerals
might be extracted at lower costs and new minerals be found, these "worthless
lands" would take on economic value. There is no convincing evidence that by
1916 the majority of legislators believed that they were protecting lands that
would be worthless for all time, and an abundance of evidence that virtually
all considered that the parks had commercial value as tourist attractions.
Nonetheless, the notion of useless or worthless lands may help to account
for why many in Congress felt no urgency to define the signifying terms with-
in Olmsted's draft. In 1915, Representative Edward T. Taylor of Colorado,
then a ranking member of the House Committee on the Public Lands, spoke of
the beauty of the proposed Rocky Mountain National Park, comparing it to
Switzerland, and said that it had "no value for anything but scenery." He was
careful to assuage the feelings of forestry and farming interests by stating that
the park would contain "little timber of merchantable value" and that its eleva-
tions were too high for farming."° Thus language was used in 1915-16
somewhat differently than we use it today.
While the crucial words from the preamble to the Organic Act of 1916
have traditionally been viewed as the statement of "fundamental purpose"
already examined here, there is other language in the act that requires consid-
98. ALFRED RuNTE, NATIONAL PARKS: TE AMEIuCAN EXPERIENCE (2d rev. ed. 1987). For
discussion of the "worthless lands" thesis, see Richard W. Sellars et al., The National Parks: A
Forum on the "Worthless Lands" Thesis, J. FOREST HIST., July 1983, at 130, 130-45. John C.
Freemuth has posed the question whether mineral extraction would be permitted from under the
water impounded behind a dam within a National Recreation Area, since such an area was not
created because of its inherent commercial worthlessness, the reservoir so impounded-and thus
proposed for possible violation-being an aspect of the worth of the area. See JOHN C.
FREEMUTH, ISLANDS UNDER SIEGE: NATIONAL PARKS AND THE POLmcs OF EXTERNAL THREATS
54 (1991).
99. Quoted in GuSTAvuS MYERS, HISTORY OF THE GREAT AMERICAN FORTUNES 223-24
n.23 (1936); see also ROBIN W. WINKS, FREDERICK BILLINGS: A LIFE 291 (1991).
100. 63 CONG. REc. 1,789-91 (1915).
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eration. Let us read the preamble again:
The service thus established shall promote and regulate the use of the
Federal areas known as national parks, monuments, and reservations
hereinafter specified... by such means and measures as conform to
the fundamental purpose of the said parks, monuments, and reserva-
tions, which purpose is to conserve the scenery and the natural and
historic objects and the wild life therein and to provide for the enjoy-
ment of the same in such manner and by such means as will leave
them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.'
Thus, the primary goal of the new Service is to "leave" the parks and monu-
ments unimpaired, placing clear priority on protection as opposed to restora-
tion of landscapes and by implication arguing for a presumption of inaction in
the face of any request for what may be viewed as "impairment." Arguably
any action taken prior to passage of the Organic Act that might be viewed as
impairment represented an action that could be, in so far as possible, undone,
reversed, or nullified.
But what of "shall promote and regulate" in reference to the parks and
monuments? Here arises the true source of the dichotomy of purpose, between
preservation and use, conservation and enjoyment."H It may well be argued
that the order in which these two objectives are set forth, as well as the se-
quence by which taken together they precede other terms in the statement, is
significant, with "enjoyment" circumscribed by "unimpaired."'0 3 The legisla-
tive history of the act would appear to support this view, and successive Di-
rectors of the National Park Service, and for the most part Secretaries of the
Interior, as well as chairpersons of the relevant committees and subcommittees
in Congress, have usually acted in such a manner as to suggest that the Park
Service's first priority should be preservation.
The "governing sentence" and the sections that follow are silent on ques-
tions of water or timber use, and one must infer intent from that which is said.
In a circular letter to his colleagues on April 27, Kent supplied the amended
bill as reported out following the mid-April hearings. He drew attention to its
provisions."° Cutting of timber was to be permitted only in order to control
insect attack or disease or to conserve the scenery or the natural or historic
objects: that is, one resource that was specified was to be altered only with a
view to conservation purposes. While permits could be granted for use of the
land, these permits were to be "only for the accommodation of visitors in the
101. 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1994) (emphasis added).
102. On this point see THoMAs J. CAROLAN, JR., U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, THE PoLncAL DY-
NAMICS OF THE NATIONAL PARK SERVICE (1980-81), especially pages 2-5.
103. The act refers to "enjoyment" by "future generations," not to "the people," which intro-
duces an expectation of changing definitions of "enjoyment" by reference to the future. This
makes legitimate an examination of changing perceptions relating to the signifying terms in the
statement of purpose. Significantly, "the people" are acknowledged not to be static. Even were the
term used in its customarily monolithic way, courts have interpreted "the people"-as in decisions
involving the right to bear arms, for example-to mean the people as a group not as individuals,
thus opening the way to barring certain individuals. The same is true of use of grandfathered
privileges within a park: they might apply to "the people" but not necessarily to any given person.
104. William Kent Papers, supra note 51 (box 24, folder 476).
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various parks," so that land grants were to be denied save to meet the needs of
accommodation. "No natural curiosities, wonders or objects of interest" could
be leased, rented, or granted on terms that would "interfere with free access to
them by the public," which placed the public interest first while permitting
rental or lease that presumably went beyond accommodation, to which grants
were limited. The Secretary could grant grazing rights when they were not
detrimental to "the primary purpose" of a park, which was enjoyment by the
people and preservation of wild life and natural features. Section 6 declared
that all acts or parts of acts "inconsistent herewith" were repealed.
The intent of Congress as expressed in 1916 must also be seen as modi-
fied in light of the acts of 1970 and 1976. The act of 1970 introduces some-
what revised language, for unlike the act of 1916, it does refer to "the people."
The act arose in the context of a growing concern for recreational opportuni-
ties in the United States, recognized by the Outdoor Recreation Resources
Review Commission appointed by President Dwight D. Eisenhower, which
reported to President John F. Kennedy in 1962."° In 1970, President Richard
M. Nixon's "Legacy of the Parks" program held that the government should
be "taking parks to the people," an idea which was supported on a bipartisan
basis in Congress. The result was the Act of August, 1970, which in addition
to reasserting the significance of the national parks, remarked upon their "in-
creased national dignity" both "individually and collectively," so that an in-
fringement upon the dignity of one was an infringement upon the dignity of
all. This, some commentators thought, meant that each park superintendent had
the responsibility to act aggressively with respect to threats against his or her
unit rather than awaiting a directive by the Director of the National Park Ser-
vice.
Less commented upon, but important, is the language by which "the peo-
ple" are invoked: the parks, which must represent "superb environmental qual-
ity," also acquire their significance by virtue of their "inclusion jointly with
each other in one national park system preserved and managed for the benefit
and inspiration of all the people." In addition to the explicit citation to the
people, the act added to the linked criteria of 1916, unimpaired preservation
and access for enjoyment, the new, if parallel, concepts of "inspiration" and
"benefit." As these words are at least as open to subjective interpretation as
were those of 1916, they gave rise to renewed debate.
However, "benefit" and "inspiration" need not be placed in opposition to
each other. The context makes clear that "inspiration" refers to the re-creation
of the spirit that comes from gazing upon or walking amidst a sublime scene,
or from examining an historical remnant relating to an event or achievement
presumably inspiring to most Americans; it may, of course, also refer to the
"inspiration" that arises from the healthy use of recreational outlets, mastery
over one's body, or simply a sense of well-being. Indeed, since Congress pro-
ceeded to create, under the 1970 act, a number of new National Recreation
Areas, including so-called "urban parks," at the least this reading seems es-
105. See ROBIN W. WINKS, LAURANCE S. ROCKEFELLER: CATALYST FOR CONSERVATION
(Washington's Island Press (1997)), on the significance of the Review Commission.
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sential. It does not follow, however, that "recreation" was given priority over
"re-creation." The 1970 act clearly strengthened the Congressional mandate
placed upon the Park Service to protect park units in the fullest sense of the
word.
"Benefit" requires less parsing, though in conjunction with "the people" it
does require a textual comment. As stated, this linkage had not been made
explicit in previous legislation. By the linkage, Congress appears to have been
saying that management principles must look to actions that would benefit "all
the people" (indeed, the 1970 act used precisely this language) rather than
decisions that would redound primarily to the benefit of a minority, be it local,
an interest group, or an ethnic community. Thus guidance was given to the
Park Service to exercise the broad powers it either possessed or would acquire
over the next decade.
The act of 1970 also expanded the definition of the Park System to in-
clude "any area of land and water now or hereafter administered by the Sec-
retary of the Interior through the National Park Service for park, monument,
historic, parkway, recreational, or other purposes." While this provision was
directed to the concept of national seashores, national lakeshores, and wild and
scenic rivers, no distinction of this nature was made in the act itself, and thus
the language is quite sufficiently broad to admit of all water and land resourc-
es within a park."°
In Section 8 of the Act of October, 1976, Congress directed the Secretary
of the Interior to "investigate, study and continually monitor the welfare of
areas whose resources exhibit qualities of national significance and which may
have potential for inclusion in the National Park System." While this section
did not, as some critics suggested, lessen the actual criteria for inclusion in the
system, it did lead to many new additions; more important is the fact that it
also gave the Secretary an essential advisory authority on resource issues out-
side the boundaries of any of the existing parks. From this it was a short step,
through four key acts already on the books-the Wilderness Act of 1964, Wild
and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968, Clean Water Act of 1972, and Endangered
Species Act of 1973-to charging other government agencies with cooperating
with the National Park Service.
In the 1970s, the Park System grew at a nearly unprecedented rate, espe-
cially under the impetus of Representative Phillip Burton of California. As
Chairman of the House Subcommittee on National Parks and Insular Affairs,
Burton required that twelve potential park proposals be reviewed each year.
Thus Congress took over an initiatory r6le, not waiting for the Park Service to
propose units. As Congress increasingly took primary responsibility for the
creation of new units, in view of what it regarded as a default on this respon-
sibility by the Executive Branch and the Park Service, dozens of acts were
106. One may well argue that in creating national recreation areas, national seashores, national
lakeshores, and other more clearly recreational units, Congress was intending to put distance be-
tween the National Parks, unqualified by any adjective, and other types of units, thus suggesting a
preference for the strictest application of protection to the National Parks, so called, as distinct
from the other designations.
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passed. While each of these was specific to a unit, some contained varied
language concerning that unit, or on occasion units collectively. It is an inter-
esting question (and a nightmarish one), therefore, as to whether in order to
interpret or understand the intent of Congress today one needs to examine
each of the nearly four hundred individual acts in search of language that
would effect the collectivity."
A NOTE ON SOME SUBSEQUENT LEGAL INTERPRETATIONS OR ACTIVITY
OUTSIDE THE PARKS: WATER BY WAY OF EXAMPLE
The Organic Act establishing the National Park Service in 1916 provided
that the National Park Service (NPS) was to "conserve the scenery and the
natural and historic objects and the wild life therein and to provide for the
enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such means as will leave them
unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations. ' '""a This act was amend-
ed in 1970 and in 1978-those amendments are found at 16 U.S.C. § la-I
(1994). The purpose of those amendments was to reiterate the NPS's duty to
maintain and protect parks in the spirit of the 1916 act. As we have seen, none
of these statutes provides any scheme for how the NPS is supposed to fulfill
the lofty objectives in the statutes.'"
I have tracked how courts have interpreted these statutes. A vast majority
of cases involve challenges to NPS regulation within parks. With a few excep-
tions courts overwhelmingly defer to the discretion of the NPS to regulate
within the parks in carrying out the mandates of the legislation." ' This clos-
ing note will, therefore, focus on the more difficult question of power to con-
trol or affect activity outside the parks.
Some courts, even before 1916, have held that the Secretary of the Interi-
or has a trust obligation to protect public lands. In Knight v. United Land
Ass'n, the Supreme Court said that the Secretary of the Interior is the
guardian of the people of the United States over the public lands. The extent
107. This writer is attempting precisely this task for a work in progress, The Rise of the Na-
tional Park Ethic (forthcoming).
108. 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
109. In 1946 Congress also gave the NPS the power (financially) to acquire rights in accor-
dance with local customs or laws if "necessary or beneficial in the administration" of the National
Parks and Monuments. 16 U.S.C. §17j-2(g) (1994).
110. See, e.g., United States v. Vogler, 859 F.2d. 638 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that the NPS
can require permits to transport off-road vehicles through park land in Alaska); Wilderness Pub.
Rights Fund v. Kleppe, 608 F.2d 1250 (9th Cir. 1979) (stating that the NPS can allocate commer-
cial and non-commercial boating on Colorado River); Town of Beverly Shores v. Lujan, 736 F.
Supp. 934 (N.D. Ind. 1989) (stating that the NPS can pave parking area at Indiana Dunes, balanc-
ing natural preservation with public access). For an example of a case where NPS regulations
were held invalid, see Wilkenson v. Dep't of interior, 634 F. Supp. 1265 (D. Colo. 1986) (holding
that the NPS could not charge fee for travel through Colorado National Monument because roads
through the park were a public right of way, being State Highway 340, a portion of the only all-
weather road to the settlement of Glade Park). I choose court decisions concerning water rights, as
these, together with grazing and the extraction of minerals, were at issue in all early park legisla-
tion, and access to water is more nearly a universal question throughout all types of National Park
System units than questions relating to grazing or mineral extraction are likely to be. I wish to
thank Janet Satterthwaite for assistance with this note.
11. 142 U.S. 161 (1891).
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of this duty was highlighted in litigation involving Redwood National Park in
the 1970s. The unique legislation that created the park in 1968 contemplated
that problems would arise from external logging and gave the NPS the author-
ity to acquire interests in land outside the park to minimize ecological damage
within the park."' The Sierra Club sued the NPS to force the NPS to exer-
cise this power."3 Courts will usually overturn an agency's exercise of dis-
cretion only upon a showing of abuse of that discretion. Nevertheless, after
reviewing the evidence, the court ordered the NPS to exercise its power to ac-
quire interests in land outside the park.
Although the court in the Redwood cases relied on the unique statute
creating the park, the case nevertheless has implications for other parks. The
court also invoked the general duties under 16 U.S.C. § 1 and a general trust
obligation of the NPS to protect parks." 4 The court noted that the NPS had
failed to "exercise and perform duties imposed upon them by [16 U.S.C. § 11
and the Redwood National Park Act ... and duties otherwise imposed on
them by law.""' (After the Department of the Interior had submitted reports
to the court, the court found that the Department was attempting to comply
with the law.)" 1
6
After the Redwood litigation, Congress passed another statute for Red-
wood National Park. To clarify the confusion over the duties of the NPS gen-
erally, Congress added a rider to the statute to reinforce 16 U.S.C. § ."7
The Senate Report accompanying the bill emphasized that the purpose was to
refocus and insure that the basis for decision-making concerning the National
Park System continues to be the criteria provided by 16 U.S.C. § 1 because
the committee had been concerned that litigation with regard to Redwood
National Park and other areas of the system may have blurred the responsibil-
ities articulated by the 1916 Act creating the National Park Service.
Accordingly ... The Secretary is to afford the highest standard of
protection and care to the natural resources within Redwood National
Park and the National Park System. No decision shall compromise
these resource values except as Congress may have specifically pro-
vided."
In 1980 the U.S. district court in the District of Columbia relied on this
language to reject the notion of a separate public trust outside the statutory
duties imposed on the NPS.' On the other hand, the court found that the
NPS had very broad discretionary power from several sources.
112. 16 U.S.C. §§ 79c(a), (e) (1994).
113. Sierra Club v. Dep't of Interior, 376 F. Supp. 90 (N.D. Cal. 1974); Sierra Club v. Dep't
of Interior, 398 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
114. Sierra Club, 376 F. Supp. at 95-96.
115. Sierra Club, 398 F. Supp. at 293.
116. Sierra Club v. Dep't of Interior, 424 F. Supp. 172 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
117. See 16 U.S.C. § la-l.
118. S. REP. No. 528, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14 (1977); see also H.R. REP. No. 581, 95th
Cong., Ist Sess. (1977).
119. Sierra Club v. Andrus, 487 F. Supp. 443 (D.D.C. 1980), affd sub nom. Sierra Club v.
Watt, 659 F.2d 203 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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In Andrus, the Sierra Club sued to force the Interior Department to assert
federal water rights in water courses affecting the Grand Canyon and Glen
Canyon, both within units of the National Park System.2 The court agreed
that in the event of a real threat to the water supply for scenic, biotic or natu-
ral purposes in those areas, the Secretary would be required to take action. 2'
The Court noted that the statutes do not provide a mechanism for how this ac-
tion is to be taken, but found that the Secretary had broad (although not un-
limited) discretion to take action, including but not limited to:
(1) asserting reserved water rights;
(2) acquiring water rights under 16 U.S.C. § 17j-2(g);
(3) denying land exchanges and rights of way; and
(4) bringing trespass or nuisance actions."
The court deferred to the Secretary's discretion and declined to force him
to assert the rights the Sierra Club wanted.
123
The NPS may also have authority under the property clause of the Con-
stitution to control activity outside park boundaries as that activity impinges
upon public property. In Minnesota v. Block,124 the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals found that Congress could make regulations outside the Boundary
Waters borders because of the property clause. The same court later found that
the NPS also had this power and could regulate delivery of canoes along pub-
lic roads leading into NPS riverways in Missouri, even were the canoe-renting
people never to enter park property."2 Under the property clause, Congress
has power to protect public lands. The Eighth Circuit applied this doctrine to
find that this power extended to regulation on or off public land in order to
protect public land.26
There is thus tentative authority for the NPS to act outside its borders.
Still, as the Andrus court pointed out, it is not entirely clear from NPS statutes
alone how this is to be done. In addition to the methods suggested by the
Andrus court, there are several other possible sources of authority to act, how-
ever.
120. Id. at 445.
121. Id. at 448.
122. Id.
123. d at 452. In Sierra Club v. Block, 622 F. Supp. 842 (D. Colo. 1985), vacated sub nom.
Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 911 F.2d 1405 (10th Cir. 1990), the district court in Colorado agreed with
the Andrus decision and rejected the notion of a public trust separate from statutory powers. Since
that opinion was vacated for other reasons (see infra note 20), it has no force; however, it illus-
trates a trend in light of the 1978 amendments to reject the idea of public trusteeship while simul-
taneously beefing up the authority imputed to the government by statutes.
124. 660 F.2d 1240 (8th Cir. 1981).
125. Free Enter. Canoe Renters Ass'n v. Watt, 711 F.2d 852 (8th Cir. 1983).
126. Minnesota, 660 F.2d at 1249; accord Free Enter. Canoe, 711 F.2d at 856. It is one thing
to say Congress can do something, and another to say that the NPS can do it absent specific ac-
tion by Congress. Nevertheless, see also Blake Shepard, Note, The Scope of Congress' Constitu-
tional Power Under the Property Clause: Regulating Non-Federal Property to Further the Pur-
poses of National Parks and Wilderness Areas, 11 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 479 (1984).
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Conservation and Environmental Statutes
Various environmental statutes may be able to be exploited to help the
NPS protect resources such as water in the parks. Among the statutes to con-
sider are (1) the Clean Water Act, (2) the Endangered Species Act, (3) the
Wilderness Act, and the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act.1
27
Implied Reserved Federal Water Rights
Another potential source of NPS power, depending on the circumstances,
might allow the NPS to assert "implied reserved federal water rights" in land
outside the park. This doctrine, developed in the courts, provides that when the
government withdraws land from the public domain for a federal purpose
(such as a national park or forest) the government impliedly reserves, as
against future users, whatever water rights are needed to effectuate the purpose
for which the land was reserved, but only the amount necessary to accomplish
those purposes. The key is the intent of Congress for the use of the land at the
time it was withdrawn from the public domain for a use such as a park or for-
est.U This intent is applied vertically, that is, chronologically, and it is this
intent we have sought in the body of this monograph.
The Supreme Court restated this doctrine in a case involving the NPS in
1976: "[W]hen the Federal Government withdraws its land from the public
domain and reserves it for a federal purpose, the Government, by implication,
reserves appurtenant water then unappropriated to the extent needed to accom-
plish the purpose of the reservation.'" This right vests (i.e., you get it) on
the date of the reservation and is superior to future appropriators. In other
words, at the time the government creates a park or a forest, it gets the rights
and no subsequent user can impair them.
Cappaert was a rancher who owned land near Devil's Hole National Mon-
ument (now functionally part of Death Valley National Monument) in Neva-
da.3o President Harry S Truman had reserved the monument in 1952 in part
because of unique fish that lived in a pool in a cavern, and protection of the
pool was specifically mentioned in his proclamation reserving the monu-
ment. '3 The Supreme Court held that the NPS could stop Cappaert from
pumping groundwater on his ranch in amounts that were diminishing the level
127. For a discussion of how some of these statutes might apply, see Mark T. Pifner, Quality
versus Quantity: The Continued Right to Appropriate-Part 11, 15 COLO. LAW. 1204 (1986); see
also John W. Hiscock, Protecting National Park System Buffer Zones: Existing, Proposed, and
Suggested Authority, 7 J. ENERGY L. & POL'Y 35 (1986). In Sierra Club v. Block, discussed supra
note 16, the Court found that the Wilderness Act created implied federal reserved water rights
(this doctrine is explained below). The opinion attracted some attention from commentators, but as
noted above has since been vacated as not "ripe" for adjudication in the courts.
128. For a discussion of the historical basis of federal reserved water rights, see A. Dan
Tarlock, Protection of Water Flows for National Parks, 22 LAND & WATER L. REv. 29, 38-48
(1987).
129. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976).
130. Id. at 133.
131. Id. at 131-32.
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of the pool and threatening the fish.'
The key issue in Cappaert was whether maintaining the level of the pool
was necessary to the purpose of the reservation of the monument. Moreover,
since the doctrine of implied reservation of water rights reserves only the
amount necessary to accomplish the purpose of the reservation, Cappaert was
allowed to pump some water so long as the level of the pool did not drop to
such a low level that it harmed the fish and other scientifically valuable as-
pects of the pool.133
Compare United States v. New Mexico, 34 where the Supreme Court held
that the United States had not impliedly reserved water rights for aesthetic
wildlife preservation, or recreational purposes when it created the Gila Nation-
al Forest. 35 The Court noted that the purposes for which national forests are
reserved are to protect timber and watershed.'36 The court contrasted the
much broader purposes for which National Parks are reserved, citing the lan-
guage of 16 U.S.C. § . 3
What of National Parks created from National Forest land? The lands of
Rocky Mountain National Park (RMNP) were originally reserved as a national
forest and were only later made a national park, in 1915. As seen in New
Mexico, the purposes, and correspondingly the extent of water rights, are much
narrower for national forests than for parks. Technically, it might be argued
that only national forest rights were reserved at the time of initial reservation
from the public domain. However, this question has been addressed and re-
solved favorably to the NPS by the Supreme Court of Colorado. In United
States v. City of Denver,3 ' the court was asked to determine the extent of
federal reserved water rights in the Colorado, Gunnison, North Platt, White
and Yampa River Basins in Colorado. 3 9 Relying on New Mexico and
Cappaert, the court focused on the precise federal purposes (including the
priority date) for which the lands had been reserved."4
With respect to RMNP, the court held that the priority dates for water
rights related to forest purposes (i.e., protection of watershed and timber) dat-
ed from the creation of the national forest, but that additional, broader rights
consistent with the purposes of a park obtained when the park was created in
1915."" (The court found that the purpose of a national forest was a subset
of the broader purposes of a park, so that simply adding new water rights onto
132. Id. at 147.
133. Id. at 141. Neither Cappaert nor anyone else had any rights to the water before 1952.
The Court thus did not address what happens when the government reserves land and there are
already persons with rights over the appurtenant water. Note also that this case established that the
implied reserved federal rights doctrine applies to ground water as well as surface water. Id. at
144.
134. 438 U.S. 696 (1978)
135. Id. at 711.
136. Id. at 718.
137. Id. at 709.
138. 656 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1982) (en banc).
139. Id. at 4.
140. Id. at 17.
141. Id. at 30.
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existing forest-related rights would not be consistent with the purposes of a
park.) The court thus implied a second reservation from the public domain
when the park was created. 4 The court sent the case back to the water court
to determine the specificity of those rights." 3
Third, the RMNP legislation of 1915 made specific reference to "home-
stead, mineral, right of way" and to "private, municipal, or State ownership";
that is, it made no reference in these contexts to another government agency,
such as the Forest Service, thus implying that upon the designation of the land
as a national park rather than national forest, the Forest Service no longer had
authority within those lands. Much subsequent legislation has made this point
abundantly clear. The act did refer to "rights of way in certain national parks
and the national forests for irrigation and other purposes," but did not ascribe
any authority with respect to those rights of way in national parks to any other
body, and by virtue of specific reference to both national parks and national
forests made it clear that the two were seen as mutually exclusive. The Secre-
tary of the Interior was given the discretion to grant "easemert.z or rights of
way for steam, electric, or similar transportation upon or across the park," but
no reference was made to having discretion to grant such rights of way or
easements for the purposes of irrigation, thus suggesting that the Secretary had
no such discretionary power in this area.
Conclusion
Where water is involved, one may not invariably separate issues of quan-
tity from issues of quality, of course, since a diminution in quality may well
require an increase in quantity to achieve the same purposes, if indeed, one
may in any measure be said to have preserved the natural conditions if there is
a significant change in either quantity or quality. It appears that the federal
reserved water right doctrine would not be applied in a way that would make
142. Id. This approach is similar to that used in the now vacated opinion in Sierra Club v.
Block, discussed supra note 16. The Court ruled that even though the Wilderness Act withdrew
wilderness areas from existing national forests, such areas constituted a "second" withdrawal from
the public domain so that broader water rights relevant to a wilderness as opposed to a forest were
created by the act. Block, 622 F. Supp. at 862. Indeed, the Block Court referred to City of Denver
in its opinion. Id. In vacating the opinion, the 10th Circuit avoided ruling on whether the Wilder-
ness Act implied any new reserved water rights, but referred to them as "alleged" rights. Yeutter,
911 F.2d at 1419. Essentially, the Court vacated the opinion because it thought it was too early to
decide whether any public harm would result from the Forest Service's alleged failure to act, so
that it could not be determined whether the Forest Service was abusing its discretion. Id. at 1414.
143. City of Denver, 656 P.2d at 36. Since passage of the McCarran Act, the United States
may be brought in as a party to a state court water rights adjudication proceeding. Simply stated,
the basic premise of Colorado water rights law is that a person who appropriates water for a bene-
ficial use acquires rights to that water as against future users. For an explanation of how this
works vis-d-vis federal reserved rights, see Navajo Dev. Co. v. Sanderson, 655 P.2d 1374 (Colo.
1982) (en banc). For example, Navajo notes that, if the government wants to acquire water rights
beyond those implied by reservation, it must use state appropriation proceedings or must condemn
the rights. Id. at 1379. Other cases to keep in mind are: Colorado River Water Conservation Dist.
v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976); Yeutter, 911 F.2d at 1419; United States v. Bell, 724 P.2d
631 (Colo. 1986) (en banc); see also Aaron H. Hostyk, Who Controls the Water? The Emerging
Balance Among Federal, State, and Indian Jurisdictional Claims and Its Impact on Energy Devel-
opment in the Upper Colorado and Upper Missouri River Basins, 18 TULSA LJ. 1 (1982).
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it meaningless-that is, if it is necessary to accomplish the purpose for which
land was reserved to have clean, as well as sufficient, water, then presumably
a right to clean water applies.
If any issue of water quantity (or quality) arises from conflict or interpre-
tation with another federal government agency, the various court decisions that
suggest national parks are to be held to a higher standard of preservation than
lands administered by another agency would seem to apply. In the Committee
Report accompanying the 1916 bill for the NPS, Congress noted that there was
not supposed to be any conflict of jurisdiction among the agencies, but it is
not clear what the Committee meant in practical terms.'" Most of the legis-
lation seems to contemplate that the NPS is to work in cooperation with other
agencies, with no implication of any form of subordination. 45
There is also the simple force of history, public opinion, and common
sense. Whatever may have been read into certain words in 1916, those words
now have relatively agreed upon meanings. The NPS is to "preserve" and
"protect"-that is, make certain through management that a sufficient quantity
of those elements natural to the landscape are retained unto future generations
to carry out the purpose of the establishment of a given park unit; it is to
apply this conservation to the "scenery"-that is, to the aggregate landscape as
broadly perceived to the senses, and most particularly to the eye; it is to apply
it to the "natural" objects-that is, to those individual constituent elements of
the landscape that are "perceptible to one or more of the senses, especially
something that can be seen and felt" (surely a definition applicable to water, to
restrict this commentary to our one sustained example); and it is to apply it to
"historic" objects as well-that is, to individual constituent elements that are
historically part of the landscape to be conserved (and clearly a flow of water,
a pond or lake, that form part of the historic landscape would thus be cov-
ered); as well as to "wild life"-which, were there to be dramatically altered
stream flows, lake levels, or ground water would be seriously affected. Thus,
quite without invoking that most famous portion of the legislation, which
refers to leaving the resources of a park "unimpaired for the enjoyment of
future generations," one may readily argue that the purposes of a national park
have preeminence over other federal agencies and goals absent specific legisla-
tion to the contrary.
CONCLUSION
Arguably the intent of Congress with respect to any single act cannot be
perfectly devined or proven. The intent of Congress across a number of related
acts, and as adumbrated by other acts that bear upon the related group, may
more nearly be understood. This paper has attempted to judge that intent. It
has argued that the language contained in the preamble to the National Park
144. H.R. REP. No. 700, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1916).
145. See Julie A. Bryan, Comment, The National Park Service Organic Act Prohibits Turning
the Doorstep of Canyonlands National Park into a Nuclear Wasteland, 7 J. ENERGY L. & POL'Y
95 (1986). A comment-indeed, any law school journal article at all-does not have the force of
law, of course, though the argument may be found convincing to a court at the appropriate time.
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Service Act of 1916 is not, in fact, contradictory and that Congress did not re-
gard it as contradictory; that to the extent that a contradictory interpretation
can be imputed to the sentence to the preamble quoted in the Introduction to
this paper, that contradiction can be eliminated by reference to the printed
record of Congress at the time, to the private papers of those individuals most
directly responsible for framing the language of the act, and to the prevailing
canons of rhetoric in 1916. Further, it is argued that subsequent legislation,
and numerous interpretations of related legislation by the courts (taking water
as a resource by way of example) sustain the view that there was and is no
inherent contradiction in the preamble to the Act of 1916. The National Park
Service was enjoined by that act, and the mission placed upon the Service was
reinforced by subsequent acts, to conserve the scenic, natural, and historic
resources, and the wild life found in conjunction with those resources, in the
units of the National Park System in such a way as to leave them unimpaired;
this mission had and has precedence over providing means of access, if those
means impair the resources, however much access may add to the enjoyment
of future generations.

THE UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE AND NATIONAL
PARK SERVICE: PARADOXICAL MANDATES, POWERFUL
FOUNDERS, AND THE RISE AND FALL OF AGENCY
DISCRETION
FEDERICO CHEEVER*
There was no harm in getting a purpose down, even though the only
purpose admissible raises more questions than it answers.'
I. INTRODUCTION
On September 18, 1996, President Clinton announced the designation of
the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument in southern Utah. Although
a national monument in an area long targeted for protection by the National
Park Service,' President Clinton's announcement made it clear that the
monument's initial management plan would be prepared by another agency of
the Department of the Interior, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM). Pres-
ident Clinton's action implied that the BLM might be more accommodating to
local interests than the Park Service.3 Other sources suggest that the local
interests in question include not only those concerned about the fate of the
Andalex Resources Inc. mining enterprise within the monument, but also local
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law. B.A., M.A., Stanford
University 1981; J.D. University of California at Los Angeles School of Law 1986. Copyright
Federico Cheever 1997. 1 would like to thank Jan Laitos for organizing the University of Denver
College of Law Symposium on the National Parks and Chad Henderson, research assistant and
Law Review editor, without whose able and extraordinary assistance this essay could not have
been written. I also wish to thank John Carver and Mark Hughes for their comments on earlier
drafts and, of course, the staff of the University of Denver Law Review, Mary McNeil Cheever,
Elizabeth Oakley Cheever and Laurel Marion Cheever.
1. ROBERT SHANKLAND, STEVE MATHER OF THE NATIONAL PARKS, 101 (1951) (discussing
purpose language in National Park Service Organic Act of 1916).
2. Christopher Smith, Feds Seek a Truce with Utah, SALT LAKE TRIB., Nov. 9, 1996, at
A5. George Frampton, Assistant Secretary of the Interior, referring to management of Grand Stair-
case-Escalante National Monument by the Bureau of Land Management, rather than the Park Ser-
vices, stated:
I realize it may be controversial within the Park Service but I'm very comfortable with
it.... The Park Service is more preservationminded, (sic] but BLM has the skills and
science available to uphold the mandate in the [monument's] proclamation. I would like
to see this as a test for BLM and I would not like to see the monument go to the Park
Service.
Id. Sen. Orrin Hatch, Utah, fumed "Indeed, this is the mother of all land grabs" when referring to
the creation of the national monument. Laurie Sullivan Maddox, Taking Swipes at Clinton, Utah-
ans Vow to Fight Back, SALT LAKE TRIB., Sept. 19, 1996, at A5.
3. Details of the Monument, SALT LAKE TRIB., Sept. 19, 1996, at A4 (quoting President
Clinton's assurances that with BLM management, the public will be able to hunt, fish and graze
livestock in the monument).
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environmentalists concerned about the Park Service's management approach in
some of the canyon parks in southern Utah.
Although almost unnoticed in the fanfare surrounding the monument's
designation, this exclusion from coveted terrain is a blow to the Park Service
and suggests a level of controversy about the agency unparalleled in its eighty-
year history. The Park Service remains one of a very few federal government
icons in an anti-government age. The flat brimmed hats and brown uniforms
of the park ranger evoke a sense of well being in most Americans.' At the
same time, with various interest groups, the Park Service is running into trou-
ble, attacked both for its protectiveness of the lands it manages6 and for its
traditional methods of facilitating human access to the national parks.7 Long
standing contradictions in our national image of what national parks should be
are generating new tension. Scholars have a role to play in describing these
disputes and seeking out their sources. This symposium in the Denver
University Law Review comes at a propitious time.'
This essay provides one cautionary observation: The Park Service may be
following the road followed a few decades before by its sister agency, the
United States Forest Service.9 Into the 1960s, the forest rangers and their mas-
4. Both federal land managers and nonprofit organizers expressed local environmental con-
cerns:
"It's a good laboratory," said Eric Howard of the Grand Canyon Trust, which
would like to see "local control with local dollars, not falling prey to chain-store devel-
opment patterns."
"We want to do a good job and show everybody we can," said Gregg
Christiansen, one of six employees in the BLM Escalante office. "I think we can if we
don't screw up, if they give us the money and don't give it to the National Park Ser-
vice."
And the first issue will likely be paving the roads.
"Don't pave it," said Grant Johnson, a SUWA founder and outfitter who leads
walks into Escalante. "The monument will never be better. Right now the trailhead is
unmarked. Next thing you know they'll put up a sign, and then you'll have a ranger
patrolling with a gun."
Jim Carrier, The Last Place, DENy. POST (Empire Mag.), Nov. 17, 1996, at 18 (emphasis added).
5. In August 1996, developers outside Denver, Colorado, opened the Park Meadows Mall.
The mall uses the traditional motifs of the National Park Service and National Park architecture to
sell the usual mix of housewares, clothes and self-help literature:
At the main entrance, shoppers are greeted by nothing resembling a traditional
mail entrance. Park Meadows' sandstone-and-rounded-timber-beam entrance, topped by
a pediment, is certainly different and larger than life, but definitely not intimidating.
The unmistakable national parks-lodge lines are warmer and more friendly than
the standard, chilly steel-and-glass mall entrances that have held sway for the past two
decades.
J. Sebastian Sinisi, Inviting Park Meadows Embraces Shoppers, DENY. POST (EMPIRE MAG.),
Nov. 10, 1996, at 18. The developer's choice is, if nothing else, a testament to the esteem in
which most Americans still hold the National Parks and National Park Service.
6. In 1995, Congress appropriated a mere $1 to fund the Mojave National Preserve. H.R.
1977, 104th Cong. (1995). President Clinton vetoed the appropriations bill, specifically targeting
the lack of funding for the preserve. Veto of H.R. 1977, 104th Cong. (1995).
7. See Sierra Club v. Lujan, 716 F.Supp. 1289, 1293 (D. Ariz. 1989) (ordering preliminary
injunction halting construction of a restaurant, hotel, and related structures on the north rim of the
Grand Canyon).
8. Symposium, The National Park System, 74. DENY. U. L. REV. 567 (1997).
9. At a 1991 conference held in Yellowstone National Park for the Park Service managers
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cot, Smokey Bear,' enjoyed great popular esteem. Even Lassie spent some
time in the Forest Service." In thirty years, strong popular reaction to Forest
Service logging practices and increased concern for the species, ecosystems,
and scenery harmed by those practices wrought dramatic changes in a timber-
oriented agency. 2 Changes in traditional Forest Service practices, in turn,
provoked strong, if localized, popular reaction to change. 3 Smokey Bear re-
ceives death threats. 4 The Forest Service is attacked from both ends of the
political spectrum and pleases almost no one. The fabric of Forest Service
agency culture is in jeopardy.'5
of the large western "backcountry parks," such as Yellowstone, Rocky Mountain, Glacier, and
Olympic national parks, a manager admitted that although the public still views the Park Service
as "America's favorite agency," he and other wilderness managers knew otherwise; that, in fact,
the Park Service was losing the battle to maintain natural systems in the parks. Interview with
Chad Henderson, former public policy manager of the National Outdoor Leadership School, in
Denver, Colo. (Jan. 12, 1997).
10. References to "Smokey the Bear" are not only incorrect, but also contradict federal law.
See 16 U.S.C. § 580p (1994) (establishing use and protection for the characters Smokey Bear and
Woodsy Owl).
11. Evolution of attitudes toward the Forest Service:
The 1950s and '60s were kind to the Forest Service. The image of the ranger in
the green uniform, there to protect the woods and rescue stray kids, dominated the na-
tional psyche. The Forest Service was trusted as the paternal land manager, its rangers as
true as Smokey Bear, on TV, one of them was cast as fitting companion to no less a
hero than Lassie.
But that image devolved with the social revolution that swept America in the late
1960s and early 1970s. The Forest Service drew a more critical stare from a public
awakening to warnings of environmental catastrophe.
Then came the first Earth Day, the Endangered Species Act and the National
Forest Management Act. Charges surfaced of illicit ties between the agency and the
CIA; news accounts revealed below-cost timber sales and logging thefts.
By the late 1980s, the Forest Service was driving on its rims, battered and lack-
luster. Trust in the agency's stewardship had all but dissolved.
Peter D. Sleeth, Even in Washington, D.C., Thomas Keeps Forest Close, PORTLAND OREGONIAN,
July 14, 1996, at Al.
12. In 1971, the "Church committee" examined Forest Service timber management. See
STAFF OF THE SUBCOMM. ON PUBLIC LANDS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR
AFFAiRs, 92d CONG., CLEARCUTrING ON FEDERAL TIMBERLANDs I (Comm. Print 1972) [herein-
after 1972 CoMMrrEE REPORT]. The hearings and subsequent report contributed to congressional
unease over Forest Service clearcutting practices, and contributed to passage of the National Forest
Management Act in 1976. 16 U.S.C. 1600, 1611-1614, 472a, 521b (1994). Focus shifted from
modifying silviculture practices to protection of values beyond timber production in the late 1980s
with the northern spotted owl controversy. By 1991, the Forest Service faced dramatic reductions
in timber harvests from Pacific Northwest national forests as a result of lawsuits seeking protec-
tion for the threatened spotted owl. See Alyson C. Flournoy, Beyond the "Spotted Owl Problem":
Learning from the Old-Growth Controversy, 17 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 261 (1993) (discussing
Pacific Northwest logging and its effects on native ecosystems contrasted with the costs of envi-
ronmental protection and economic transitions of local communities).
13. See, e.g., Gail Kinsey Hill, Shortfall in Timber Sales Doubles; The Forest Service Revis-
es Previous Estimates of Timber That Won't Be Cut, and Mill Owners Say Thousands of Workers
Will Lose Their Jobs, PORTLAND OREGONiAN, Aug. 8, 1990, at BI. Timber workers in the com-
munities where the Forest Service proposed large reductions in the timber harvest were upset,
some of them feeling a "sense of doom." Id.
14. In the spring of 1989, court injunctions had effectively shut down Pacific Northwest
timber sales on national forests. Angry members of the affected communities sent death threats to
Forest Service mascots Smokey Bear and Woodsy Owl. STEvEN LEwIs YAFFEE, THE WISDOM OF
THE SPOTTED OWL xv (1994) (providing an exhaustive analysis of the northern spotted owl con-
troversy in the years 1989 to 1993).
15. Forest Service Chief Jack Ward Thomas commented on the deterioration of agency mo-
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The Park Service and the Forest Service are different. The Forest Service
authorizes logging, oil and gas development, mining and hunting in the na-
tional forests.'6 The Park Service (with a few exceptions) 7 permits none of
these uses in National Parks. In other senses, however, the agencies share
significant attributes. Both are agencies of long standing, progeny of the Pro-
gressive era. The Forest Service took on its current form in 1905 and 1906."8
The Park Service came into being in 1916."9 Congress created both to man-
age public land reserved considerably earlier. Grover Cleveland set aside the
first "forest reserves" in 1891.' 0 Congress set aside the first national park,
Yellowstone, in 1872."
More significantly for our purposes, both agencies were shaped by a type
of person, rare then and almost non-existent now: wealthy, energetic visionar-
ies who saw the reserves of public lands under their influence as a canvas for
their ideas and who used the machinery of government to further their vision.
Gifford Pinchot imagined the United States Forest Service and then created
it.22 His vision still shapes that agency's view of itself and the land it man-
ages eighty-seven years after his tenure as its chief. Steven Mather had an
equally significant role in the creation of the National Park Service. Like
Pinchot's, Mather's vision haunts the agency he helped create.23
Finally, and not coincidentally, both agencies operate under "paradoxi-
cal ' 24 legislative mandates. The National Park Service Organic Act of
rale. He stated, "This demonization [of the Forest Service] is on the verge of bringing down this
agency." Forest Service "No Demon," DENV. POST, Sept. 18, 1996, at B1.
16. 7 C.F.R. § 2.60 (1997). This regulation delegates authority to the Chief of the Forest
Service to manage the National Forest System and defines the chief's responsibility for "forestry"
to include:
renewable and nonrenewable resources of forests, including lands governed by the Alas-
ka National Interest Lands Conservation Act, forest-related rangeland, grassland,
brushland, woodland, and alpine areas including but not limited to recreation, range,
timber, minerals, watershed, wildlife and fish; natural scenic, scientific, cultural, and his-
toric values of forests and related lands; and derivative values such as economic strength
and social well being.
Id.
17. Congress allowed hunting and certain off-road motorized access to national preserves in
Alaska, managed by the Park Service. See Deborah Williams, ANILCA: A Different Legal Frame-
work for Managing the Extraordinary National Park Units of the Last Frontier, 74 DENY. U. L.
REV. 859, 860-64 (1997).
18. Charles F. Wilkinson & H. Michael Anderson, Land and Resource Planning in the Na-
tional Forests, 23 OR. L. REv. 1, 15-19 (1985), Michael Frome, THE FOREST SERVICE 12-25
(1984).
19. National Park Service Organic Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1-4 (1994); see Robin W. Winks, The
National Park Service Act of 1916: "A Contradictory Mandate?", 74 DENY. U. L. REv. 575, 583-
85 (1997).
20. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 561, 26 Stat. 1095, 1103 (repealed in 1976); see Wilkinson &
Anderson, supra note 18, at 17-18.
21. Yellowstone National Park Act of 1872, 16 U.S.C. § 21 (1994).
22. MicHAEL WILLIAMS, AMERICANS AND THEm FORESTS 417-421 (1989).
23. DYAN ZASLOWSKY & T.H. WATKINS, THESE AMERICAN LANDS 22-27 (1994).
24. I offer two defmitions of "paradox" that may apply here: "a statement that is seemingly
contradictory or opposed to common sense and yet is perhaps true" and "a self-contradictory state-
ment that at first seems true." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 842 (10th ed.
1993).
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1916' declares that the purpose of the national parks is to "conserve" scen-
ery, "natural and historic objects" and "wild life" and provide for their enjoy-
ment "by such means" as to leave them "unimpaired for the enjoyment of
future generations. 26 Congress did not specify by what means the Park Ser-
vice was to "conserve". "unimpaired" the national parks while providing for
their "enjoyment." In the 1897 "Organic Act"" authorizing management of
what were to become the national forests, Congress provided a mandate to
"improve and protect the forest" while at the same time "securing favorable
conditions of water flows" and furnishing "a continuous supply of timber for
the use and necessities of citizens of the United States. '2 Again, how to use
the resources while protecting them remains unspecified.
At present, the paradoxical mandates of the two agencies facilitate the
generation of perceptions of agency purpose at odds with actual agency con-
duct. They allow those of us who are interested in public land management to
project our vision and values onto the language Congress used to instruct these
agencies. This almost insures that some significant part of the interested public
will believe that the agencies conduct is not only wrong but illegal.
Federal officials are fond of saying that when they anger both sides in a
dispute, they are probably doing their jobs. In fact, operating in a manner that
defies the expectations of interested outside groups has a corrosive quality. It
corrodes working relationships between the agency and its potential partners in
the community in which it operates, and it corrodes judicial deference to agen-
cy action. When a Winnebago tourist, who believes the national parks exist for
his enjoyment, hears that the Park Service is planning to ban cars from Zion
National Park,29 he feels betrayed. When a wilderness enthusiast, who be-
lieves the national parks exist to preserve natural wonders, finds the equivalent
of a shopping mall in Yosemite Valley, she feels betrayed.3" When a timber
25. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1-4 (1994).
26. 16 U.S.C. § 1. The National Park Service Organic Act declares that:
The service thus established shall promote and regulate the of the Federal areas known
as national parks, monuments, and reservations... by such means and measures as
conform to the fundamental purpose ... which purpose is to conserve the scenery and
the natural and historic objects and the wild life therein and to provide for the enjoyment
of the same in such manner and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the
enjoyment of future generations.
Id. (emphasis added).
27. Forest Service Organic Administration Act of June 4, 1897, 16 U.S.C. § 473-482, 551
(1994). The Forest Service's pre-1976 authorizing legislation includes: Forest Transfer Act, 16
U.S.C. §§ 472, 615b, 554, 524 (1994); Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. §§
528-531 (1994).
28. 16 U.S.C. § 475. The Forest Service Organic Administration Act states that "[nlo nation-
al forest shall be established, except to improve and protect the forest within the boundaries, or for
the purpose of securing favorable conditions of water flows, and to furnish a continuous supply of
timber for the use and necessities of citizens of the United States." Id.
29. See Tom Kenworthy & Gary Younge, Falling into a Hole at Grand Canyon; Nation's
Parks Face Severe Budget Crunch; WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 1996, at A23 (stating that Zion Nation-
al Park officials are considering a ban on automobiles in the park to address visitation pressures
and limited funds).
30. George Cameron Coggins & Robert L. Glicksman, Concessions Law and Policy in the
National Park System, 74 DENv. U. L. REV. 729, 740 (1997) (discussing only one instance in
which the National Park Service has been enjoined from allowing facility development to accom-
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mill worker who believes that the purpose of the Forest Service is to furnish
"a continuous supply of timber" learns the Forest Service will sell less timber
in order to protect owl habitat, the timber mill worker feels betrayed." When
a judge who believes that the purpose of the Forest Service is to protect na-
tional forest resources for future generations sees pictures of national forest
land that look more like a clipped poodle than a landscape, the judge is in-
clined to believe the agency has broken the law.32
So how did these agencies get stuck with such counter-productive man-
dates, and why did it take the better part of the twentieth century for the man-
dates to create such problems? I suggest that these paradoxical mandates once
served to enhance agency prestige and esprit de corps by giving the powerful
men who influenced the agencies' early years language onto which they could
project their vision and that, in a world in which Congress and the Cabinet
provided the only arenas for disputes about the public land, their opacity did
little or no harm. Times have changed; ambiguity which once provided agen-
cies necessary latitude before Congress and the Cabinet now inspire sophisti-
cated western interest groups to challenge agency policy. Mandates which
once contributed to the rise of agency discretion now contribute to its decline.
II. VISIONS, WEALTH AND CRAMPED GOVERNMENT OFFICES
Stephen Mather was 47 and a Borax tycoon when he made his tour of the
western national parks in 1914.33 A promoter, originator of the "twenty mule
team" borax slogan,34 and a business strategist who had bested Francis
Marion "Borax" Smith in the business Smith had originated,35 Mather was
also an outdoorsman, member of John Muir's tiny Sierra Club and participant
in the Club's 1905 Mount Rainier expedition. 6 Mather did not find the man-
agement of the western parks to his liking.37 He wrote Franklin Lane, Secre-
tary of the Interior and a friend from Mather's college days at Berkeley."
Lane wrote back telling Mather that if he didn't like the way the national
modate visitation within a national park).
31. President Clinton addressed the timber-spotted owl conflict in the Pacific Northwest by
forming the "Forest Ecosystem Management Assessment Team." The team presented a plan, and
the plan's "Option 9" was selected as the approach to limit timber harvest in order to protect the
owls. Local opposition was fierce. Sue Kupillas, an Oregon county commissioner, testified before
a House subcommittee, stating "Our worst fears were realized when the FEMAT [Forest Ecosys-
tem Management Assessment Team] group emerged from its secret deliberations and handed
down plans that included an 80-percent reduction in timber harvests, with corresponding losses of
revenues upon which we depend." Hearing on President Clinton's Forest Plan for Spotted Owl
Before the Subcommittee on National Parks, Forest, and Lands, House Committee on Resources,
104 Cong. (1996) (statement of Sue Kupillas, Commissioner, Jackson County, Oregon).
32. See, e.g., Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Espy, 998 F.2d 699, 704-05 (9th Cir. 1993) (af-
firming injunction of Forest Service from awarding timber contracts in Pacific Northwest national
forests that would log habitat suitable for the spotted Qwl until the agency complies with the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act and the National Forest Management Act).
33. SHANKLAND, supra note 1, at v.
34. Id. at 27-28.
35. Id. at 33-39.
36. Id. at 9.
37. Id. at 7.
38. Id.
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parks were run, he could come down to Washington and run them himself.39
Mather did.'
Mather left a life of comfort in Chicago, moved into a small office in the
Department of the Interior, and through a decade and one-half of almost inces-
sant labor left an indelible impression on the national parks and the people
who run them. Mather supplemented his employees' salaries out of his own
pocke4 and purchased significant assets for the parks with his own money,
including the Tioga Road, the only eastern, and most spectacular, entrance into
Yosemite National Park.42 He used his personal connections in business and
government to further the interests of the national parks as he saw them, and
he had much to do with the passage of the National Park Service Organic Act
of 1916." Mather knew what he wanted the national parks to be, and he used
every asset at his disposal to remake them in that image."
Mather's mixture of vision and philanthropy in government service strikes
us as alien and even slightly disturbing. He was of another time, not so much
in his willingness to spend almost unlimited quantities of his money and time
to further his version of the public good,45 but rather in his choice of the fed-
eral government as the instrument of his will.
Mathers are rare in any age, but Stephen Mather was not unique in his
time. He operated in the wake of a better known and similar man. Gifford
Pinchot was not a businessman. He was rich. Few would deny that Pinchot's
gifts for promotion and organization would have made him an excellent busi-
nessman had his vision not taken him in another direction. As a very young
man he travelled to Europe to study forestry and encountered there the perpet-
ually harvested and perpetually maintained forests of France, Germany and
Switzerland.' As Pinchot wrote in his autobiography:
The Forests of Haye and Vandoeuvres are.., hardwood forests,
managed on a system of coppice (sprouts cut once every thirty years)
under standards (seedling trees cut once in 150 years). They gave me
my first concrete understanding of the forest as a crop, and I became
deeply interested not only in how the crop was grown, but also in
how it was harvested and reproduced.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Winks, supra note 19, at 58.
42. Mather's generosity described:
Congress would get around to voting the parks an ample appropriation only when it
heard a loud enough public demand, but it would hear a loud enough public demand
only after an ample appropriation had been spent on publicity and improvements. A cash
primer was called for to set the process off. Mather thought about this and had a famil-
iar reaction. He hauled out his checkbook. For a curtain-raiser to his park administration
he wanted to make some noise .... Casting about for an idea, he remembered the
Tioga Road, a broken-down east-west thoroughfare, fifty-six miles long that bisected
[Yosemite National] [P]ark.
Id. at 57-58.
43. SHANKLAND, supra note 1, at 100-06.
44. Id. at 243.
45. Witness Ross Perot.
46. GIFFoRD PINcHol, BREAKING NEw GROUND 10-22 (1947).
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Work in these woods was assured for every year, and would be,
barring accidents, world without end. The forest supported a perma-
nent population of trained men... and not only a permanent popu-
lation but also permanent forest industries, supported and guaranteed
by a fixed annual supply of trees ready for the ax.'
Pinchot brought the vision of sustained yield forestry back to the United States
in the early 1890s and spent most of the next twenty years lobbying for the
creation of the national forests and creating the organization that would man-
age them, the United States Forest Service." Like Mather, he moved into
cramped government offices and created an agency which eventually grew to
include tens of thousands of employees controlling millions of acres of
land.49
Pinchot's philanthropy was not as ostentatious as Mather's. However, the
Yale Forestry School, established to train his successors in the Forest Service,
owes much to his largess.'
Like Mather, Pinchot used the government to further his vision. As
Mather saw the national parks on his 1914 trip, so Pinchot saw the Depart-
ment of the Interior "forest reserves" when he inspected them on his visit to
the west as a "confidential forest agent" in 1897." Like Mather, he used all
the assets at his disposal to remake the reserve system in the image of the
perpetual forestry he brought from Europe, personally reformulated for his
native country.52
III. GETTING "CARTE BLANcHE" FROM CONGRESS
A. Personal Vision and Washington Politics
In the age of Mather and Pinchot, there were two significant obstacles to
using the machinery of the federal government to realize a personal vision:
Congress and cabinet-level officials. Both Mather and Pinchot became masters
at manipulating Congress and the various secretaries of Interior and Agricul-
ture.
Generating benign popular interest has always been a key to congressional
support. Michael Frome, a journalist himself, observes that Gifford Pinchot
"may have been the best press agent of his time"'3 As Theodore Roosevelt,
an intimate friend of Pinchot's, notes in his autobiography:
It is doubtful whether there has ever been elsewhere in the Gov-
47. Id. at 13.
48. Id. at .188-262.
49. In 1898 Pinchot Succeeded Bernhard Femow as chief of the division of Forestry in the
Department of Agriculture. He began with eleven employees "the nucleus of the Forest Service
today." FROME, supra note 18, at 19.
50. FRoME, supra note 18, at 298-299.
51. PINCHOT, supra note 46, at 122-132.
52. Pinchot had considerable disdain for those who wished to apply European forestry prin-
ciples unaltered in the United States. Id. at 147. However, it is far from clear how his personal
vision differed from theirs.
53. FROME, supra note 18, at 45 (Frome quickly notes that Mather ran a close second).
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emnment such effective publicity [as that of the Forest Ser-
vice]-purely in the interest of the people-at so low a cost. Before
the educational work of the Forest Service was stopped by the Taft
Administration, it was securing the publication of facts about forestry
in fifty million copies of newspapers a month.54
Pinchot lobbied for the 1897 "Forest Service Organic Act"'5 which gave
authority to sell timber to whomever managed the national forests.56 Pinchot
termed it a "door wide open to the forester."'57 Pinchot mounted a lengthy
political campaign which finally resulted in the 1905 Transfer Act58 which
transferred authority over the forest reserves from the Department of the
Interior, where Pinchot had made some enemies, 9 to the Department of
Agriculture, where he had good friends.' The hallmark of his victory over
Congress was his establishment of a significant federal agency authorized by
only a few paragraphs of congressional mandate. Pinchot did not want
Congress interfering which his Forest Service or his vision of the national
forests, and he significantly advanced that end by preventing Congress from
imposing any significant legal standards on himself or his agency.
Similarly, Mather worked for enthusiastic congressional support of the
national parks without congressional participation in their management.
Between his arrival in Washington in early 1915 and passage of the National
Park Service Organic Act on August 25, 1916, he marshalled his friends in the
press to cover the parks,6' and, in the summer of 1915 he took a select group
of influential people on a tour of the western parks. 62 The party contained a
number of well positioned members of Congress, including Gilbert Grosvenor
of the National Geographic Society and the United States Geological Survey's
most prized trail cook, Ty Sing. 63 Mather was a Republican who "took the
Bull Moose turn-off' in 1912.6 He worked happily and effectively in Demo-
cratic administrations. When Republicans of a very different sort recaptured
the White House in 1920, and Albert Fall, of Teapot Dome fame, became Sec-
retary of the Interior, Mather had established a sufficient network of influential
friends to prevent Fall from doing much damage to the national parks.'
Professor Fischman points out that scholars have focused considerable
attention on a single prescriptive phrase in the National Park Service Organic
54. Id. at 45-46.
55. 16 U.S.C. §§ 473-482, 551.
56. 16 U.S.C. § 475.
57. PINCHOr, supra note 46, at 117.
58. 16 U.S.C. §§ 472, 615b, 524, 554.
59. WILLIAMs, supra note 22, 105, at 418 (describing Pinchot's attack on the Department of
the Interior's General Land Office for its incompetence in managing the forest reserves).
60. Notably "Tama" Jim Wilson, Secretary of Agriculture, who Pinchot described:
He was a grand man to work for. He knew enough, as plenty of executives do not, to
give a man his head-let him alone, so long as he stayed on the right track.
PINCHOT, supra note 46, at 137.
61. SHANKLAND, supra note 1, at 83-99.
62. Id. at 68.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 42.
65. Id. at 217-18.
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Act of 1916:'
[T]o conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the
wild life therein and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such
a manner and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the
enjoyment of future generations.67
They have done so, in part, because it is the only prescriptive provision in the
1916 law. In that act, Mather gained the authority to hire employees, the
authority to make and publish rules and regulations "necessary or proper for
the use and management of the parks," the authority to sell and dispose of
timber "in order to control the attacks of insects or diseases or otherwise con-
serve the scenery," the authority to destroy "detrimental" animals and plants,
the authority to grant "privileges, leases, and permits for the use of land for
the accommodation of visitors," and the authority to permit cattle grazing
"when [in the judgment of the Secretary of the Interior] such use is not detri-
mental to the primary purpose for which such park... was created." The
law granted this authority subject to the limitations imposed in specific acts
establishing parks' and the paradoxical provision quoted above.
B. The Promise of Balance
The success Pinchot and Mather enjoyed in their dealings with Congress
and the Cabinet had something to do with their promises, explicit and implicit,
to do the difficult job of striking a balance between preservation and use. The
texts of the laws Congress enacted clearly indicated congressional awarenesss
of the need for such a balance.7" While the legislators of the first decades of
the century could not imagine the effect of chainsaws, snowmobiles and inter-
state highways, they understood that managing the public lands required trade-
offs.
The creation of the original forest reserves in 1891 was intended to stop
unregulated timber harvest on sensitive public lands and provided no authority
for the sale of federal timber.7 This set off a backlash among those who ben-
efitted from logging on public land and led to the 1897 Organic Act which au-
thorized regulated timber cutting." Pinchot obtained control of the national
forests in 1905 by telling Congress that he and the agency he created could
regulate the timber harvest to the benefit of all the people without damaging
the national forest resources or draining the treasury."
66. Robert L. Fischman, The Problem of Statutory Detail in National Park Establishment
Legislation and its Relationship to Pollution Control Law, 74 DENY. U. L. REv. 779, 779-80
(1997).
67. 16 U.S.C. § 1.
68. 16 U.S.C. § 3.
69. Fischman, supra note 66, at 779-80; see also Dennis J. Herman, Loving Them to Death:
Legal Controls on the Type and Scale of Development in the National Parks, 11 STAN. ENvTL.
LJ. 3, 16-31 (1992).
70. See supra notes 16-28, and accompanying text.
71. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 561, 26 Stat. 1095, 1103, (repealed 1976).
72. FROME, supra note 18, at 18-19.
73. See Robert E. Wolf, National Forest Timber Sales and the Legacy of Gifford Pinchot:
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The seminal policy document for Pinchot's Forest Service, the document
that acted "to crystallize the purpose and spirit of the new enterprise in terms
that are as valid today [1946] as they were forty years ago [1905]" was a
letter transmitted to Pinchot by his friend, Secretary of Agriculture James
"Tama Jim" Wilson, dated the day of the transfer of authority over the forest
reserves into Pinchot's hands.75 In his autobiography, Pinchot coyly noted
"[t]hat letter, it goes without saying, I had brought to the Secretary for his
signature. ' 6 The letter states:
In the administration of the forest reserves it must be clearly
borne in mind that all land is to be devoted to its most productive use
for the permanent good of the whole people .... All the resources of
the forest reserves are for use, and this use must be brought about in
a thoroughly prompt and businesslike manner, under such restrictions
only as will insure the permanence of these resources .... The per-
manence of the resources of the reserves is... indispensable to con-
tinued prosperity, and the policy of this department for their protec-
tion and use will invariably be guided by this fact, always bearing in
mind that the conservative use of these resources in no way conflicts
with their permanent value.
You will see to it that the water, wood, and forage of the re-
serves are conserved and wisely used for the benefit of the
homebuilder first of all .... 77
Reading through the text of Pinchot's letter, one senses the oscillation between
declarations in favor of use and of preservation. In the first two sentences, use
is paramount, modified by the need for permanence. However, by the end of
the paragraph, "permanence" and even "protection" dominate, modified by
allegedly consistent "conservative use."
The tension between use and preservation framed the debate surrounding
enactment of the National Park Service Organic Act of 1916 (1916 Act). The
debate took place in the shadow of the 1913 Hetch-Hetchy dam controversy,
in which federal agencies, supported by Pinchot and opposed by his former
friend John Muir, allowed the City of San Francisco to build a dam in Yo-
semite National Park and flood one of its most beautiful valleys.78 Mather
was still in the Borax trade when the Hetch-Hetchy controversy took place,
but the fight spurred the movement to establish a separate agency to manage
the national parks, 79 a movement that Pinchot opposed.' The promise in the
Managing A Forest and Making It Pay, 60 U. COLO. L. REv. 1037, 1045-51 (1989) (discussing
Pinchot's promises to Congress regarding the Forest Service's profitability and budget).
74. PINCHOT, supra note 46, at 261.
75. See id. at 260-61.
76. Id. at 260.
77. Id. at 261.
78. FROME, supra note 18, at 276.
79. Id.
80. When the idea of a separate national park service was first introduced, Pinchot scoffed
that it "was no more needed than two tails to a cat." FRANK E. SMrrH, TmE PoLmcs OF CONSER-
VATION 155 (1966). Pinchot believed the Forest Service should run the National Parks. Hetch-
Hetchy among other things made that impossible. Id.
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1916 Act to preserve the parks while facilitating their enjoyment suggested
that there would be no more need to resolve Hetch-Hetchy-like controversies
in Congress. Two prominent sponsors of the 1916 Act, Congressmen John E.
Raker and William Kent, had been in the thick of the debate and strong pro-
ponents of the Hetch-Hetchy dam. Kent, an outdoorsman, suffered the loss of
his friendship with John Muir as a result of the Hetch-Hetchy dispute."
Franklin Lane, the Secretary of the Interior who hired Mather, had also sup-
ported the Hetch-Hetchy dam. 2 The single prescriptive provision of the 1916
Act, quoted above, requires both use and preservation.83 From now on, bal-
ancing would be done at the agency level.
Many of the current balancing acts regarding both national parks and
national forests center around one extremely useful and destructive technology,
internal combustion vehicles and the roads on which they travel. Some of the
damage and pressure associated with roads, cars, campers, snowmobiles and
all-terrain vehicles can be traced to Stephen Mather's enthusiastic acceptance
of automobiles as a means of access to the national parks. While much of the
current problems may have been inevitable in light of America's romance with
the automobile, some can be traced to Mather's personal romance with the
automobile:
As (in the jargon of the early motor age) an "auto crank," Mather
belonged to the American Automobile Association and the Chicago
Automobile Association and operated a car of his own in Washing-
ton. He knew what agonies the motorist suffered. Once, in the spring
of 1916, he invited Grace and Horace Albright on a spin to Rich-
mond, but they stopped spinning in a sea of mud in Fairfax Court
House on the outskirts of the national capital.84
Mather's biographer observes that "[firom the start [Mather] touted the au-
tomobile as a source of abundant strength to the national parks," an assertion,
he adds, "inescapable [as] it seems now, that most of his colleagues fiercely
resisted." 5
In 1916, Congress delegated Mather the authority to set the balance be-
tween use and preservation in the national parks.' In setting that balance, he
decided automobiles were a good thing for use and not a bad thing for preser-
vation.8" In 1915, he had opened Yellowstone National Park to automo-
biles," and was present at the dedication of Rocky Mountain National Park
and "the greatest automobile demonstration ever seen in Colorado [300
cars]." '89 Additionally, Mather is credited with inspiring the National Park-to-
Park Highway Association dedicated to connecting the national parks by high-
81. RODERICK NASH, WILDERNESS AND THE AMERICAN MIND at 173-175 (3d ed. 1982).
82. Id. at 170.
83. See supra note 16.
84. SHANKLAND, supra note 1, at 148.
85. Id. at 147.
86. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1-4.
87. SHANKLAND, supra note 1, at 154.
88. Id. at 151.
89. Id. at 79.
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way so that "the people can tour all the national parks by machine."
Robert Sterling Yard recalled Mather's statements inducing one reluctant
developer to build a hotel in Yosemite Valley: "Why, look at those cars!" he
snorted. "There must be close to two hundred of them. Where's your imagina-
tion, man? Some day there'll be a thousand!"'
In the long run, the significance of Stephen Mather's enthusiastic accep-
tance of the automobile as a method of enjoying national parks, dwarfs the
significance of the Hetch-Hetchy dispute. Some modem visitors to Yosemite
find the valley saved-the Yosemite valley, with its grand hotels, stores,
crowds and armed rangers-far less evocative of any spirit of natural grandeur
than its flooded sister, Hetch-Hetchy. 9 Stephen Mather may not have imag-
ined the "industrial tourists" of Edward Abbey's famous polemic on tourism in
the national parks, but he certainly had a hand in creating them.93
C. Carte Blanche
The better part of a century of public land management controversies
demonstrate that there is at best a tension and at worst a direct contradiction in
a mandate that directs an agency to exploit a public land resource and preserve
it at the same time. The American people are "loving their parks to death":94
using them to a degree that will ultimately degrade their value for future use.
Forest Service logging and road building, even when subject to political scruti-
ny, continues to silt-up salmon runs, cause landslides,95 reduce the habitat for
90. Id. at 150 (quoting Gus Holms of Cody, Wyoming, one of the organization's founders).
91. Id. at 147.
92. Summertime in Yosemite:
Yosemite Valley feels enclosed and civilized, tamed and overrun by humans,
swarmed upon in the 1850s by Gold Rush zealots and subsequently by entrepreneurs
eager to take advantage of a new concept in leisure: tourism.
Last summer, visitors without camp or lodge reservations had to be turned away
for six straight weekends. As autumn approached, park officials were experimenting with
weekend changes in the traffic patterns, making some roads one-way and closing a few
others.
Robert Cross, The Weeping Face: Indian Legend or Glacier? SUN-SENTiNEL (Ft. Lauderdale), July
14, 1996 at 1J.
93. EDWARD ABBEY, Polemic: Industrial Tourist and the National Parks, in THE SERPENTS
OF PARADISE 110 (John Macrae ed. 1995). The modem version of Mather's credo emerges in the
statement of the road crew surveying boss Abbey encounters in Arches National Park half a centu-
ry later.
"Look," the [surveying] party chief explained, "Mou need this road." He was a
pleasant-mannered, soft-spoken civil engineer with an unquestioning dedication to his
work. A very dangerous man .... When this road is built you'll get ten, twenty, thirty
times as many tourists in here as you get now." His men nodded in solemn agreement,
and he stared at me intently, waiting to see what possible answer I could have to that.
"Have some more water," I said. I had an answer all right but I was saving it for
later. I knew I was dealing with a madman.
Id. at 114.
94. See Jan G. Laitos, National Parks and the Recreation Resource, 74 DENV. U. L. REv.
847 (1997), Robert B. Keiter, Preserving Nature in the National Parks: Law, Policy, and Science
in a Dynamic Environment, 74 DENY. U. L. REv. 649 (1997).
95. A cause of landslides:
"It was no act of God that caused these landslides," said Andy Stahl of the Association
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forest species and ultimately reduce the ability of the forests to produce
timber.'
The conflict between use and preservation leads many scholars to ponder
the language of the various laws and quasi-legal documents that outline the
institutional missions of the Park Service and Forest Service. Scholars endeav-
or to discover, through close reading of the texts, what Congress might have
told Stephen Mather or Gifford Pinchot to do in a world with chainsaws,
snowmobiles, and Cinemax theaters.'
But consideration of these mandates in the context of the history of their
times suggests a disturbing alternative: These mandates have no content. Men
like Mather and Pinchot sought support from Congress, but not direction. The
legislative mandates they lobbied for and, in large part, achieved, were so
broad they were almost meaningless. They received the authority to operate
with the blessing of Congress, but without congressional supervision. Mather
and Pinchot received carte blanche. Neither man was a lawyer and therefore
both lacked a lawyer's customary veneration of legislative text and history.
Both men were instrumentalists when it came to Congress, using the assets at
their disposal to extract from Congress the authority they needed to further
their visions for the public land. Paradoxical mandates were a particularly
useful form of legislative carte blanche. They appear to have substance be-
of Forest Service Employees for Environmental Ethics. "With few exceptions, the slides
resulted form [sic] clearcutting and logging roads on steep hillsides." Many of the as-
sessments were made by aerial surveys, Stahl said, adding the damage to the region's
threatened salmon runs must await more detailed ground inspections.
Forest employees: Logging worsened landslides, GANNETr NEws SERv., Feb. 15, 1996, available
in 1996 WL 4374215.
96. The ability of forest soils to remain productive through repeated timber harvests has been
debated for decades. In, 1971, Dr. Robert R. Curry, Professor of Environmental Geology at the
University of Montana, testified before the Church committee. Curry discussed the "long range
adverse effects of clear-cutting on soil nutrients." STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND
INSULAR AFFAIRS, 92D CONG., "CLEAR-CUTtING" PRACTICES ON NATIONAL TIMBERLANDS: HEAR-
INGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON PUBLIC LANDS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSU-
LAR AFFAIRS 158 (Comm. Print 1971) [hereinafter 1971 CoMMrrTEE REPORT]. Curry's issue was
one of the few issues discussed during the hearings specifically referenced in the subcommittee's
subsequent report. 1972 COMMrrTEE REPORT, supra note 12, at 1. During the hearings, Chairman
Church called the "question of loss of nutrient and adequate management of the soil" a "most
critical question that has been uncovered in the course of these hearings." 1971 COMMITTEE RE-
PORT, supra at 829.
97. Consider.
While in Springdale [Utah], treat yourself to a visit to the new large-screen Zion
Canyon Cinemax Theatre, opened in May 1994. The theater has been showing a spec-
tacular film on Zion and nearby scenic areas called "Zion Canyon-Treasure of the
Gods." Early this month, the theater began showing a second film entitled "The Great
American West." The films are each about 40 minutes in length and shown on alternat-
ing hours. The $7 ticket may seem a bit pricey until you have viewed either of the films.
The two films are presented in an indoor auditorium on a six-story-high screen.
The sound system is terrific. The projected images are splendid and hard to describe.
Either film will give you an eagle-eyed view of scenery only a handful of photographers
will ever see firsthand. It is no substitute for visiting Zion and other scenic treasures of
the West yourself, but you will get an introduction to scenery so difficult to access that
you may never see it on your own.
Margo Bartlett Pesek, Autumn Helps Make Zion National Park a Must See Destination, LAS VE-
GAS REv.-J., Nov. 17, 1996, at 8K.
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cause they speak of general values in mandatory terms. However, they do not
significantly constrain agency action. Almost anything can be justified between
the two poles of "use" and "preservation", extensive clearcuts9s and swank
hotels" as well as limitations on rafting access"to and livestock trains."
The resolution of the paradox required balancing, and balancing traditionally
fell within the expert agencies' discretion.
IV. A CHANGED WESTERN LANDSCAPE
The political landscape of the American west has changed dramatically
since Mather and Pinchot's time. The level of use on the public lands has
multiplied many times. Use pressures come from both within and without
national park boundaries. Visitation has increased over 800% in the last forty
years." 2 The constituency for preservation has grown almost as fast.
Mather's small social Sierra Club now contains more than half a million peo-
ple. ' 3 Development near park borders increasingly causes conflict."4 New
parks and monuments are subject to intense political debates that lead to com-
promises in establishment legislation, often at the expense of traditional park
purposes and prohibitions. °"
As significantly, battles over western public land policy, which once took
place almost exclusively in the halls of Congress, now take place in federal
court, 1 6 state court, before county commissioners" and governors' com-
98. FROME, supra note 18, at 108-12.
99. Consider
The Ahwahnee Hotel at Yosemite National Park is hosting its midwinter Chefs
Holiday program Feb. 2-5. Chefs from restaurants throughout California will hold morn-
ing and afternoon cooking demonstrations in the main ballroom. A reception on the first
evening will allow tour participants to meet the chefs. A final banquet Feb. 5 will be
prepared by the chef-instructors. Guests stay three nights at the Ahwahnee or at the
nearby Yosemite Lodge, take three cooking classes and tour the historic Ahwahnee and
its kitchen. Cost: $499 per person, double occupancy at the Ahwahnee; $379 per person,
double occupancy at Yosemite Lodge. Both prices include transportation via Amtrak,
cooking demonstrations and two meals.
Tours, ARIz. REPuBLic, Jan. 5, 1997, at T4.
100. Wilderness Public Rights Fund v. Kleppe, 608 F.2d 1250, 1251 (9th Cir. 1979).
101. High Sierra Hikers Ass'n v. Kennedy, 1995 WL 382369, at *17 (N.D. Cal. June 14,
1995).
102. See Laitos, supra note 94, at 851.
103. As of May, 1996, the Sierra Club had 587,000 members. Alex Barnum, A Fresh Look
for Sierra Club, S.F. CHRON., May 25, 1996, at Al.
104. See, e.g., Al Knight, The Real Story of Mine Swap at Yellowstone, DENV. POST, Aug. 14,
1996, at B9 (discussing President Clinton's agreement with a Canadian company to swap land to
stop a proposed gold mine development near Yellowstone National Park). For a discussion of park
boundaries and their relationship to wildlife management and ecological processes, see Keiter,
supra note 94.
105. For example, traditional prohibitions against hunting and off-road vehicle access were
expressly eliminated from the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, the 1980 legisla-
tion that created or expanded 13 of Alaska's 15 national park units. See Williams, supra note 17
(discussing greater statutory detail in national park establishment legislation that results from the
increasingly complex land use system that exists under new parks and creeps closer to established
parks).
106. California Coastal Cormm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 577 (1987).
107. City of Colorado Springs v. Board of County Comm'rs of County of Eagle, 895 P.2d
1105, 1109 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994).
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missions.'" The once hierarchical public land management regime-with
Congress and the Cabinet at the top, the agencies below and the users below
them-has given way to a much more pluralistic, sometimes anarchic political
process. Expertise and resources once concentrated in federal agencies are now
spread among local governments, industry groups and public interest groups,
to name only the most obvious."°
In 1985, the United States Supreme Court held that state agencies could
regulate mining operations on national forest land."0 This holding represents
and accelerates a trend toward more local and state participation in federal
land use decisions."' More recently, western counties have been declaring
themselves masters of federal land within their borders in an apparent attempt
to usurp the Forest Service's functions completely.'
1 2
This new political pluralism has transformed the effect of paradoxical
agency mandates. Interest groups are willing to exploit congressionally-created
ambiguity to further their goals. "Carte blanche" mandates, rather than provid-
ing a vehicle for pursuing personal or agency vision, allow interest groups to
project their visions onto the congressional mandates. This provides the inter-
est groups with something far more significant than legal arguments; it pro-
vides the conviction that they are right.
In his book-length attack on federal land management in the west, War on
the West,"3 William Perry Pendley, a lawyer who, in his own words, "repre-
sents hundreds of westerners in the battle against environmental oppres-
sion,"'' takes the Park Service to task for ignoring its legislative mandate:
Congress saw parks as preforming two missions: "to conserve the
scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wildlife therein
and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such a manner and
by such means as to leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of
future generations" (emphasis added). Note that Congress chose the
word "conserve," not "preserve...... In other words, the National
Park Service was to utilize those natural resources wisely, not place
them off limits to the people.
The National Park Service is currently busy putting a creative
spin on the statutes under which it is supposed to operate .... The
108. See, e.g., D. Craig Bell et al., Retooling Western Water Management: The Park City
Principles, 31 LAND & WATER L. REV. 303 (1996). The Western Governor's Association and
Western States Water Council sponsored workshops in 1993 and 1994 to develop western states
capacity to deal with complex water issues. Id. The workshops led to the adoption of the "Park
City Principles" which attempt to defime the relationships and roles of different levels of govern-
ment and private users with respect to water rights. Id.
109. See WESTERN PUBLIC LANDS AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 4-6 (Charles Davis ed.
1997)
110. California Coastal Comm'n, 480 U.S. at 613-14.
111. See City of Colorado Springs, 895 P.2d at 1120.
112. See United States v. Nye County, Nev., 920 F.Supp. 1108, 1109, 1120 (D. Nev. 1996)
(granting summary judgement to the federal government against the claim that Nye County owns
disputed federal lands in the county).
113. WILAM PERRY PENDLEY, WAR ON THE WEST: GOVERNMENT TYRANNY ON AMERICA'S
GREAT FRONTIER xvii-xx (1995).
114. Id. at231.
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NPS's views coincide with those of environmental extremists, the
self-proclaimed protectors of the nation's parks." 5
Environmentalists, concerned about the future of the national parks, see the
mandate of the 1916 Act in quite a different way:
The Organic Act of 1916 stipulated that the parks were to be pre-
served "unimpaired, for the enjoyment of future generations." By the
year 2010, visitation to the parks is expected to reach an astonishing
half-billion people a year, and if we do not take action, those "future
generations" may have little to enjoy that has not been significantly,
perhaps permanently, impaired."
6
Paradoxical agency mandates can be used to challenge agency action in
court. Most notably, in 1978, in United States v. New Mexico,"7 five justices
of the United States Supreme Court affirmed the State of New Mexico's use
of the language of the Forest Service Organic Act to reduce the water rights
the Forest Service could claim in the Rio Mimbres by finding narrow limits to
the preservation component in the 1897 Forest Service Organic Act:
The legislative debates surrounding the Organic Administration Act of
1897 and its predecessor bills demonstrate that Congress intended
national forests to be reserved for only two purposes--"[t]o conserve
the water flows, and to furnish a continuous supply of timber for the
people." . . National forests were not to be reserved for aesthetic,
environmental, recreational, or wildlife-preservation purposes."'
Justice Powell, joined by three other justices in dissent, championed a more
preservation-oriented view of the Organic Act:
I do not agree.., that the forests which Congress intended to "im-
prove and protect" are the still, silent, lifeless places envisioned by
115. Id. at 101-02 (citations omitted).
116. Zaslowsky & Watkins, supra note 23, at 51. Another writes:
Preservation has been a guiding mandate for the National Park System from the
moment Yosemite and Yellowstone were set aside for the enjoyment of future genera-
tions of park visitors. The mission of the parks is to provide visitors with a natural expe-
rience in a natural setting, to challenge people to meet nature on its own terms and come
away with an appreciation of the importance of the natural world. In carrying out this
mission, the National Park Service must refuse the whims and desires of popular de-
mand and instead exert a strong hand in shaping both the type and scale of development
to create an experience worthy of this mandate.
Dennis J. Herman, Loving Them to Death: Legal Controls on the Type and Scale of Development
in the National Parks, 11 STAN. ENVTL. LJ. 3, 66 (1992).
117. 438 U.S. 696, 697 (1978).
118. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 707-09. Interestingly, the majority bolstered their narrow view
of the language of the Forest Service Organic Act by citing the purportedly broader language of
the Park Service mandate:
Any doubt as to the relatively narrow purposes for which national forests were to be
reserved is removed by comparing the broader language Congress used to authorize the
establishment of national parks. In 1916, Congress created the National Park Service and
provided that the "fundamental purpose of the said parks, monuments, and reserva-
tions ... is to conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wild life
therein and to provide for the enjoyment of the same ... unimpaired for the enjoyment
of future generations."
Id. at 709 (footnotes omitted).
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the Court. In my view, the forests consist of the birds, animals, and
fish-the wildlife-that inhabit them, as well as the trees, flowers,
shrubs, and grasses....
My analysis begins with the language of the [Organic Adminis-
tration Act of 1897] .... Although the language of the statute is not
artful, a natural reading would attribute to Congress an intent to au-
thorize the establishment of national forests for three purposes...
"1) improving and protecting the forest, 2) securing favorable con-
ditions of water flows, and 3) furnishing a continuous supply of
timber."'' 9
The effect of paradoxical mandates reaches beyond cases in which the
language of the statutes are at issue and color a range of legal disputes about
the balance between preservation and use. In 1973, Congress passed the En-
dangered Species Act. 2° The first show-downs between this national man-
date to protect biological diversity and agency agendas involved the Little
Tennessee River and the Tennessee Valley Authority, 2' and the slopes of
Moana Kai and the Hawaii Department of Lands and Natural Resources."
However, since the middle 1980s, the United States Forest Service has borne
the brunt of the Endangered Species Act's effect. Efforts to enforce the
act-mostly in the form of federal court cases brought by environmental
groups-have severely curtailed agency discretion in the Forest Service's two
most valuable timber producing regions: the forests of the southeast-home of
the Red-Cockaded Woodpecker' 23 -and the forests of the Northwest, home
of the Northern Spotted Owl 24 and various runs of protected salmon."2
Forest Service timber production has dropped precipitously in recent years'26
119. Id. at 719-20 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citing Mimbres Valley Irrigation Co. v. Salopek,
564 P.2d 615, 617 (N.M. 1977)).
120. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1973).
121. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 172 (1978) (holding that Endangered
Species Act prohibited Tennessee Valley Authority from completing dam where construction of
the damn threatened to eradicate the snail darter, an endangered species).
122. Palila v. Hawaii Dept. of Land and Natural Resources, 852 F.2d 1106, 1110-11 (9th Cir.
1988) (holding that the state agency's permitting of sheep of on the slopes of Moana Kai consti-
tuted a "taking" under the Endangered Species Act because the sheep ate the mamane trees es-
sential for the habitat of the palila, an endangered bird); Palila v. Hawaii Dept. of Land and Natu-
ral Resources, 639 F.2d 495, 495-96 (9th Cir. 1981) (affirming summary judgment against the
state agency and order to remove feral sheep and goats from palila's critical habitat).
123. The red-cockaded woodpecker has been the subject of numerous federal court decisions.
See Sierra Club v. Glickman, 67 F.3d 90, 91 (5th Cir. 1995); Sierra Club v. Espy, 38 F.3d 792
(5th Cir. 1994); Region 8 Forest Serv. Timber Purchasers Council v. Alcock, 993 F.2d 800, 802
(l1th Cir. 1993); Sierra Club v. Lyng, .694 F. Supp. 1260, 1262 (E.D. Tex. 1988), affid in part,
vacated in part sub nom. Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 926 F. 2d 429 (5th Cir. 1991).
124. See, e.g., Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Babbitt, 998 F.2d 705, 707-09 (9th Cir. 1993) (af-
firming standing, possibility of injunction and order of supplementary environmental impact state-
ments for environmental groups suing to protect northern spotted owl habitat).
125. See, e.g., Pacific Rivers Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050, 1056 (9th Cir. 1994) (affirm-
ing injunction against Forest Service that prevents agency from proceeding with forest projects
authorized under management plans that violated the Endangered Species Act consultation require-
ment).
126. Timber production declined to 4.8 billion board feet in fiscal year 1994, down from
annual harvests regularly exceeding 10 billion board feet in the previous three decades. U.S. For-
est Service, Timber Sale Program Annual Report FY1994, fig. 3 <http//:www.-
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and not as a result of agency decisions.
In these situations, one can perceive a gap between what the Forest Ser-
vice is doing and what a powerful interest group believes they should be do-
ing. In each case that gap leads to conflict and, in many cases, an erosion of
Forest Service prestige and discretion. Generally, Congress and the Cabinet,
the primary concerns of Pinchot and Mather, are not involved. When they do
take a hand it is usually in support of the agency and is often indecisive.'"
Court decisions reveal evidence of a similar gap between interest groups'
expectations of the Park Service and Park Service actions. Groups are bringing
"Organic Act" claims against the Park Service. The Park Service still usually
wins these cases.'28 In Wilkins v. Lujan,' 9 a United States District Court
used the language of the National Park Service Organic Act to support its
argument that the Park Service had made a "clear error of judgment" in its
decision to remove wild horses from the Ozark National Scenic
Riverways.'" The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit sub-
sequently reversed. 3' The circuit decision used the National Park Service
Organic Act language concerning removal of "detrimental" animals and plants
to support Park Service discretion:
Our conclusion is supported by the 1916 Organic Act. . . "The
obvious purpose of [organic act] language is to require the Secretary
to determine when it is necessary to destroy animals which, for any
reason, may be detrimental to the use of the [national] park.'9
132
However, Judge Loken dissented:
To suit the Park managers' convenience and preconceived notions of
culture and history, we will now incur significant expense and short-
term environmental damage to remove a small band of wild horses
fs.fed.us/land/fm/tspirs/tspirs.html>.
127. In 1995, Congress passed a "salvage rider" to allow logging of insect and fire-damaged
old-growth timber in the Pacific Northwest, bypassing environmental regulations. Emergency
Salvage Timber Sale Program, Pub. L. 104-19 § 2001, 109 Stat. 240 (1995). In 1993, President
Clinton held a "Timber Summit" to address timber management issues in the Pacific Northwest.
Kathie Durbin, Forest Conference Reaches Harvest Point, PORTLAND OREGoNIAN, Apr. 2, 1993,
at Al.
128. See Bicycle Trails Council of Main v. Babbitt, 82 F.3d 1445, 1454 (9th Cir. 1996);
Greater Yellowstone Coalition v. Babbitt, 952 F.Supp. 1435 (D. Mont. 1996). The court in
Greater Yellowstone Coalition stated:
Title 16 of the United States Code, section one, requires NPS to conform its
actions to its purpose, which "purpose is to conserve the scenery and the natural and
historic objects and the wildlife therein and to provide for their enjoyment and leave
them unimpaired for future generations." 16 U.S.C. § 1. Plaintiffs argue that by this
statutory language Congress has clearly required NPS to leave the Yellowstone bison
absolutely untouched. But the statutory purpose language obviously gives park managers
broad discretion in determining how best to conserve wildlife and to leave them unim-
paired for future generations.
Greater Yellowstone Coalition, 952 F.Supp. at 1441.
129. 798 F.Supp. 557 (E.D. Mo. 1992), rev'd sub nom. Wilkins v. Secretary of Interior, 995
F.2d 850 (8th Cir. 1993) [hereinafter Wilkins 11].
130. Wilkins, 798 F.Supp. at 562-63.
131. Wilkins 11, 995 F.2d at 853.
132. Id. at 853. (quoting New Mexico State Game Comm'n v. Udall, 410 F.2d 1197, 1199
(10th Cir.1969)).
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from the 65,000-acre Ozark National Scenic Riverways. Most users
of the Park believe (and the record establishes it is a reasonable be-
lief) that these animals reflect the cultural heritage of the region and
contribute toward what Congress intended to foster, with only negligi-
ble impact on the Park's other resources and attractions. I am hard-
pressed to find a clearer example of arbitrary and capricious agency
action.'
33
While a victory for the Park Service, the decision demonstrates the willingness
of judges at both the district and circuit level to question Park Service deci-
sions about what "preservation" means.
The Park Service has begun losing a few cases to park user groups un-
happy with the balance it has struck between use and preservation. In Mausolf
v. Babbitt,'34 the United States district court in Minnesota granted summary
judgment to snowmobilers challenging the Park Service's determination to
prohibit snowmobiling on frozen lake shores in Voyageur National Park. 33
While the Park Service provided some "anecdotal" evidence that the snowmo-
biling disrupted the feeding patterns of protected eagles and wolves, the court
did not find the evidence convincing.'36
In another access case, a federal court in California enjoined the Park
Service from expanding the number of pack animals allowed for each party in
the wilderness area in Sequoia-Kings Canyon National Park. According to the
court in High Sierra Hikers Association v. Kennedy,'37 the Park Service had
failed to justify its decision not to prepare an environmental impact statement
analyzing its decision to alter its stock animal limits in the wilderness.'38
The finding that the proposed increase in the stock limit would
result in little or no change in actual stock use is inconsistent with the
premise on which the proposal is itself based. The EA [justifying not
preparing an EIS] explicitly states that the proposal is premised in
133. Id. at 853-54 (Loken, J., dissenting).
134. 913 F.Supp. 1334 (D. Minn. 1996).
135. Mausolf, 913 F.Supp. at 1344.
136. The court wrote:
A generous review of defendants' evidence reveals: Snowmobilers and other winter
recreationists have apparently displaced some wolves feeding on kills along shorelines,
but scientific evidence shows the likelihood of permanent displacement is less than mini-
mal. Of the four validated reports of wolf takings, two were aerial gunnings, bearing no
relation to snowmobile trail closures. One poacher drove a wolf off a kill and scavenged
the remains, with neither evidence nor suggestion that a snowmobile was present. Final-
ly, one snowmobiler apparently permanently displaced a wolf feeding on a kill. The only
formal, scientifically prepared reports indicate that snowmobilers have no significant
impact on wolf or eagle populations, although "generally accepted" principles indicate
that increased Park access, by whatever means, will likely result in increased mortality
among individual animals.
Mausolf, 913 F.Supp. at 1343. The court continued:
This "generally accepted" principle applies equally to any mode of transporta-
tion-snowmobiles, motor vehicles, skis, snowshoes, hiking, or aircraft. The value, if
any, of a snowmobile bar on the basis of such evidence is purely speculative.
Id. at 1344.
137. No. C-94-3570 CW, 1995 WL 382369 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
138. High Sierra, 1995 WL 382369, at *16.
[Vol. 74:3
1997] MANDATES, FOUNDERS, AND AGENCY DISCRETION 645
part on the existence of stock parties exceeding 20 animals who have
been "blocked" from entering the park by the pre-existing policy.
Since an express purpose of the proposal is to permit such previously
blocked parties to enter, it is arbitrary and capricious to assume that
they will not in fact enter.39
The Court cited the high level of controversy concerning alteration in the
stock animal limits as one of the factors supporting its decision."+
While specifically about Park Service failures to justify important deci-
sions, these two opinions speak directly to the balance between use and pres-
ervation and the discretion of the Park Service to strike that balance. Snow-
mobilers and hikers, like the environmental groups and local and state govern-
ments that batter the Forest Service, have the power to use the Park Service's
ambiguous mandate against it, projecting their values-preservation (in the
case of the hikers) or motorized use (in the case of the snowmobilers)--on
Congress' ambiguous language.
V. CONCLUSIONS
It would be alarmist and intellectually myopic to say that federal land
management agencies are being torn apart by their inadequate legislative man-
dates. It is fair to say, that in an age fraught with contradictory forces,
amounting, perhaps, to a complete reformulation of the American perception
of public land, the paradoxical mandates of the Forest Service and Park Ser-
vice are not helping any and may be hurting some. The differing interpreta-
tions of these mandates express a deeper cultural disconformity which may
indeed be tearing the agencies apart.
It also seems fair to observe that these mandates once made more practi-
cal sense than they do now. That congressional mandates to "go forth and do
good" had a place in a world of people like Pinchot and Mather, masters of
Washington politics, who were innocent of the organized, powerful indigenous
western interest groups so evident in today's public land disputes.
Congress could pass organic legislation telling the Forest Service and the
Park Service exactly what to do. Those who supported Jennings Randolph's
prescriptive Forest Service reform legislation in 1976,' subscribed to some-
thing approaching this idea. Randolph's bill was defeated, and Hubert
139. High Sierra, 1995 WL 382369, at *9.
140. The court wrote:
The Administrative Record demonstrates that the increased stock limit was highly con-
troversial from the moment it was proposed. The Wilderness Managers Group's proposal
of a standardized 25 stock animal limit, [The Park Service's] draft wilderness manage-
ment plan incorporating the stock limit increase and SEKI's 1993 EA supporting the
increase all generated substantial opposition. While much of the public comment merely
expressed opposition to the proposed increase itself, some of the objecting comments
explicitly addressed the "size, nature or effect" of the increase and called into question
[the Park Service's] representations regarding those issues.
Id. at *15.
141. See DENNiS C. LE MASTER, DECADE OF CHANGE: THE REMAKING OF FOREST SERVICE
STATUTORY AUTHORrrY DURING THE 1970S 58-59 (1984).
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Humphrey's National Forest Management Act endeavored to preserve much of
the discretion traditionally granted to the Forest Service. 42 The battering the
Forest Service has taken over the last twenty years suggests the curse embod-
ied in retention of that discretion. Professor Fischman's analysis of the in-
creased prescriptiveness of national park legislation suggests that some limita-
tion of discretion is already happening piecemeal.
43
Yet there is much more going on here than law. To take management
discretion away from an agency like the Forest Service or the Park Service
also have a negative effect on agency culture. The effectiveness of law, any
law, on the public lands depends completely on a healthy agency culture. Nei-
ther industry representatives nor environmental activists will ever manage the
public lands, staff the regional offices, collect the data, inspect the range, con-
trol the run-off, welcome and manage the visitors. Legislation which furthers
ideological goals at the cost of destroying the agencies which might effectuate
them is a victory for no one.
At the same time, it would be useful to have agency mission statements
that were more than mirrors, reflecting back the values of each interest group
on itself. A clearer mission statement, conveying the same message to all in-
terested parties, would not guarantee enhanced agency stature and discretion,
but would at least make it possible. While we cannot all agree on what should
be done on the public lands, we all have at least grudging respect for a job
well done.
Effective "new law"-legislative, administrative or judicial-must be
grounded in an historical understanding of the original purposes of the agen-
cies and the evolution of those purposes over time. To a considerable degree,
it must be a rearticulation (and perhaps redirection) of established agency
values and not the imposition of alien congressional mandates.
So what should the new law/old law be? Professor Winks argues that the
framers and supporters of the 1916 Organic Act knew exactly what they meant
by "to conserve the scenery ... and to provide for the enjoyment of the
same.,"' Professor Winks informs us that, in 1916, preservation did come
first. Through judicial and administrative action, and perhaps legislation,
we can make it clear that there is a traditional hierarchy of values in national
park management with preservation at the top.
In recent years, the Park Service itself has begun reasserting its mandate
for preservation. First, in the 1960s, a Department of Interior committee of
142. Id. at 58-79.
143. Fischman, supra note 66, at 782. Fischman notes that while the purpose clause of the
National Park Service Organic Act has received generous attention over the years, over 120 na-
tional parks and monuments were created by establishment legislation containing, in many cases,
specific mandates that direct agency management of the unit. Id. at 775-76.
144. Winks, supra note 19, at 623.
145. Id. Winks' thorough analysis of the legislative and social history of the Organic Act
supports his conclusion. For example, Congressman Kent, one of the principal authors of the act,
believed that national parks should be maintained "in a state of nature", "forever free from moles-
tation." Id. at 601. Mather himself believed that national parks "must be maintained in absolutely
unimpaired form," though this comment came in 1918, and he apparently did not comment on the
purpose clause during the act's deliberations by Congress. Id. at 607.
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scientists produced the influential "Leopold Report" pronouncing a "primary
goal" of national park management to be preservation of biotic systems "in the
condition that prevailed when the area was first visited by white men.""
Second, the Park Service produced a report, the Vail Agenda, during its 75th
anniversary in 1991."4' The agenda stated the Park Service's central objective
as "protection of park resources from internal and external impairment. '"
The new emphasis on preservation has roots not only in the creation of
the Park Service but also in the birth of the concept of national parks. In 1865,
fifty years before Congress created the Park Service, Frederick Law
Olmstead 49 wrote a report on "The Yosemite Valley and the Mariposa Big
Trees." In this report, Olmstead articulated an early preservatoinist vision:
The first point to be kept in mind then is the preservation and main-
tenance as exactly as possible of the natural scenery; the restriction,
that is to say, within the n arrowest limits consistent with the neces-
sary accommodations of visitors of all artificial constructions and the
preventions of all constructions markedly inharmonious with the scen-
ery or which would unnecessarily obscure, distort or detract from the
dignity of the scenery.
Second: it is important that it should be remembered that in per-
mifting the sacrifice of anything that would be of the slightest value
to future visitors to the convenience, bad taste, playfulness, careless-
ness, or wanton destructiveness of present visitors, we probably yield
in each case the interest of uncounted millions to the selfishness of a
few individuals. 5 °
While this report did not persuade California's legislators to establish a park in
1865, John Muir sought Olmstead's assistance to establish Yosemite National
park in 1890."'
One could hear an echo of Olmstead's prescription in January, 1996,
when the Park Service proposed to ban at least four-fifths of all automobiles
from Grand Canyon National Park.'52 By proposing such a ban, the Park
Service appeared to turn away from Stephen Mathers' inspired but outdated
146. Leopold et al., Wildlife Management in the National Parks, in 28 Transactions of the N.
Am. Wildlife & Nat. Resources Conf. 29, 29-44 (1963). For a discussion of the report and its
influence, see Keiter, supra note 94, at 656-57.
147. NATIONAL PARKS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY-THE VAIL AGENDA (National Park Founda-
tion 1992).
148. Id. at 17.
149. Olmstead influenced both Pinchot and Mather. He encountered Pinchot when Pinchot,
just back from Europe, arrived in the Biltmore Estate near Ashville, North Carolina:
Mr. Olmstead was to me one of the men of the century. He was a quiet-spoken little
lame man with a most magnificent head and one of the best minds I have ever had the
good luck to encounter. His knowledge was far wider than his profession.
PINCHOT, supra note 46, at 48.
150. Frederick Law Olmsted, The Value and Care "of Parks, in THE AMERICAN ENVIRON-
MIENT: READINGS IN THE HISTORY OF CONSERVATION 23-24 (Roderick Nash ed. 2d ed. 1976)
(emphasis added). For a provocative analysis of Olmstead's statement, see JOSEPH L. SAX, MouN-
TAINS WrrHotr HANDRAEIs 19-24 (1980).
151. Id. at 18-19.
152. U.S. Seeks to Cut Grand Canyon Park's Traffic, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1997, at A4.
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solution to the use/preservation quandary and implementing-in a modest
way-Edward Abbey's prescription for preserving the national parks.'53
Reemphasizing preservation will require hard, unpopular choices. William
Lowry, in Capacity for Wonder: Preserving National Parks, his comparison of
the American and Canadian Park systems related a story about a grizzly bear
in a Canadian park:
[Superintendent Church] described an incident at Lake O'Hara, the
most acclaimed destination in Yoho National Park. Visitors need
reservations months in advance to camp or stay at the lodge there.
The Canadian Park Service (CPS) already imposes limits on visitation
and use, but on the preceding weekend, with beautiful weather and a
full load of visitors anxious to go hiking, Church had shut the area
down. A grizzly bear, a threatened species, had wandered into a
campsite looking for food. To protect the bear, the CPS required
people to stay inside the lodge from which they were bussed out to
designated hiking areas .... Being smart means allowing only use of
parks that does not compromise the preservation of natural features
such as grizzly bears.'54
Examples of positive approaches to preservation abound. The fundamental
question remains: As a nation, are we wise enough to support a public land
management agency that "conserves" or "preserves" natural wonders for our
children by preserving them from us.
153. Abbey wrote:
No more cars in the national parks. Let the people walk. Or ride horses, bicycles, mules,
wild pigs-anything-but keep the automobiles and the motorcycles and all their motor-
ized relatives out. We have agreed not to drive our automobiles in cathedrals, concert
halls, art museums, legislative assemblies, private bedrooms and other sanctums of our
culture; we should treat or national parks with the same deference, for they, too, are
holy places.
ABBEY, supra note 93, at 121-22.
154. WiLLiAM R. LOWRY, THE CAPACITY FOR WONDER: PRESERVING NATIONAL PARKS 153
(1994).
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I. INTRODUCTION
America's national parks represent a major national commitment to nature
preservation. Begun in 1872 when Congress created Yellowstone National
Park, the United States' national park system has grown to 369 designated
park sites located in each of the fifty states and several territories.' Since
1916, the National Park Service has been responsible for managing the nation-
al park system to promote public understanding and appreciation of the
nation's wildemess heritage and its natural splendor.2 What controversy origi-
nally surrounded establishment of the national park system and the then-sus-
pect idea of removing public lands from settlement or development has largely
dissipated; the American public strongly supports the concept of national parks
and has a high regard for the Park Service as a public institution.3 Neverthe-
less, the Park Service and its resource management policies are under intense
scrutiny over what it means to preserve nature.
National parks are generally regarded as pristine settings where nature is
preserved in a fundamentally unaltered state. Originally conceived as a tribute
to monumentalism,4 the national park system is governed by organic legisla-
tion that encourages human visitation and provides that park resources are to
be "conserved" in an "unimpaired" condition for future generations.' For over
half a century, the National Park Service pursued its preservationist mission by
managing its lands primarily to accommodate visitors: hotels and other tourist
facilities were constructed in the parks, often on environmentally sensitive
lands; "bad" animals, such as wolves and other predators, were systematically
eradicated; yet other animals were put on display for the public's easy viewing
pleasure.6 During the 1960s, however, following publication of the landmark
Leopold Report,7 the Park Service was admonished to manage its natural ar-
1. See NATIONAL PARK SERV., NATONAL PARK SERVICE STRATEGIC PLAN FINAL DRAFT
2-3, 10 (1996) [hereinafter 1996 NPS STRATEGIC PLAN]; NATIONAL PARK SERV. STEERING
COMM., NATIONAL PARK SERv., NATIONAL PARKS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: THE VAIL AGENDA
10 (1992) [hereinafter THE VAIL AGENDA].
2. See National Park Service Organic Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1-18f (1994). See generally WIL-
LIAM C. EVERHART, THE NATIONAL PARK SERVICE (1983) (detailing the history of the National
Park Service); JOHN ISE, OUR NATIONAL PARK POLICY: A CRITICAL HISTORY (1961) (chronicling
the development of national park policy through successive administrations).
3. See JEANNE NIENABER CLARKE & DANIEL C. MCCOOL, STAKING OUT THE TERRAIN:
POWER AND PERFORMANCE AMONG NATURAL RESOURCE AGENCIES 82 (2d ed. 1996).
4. See ALFRED RUNTE, NATIONAL PARKS: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 11-47 (rev. 2d ed.
1987); JOSEPH SAX, MOUNTAINS WrTHOUT HANDRAIrs: REFLECTIONS ON THE NATIONAL PARKS 7
(1980).
5. 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). See Robert B. Keiter, National Park Protection: Putting the Or-
ganic Act to Work, in OUR COMMON LANDS: DEFENDING THE NATIONAL PARKS 75 (D. Simon
ed., 1988); John Lemons & Dean Stout, A Reinterpretation of National Park Legislation, 15
ENvTL. L. 53 (1984).
6. RUNTE, supra note 4, at 138-54; see Richard West Sellars, Manipulating Nature's Par-
adise: National Park Management Under Stephen T. Mather, 1916-1929, 43 MONT.: MAG. W.
HIST. 2 (1993).
7. Leopold et al., Wildlife Management in the National Parks, in TRANSACTIONS OF THE
TWENTY-EIGTH NORTH AMERICAN WILDIFE & NATURAL RESOURCES CONFERENCE 29, 29-44
(1963), reprinted in AMERICA'S NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM: Tim CRITcAL DOCUMENTS 237, 237-
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eas "toward maintaining, and where necessary re-establishing, indigenous plant
and animal life."8 In response, national park preservation policy was revised:
The Park Service implemented controversial nonintervention and restoration
policies, based on the related premises that human interference with ecological
processes generally should be avoided or corrected where necessary to restore
a functioning ecological complex.9
Nowhere is this revised preservation policy more controversial than in
Yellowstone National Park.' Critics charge that Yellowstone's noninterven-
tion management policy was responsible for the summer 1988 conflagration
that engulfed much of the park in flames, threatened surrounding communities,
and ruined the local tourist season." Critics also charge that the same policy
is responsible for the gradual destruction and imminent ecological collapse of
Yellowstone's northern range to an uncontrolled ungulate population. 2 In
addition, the livestock industry is convinced that the Park Service's noninter-
vention policy has allowed Yellowstone's bison population to proliferate be-
yond the park's carrying capacity, thus essentially forcing the bison to migrate
out of the park where they may spread brucellosis to local cattle. 3 Moreover,
critics have assailed the Park Service's wolf reintroduction program as an ill-
advised attempt to reconstruct a past landscape.' 4 At bottom, Yellowstone's
critics are convinced that any attempt to manage national parks by discounting
51 (Lary M. Dilsaver ed., 1994) [hereinafter Dilsaver]. Dilsaver's useful volume assembles and
organizes most of the key statutes, policy statements, and other documents relating to the evolu-
tion of national park policy. Citations to key Park Service and related documents in this article
will be cross-referenced to this volume.
8. Memorandum from Secretary of the Interior Stuart Udall, on Management of the Na-
tional Park System to National Park Service Director, (July 10, 1964), reprinted in Dilsaver, supra
note 7, at 272, 273 [hereinafter 1964 Udall Memorandum].
9. NATIONAL PARK SERv., ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES FOR NATURAL AREAS (1968), re-
primed in Dilsaver, supra note 7, at 354 [hereinafter 1968 NPS NATURAL AREAS POLICIES].
10. See, e.g., ALSTON CHASE, PLAYING GOD IN YELLOWSTONE: THE DESTRUCTION OF
AMERICA'S FIRST NATIONAL PARK (1986) (hereinafter CHASE, YELLOWSTONE); FREDERIC H.
WAGNER ET At., WILDLIFE POLICIES IN THE U.S. NATIONAL PARKS (1995); Steve W. Chadde &
Charles E. Kay, Tall-Willow Communities on Yellowstone's Northern Range: A Test of the "Natu-
ral Regulation" Paradigm, in THE GREATER YELLOWSTONE ECOSYSTEM: REDEFINING AMERICA'S
WILDERNESS HERITAGE 231-262 (Robert B. Keiter & Mark S. Boyce eds., 1991) [hereinafter THE
GREATER YELLOWSTONE ECOSYSTEM]; Frederic H. Wagner & Charles E. Kay, "Natural" or
"Healthy" Ecosystems: Are U.S. National Parks Providing Them?, in HUMANS AS COMPONENTS
OF ECOSYSTEMS: THE ECOLOGY OF SUBTLE HUMAN EFFECTS AND POPULATED AREAS 257, 257-
270 (Mark J. McDonnell & Steward T.A. Pickett eds., 1993).
11. See The Economic Impact of Fires in Yellowstone National Park and Western Montana
on Small Business: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Rural Econ. and Family Farming of the
Senate Comm. on Small Business, 100th Cong. 50 (1988) [hereinafter Economic Impact Hearings];
see also infra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
12. See WAGNER ET AL., supra note 10, at 48-53; Chadde & Kay, supra note 10, at 231. See
also infra notes 65-74 and accompanying text; see generally DON DESPAIN ET AL., WILDLIFE IN
TRANSITION: MAN AND NATURE ON YELLOWSTONE'S NORTHERN RANGE (1986).
13. See Robert B. Keiter & Peter H. Froelicher, Bison, Brucellosis, and Law in the Greater
Yellowstone Ecosystem, 28 LAND & WATER L. REv. 1 (1993); E. Tom Thome et al., Brucellosis
in Free-Ranging Bison: Three Perspectives, in THE GREATER YELLOWSTONE ECOSYSTEM, supra
note 10, at 275. See also infra notes 75-84 and accompanying text.
14. See L. David Mech, Returning the Wolf to Yellowstone, in THE GREATER YELLOWSTONE
ECOSYSTEM, supra note 10, at 309-22 (discussing wolf reintroduction criticisms); see also infra
notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
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a human presence in nature is flawed historically and doomed to fail in
today's ever more populated world.
The stakes in this controversy should not be underestimated. America's
national parks play a prominent role in national and international conservation
efforts. Domestically, the national parks occupy a critical niche in current
efforts to preserve the nation's biological legacy; many parks are situated at
the core of larger ecosystems, which contain species facing imminent decline
due to surrounding habitat degradation. 5 In these threatened ecosystems, the
parks are regarded as vital sanctuaries in regional, ecosystem-based manage-
ment initiatives, where the idea of minimizing human intervention into natural
systems is an important goal. 6 Internationally, the American national park
system-the first one ever established in the world-continues to serve as a
model for preservation policy, 7 which includes a major biodiversity conser-
vation campaign that has been enshrined in an international treaty.' If the
Park Service's critics are correct that its preservation policy is unsound or if
the policy is legally vulnerable, then the agency may have little choice but to
alter its basic approach to managing national park resources. Not only would
such a policy shift significantly affect America's national parks, but it could
also impact international conservation policy.
This article will examine the policy implications and legal underpinnings
of the Park Service's preservation policy. The article begins by reviewing the
evolution of resource management policy in the national parks and by defining
the contours of current preservation policy. The article then recounts how
preservation policy has been applied in the Yellowstone setting to illustrate
why it has been so controversial. Next, the article identifies and rejoins the
principal criticisms that have been leveled against the policy. The article then
examines the legal basis for the policy as well as related legal ramifications to
assess its legitimacy. The article concludes with observations endorsing the
basic philosophy underlying national park preservation policy, but also sug-
gests that the policy should be further clarified and legitimized.
15. See R. EDWARD GRUMBINE, GHosT BEARS: EXPLORING THE BIODIvERS1TY CRIsIs
(1992); REED F. NOSS AND ALLEN Y. COOPERRIDER, SAVING NATURE'S LEGACY: PROTECTING
AND RESTORING BIODIvERSrrY 71-72 (1994); William D. Newmark, Legal and Biotic Boundaries
of Western North American National Parks: A Problem of Congruence, 33 BIOLOGICAL CONSER-
VATION 197, 197-208 (1985).
16. See Robert B. Keiter & Mark S. Boyce, Greater Yellowstone's Future: Ecosystem Man-
agement in a Wilderness Environment, in THE GREATER YELLOWSTONE ECOSYSTEM, supra note
10, at 379; Hal Salwasser et al., The Role of Inter-Agency Cooperation in Managing for Viable
Populations, in VIABLE POPULATIONS FOR CONSERVATION 160 (Michael E. Soule ed., 1987).
17. THE VAIL AGENDA, supra note 1, at 1; 1996 NPS STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 1, at 45.
18. Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818
(1992). See Catherine J. Tinker, Introduction to Biological Diversity: Law, Institutions, and Sci-
ence, 1 BUFF. J. INT'L LAW 1 (1994).
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H. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL PARK
PRESERVATION POLICY
A. Early Preservation Policy, 1872-1962
The national park concept first gained official recognition in 1872, when
Congress designated Yellowstone National Park as "a pleasuring-ground for
the benefit and enjoyment of the people."' 9 Through enabling legislation,
Congress instructed the Secretary of the Interior to preserve the park "from
injury or spoilation, of all timber, mineral deposits, natural curiosities or won-
ders within said park, and their retention in their natural condition."'2 The
Secretary also was instructed to "provide against the wanton destruction of the
fish and game within said park."'" To accomplish these preservation objec-
tives, Congress gave the Secretary power to promulgate regulations.22 And to
enforce this preservation mandate, the United States cavalry was enlisted to
protect the new park's resources from early interlopers and poachers.23
The Yellowstone Park Act of 1872 represented the first time that any
nation had preserved such a large block of undeveloped public land-nearly 2
million acres-from settlement or development, and then opened it for public
enjoyment. Until then, the nation's public lands were available for settlement
or disposition, following the general policy that cheap land would promote
development of the Western frontier.24 The designation of Yellowstone
changed that and formally introduced the notion of setting some public lands
aside for nature conservation purposes. Following the Yellowstone designa-
tion, Congress soon proceeded to protect several other Western scenic marvels,
including Yosemite, Mount Rainier, and Glacier.26 But given its prominence,
Yellowstone has become a crucible for formulating and testing preservation
policies, making it both an international model as well as a symbolic battle-
ground over competing park management philosophies.27
19. 16 U.S.C. § 21 (1994). See generally AUBREY L. HAINES, THE YELLOWSTONE STORY: A
HISTORY OF OUR FIRST NATIONAL PARK (rev. ed. 1966) (providing a historical account of the
social and political forces behind the designation of the Park).
20. 16 U.S.C. § 21 (1994).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See H. DUANE HAMPTON, How THE U.S. CAVALRY SAVED OUR NATIONAL PARKS 165-
67 (1971).
24. On the settlement and development of the western United States, see PAUL W. GATES,
PuBLic LAND LAW REVIEW COMM'N, HISTORY OF PUBuC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT (1979); See
generally W. WYANT, WESTWARD IN EDEN: THE PUBLIC LANDS AND THE CONSERVATION MOVE-
Myrrr (1982) (discussing the settlement and development of the western United States).
25. See RODERICK NASH, WILDERNESS AND THE AMERICAN MIND 108 (3d ed. 1982). See
generally MICHAEL COHEN, THE PATHLESS WAY: JOHN MUIR AND THE AMERICAN WILDERNESS
(1984); STEPHEN Fox, THE AMERICAN CONSERVATION MOVEMENT: JOHN MUIR AND HIS LEGACY
(1985).
26. See RUNTE, supra note 4, at 65-81. See generally ISE, supra note 2, at 51-182 (detailing
the history and characteristics of Yosemite, Mount Rainier, and Glacier national parks).
27. John J. Craighead, Yellowstone in Transition, in THE GREATER YELLOWSTONE ECOSYS-
TEM, supra note 10, at 27-39. See, e.g., TIM W. CLARK & STEVEN C. MINTA, GREATER
YELLOWSTONE'S FUTURE: PROSPECTS FOR ECOSYSTEM SCIENCE, MANAGEMENT, AND POLICY
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In 1916, Congress formally established the National Park Service and
vested it with management responsibility for the nation's fledgling park sys-
tem. In the National Park Service Organic Act of 1916,28 Congress mandated
that the national parks were to be managed to "conserve the scenery and the
natural and historic objects and the wildlife therein and to provide for the
enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such means as will leave them
unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations."" The Secretary of the
Interior was given responsibility for the new National Park Service, and em-
powered to promulgate rules and regulations deemed "necessary or proper for
the use and management of the parks. '"' In 1918, to implement these statuto-
ry mandates, Secretary of the Interior Franklin Lane instructed Stephen
Mather, who had been named the first Park Service Director, that "every activ-
ity of the Service is subordinate to the duties imposed on it to faithfully pre-
serve the parks for posterity in essentially their natural state."'" With this in-
struction, the Secretary officially acknowledged that the goal of national park
management was to preserve natural conditions,32 thus establishing an impor-
tant standard that has since become a dominant park management goal. How-
ever, defining exactly what "natural" means and then reconciling competing
visitor and other interests to accomplish naturalness goals has proven more
elusive.
Indeed, the Park Service has frequently subordinated its statutory
preservationist obligation to its public use obligation. Early management of the
national parks was primarily designed to encourage visitation to these remote
areas. Railroad lines, hotels, roads, and other facilities were constructed with
the dual objectives of promoting tourism and cultivating a national constituen-
cy to support the Park Service in the congressional legislative arena.3 While
(1994); THE GREATER YELLOwsToNE ECOSYSTEM: REDEFINING AMERICA'S WILDERNESS HERI-
TAGE (Robert B. Keiter & Mark S. Boyce eds., 1991); THE YELLOWSTONE PRIMER: LAND AND
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN THE GREATER YELLOWSTONE ECOSYSTEM (John A. Baden & Donald
Leal eds., 1990).
28. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1-18f (1994).
29. Id. § 1.
30. Id. § 3.
31. Letter from Franklin K. Lane, Secretary of the Interior, to Stephen W. Mather, Director,
Nat'l Park Serv. (May 13, 1918), reprinted in Dilsaver, supra note 7, at 48-52.
32. In his 1918 letter, Secretary of the Interior Lane also set forth three important national
park management principles:
First that the national parks must be maintained in absolutely unimpaired form for the
use of future generations as well as those of our own time; second, that they are set
apart for the use, observation, health, and pleasure of the people; and third, that the
national interest must dictate all decisions affecting public or private enterprise in the
parks.
Id. at 48.
33. See RUNTE, supra note 4, at 82-105; Sellars, supra note 6, at 2. See generally HORACE
M. ALBRIGHT & ROBERT CAHN, THE BIRTH OF THE NATIONAL PARK SERVICE: THE FOUNDING
YEARS, 1913-33 (1985) (detailing the passage of the National Parks Act and the formation of the
National Park Service); ROBERT SHANKLAND, STEVE MATHER OF THE NATIONAL PARKS (1951)
(providing insight into Mather's role as Assistant to the Secretary in raising the National Park
System to its present day status); DONALD C. SWAIN, WILDERNESS DEFENDER: HORACE M.
ALBRIGHT AND CONSERVATION (1970) (discussing Albright's role as a leading spokesperson for
conservation during the 1920s and 1930s).
[Vol. 74:3
PRESERVING NATURE IN THE NATIONAL PARKS
park facilities were ,usually constructed with a view toward minimizing intru-
siveness on the surrounding scenery, little concern was paid to the impact
these facilities may have on wildlife habitat.34 With its emphasis on providing
visitors a pleasurable experience and with no regard for ecological conse-
quences, the Park Service undertook to eliminate wolves and other predators,
to suppress fires throughout the system, to introduce exotic game fish species,
and to promote wildlife spectacles by feeding bears at garbage dump sites.35
Upon reviewing how strongly the Park Service's early preservation policies
were oriented toward scenic resources, the agency's own historian has labeled
this approach "facade management."36 In short, ecology and the role of eco-
logical processes were given short shrift in most early park policies.
In the early 1930s, Park Service biologist George Wright spearheaded a
major initiative to elevate the stature of scientists within the agency and to
integrate scientific principles into park management policy. Wright and his
colleagues published a ground-breaking Faunal Survey report, which recom-
mended restoring park fauna to its pristine state and acquiring necessary win-
ter habitat." Wright's far-sighted report, however, had little immediate impact
on Park Service policy. Shortly after the report was published, Wright was
tragically killed in an automobile accident. His scientific colleagues soon
found themselves again subordinated within the Park Service's hierarchy to its
rangers, landscape architects, and engineers, a situation that continued over the
next thirty years.3" As a result, the Park Service lacks a strong tradition of
scientific research or management-a shortcoming that has rendered it vulner-
able to charges of mismanagement and biological indifference, even after ex-
plicitly incorporating ecological considerations into its management philoso-
phy.
39
34. See, e.g., NATIONAL PARK SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, YELLOWSTONE NA-
TIONAL PARK MASTER PLAN 17-18 (1973).
35. See RuNTE, supra note 4, at 111, 168-69; R. GERALD WRIGHT, WILDLIFE RESEARCH
AND MANAGEMENT IN THE NATIONAL PARKS 35-42, 55, 59-69 (1992). See also Richard West
Sellars, The Rise and Decline of Ecological Attitudes in National Park Management, 1929-40 (pts.
1-3), 10 GEORGE WRIGHT FORUM 38, 55, 79 (1993) (providing a concise early history of the Park
Service's biological resource management policies).
36. Sellars, supra note 6, at 6.
37. GEORGE WRIGHT Er AL., U. S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, FAUNA OF THE NATIONAL
PARKS OF THE UNITED STATES: A PRELIMINARY SURVEY OF FAUNAL RELATIONS IN NATIONAL
PARKS (1932), reprinted in Dilsaver, supra note 7, at 104, 109.
38. Sellars, supra note 35, at 107-08.
39. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES COMM. ON IMPROVING SCIENCE & TECH. PROGRAMS
OF THE NAT'L PARK SERV., SCIENCE AND THE NATIONAL PARKS (1992), partially reprinted in
Dilsaver, supra note 7, at 446 [hereinafter NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES]; COMMISSION ON
RESEARCH & RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN THE NAT'L PARK SYS., NATIONAL PARKS & CONSER-
VATION Ass'N, NATIONAL PARKS: FROM VIGNETTES TO A GLOBAL VIEw (1989); see also Ervin
H. Zube, Management in National Parks: From Scenery to Science, in SCIENCE AND ECOSYSTEM
MANAGEMENT IN THE NATIONAL PARKS 11-22 (William L. Halvorson & Gary E. Davis eds.,
1996) [hereinafter SCIENCE AND ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT].
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B. The Leopold Report and Its Aftermath, 1963-Present
During the 1960's, almost half a century after its creation, the Park Ser-
vice finally elevated scientific management to a prominent position on the
agency's policy agenda. Confronted with an adverse public reaction to the
shooting of elk on Yellowstone National Park's northern range, the Secretary
of the Interior appointed a committee of prominent scientists, under the direc-
tion of Starker Leopold, to provide advice on how to address the park's elk
population problem.' The ensuing recommendations, since dubbed the
Leopold Report,4 profoundly reshaped how the Park Service views its natural
resource management role. These same recommendations also set the stage for
the ongoing debate over the Park Service's revised preservation policy.
The concise yet eloquent 14-page Leopold Report made a powerful case
for revising the Park Service's natural resource management policies. In its
most widely quoted statement, the Committee concluded:
As a primary goal, we would recommend that the biotic associations
within each park be maintained, or where necessary recreated, as
nearly as possible in the condition that prevailed when the area was
first visited by the white man. A national park should represent a
vignette of primitive America.4'
Calling for "an overall scheme to preserve or restore a natural biotic scene,"
the report proposed restoring missing species, eliminating exotic species, stop-
ping artificial feeding programs, reducing road construction, eliminating inap-
propriate tourism facilities, and enhancing the Park Service's scientific re-
search capabilities.43 Notwithstanding the reference to "a natural biotic
scene," the report acknowledged that intensive management, based on the best
ecological data available, would be necessary to accomplish these policy ob-
jectives, including the controlled use of fire and the shooting of excess ungu-
lates." Moreover, the report noted that most parks were too small to contain
all of the habitat required by resident species, and that past human manipula-
tions or intrusions had so altered ecological processes that active intervention
would be necessary to restore anything approaching a natural ecological or-
der.4' The Leopold Report's recommendations were reinforced by a contem-
poraneous National Academy of Sciences study, which likewise concluded that
national parks should be managed to maintain and perpetuate natural features
and processes.'
The Leopold Report had an immediate and far-reaching impact on Park
Service management policies. In 1964, relying upon the Report's recommen-
40. WRIGHT, supra note 35, at 27-28; WAGNER ET AL., supra note 10, at 22.
41. Leopold, et a]., supra note 7.
42. WRIGHT, supra note 35, at 31; Leopold et al., supra note 7, at 239.
43. WRIGHT, supra note 35, at 33-37; Leopold et al., supra note 7, at 241-45.
44. WRIGHT, supra note 35, at 37-42; Leopold et al., supra note 7, at 244-49.
45. WRIGHT, supra note 35, at 33-34; Leopold et al', supra note 7, at 240-41.
46. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, A REPORT BY THE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE NATIONAL PARK SERVICE ON RESEARCH (1963) [hereinafter NA-
TIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL], partially reprinted in Dilsaver, supra note 7, at 253.
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dations, Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall instructed the Park Service to
manage national parks "toward maintaining, and where necessary reestab-
lishing, indigenous species" while "preserving the total environment." In
1968, the Park Service issued a policy document providing that national parks
should be managed as ecological entities. The document stated that "the con-
cept of preservation of a total environment, as compared with the protection of
an individual feature or species, is a distinguishing feature of national park
management. '" Noting that national parks were becoming "islands of primi-
tive America" impacted by development activities on surrounding lands and by
escalating visitation numbers, the document called for "active management" of
the natural environment.49 It then concluded that such an approach will entail
"application of ecological management techniques to neutralize the unnatural
influence of man, thus permitting the natural environment to be maintained
essentially by nature., ' °
More recently, in its 1988 Management Policies document,5 the Park
Service reaffirmed and refined its commitment to an ecologically-driven pres-
ervation policy. As a general goal, the Park Service will "try to maintain all
the components and processes of naturally evolving park ecosystems, including
the natural abundance, diversity, and ecological integrity of the plants and ani-
mals."'52 Committing itself to "perpetuate the native animal life ... as part of
the natural ecosystems of parks," the document calls for "minimizing human
impacts on natural animal population dynamics."" The document also pro-
vides that "[n]atural processes will be relied on to control populations of na-
tive species to the greatest extent possible." '54 Park management goals and
practices are to be based on the best scientific information available, estab-
lished through comprehensive planning processes, and subjected to public
review.55 In short, building upon the Leopold Report, the Park Service now
defines its statutory preservation responsibilities in terms of maintaining and
restoring native species and processes, while minimizing human intervention
into natural ecological processes.
47. 1964 Udall Memorandum, supra note 8, at 272, 273, 275; see also text accompanying
supra note 8.
48. 1968 NPS NATURAL AREAS POLICIES, supra note 9, at 354.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. NATIONAL PARK SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, MANAGEMENT POLICIES (1988)
[hereinafter 1988 NPS MANAGEMENT POLICIES]. For purposes of establishing natural resource
management policies, the document divides national park lands into three zones: natural zones,
cultural zones, and park development zones. The references throughout this article are to policies
that prevail in natural zones.
52. 1988 NPS MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 51, at 4:1. In addition, the document
recognizes that "interference with natural processes ... will be allowed ... to restore native eco-
system functioning that has been disrupted by past or ongoing human actions." Id. at 4:2.
53. Id. at 4:5. The document also states that the Park Service will strive "to protect the full
range of genetic types (genotypes) native to plant and animal populations in parks by perpetuating
natural evolutionary processes and minimizing human interference with evolving genetic diversi-
ty." Id. at 4:10.
54. Id. at 4:6.
55. Id. at 4:6.
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III. THE YELLOWSTONE CONTROVERSIES: To INTERVENE OR NOT
A. Yellowstone and Its Ecological Systems
Most challenges to the Park Service's preservation policy have focused on
Yellowstone National Park's management policies. As the world's first nation-
al park and the site of recurrent, high-profile controversies, Yellowstone serves
as a bellwether for defining resource management policies for national
parks.56 Encompassing approximately two million acres of high plateau and
mountainous terrain, Yellowstone National Park has the full assembly of wild-
life species that historically populated the region, including recently reintro-
duced gray wolves." Because the park is mostly surrounded by undeveloped
national forest lands, much of which is protected as wilderness, the region's
ecological systems have not been significantly disturbed by human actions.
Knowledgeable observers refer to the park and surrounding lands as the Great-
er Yellowstone Ecosystem, labeling it the world's largest relatively intact
temperate ecosystem.5" But with annual park visitation approaching 3 million
visitors, with subdivisions beginning to dot perimeter ranch lands, and with
development pressures mounting in the surrounding national forests, the park
often seems more like an endangered island than the vibrant core of a healthy
ecosystem.59
Nonetheless, the Greater Yellowstone region offers one of the few loca-
tions where natural processes still operate on an expansive scale. In Yellow-
stone, therefore, the Park Service has sought to maintain and restore ecological
processes with minimal human intervention.' The policy-sometimes labeled
"a grand experiment"'-directly influences how the Park Service manages
ungulate populations, bison, predators, and fires, which are examined in more
detail below.62 In each instance, drawing upon Leopold Report recommenda-
56. See, e.g., RICHARD A. BARTLETr, YELLOWSTONE: A WILDERNESS BESIEGED (1985);
CHASE, YELLOWSTONE, supra note 10.
57. JOHN J. CRAIGHEAD Er AL., THE GRIZZLY BEARS OF YELLOWSTONE: THEIR ECOLOGY IN
THE YELLOWSTONE ECOSYSTEM, 1959-1992, at 3-7 (1995); DESPAIN, ET AL., supra note 12. On
wolf reintroduction, see HANK FISCHER, WOLF WARS: THE REMARKABLE INSIDE STORY OF THE
RESTORATION OF WOLVES TO YELLOWSTONE (1995); GARY FERGUSON, THE YELLOWSTONE
WOLVES: THE FIRST YEAR (1996).
58. See, e.g., Duncan T. Patten, Defining the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem, in THE
GREATER YELLOWSTONE ECOSYSTEM, supra note 10, at 19-26; RICK REESE, GREATER YELLOW-
STONE: THE NATIONAL PARK AND ADJACENT WILDLANDS (2d ed. 1991); GREATER YELLOWSTONE
COALITION, AN ENVIRONMENTAL PROFILE OF THE GREATER YELLOWSTONE ECOSYSTEM (1991).
59. GREATER YELLOWSTONE COALITION, SUSTAINING GREATER YELLOWSTONE: A BLUE-
PRINT FOR THE FUTURE (1994); GREATER YELLOWSTONE COALITION, AN ENVIRONMENTAL PRO-
FILE OF THE GREATER YELLOWSTONE ECOSYSTEM (1991).
60. YELLOWSTONE NATIONAL PARK, RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PLAN 2 (1995); YELLOW-
STONE NAT'L PARK, NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PLAN AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESS-
MENT 7 (1983); see also DESPAIN ET AL., supra note 12, at 6-13, 27.
61. DESPAIN, ET AL., supra note 12, at 10; see also WAGNER ET AL., supra note 10, at 152.
62. The ensuing sections briefly describe several controversial management policy shifts that
were implemented in Yellowstone in the aftermath of the Leopold Report to address these resourc-
es. The account of these controversies is truncated due to space limitations; it is offered as an
overview of how the Park Service has interpreted and implemented its revised preservation poli-
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tions, the Park Service has reversed longstanding, interventionist policies and
implemented new ones designed to maintain or restore ecological systems.63
Where the ecological system has been severely disrupted, the Park Service has
actively intervened to restore missing ecological components and processes,
such as wolves and fire, and to eliminate exotic intruders, such as lake
trout.' However, in the face of often heavy criticism and recurrent political
pressure, the Park Service has also modified its preservation policy for
nonecological reasons, thus raising both consistency and legitimacy concerns.
B. Ungulates and the Northern Range
The Park Service's decision to withdraw from actively managing
Yellowstone's northern range elk population has generated charges of biologi-
cal mismanagement. Prior to the Leopold Report, Yellowstone's northern elk
herd was intensively monitored and managed to control the population size.
Despite public protests, the Park Service culled (i.e. shot) elk from the herd to
limit its size based on the northern range's perceived limited carrying capaci-
ty.' Following the Leopold Report, the Park Service concluded that the
northern range could support substantially more elk than previously believed.
Park officials terminated the controversial culling program and began relying
upon natural factors, mainly the region's harsh winters and limited habitat, to
control the elk population.' In addition, the elk continued to be hunted in
Montana during their fall migration from the park to lower elevation winter
habitat.
Following implementation of this nonintervention policy, many elk per-
ished during periodic harsh winters, but overall elk population numbers
steadily mounted. Critics responded by asserting that the park's elk population
had grown too large, that elk were overbrowsing the northern range and per-
manently altering its ecological character.6" They argued that the northern
range's aspen stands were being virtually eliminated by overbrowsing, as was
the beaver population that relied upon these trees.' In short, critics concluded
cies. More detailed and nuanced discussions of these issues can be found in the general references
that are cited in the accompanying footnotes.
63. WRIGHT, supra note 35, at 35-59; WAGNER ET AL., supra note 10, at 10-43. See gener-
ally DESPAIN ET AL., supra note 12; see also Alston H. Chase, How to Save Our National Parks,
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, July 1987, at 35.
64. See WRIGHT, supra note 35, at 35-39. During this century, Yellowstone's fisheries man-
agement policy has undergone a profound evolution that raises related ecological restoration and
intervention issues. After first importing exotic game species of fish to establish a world class
fishery, the Park Service has sought to restore a native cutthroat trout fishery by eliminating exotic
species. Limited space does not permit a full recounting of this preservation management issue.
See generally John D. Varley & Paul Schullery, Yellowstone Lake and its Cutthroat Trout, in
SCIENCE AND ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT, supra note 39, at 49.
65. DOUGLAS HousToN, THE NORTHERN YELLOWSTONE ELK: ECOLOGY AND MANAGEMENT
18 (1982); see also WAGNER FT AL., supra note 10, at 48-50.
66. DESPAIN ET AL., supra note 12, at 22-36; WAGNER ET AL., supra note 10, at 48-54.
67. See CHASE, YELLOWSTONE, supra note 10, at 14-91; Chadde & Kay, supra note 10, at
231; WAGNER ET AL., supra note 10, at 48-54.
68. Id. But see Francis J. Singer et al., Ungulate Herbivory of Willows on Yellowstone's
Northern Winter Range, 47 J. RANGE MGMT. 435 (1994); Michael B. Coughenor & Francis J.
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that the proliferating elk had taken over the northern range and were eating it
into ecological collapse.' 9 They advocated establishing elk population goals
so park officials could actively control elk numbers to achieve a healthy eco-
logical balance.
The Park Service, however, has adhered to a nonintervention policy and
resisted calls for more intensive management. Yellowstone officials and other
scientists believe that elk population numbers have always fluctuated widely
depending upon seasonal weather and other conditions, and that similar fluc-
tuations occur regularly in most wildlife populations.70 Although the northern
elk population has exceeded original Park Service projections, Yellowstone
officials believe the population remains within an ecologically acceptable
range.7' Various scientists basically concur, and also observe that there is
insufficient trend data to draw any definitive biological conclusions. 72 They
also note that the recent wolf reintroduction will affect the elk population,73
and that hunting outside the park will continue to help limit the population. 4
As a result, park officials have not resumed active elk management.
C. Bison, Brucellosis, and Domestic Livestock
As with elk management, Yellowstone's bison management policy has
evolved through several distinct phases. At the turn of the century,
Yellowstone's military caretakers imported bison to supplement the park's
Singer, The Concept of Overgrazing and Its Application to Yellowstone's Northern Range, in THE
GREATER YELLOWSTONE ECOSYSTEM, supra note 10, at 209. While acknowledging that elk may
account for the decline in aspen on the Northern Range, Yellowstone officials also cite other po-
tential causes, including plant succession, climate change, and fire suppression. See HOUSTON,
supra note 65, at 129.
69. In addition, a dispute continues over whether elk historically used Yellowstone's north-
em range as winter habitat. See HOUSTON, supra note 65, at 23-25; see also Cathy Whitlock et al.,
A Prehistoric Perspective on the Northern Range, in THE GREATER YELLOWSTONE ECOSYSTEM,
supra note 10, at 289.
70. DESPAIN Er AL., supra note 12, at 32-36; Michael B. Coughenor & Francis J. Singer, Elk
Population Processes in Yellowstone National Park Under the Policy of Natural Regulation, 6
ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 573 (1996). But see WAGNER Er AL., supra note 10, at 145-49. See
generally James G. MacCracken, Managing and Understanding Wild Ungulate Population Dy-
namics in Protected Areas, in NATIONAL PARKS AND PROTECTED AREAS: THEIR ROLE IN ENVI-
RONMENTAL PROTECTION 249 (R. Gerald Wright ed., 1996); NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, U.S.
DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, EFFECTS OF GRAZING BY WILD UNGULATES IN YELLOWSTONE NATION-
AL PARK (1996) [hereinafter EFFECTS OF GRAZING].
71. DESPAIN Er AL., supra note 12, at 32-36; Coughenour & Singer, supra note 68.
72. Coughenour & Singer, supra note 68; Yellowstone Science Interview: Sam McNaughton,
Grazing and Yellowstone, 4 YELLOWSTONE SO. 12, 13 (1996). See generally EFFECTS OF
GRAZING, supra note 70; YELLOWSTONE NAT'L PARK RESEARCH Div., INTERIM REPORT YELLOW-
STONE NATIONAL PARK NORTHERN RANGE RESEARCH (1992).
73. Before wolves were reintroduced to Yellowstone, scientists predicted that they would
have an inhibiting (but not devastating) effect on elk population numbers. See Mark S. Boyce,
Wolf Recovery for Yellowstone National Park: A Simulation Model, in 2 YELLOWSTONE NAT'L
PARK ET AL., WOLVES FOR YELLOWSTONE?: A REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS 3-3, 3-
5 (1990); Edward 0. Garton et al., The Potential Impact of a Reintroduced Wolf Population on the
Northern Yellowstone Elk Herd, in id. at 3-61.
74. Montana's revised late season elk hunt along the park's northern border is generally seen
as complimenting the park's elk management policies. DESPAIN ET AL., supra note 12, at 35;
HOUSTON, supra note 65, at 199-200. But see CHASE, YELLOWSTONE, supra note 10, at 77-78.
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small remnant bison population." The experiment was successful, and the
herd gradually grew in size.7 6 In 1917, however, a contagious livestock dis-
ease-brucellosis-was discovered in Yellowstone's bison." Because brucel-
losis can cause cattle to abort, the Park Service began to test bison for the
disease and to slaughter those testing positive. During this period, most of the
park's bison were managed on the Buffalo Ranch; the herd was periodically
culled to keep population numbers within the perceived range carrying capaci-
ty. After World War II, however, the Park Service closed the Buffalo Ranch,
though culling still continued.
In the mid 1960's, following the Leopold Report, Yellowstone officials
ceased culling bison and adopted a nonintervention management approach. The
bison population rose sharply7" and began moving outside the park during
winter months to access new forage areas.7 9 Local ranchers, joined by Mon-
tana livestock and federal agriculture officials, became increasingly concerned
that park bison might transmit brucellosis to area cattle and jeopardize the
state's brucellosis-free status."0 However, whether Yellowstone's wild bison
actually can transmit brucellosis to domestic livestock in the region's wilder-
ness environment is a hotly contested matter."' When hazing failed to deter
75. HAMPTON, supra note 23, at 165-67; HAINES, supra note 19, at 3-21. For an historical
overview of Yellowstone's bison, see generally MARY MEAGHER, NATIONAL PARK SERv., THE
BISON OF YELLOWSTONE NATIONAL PARK (1973) (Scientific Monograph Series Number One, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.).
76. By 1930, Yellowstone's bison population had grown to over 1,000 bison. MEAGHER, su-
pra note 75, at 32.
77. Ironically, scientists generally agree that brucellosis was originally passed to
Yellowstone's bison by diseased livestock. See Mary Meagher & Margaret E. Meyer, On the Ori-
gin of Brucellosis in Bison of Yellowstone National Park: A Review, 8 CONSERvATION BIOLOGY
645 (1994); James D. Herriges, Jr. et al., Vaccination to Control Brucellosis in Free-Ranging Elk
on Western Wyoming Feed Grounds, in THE BIOLOGY OF DEER 107 (Robert D. Brown ed., 1992).
78. The park's bison population grew from 397 bison in 1967 to more than 3000 bison in
1988, and currently totals approximately 3000-3500 bison. NATIONAL PARK SERV. & STATE OF
MONT., INTERIM BISON MANAGEMENT PLAN DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 2 (1995).
79. Different theories have been put forth to explain the recent bison migration pattern. It
has been argued that the bison are migrating because the park ranges are depleted from overgraz-
ing. It also has been suggested that hard-packed park roads, which have been groomed for winter
snowmobile traffic, are responsible because they make it possible for bison to exit the park despite
the deep winter snows. And it has been noted that the bison may simply have found new forage
areas and are naturally migrating to them. See Robert B. Keiter, Greater Yellowstone's Bison:
Unraveling of an Early American Wildlife Conservation Achievement, 61 J. WILDLIFE MGMT. 1, 3
(1997) [hereinafter Keiter, Greater Yellowstone's Bison].
80. During the late 1940s, relying upon the amended Animal Industry Act, 21 U.S.C. §§
111-143 (1994), the Department of Agriculture's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
(APHIS), the states, and the livestock industry initiated an aggressive national effort to eradicate
brucellosis from livestock herds. 21 U.S.C.A. § 114a. Among other things, APHIS has promul-
gated regulations dividing states into different classes according to the prevalence (or absence) of
brucellosis in livestock. See 9 C.F.R. §§ 78.1-78.44 (1995). States classified as brucellosis-free can
freely market cattle interstate while nonbrucellosis-free states face inspection and other re-
quirements before selling cattle interstate. 9 C.F.R. §§ 78.40-78.43 (1995). Montana is classified
as a brucellosis-free state, but has been threatened with loss of that status based on the presence of
brucellosis-exposed bison from Yellowstone on lands outside the park. For a more detailed de-
scription of the legal and regulatory structure governing brucellosis, see Keiter & Froelicher, supra
note 13, at 21-27.
81. Margaret E. Meyer & Mary Meagher, Brucellosis in Free-ranging Bison (Bison bison) in
Yellowstone, Grand Teton, and Wood Buffalo National Parks: A Review, 31 J. WILDLIFE DISEASES
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bison from leaving the park, Montana instituted a controversial public bison
hunt that was quickly cancelled following public protests. 2
Meanwhile, Montana and federal agriculture officials continued to voice
concern over the Park Service's basically "laissez faire" bison management
policy, asserting that depleted range conditions attributable to dvergrazing
were precipitating the winter exodus. Faced with litigation challenging its
bison management policies, 3 the Park Service has agreed to implement an
intensive bison management plan that entails capturing, testing, and slaughter-
ing bison within the park to protect adjacent landowners and grazing allot-
ments." In the case of bison, therefore, the Park Service has essentially aban-
doned its nonintervention preservation policy and is poised to begin managing
bison as if they were livestock rather than wildlife.
D. Wolves, Grizzly Bears, and Endangered Species Management
Yellowstone's controversial predator management policies have changed
dramatically over the past century. During the early 20th century, the Park
Service systematically eliminated wolves from the park, subscribing to the
view that wolves were "bad" animals that killed valuable wildlife as well as
domestic livestock.85 But following the Leopold Report and the subsequent
listing of wolves under the Endangered Species Act," the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service, with strong support from the Park Service, adopted a wolf
recovery plan in 1987 that called for reintroduction in Yellowstone." Howev-
er, in response to local political opposition, actual reintroduction was delayed
as proponents and opponents vigorously debated the impact wolves would
have on livestock and the ramifications of endangered species protection.
In 1994, gray wolves were finally reintroduced into the park as a nones-
sential "experimental population.""M These reintroduced wolves, which were
579 (1995); see also Keiter, Greater Yellowstone's Bison, supra note 79, at 4; Keiter &
Froelicher, supra note 13, at 27-32.
82. The contemporary bison-brucellosis controversy is recounted in Keiter & Froelicher,
supra note 13. See also Thome et al., supra note 13, at 275.
83. See infra note 197 for a brief discussion of this litigation.
84. See YELLOWsTONE NAT'L PARK & MONT. DEP'T OF LIVESTOCK, INTERIM BISON MAN-
AGEMENT PLAN (1996); Keiter, Greater Yellowstone's Bison, supra note 79, at 8. Under this inter-
im policy, 1080 bison were slaughtered by federal and state employees during the 1996-1997
winter. James Brooke, Yellowstone Bison Herd Cut in Half Over Winter, THE N.Y. TIMES, April
13, 1997.
85. Sellars, supra note 6, at 7-8. See generally BARRY HOLSTUN LOPEZ, OF WOLVES AND
MEN (1978) (discussing the relationship between wolves and humans).
86. 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (1994); 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (1995). Under the Endangered Species Act,
terrestrial species listed as endangered or threatened are managed by the Secretary of the Interior
through the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service; similarly listed marine species are managed by the
Secretary of Commerce through the National Marine Fisheries Service. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(15)
(1994).
87. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., NORTHERN ROCKY MOUNTAIN WOLF RECOVERY PLAN
(1987); Robert B. Keiter & Patrick T. Holscher, Wolf Recovery Under the Endangered Species
Act: A Study in Federalism, 11 PUB. LAND L. REV. 19 (1990); see Mech, supra note 14, at 309-
22.
88. 16 U.S.C. § 15390); 50 C.F.R. § 17.80-84 (1995); see 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N., 2833-35,
2845-46, 2857, 2870-76 (discussing "experimental population" provisions of the Endangered Spe-
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initially live-captured in Canada and then held in acclimation pens, are being
intensively monitored through radio collars; they can be removed if found
preying on domestic livestock." With wolf reintroduction, Yellowstone now
has a full compliment of its original predators, and traditional predator-prey
relationships are being reestablished with the abundant ungulate population. To
accomplish its wolf reintroduction ecological goals, however, the Park Service
has committed itself to active, interventionist management and made key po-
litical compromises to accommodate local interests.
In the case of Yellowstone's grizzly bears, Park Service policy has been
quite different from the wolf, yet equally contentious. Because the grizzly bear
is a top-of-the-food-chain carnivore, ecologists have long regarded
Yellowstone's grizzly bear population as an important barometer for measur-
ing the health of the regional ecosystem.9 By the mid 20th century,
Yellowstone's bears had grown habituated to people; they frequented camp-
grounds and roadways, and were fed at park garbage dumps." Following the
Leopold Report, however, the Park Service summarily closed the garbage
dumps and left the bears to fend for themselves from natural food sources.
Local wildlife biologists protested vehemently, arguing that the bears were not
adequately accustomed to foraging in the wild and that the garbage dumps
should therefore be phased out.92 As was predicted, several bear-human con-
flicts ensued and problem bears were killed, which raised concern about over-
all grizzly bear population numbers. Nonetheless, the Park Service persisted
with its revised nonintervention policy.
In 1975, the grizzly bear was listed under the Endangered Species Act as
a threatened species,93 and a recovery plan was prepared to protect the bear
and its habitat.94 When the Park Service, in a controversial decision, declined
to close Yellowstone's Fishing Bridge campground to protect grizzly habitat, it
cies Act). Under the "experimental population" designation, the wolves are treated as a
threatened--rather than endangered-species, and they do not enjoy the full protections of the
Endangered Species Act, principally the jeopardy review process. On the experimental population
provision, see Keiter & Holscher, supra note 87, at 36-37. See also Dale D. Goble, Of Wolves and
Welfare Ranching, 16 HARv. ENvTL. L. REv. 101 (1992). See generally U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE
SERV., THE REINTRODUCTION OF GRAY WOLVES TO YELLOWSTONE NATIONAL PARK AND CEN-
TRAL IDAHO: FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (1994) (describing alternative ways for
re-introducing gray wolves into Yellowstone).
89. See FISCHER, supra note 57, at 150; Robert C. Moore, Comment, The Pack is Back: The
Political, Social, and Ecological Effects of the Reintroduction of the Gray Wolf to Yellowstone
National Park and Central Idaho, 12 T.M. COOLEY L. REv. 647 (1995); see also James M. Peek
& John C. Carnes, Wolf Restoration in the Northern Rocky Mountains, in NATIONAL PARKS AND
PROTECTED AREAS, supra note 70, at 325; Edward E. Bangs, Restoring Wolves to the West, in
RECLAIMING THE NATIVE HOME OF HOPE: COMMUNITY, ECOLOGY, AND THE WEST (Robert B.
Keiter, ed., 1998) (forthcoming) (hereinafter RECLAIMING THE NATIVE HOME OF HOPE).
90. See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERv., GR=zz.Y BEAR RECOVERY PLAN 28 (1993) [hereinaf-
ter 1993 GRIZZLY BEAR RECOVERY PLAN]; GRUMBINE, supra note 15, at 66; see also CRAIGHEAD
Er AL., supra note 57; FRANK C. CRAIGHEAD, JR., TRACK OF THE GRIZZLY (1979); THOMAS
MCNAMEE, THE GRIZZLY BEAR (1984).
91. RUNTE, supra note 4, at 168-69.
92. See CRAIGHEAD, supra note 90, at 192-94; MCNAMEE, supra note 90, 90, at 107-22.
93. 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (1994); 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (1995).
94. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., GRIZZLY BEAR RECOVERY PLAN (1982). For the latest
update and revisions to the plan, see 1993 GRIZZLY BEAR RECOVERY PLAN, supra note 90.
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was sued--unsuccessfully-for violating its Organic Act and Endangered Spe-
cies Act obligations.95 According to federal officials, grizzly bear population
numbers have gradually increased in the Greater Yellowstone region and the
bear's range has expanded.' Several observers, however, believe that current
population figures are unreliable and that grizzly habitat is not secure either
inside or outside the park.97 Moreover, problem bears (i.e. those posing a
threat to human life or property) are monitored intensively and continue to be
removed to minimize bear-human conflicts. Against the backdrop of the En-
dangered Species Act, the Park Service has therefore generally adhered to a
nonintervention policy with Yellowstone's grizzly population, while selectively
intervening on occasion for nonecological purposes.
E. Fire as an Ecological Process
The Park Service's revised preservation policy has also triggered a rever-
sal in its approach to fire management. Through the mid 1960s, Yellowstone
officials actively suppressed all fires within the park. Across the public do-
main, fire was viewed only as a destructive force that burned forests and
rangelands, threatened human lives and property, and scarred aesthetic land-
scapes. 98 During this total suppression period, Yellowstone's lodgepole pine
forests continued to mature and die, creating a heavy fuel load. Following the
Leopold Report, however, park officials adopted a new fire management poli-
cy, generally allowing natural fires to burn while still suppressing human-ig-
nited blazes. 99 The policy did not authorize active intervention through the
use of prescribed (i.e. human-ignited) fires to reduce the fuel load.
The revised fire policy worked reasonably well until the summer 1988
season when multiple fires-some natural and others human-caused--charred
nearly one third of the park."° Although several fires were fought aggres-
sively from the outset, the heavy fuel load and extreme weather conditions
caused the fires to burn out of control for over a month. Local politicians and
other critics blamed the conflagration on the Park Service's laissez faire policy
95. National Wildlife Fed'n v. National Park Serv., 669 F. Supp. 384, 385-86 (D. Wyo.
1987); see also Brian L. Kuehl, Comment, Conservation Obligations Under the Endangered Spe-
cies Act: A Case Study of the Yellowstone Grizzly Bear, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 607, 636 (1993).
96. See 1993 GRIZZLY BEAR RECovERY PLAN, supra note 90, at 2-12, 41-58.
97. See Fund for Animals v. Babbitt, 903 F. Supp. 96 (D.D.C. 1995); see also MARK L.
SHAFFER, THE WILDERNESS SoCIETY, KEEPING THE GRIZZLY BEAR IN THE AMERICAN WEST: A
STRATEGY FOR REAL RECOVERY (1992). In addition, some biologists argue that supplemental food
sources (i.e. ecocenters) are necessary to ensure full grizzly bear recovery. See CRAIGHEAD Er AL.,
supra note 57, at 484.
98. See STEPHEN J. PYNE, FIRE IN AMERICA: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF WILDLAND AND
RURAL FIRE (1982).
99. See YELLOwSTONE NAT'L PARK, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, YELLOWSTONE NATION-
AL PARK WILDLAND FIRE MANAGEMENT PLAN 11 (1992) [hereinafter YELLOWSTONE FIRE MAN-
AGEMENT PLAN]; Paul Schullery, The Fires and Fire Policy, 39 BIOSCIENCE 686 (1989); Dennis
H. Knight, The Yellowstone Fire Controversy, in THm GREATER YELLOWSTONE ECOSYSTEM, supra
note 10, at 87, 90-91.
100. See MICAH MORRISON, FIRE IN PARADISE: THE YELLOWSTONE FIRES AND THE POLrICS
OF ENVIRONMENTALISM (1993); NATIONAL PARK SERV., THE YELLOWSTONE FIRES: A PRIMER ON
THE 1988 FIRE SEASON (1988).
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and labeled the park a disaster."' Park Service and other scientists responded
that large forest fires had historically occurred in Yellowstone's lodgepole pine
forests and represented an ecological renewal."°
Following an extensive policy review, Department of the Interior officials
have reaffirmed the basic scientific validity of the Park Service's fire manage-
ment policy, though with some modifications. 3 Under its revised fire man-
agement plan, Yellowstone officials will continue allowing some naturally-
caused fires to bum subject to tighter controls (or prescriptions) to protect park
resources and neighboring property owners." 4 These controls include regular
monitoring of weather and fuel conditions, application of detailed standards to
predict fire behavior, delineation of predetermined fire management zones,
daily monitoring of fire progress, and maintenance of adequate fire suppres-
sion equipment and personnel."H And the Park Service has begun experi-
menting with a prescribed burning program, though critics question whether it
can adequately reduce the remaining fuel load." In the case of fire, there-
fore, Yellowstone's nonintervention policy has been substantially modified to
address political as well as ecological concerns.
F. Preservation Policy Elsewhere
Beyond Yellowstone, the Park Service has pursued similarly controversial
preservation policies with a view toward maintaining or restoring ecological
processes. In Rocky Mountain National Park, as in Yellowstone, the Park
Service's decision not to regulate the park's elk population has led to charges
that the proliferating herd is destroying native trees and grasses in its quest for
food." At Grand Canyon National Park, following recent recommendations
triggered by the Grand Canyon Protection Act of 19 9 2 ,"m federal reclamation
officials have experimented with increased release flows from the upstream
Glen Canyon Dam.'" This experimental release regime is designed to simu-
101. See Economic Impact Hearings, supra note 11, at 43, 48-51.
102. THE GREATER YELLOWSTONE POsTFIRE ECOLOGICAL AssEssMENT WORKSHOP, ECO-
LOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE 1988 FIRES IN THE GREATER YELLWSTONE AREA: FINAL RE-
PORT (1989); Christensen et al., Interpreting the Yellowstone Fires of 1988, 39 BIoSCIENCE 678,
679-80 (1989).
103. YELLOWSTONE FIRE MANAGEMENT PLAN, supra note 99; see also U.S. DEPT. OF THE
INTERIOR AND U.S. DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE, FEDERAL WILDLAND FIRE MANAGEMENT: POLICY &
PROGRAM REvIEw FINAL REPORT (1995) [hereinafter 1995 FEDERAL WILDLAND FIRE MANAGE-
MENT].
104. YELLOWSTONE FIRE MANAGEMENT PLAN, supra note 99, at 12-13; see 1995 YELLOW-
STONE NATIONAL PARK RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PLAN, supra note 60, at YELL-N-020.000.
105. YELLOWSTONE FIRE MANAGEMENT PLAN, supra note 99, at 52-57.
106. Id. at 50-52; see Paul Schullery & Don G. Despain, Prescribed Burning in Yellowstone
National Park: A Doubtful Proposition, 15 W. WILDLANDS 30 (1989).
107. See KARL HESS, JR., ROCKY TIMES IN ROCKY MOUNTAIN NATIONAL PARK: AN UNNAT-
URAL HISTORY 15-49 (1993). Moreover, the Park Service's fire suppression policy, which was
adopted to protect nearby residents from uncontrollable forest fires, has been criticized as an ex-
ample of too much intervention into ecological processes. Id. at 51-76.
108. Pub. L. No. 102-575, 106 Stat. 4669; see Michael Conner, Extracting the Monkey
Wrench from Glen Canyon Dam: The Grand Canyon Protection Act - An Attempt at Balance, 15
PUB. LAND L. REV. 135 (1994).
109. See BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, OPERATION OF GLEN
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late the original hydrologic impacts that Colorado River spring floods had on
adjacent river banks and sandbars, but critics are concerned that it could dis-
rupt power distribution in the Southwest and destroy the cold water trout fish-
ery below the dam." ° In Yosemite National Park, the Park Service is ac-
tively involved in restoring natural fire to the landscape and reintroducing
bighorn sheep.1" In Olympic National Park, the Park Service has invoked
ecological restoration goals to support proposals to remove two small hydro-
power dams on the Elwha River"' and to cull exotic mountain goats that are
destroying vegetation on the park's fragile mountain slopes."3 Similar re-
source management policies have been implemented-and often criticized-in
other parks where the Park Service has sought to maintain or restore ecosys-
tems by curtailing human intervention into ecological processes. " 4
IV. PRESERVATION POLICY EXAMINED: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
Since adopting the Leopold Report recommendations, the Park Service has
been dogged with controversy over its revised preservation policy. Critics have
attacked the policy on philosophical and scientific grounds. Local communities
and residents have secured notable modifications to the policy. The ensuing
discussion first puts the Park Service's preservation policy in historical context
and then sets forth the principal criticisms against it. It then responds to these
criticisms, concluding that the related nonintervention and ecological restora-
tion concepts represent a viable though still experimental preservation policy.
As a consequence, without further clarification and legitimization, the policy
will remain vulnerable in political and other arenas.
A. Nonintervention, Restoration, and its Critics: An Overview
Because the Park Service's preservation policy represents a significant
departure from conventional natural resource management practices, it has
been subject to intense scrutiny and criticism. Two dimensions of the policy
have come under repeated attack. The Park Service's nonintervention philoso-
phy has been criticized as an ill-conceived biocentric policy that ignores the
human presence in nature, lacks a credible scientific basis, and is unattainable
CANYON DAM: FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (1995).
110. See id. at 122-25, 166-73.
111. ALFRED RUNTE, YosEMrrE: THE EMBATTLED WILDERNESS 216-17 (1990); see also
WAGNER ET AL., supra note 10, at 67.
112. Elwha River Ecosystem and Fisheries Restoration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-495, 106
Stat. 3173, 3174. NATIONAL PARK SERV,, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR
ELwHA RIVER ECOSYSTEM RESTORATION IMPLEMENTATION, OLYMPIC NATIONAL PARK, WASH-
INGTON (1996); see Catherine Hawkins Hoffman & Brian D. Winter, Restoring Aquatic Environ-
ments: A Case Study of the Elwha River, in NATIONAL PARKS AND PROTECTED AREAS, supra note
70, at 303.
113. WRIGHT, supra note 35, at 101-05; WAGNER Er AL., supra note 10, at 61-62.
114. See EVERGLADES: THE ECOSYSTEM AND ITS RESTORATION (Steven M. Davis & John C.
Ogden eds., 1994); David J. Parsons & Jan W. van Wagtendonk, Fire Research and Management
in the Sierra Nevada National Parks, in SCIENCE AND ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT IN THE NA-
TIONAL PARKS, supra note 39, at 25.
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in the altered national park environment. The related ecological restoration
policy, which paradoxically often involves active human intervention into
ecosystem processes, has been attacked on similar grounds, primarily by local
property owners who view reintroduced predators or officially sanctioned fires
as a direct threat. In both cases, the policies under attack reflect a renewed
faith in the value of maintaining and restoring relatively pristine ecological
conditions in national parks.
Historically, natural resource management policy has focused on manag-
ing select resources on clearly defined land designations for productive pur-
poses. Early on, natural resources were viewed as discrete commodities, and
laws were adopted establishing detailed management regimes for water, min-
erals, timber, forage, and wildlife. "5 The goal was production for human
consumption and enjoyment."6 State game agencies, for example, focused
wildlife management efforts on featured hunting species; population targets
were established, necessary habitat was acquired and then managed for select
species, and other species were largely ignored."7 Perceived negative natural
influences, such as fire and predators, were systematically eliminated to pro-
tect more valuable resource commodities. A similar philosophy prevailed in
the national parks, which were managed to produce "good" scenic, wildlife
viewing, and recreation experiences for visitors."'
During the late 20th century, drawing upon the insights of Aldo Leopold
and others, this resource production focus has begun to change, with resource
managers beginning to view the landscape as an ecological entity." 9 Gradu-
ally, a consensus is emerging that resource management efforts must be ex-
panded to encompass the entire ecological complex, both species and process-
es.'20 As a legal matter, the first shifts in this direction were manifested in
legislation like the Endangered Species Act and National Forest Management
Act. '2 Recent administrative initiatives promoting ecosystem management
115. See SAMUEL P. HAYS, CONSERVATION AND THE GOSPEL OF EFFICIENCY: THE PROGRES-
SIVE CONSERVATION MOVEMENT, 1890-1920 (1959); CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE
NEXT MERIDIAN: LAND, WATER, AND THE FUTURE OF THE WEST (1992).
116. R. McGreggor Cawley & John Freemuth, Tree Farms, Mother Earth, and Other Dilem-
mas: The Politics of Ecosystem Management in Greater Yellowstone, 6 Soc'Y & NAT. RESOURCES
41, 44-46 (1993); Winifred B. Kessler, A Tale of Two Paradigms: Multiple Use and Ecosystem
Management, 8 GEORGE WRIGHT FORUM 13-20 (1992).
117. See THOMAS A. LUND, AMERICAN WILDLIFE LAW 60-79 (1980); George Cameron
Coggins & Michael E. Ward, The Law of Wildlife Management on the Federal Public Lands, 60
ORE. L. REV. 59, 62-63 (1981); see also ALDO LEOPOLD, GAME MANAGEMENT 3-21 (1933).
118. Sellars, supra note 6, at 11-13; see supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
119. See generally ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT FOR PARKS AND WILDERNESS 9-10 (James K.
Agee & Darryll R. Johnson eds., 1988); SAMUEL P. HAYS, BEAUTY, HEALTH AND PERMANENCE:
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1955-1985 (1987); DONALD WORSTER, THE
WEALTH OF NATURE: ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY AND THE ECOLOGICAL IMAGINATION 108-09
(1993); DONALD WORSTER, NATURE'S ECONOMY: A HISTORY OF ECOLOGICAL IDEAS (1994). See
ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC (1966).
120. See, e.g., 1 INTERAGENCY ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT TASK FORCE, THE ECOSYSTEM
APPROACH: HEALTHY ECOSYSTEMS AND SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIES: OVERVIEW REPORT 31-34
(1995) [hereinafter HEALTHY ECOSYSTEMS AND SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIES I]; SOCIETY OF AM.
FORESTERS, TASK FORCE REPORT ON SUSTAINING LONG-TERM FOREST HEALTH AND PRODUC-
TIvrY (1993).
121. See Robert B. Keiter, Beyond the Boundary Line: Constructing A Law of Ecosystem
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among the federal land management agencies are a further example of this
shift. "'22 For national parks, the Leopold Report-with its recommendations
for applying these new ecological insights for preservation purpos-
es--represents an early manifestation of this new philosophical approach to
natural resource management. But as the Park Service has withdrawn from
intensive, manipulative management and simultaneously promoted controver-
sial reintroductions, it has met a skeptical response from those accustomed to
a more active and goal-driven (or quantitative) management approach.
Criticism of the Park Service's preservation policy has focused on its
nonintervention or natural regulation approach,'23 which is designed to let
nature take its course with minimal human interference. Convinced that the
concept of naturalness is ambiguous, subjective, and value-laden, critics have
asked, what exactly is "natural" and how can it be defined?"24 Does "natural"
imply the complete absence of humans and human influence from nature? Or
does "natural" contemplate the presence of Native Americans during the pre-
European settlement period?"2 Few if any places on earth, they argue, have
not been trammeled by man, which means the human presence must be inte-
grated into any natural resource management policy.'26 Asserting that Native
American hunting and burning practices had profound effects on the early
American landscape,'27 they contend that the Park Service cannot recreate a
natural setting in that image without knowing these effects."2 Moreover, ar-
guing that "natural" is a subjective construct, critics assert that the idea of
Management, 65 U. COLO. L. REv. 294, 314-16 (1994); 2 INTERAGENCY ECOSYSTEM MANAGE-
MENT TASK FORCE, THE ECOSYSTEM APPROACH: HEALTHY ECOSYSTEMS AND SUSTAINABLE
ECONOMIES: IPLEMENTATION ISSUES 69 (1995) [hereinafter HEALTHY ECOSYSTEMS AND SUs-
TAINABLE ECONOMIES 111.
122. For examples of these initiatives, see CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., ECOSYSTEM
MANAGEMENT: FEDERAL AGENCY AcnvmIES (1994); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ECOSYS-
TEM MANAGEMENT: ADDITIONAL ACTIONS NEEDED TO ADEQUATELY TEST A PROMISING AP-
PROACH (1994); THE KEYSTONE CTR., THE KEYSTONE NATIONAL POLICY DIALOGUE ON ECOSYS-
TEM MANAGEMENT: FINAL REPORT (1996).
123. The term "natural regulation" has often been used to describe the Park Service's basic
management philosophy in the aftermath of the Leopold Report, but the term does not appear in
official Park Service documents. See infra notes 138-40 and accompanying text. The term
"nonintervention" is therefore used throughout this article to describe this aspect of Park Service
preservation policy. However, this term is also not entirely accurate: Park Service policy provides
for limited interventions, and park officials have often intervened into park ecosystems, both for
ecological and other purposes. See supra notes 65-106 and accompanying text.
124. ALSTON CHASE, IN A DARK WOOD: THE FIGHT OVER FORESTS AND THE RISING TYR-
ANNY OF ECOLOGY 2-3, 411, 413 (1996) [hereinafter CHASE, DARK WOOD]; HESS, supra note
107, at 94-95.
125. CHASE, YELLOWSTONE, supra note 10, at 92-115; WAGNER ET AL., supra note 10, at
139-45.
126. HESS, supra note 107, at 95; WAGNER ET AL., supra note 10, at 139-45. The human
presence also means that resource managers must employ the social sciences as well as natural
sciences in establishing natural resource policy. CHASE, YELLOWSTONE, supra note 10, at 320-21.
127. See Charles E. Kay, Aboriginal Overkill and Native Burning: Implications for Modern
Ecosystem Management, 10 WJ. APPLIED FORESTRY 121 (1995).
128. This raises additional problems: because nature is not static but rather constantly chang-
ing, it is both misleading and undesirable to recreate a static former condition, even if it could be
reliably defined. It is likewise impossible to calculate how an area like Yellowstone would have
evolved over nearly two centuries since it was first explored by white men. See generally WAG-
NER ET AL., supra note 10, at 139-45.
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recreating nature represents a romantic ideal not a viable scientific or objective
standard. 9
How to achieve naturalness goals in a national park setting engenders
perhaps even more controversy. According to one critic, the Park Service's
preservation policy is based upon the erroneous notion of ecosystem stability;
it blindly accepts the premise that nature-knowing what is best and tending
toward equilibrium-can take care of itself."3 ' Observing that national parks
often lack original predators and have evolved under a regime of fire suppres-
sion, critics also contend that national park environments are so altered that a
natural regulation policy could actually jeopardize park ecosystems when so
many critical ecological components are missing.' And observing that na-
tional parks are not defined by actual ecosystem boundaries, critics note that
park resources are subject to pervasive development activity and human influ-
ences from beyond the border that fragment wildlife habitat and otherwise
adversely affect park ecology, making it impossible for ecological processes to
function.' 2 Moreover, critics note that the Leopold Report did not endorse
"hands off' management; rather, it expressly acknowledged the continuing
need to intervene to ensure a functional ecological setting.'33 In short, the
critics believe that more rather than less intervention is necessary to sustain
park ecosystems.
The Park Service's preservation policies have also engendered less philo-
sophical but more concrete local opposition, which has led to significant poli-
cy modifications. In the case of Yellowstone, adjacent landowners and gate-
way communities have actively resisted efforts to restore species or ecological
processes. Believing that wolves and natural fire threaten paramount human
safety and property concerns, park neighbors have applied intense political and
legal pressure to stop or modify specific restoration efforts. 34 Similarly, lo-
cal hunters, ranchers, and state wildlife officials, often imbued with a tradi-
tional range carrying capacity philosophy, have vigorously challenged
Yellowstone's elk and bison management policies. 3 Responding to these
constituencies, regional congressional delegations have exerted their political
influence and sought modifications to these preservation policies. As a result,
reintroduced wolves are radio collared and subject to strict limitations, tight
monitoring controls have been placed on natural fires, and park bison migrat-
ing toward private property are being captured and slaughtered."3 Thus, de-
spite its ostensible commitment to a nonintervention preservation policy, the
Park Service has made significant modifications for political rather than eco-
logical reasons.
129. See HEss, supra note 107, .at 77-100.
130. CHASE, YELLOWSTONE, supra note 10, at 318-19.
131. See WAGNER Er AL., supra note 10, at 145. See generally CHASE, YELLOWSTONE, supra
note 10.
132. WAGNER Er AL., supra note 10, at 145.
133. Id. at 28-30.
134. See Mech, supra note 14, at 312; Economic Impact Hearings, supra note 11.
135. See DESPAIN E7 AL., supra note 12, at 26, 35, 42.
136. See supra notes 83-84, 88-89, 103-06 and accompanying text.
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B. Clarifying Preservation Policy: Further Perspectives
Nonetheless, the Park Service's basic preservation policy remains largely
intact and can be generally sustained against these criticisms. Much of the
criticism either mischaracterizes the basic policy itself or reflects a fundamen-
tal disagreement with policy objectives. Other criticism raises difficult scien-
tific issues on which no consensus has yet emerged. 37 The fact that the Park
Service has regularly adjusted its preservation policy to accommodate the con-
cerns of neighbors indicates that it is acutely aware of the environmental and
human pressures on national parks. Nevertheless, the criticisms suggest the
need for further clarification of national park preservation policy and for addi-
tional public involvement in defining and implementing policy objectives.
Park Service preservation policy is not framed in terms of an absolute
"hands off' or natural regulation policy. The term "natural regulation" does
not appear in Park Service management documents.'38 In the 1988 Manage-
ment Policies statement,'39 the Park Service establishes a biological resource
management goal of perpetuating native animal life and natural evolutionary
processes by "minimizing human impacts on natural animal population dynam-
ics."' The document frames Park Service preservation policy in aspirational
terms: Managers are enjoined to utilize natural processes "to the greatest ex-
tent possible.''. Strictly speaking, national park preservation policy is not
simply natural regulation; rather, the policy is based on minimizing human
interventions and on using scientific data as the basis for intervention deci-
sions. Indeed, there are numerous examples of Park Service intervention into
natural systems to achieve ecological as well as nonecological objectives, in-
cluding bison, fire, and fisheries management. In cases where Park Service
officials have not intervened in ecological processes, as is true with elk on
Yellowstone's northern range, the policy decision seems to reflect a scientific
as well as philosophical judgment.
Park Service preservation policy does not contemplate a static environ-
ment or a stable ecosystem. The 1988 Management Policies document recog-
nizes that "change... [is] an integral part of the functioning of natural sys-
tems," which will not be preserved "as though frozen at a given point in
time." 42 It also provides for perpetuating "park natural resources and natural
137. This article, written by a nonscientist, focuses on the legal and policy dimensions of the
controversy over national park preservation policy. Points of scientific disagreement are noted, but
no effort is made to resolve these differences. The role of science in policy formulation, however,
is examined.
138. See supra note 123; see also DESPAIN Er AL., supra note 12, at 6-13. But see Douglas B.
Houston, Ecosystems of National Parks, 172 SCIENCE 648 (1971) (calling for "natural regulation
of animal numbers" as a means of maintaining national park ecosystems in "as nearly pristine a
condition as possible").
139. For a description of this document, see supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
140. 1988 NPS MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 51, at 4:5, 4:10.
141. Id. at 4:6. Similarly, the Leopold Report only provided for park managers to recreate
primitive vignettes "as nearly as possible." See Leopold et al., supra note 7, at 239.
142. 1988 NPS MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 51, at 4:2.
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processes,"'43 and instructs park managers to "try to maintain all the com-
ponents and processes of naturally evolving park ecosystems."'" Similarly,
Yellowstone's 1995 Resource Management Plan "focuses on preserving the
components and processes of naturally evolving ecosystems."'"5 Thus, the
policy recognizes the dynamic and evolutionary nature of park ecosystems and
is not designed to capture a snapshot in time.
The Park Service, however, has not adequately addressed either the natu-
ralness concept or the vignette of primitive America metaphor, which have
been the focus of much criticism. Although the principal policy documents
contain several references to the term "natural," it is not otherwise defined
or placed in historical context. The "primitive America" metaphor 47 also is
not referenced or discussed, though such discussion might clarify whether
national park ecological maintenance and restoration goals are tied to an his-
torical target. Viewed from a traditional natural resource management per-
spective and its commitment to objective production standards, these omissions
further the perception that park preservation policy is ambiguous,
unquantifiable, and standardless. Moreover, a policy framed in general rather
than specific ecological terms leaves the agency open to the charge that it is
basically unaccountable for its management decisions and actions."
These omissions are not, however, fatal to the policy itself, particularly
given the experimental nature of this new approach to natural resource man-
agement and the complexities involved in implementing such a policy in the
modem world. As a conceptual matter, the term "natural" can-and
should-be interpreted in a relative sense to distinguish among potential influ-
encing events, recognizing that some of these events may involve human pres-
ence or intervention. 49 For example, spontaneous occurrences in a pristine
143. Id. at 4:2, 4:10.
144. Id. at 4:1.
145. YELLOWSTONE NAT'L PARK, NATIONAL PARK SERv., RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PLAN 1
(1995) [hereinafter 1995 YELLOWSTONE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PLAN]. For example, despite
political recriminations in the aftermath of the 1988 Yellowstone fires, the park's plan acknowl-
edges that fire is a critical ecological process and provides that natural fires will be allowed to
burn, albeit subject to more rigorous limitations than before. Id. at Yell-N-020.000.
146. See, e.g., 1988 NPS MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 51, at 4:5, 4:6; 1995 YELLOW-
STONE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PLAN, supra note 145, at 1, 2. But see NATIONAL PARK SERV.,
NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES NPS-77, at 3 (1991) (defining "natural condi-
tions" as "those that would exist today in the absence of the effects of European man"). Signifi-
cantly, the NPS-77 document is an internal policy manual prepared for Park Service resource
managers, but not generally available or circulated to the public.
147. Holmes Rolston 1II, Biology and Philosophy in Yellowstone, 5 BIOLOGY & PHILO. 241,
245 (1990). See also Dan E. Huff, Wildlife Management in America's National Parks: Preparing
for the Next Century, 12(1) GEORGE WRIGHT FORUM 25, 30-31 (1997).
148. See infra notes 279-89 and accompanying text.
149. It has been argued that these problems could be addressed and national park preservation
policy clarified if the Park Service adopted the terminology "ecological process management."
Mark S. Boyce, Natural Regulation or the Control of Nature, in THE GREATER YELLOWSTONE
ECOSYSTEM, supra note 10, at 183, 190. This terminology would avoid the term "natural," cast
management policy in scientific terms, and acknowledge that human intervention may be required
to achieve these goals. Id. at 183, 203. Boyce asserts that the Park Service's management goal is
not merely to abstain from any intervention into the natural system, but to promote ecosystem
integrity by sustaining and restoring ecological processes that have shaped dynamic landscapes
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setting are one matter, human interventions to restore species or mimic pro-
cesses are another, and human interventions for other purposes are yet another
matter.5 ' As for the vignette of primitive America metaphor, the Park Ser-
vice should clarify whether its ecological management and restoration goals
are historically defined or whether ecological history simply serves as a gener-
al point of reference.'' A forthright discussion of the difficulties involved in
defining and recreating a past ecological setting in today's world would lend
additional credibility to a preservation policy not tied inextricably to the past.
In the final analysis, concepts like nature, naturalness, and wilderness are cul-
tural-and not just scientific--constructs that society regularly employs to
define and characterize relatively undisturbed environmental settings.'
The Park Service's preservation policy cannot be said to ignore human
values or concerns. At one level, by seeking to minimize human intrusions
into park ecosystems, the policy is consistent with the strong national commit-
ment--reflected in the law-to preserve national park lands and resources in
an "unimpaired" condition for the enjoyment of future generations.'53 Human
values and contemporary priorities, as manifested in endangered species legis-
lation and related laws,'54 are similarly reflected in national park manage-
ment decisions protecting and restoring dwindling species, such as grizzly
bears and wolves. 5 At another level, the Park Service has taken account of
competing human concerns by authorizing managers to intervene aggressively
when problem animals or fire directly threaten human lives or property.'56
Park Service policy documents also specify that park planning and resource
management decisions should provide for public involvement,'57 which rep-
within the national parks. Id. at 183, 190. He concludes that ecological process management more
accurately reflects park management goals and more closely tracks the Leopold Report's recom-
mendations. Id. at 190.
150. Rolston, supra note 147, at 244-46.
151. DANIEL B. BoTKIN, DISCORDANT HARMONiES: A NEw ECOLOGY FOR THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY 194-97 (1990). For example, the Forest Service has proposed using the "identi-
fication of trends and historic conditions" as one factor in an ecosystem analysis that would be-
come part of the forest planning process under proposed revisions to the National Forest Manage-
ment Act regulations. National Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning, 60 Fed.
Reg. 18886, 18925 (1995) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. § 219.7) (proposed Apr. 13, 1995).
152. Dan Flores, Making the West Whole Again: An Historical Perspective on Restoration, in
RECLAIMING THE NATIVE HOME OF HOPE, supra note 89. See also 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (defining
"wilderness" as "an area of undeveloped Federal Land retaining its primeval character and influ-
ence, without permanenent improvements or human habitation... and which generally appears to
have been affected primarily by the forces of nature, with the imprint of man's work subatantially
unnoticed ....").
153. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1, la-I (1994). For a discussion of the national park organic legislation,
see infra notes 171-89 and accompanying text. Cf. 16 U.S.C. § 1132(c) (1994) (authorizing Con-
gress to designate national park lands as wilderness).
154. For a discussion of the Endangered Species Act, see infra notes 213-21 and accompa-
nying text.
155. See Alistair J. Bath, Public Attitudes about Wolf Restoration in Yellowstone, in THE
GREATER YELLOwSTONE ECOSYSTEM, supra note 10, at 367.
156. See supra notes 83-84, 88-89, 103-06 and accompanying text.
157. See 1988 NPS MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 51, at 6. Cf. 16 U.S.C. § la-10
(1994) (requiring the Secretary of the Interior to provide for public involvement in preparing a
periodic report on "current and future needs of each unit of the National Park System for resource
management, interpretation, construction, operation and maintenance").
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resents an opportunity to inject human values and concerns into preservation
policy. However, whether the public has been afforded an adequate opportuni-
ty to participate in defining and implementing preservation policy is another
question."'
The altered state of national park ecosystems is not a basis for rejecting
the Park Service's predominantly nonintervention preservation policy. Al-
though most national park ecosystems were historically impacted by Native
Americans and early settlers, they have since been much less affected by hu-
man activities than most other locations. By law, most national parks do not
allow hunting, trapping, or other extractive uses, 5 9 which means the human
imprint has diminished over time. To be sure, visitor facilities and roads are
located within national parks, and growing visitation numbers mean these
settings are not free from a human presence. In Yellowstone and elsewhere,
however, this disturbance is generally limited to discrete visitor areas and road
corridors; it has not significantly affected the expansive back country regions
or most wildlife species. To the extent that earlier fire suppression and preda-
tor elimination policies altered park ecosystems, current preservation poli-
cy-often through human intervention-is designed to reverse these impacts
by reintroducing fire and extirpated species. Although it may be neither possi-
ble nor desirable to recreate the original ecological setting, it is still possible to
re-establish the principal ecological components and processes that shaped
national park environments.
National park preservation policy does not-and cannot-ignore the im-
pact that development on adjacent public and private lands may have on park
resources. National parks are no longer isolated; they are part of larger ecosys-
tems and are affected by activities occurring beyond their borders."6 Adja-
cent development, in the form of proliferating subdivisions, timber harvesting,
or similar intensive activities, has fragmented sensitive ecosystems and dis-
placed wildlife species. These developments highlight the important yet fragile
role national parks play as reserves in biodiversity conservation efforts. 6 ' An
increased human presence on park borders, however, has also brought pressure
to bear on park officials to protect neighbors from fire, predators, and foraging
wildlife. Given its uncertain jurisdictional authority over adjacent lands,"62
the Park Service has sought to address external concerns through cooperative
158. WAGNER ET AL., supra note 10, at 161-62; see infra notes 260-61 and accompanying
text.
159. 16 U.S.C. § 1; Michigan United Conservation Clubs v. Lujan, 949 F.2d 202, 203 (6th
Cir. 1991); National Rifle Ass'n v. Potter, 628 F. Supp. 903 (D.D.C. 1985).
160. 1988 NPS MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 51, at 1:4, 2:9-10. See generally JOHN C.
FREEMUTH, ISLANDS UNDER SIEGE: NATIONAL PARKS AND THE POLITCs OF EXTERNAL THREATS
(1991); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PARKS AND RECREATION: LIMITED PROGRESS MADE IN
DOCUMENTING AND MITIGATING THREATS TO THE PARKS (1987); NATIONAL PARK SERV., STATE
OF THE PARKS, 1980: A REPORT TO CONGRESS (1980); Robert B. Keiter, On Protecting the Na-
tional Parks From the External Threats Dilemma, 20 LAND & WATER L. REv. 355 (1985) [here-
inafter Keiter, Protecting the National Parks]; William 1. Lockhart, External Threats to Our Na-
tional Parks: An Argument for Substantive Protection, 16 STANFORD ENVTL. L.J. 3 (1997).
161. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
162. See infra notes 205, 231-21 and accompanying text.
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planning and similar processes. 63 More recently, these efforts have been ad-
vanced under the rubric of ecosystem management." Whether the Park
Service's preservation goal of perpetuating and restoring park ecosystems with
minimal human intervention can be maintained in this venue remains to be
seen. There is mounting evidence, as reflected in the Yellowstone bison man-
agement controversy, that park preservation goals may be subordinated to the
interests of neighboring land owners and managers to minimize political reper-
cussions."
The Leopold Report indicated that human intervention, including culling,
may be required to protect park resources." Park Service policies acknowl-
edge that aggressive intervention may sometimes be necessary to protect hu-
man safety, to remove exotic species, to promote genetic diversity, and to
restore missing ecological components. 67 In Yellowstone, the Park Service
plainly has not adhered to a strict nonintervention policy; it has intervened,
sometimes aggressively, to control bears, wolves, bison, and fire."6 Given
these interventions, the fact that Yellowstone officials have not culled the
park's northern elk herd may represent less a rigid adherence to a noninter-
vention philosophy and more a scientific disagreement over the propriety of
intervention to achieve specific ecological goals.'" Or, since powerful politi-
cal forces have influenced other interventions, the park's reluctance to inter-
vene in the elk controversy may reflect a calculated political judgment about
the public's tolerance for ungulate culling.' In any event, given the com-
plex jurisdictional setting and often volatile political climate that surrounds
most national parks, intervention decisions under the Park Service's preserva-
tion policy will undoubtedly continue to reflect a combination of ecological
and political judgments.
This cursory review of the Park Service's preservation policy suggests
that it represents a viable though controversial natural resource management
policy. The basic goal of maintaining and restoring the ecological landscape
while minimizing human intervention in the national park setting is plainly
163. 1988 NPS MANAGEMENT PoLIciEs, supra note 51, at 2:9-10. See generally Joseph L.
Sax & Robert B. Keiter, Glacier National Park and Its Neighbors: A Study in Federal Interagency
Relations, 14 ECOLoGY L.Q. 207 (1987).
164. See, e.g., Keiter, supra note 121; CLARK & MINTA, supra note 27; see also THE KEY-
STONE CENTER, supra note 122.
165. See supra notes 75-84 and accompanying text.
166. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
167. 1988 NPS MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 51, at 4:6, 4:10. In fact, current Park
service policy provides for fencing and culling to manage large ungulates at Theodore Roosevelt,
Wind Cave, and Badlands national parks. See Huff, supra note 147 at 26.
168. For a description of how Yellowstone has managed these resources, see supra notes 75-
106 and accompanying text.
169. See YELLowSrONE NAT'L PARK RESEARCH DIv., INTERIM REPORT: YELLoWSTONE
NATIONAL PARK NORTHERN RANGE REsEARCH (1992).
170. Indeed, the Park Service's original decision to cease culling elk was adopted, at least in
part, to appease animal humane groups. See DESPAIN ET AL., supra note 12, at 24-27; see also
Allen T. Rutberg & Wayne Pacelle, Embracing Humane Value in National Park Management,
14(1) GEORGE WRiGHT FORuM 38 (1997) (arguing that the Park Service is the principal commu-
nicator of the Federal Government's ethical views on wildlife).
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consistent with the preservationist purpose underlying the national park system
and is still achievable within many national park settings. Nonetheless, the
Park Service's preservation policy could be fortified by further clarifying the
ecological goals and by involving the public in this process. Additional clarifi-
cation of the role that historic ecological conditions play in establishing resto-
ration and other objectives (or why this is not possible or desirable), would
help address lingering accountability concerns. Public involvement in the poli-
cy definition and implementation process would help build support from myri-
ad constituencies and add legitimacy to these new preservation concepts.
V. LAW AND PRESERVATION POLICY: ASSESSING THE LEGAL FOUNDATION
Despite the critical scrutiny directed toward the Park Service's revised
preservation policy and related management decisions, the fundamental legality
of the policy has not been seriously questioned. Several laws directly support
the policy itself, while other laws governing Park Service management deci-
sions can be reconciled with it. The principal legal basis for the policy is the
amended National Park Service Organic Act as well as the enabling legislation
for individual parks. General administrative law principles can be squared with
the Park Service's decision adopting this new preservation policy, and will
govern its implementation and any significant modifications. Other statutes,
such as the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the Endangered Spe-
cies Act, and the Federal Tort Claims Act, may affect or modify the policy,
but do not undermine it. Moreover, because the policy can impact adjacent
landowners, its implementation raises difficult but not fatal legal questions
concerning the scope of Park Service authority and its potential liability be-
yond park boundaries.
A. The Organic Act
The National Park Service Organic Act of 1916 establishes the basic legal
framework governing the Park Service's management authority and responsi-
bility. Under the Organic Act, the Park Service is obligated to administer
national parks to conserve scenery, wildlife, natural and historic objects, and to
provide for public enjoyment, while ensuring that parks are left "unimpaired
for the enjoyment of future generations."'' Although the Act speaks in terms
of both preservation and public use, the statutory "nonimpairment" standard
indicates that resource preservation responsibilities should take precedence
over public use in the event of conflict.' The 1978 amendments to the Or-
171. 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
172. Keiter, Protecting the National Parks, supra note 160; Lockhart, supra note 160; Lem-
ons & Stout, supra note 5; Robin Winks, Dispelling the Myth, 70 NAT'L PARKS 52 (1996). In
1918, in his seminal letter defining the fledgling Park Service's role, Secretary of the Interior
Franklin Lane reached this same conclusion: "Every activity of the Service is subordinate to duties
imposed upon it to faithfully preserve the parks for posterity in essentially their natural state." See
supra note 31 and accompanying text; see also 1988 NPS MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 51,
at 1:3-4.
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ganic Act, which provide that national parks shall be protected and managed
"in light of the high public value and integrity" of the system, reaffirms and
strengthens Congress' commitment to the basic Organic Act preservation ten-
ets.173 Indeed, several courts have concluded that the amended statute clearly
gives primacy to resource preservation over competing uses or interests.
7 4
This construction of the Organic Act, with its emphasis on preserving nature,
supports the basic nonintervention and ecological restoration premises of the
Park Service's preservation policy.
Under the Organic Act, the Secretary of the Interior is vested with broad
regulatory authority over the national parks.'75 This provision provides the
Secretary with adequate legal authority to implement nonintervention and
restoration preservation policies. The courts have consistently sustained Park
Service regulations and policies designed to protect park resources, including
limitations on hunting, fishing, rafting, mountain biking, and vehicle use with-
in the parks. 7 Where the Park Service has sought to limit visitor activities
in deference to protecting the ecological health or appearance of park resourc-
es, the courts have deferred to the agency's judgments."7 Even in the face of
a First Amendment constitutional challenge to Park Service regulations pro-
hibiting camping on park grounds, the Supreme Court concluded that the judi-
ciary does not have "the authority to replace the Park Service as the manager
of the Nation's parks or ... the competence to judge how much protection of
park lands is wise and how that level of conservation is to be attained."'7
Nevertheless, despite its considerable authority, the Park Service generally has
not translated its resource management policies into governing regulations, 79
choosing instead to define its preservation policies through general policy
statements.'s°
The Park Service has implemented its preservation policy through the park
planning process. Under the Organic Act, the Park Service is obligated to
develop general management plans "for the preservation and use of each unit
173. 16 U.S.C. § la-1 (1994).
174. See Bicycle Trails Council v. Babbitt, 82 F.3d 1445, 1468 (9th Cit. 1996); Michigan
United Conservation Clubs v. Lujan, 949 F.2d 202, 204-05 (6th Cit. 1991); National Rifle Ass'n
v. Potter, 628 F. Supp. 903, 910 (D.D.C. 1985).
175. 16 U.S.C. § 3 (1994).
176. See Bicycle Trails Council, 82 F.3d at 1450-51 (mountain biking); Michigan United
Conservation Clubs, 949 F.2d at 210-11 (trapping); Conservation Law Found. v. Hodel, 864 F.2d
954 (1st Cit. 1989) (motorized vehicles); Organized Fishermen v. Hodel, 775 F.2d 1544 (11th Cir.
1985) (fishing); Wilderness Public Rights Fund v. Kleppe, 608 F.2d 1250 (9th Cit. 1979) (rafting);
National Rifle Ass'n, 628 F. Supp. at 909 (hunting).
177. See, e.g., Bicycle Trails Council, 82 F.3d at 1445 (applying Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), to invoke principles of judicial
deference to agency statutory interpretations to sustain Park Service regulations and management
plans); National Rifle Ass'n, 628 F. Supp. at 909-12 (applying the same principles of judicial
deference to sustain Park Service regulations). For a discussion of the Chevron principle, see infra
notes 191-97 and accompanying text.
178. Clark v. Community for Creative NonViolence, 468 U.S. 288, 299 (1984).
179. See Robert B. Keiter, Ecosystem Management: Exploring the Legal-Political Framework,
in NATIONAL PARKS AND PROTECTED AREAS, supra note 70, at 82-83.
180. See, e.g., 1988 NPS MANAGEMENT POuCIES, supra note 51; 1968 NPS NATURAL AREA
POLICIES, supra note 9.
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of the National Park system." '' General management plans are required to
address park resource preservation measures, visitor facilities plans, visitor
carrying capacities, and boundary modifications." 2 Most national parks, in-
cluding Yellowstone, have prepared management plans that contain general
wildlife and fire management principles as well as policies governing individu-
al species and ecological processes.'83 These general management plans are
sometimes supplemented by more specific management plans, such as
Yellowstone's rather detailed bison and fire management plans.8 4 Given the
environmental consequences attached to both types of plans, they ordinarily
should be subject to NEPA compliance requirements. 5 This would provide
the public an opportunity to participate in formulating and implementing pres-
ervation policy, and subject underlying ecological assumptions to some degree
of scrutiny. However, it is unclear whether preservation policies established in
general management plans would be subject to judicial review at this planning
stage. 18
The Organic Act and individual park enabling statutes also contain specif-
ic exceptions to the notion that national parks are inviolate natural sanctuaries.
Under the Organic Act, the Secretary of the Interior may cut timber to protect
park resources and scenery against insects or disease, and destroy animals or
plants "as may be detrimental to the use of ... parks."'8 7 These provisions
evidently allow the Secretary to elevate other park resource considerations
above preservation, so long as intervention can be reconciled with these statu-
tory responsibilities. Individual park enabling acts also may require or autho-
rize management approaches inconsistent with general preservation policy. For
example, elk hunting is statutorily sanctioned in Grand Teton National
Park, ' and Yellowstone National Park is authorized to "sell or otherwise
dispose of' its surplus bison. 9 Although neither provision precludes Park
Service officials from pursuing a nonintervention preservation policy, they
181. 16 U.S.C. § la-7(b) (1994).
182. Id.
183. See YELLOWSTONE NAT'L PARK, RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PLAN (1995); YELLOWSTONE
NAT'L PARK, NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT PLAN AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT
(1982); see also YELLOWSTONE NAT'L PARK, STATEMENT FOR MANAGEMENT (1991).
184. See, e.g., STATE OF MONT. & NAT'L PARK SERV., INTERIM BISON MANAGEMENT PLAN
(1996); YELLOWSTONE FIRE MANAGEMENT PLAN, supra note 99.
185. For a discussion of NEPA procedures, see infra notes 205-12 and accompanying text.
186. Cf Sierra Club v. Robertson, 28 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1994) (denying environmental
oganizations standing to challenge adoption of a format plan for lack of a concrete and particular-
ized inquiry in fact); Wilderness Soc'y v. Alcock, 867 F. Supp. 1026 (N.D. Ga. 1994), aff d, 83
F.3d 386 (11 th Cir. 1996) (concluding that adoption of a forest plan does not present a justiciable
controversy subject to judicial review until a more specific project level decision is made). But see
Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma, 956 F.2d 1508 (9th Cir. 1992) (rejecting justiciability
arguments and reviewing legal challenges to a forest plan). Of course; park general management
plans should at least be subject to judicial review for NEPA compliance. See infra notes 205-12
and accompanying text.
187. 16 U.S.C. § 3 (1994); see New Mexico State Game Comm'n v. Udall, 410 F.2d 1197,
1199-1201 (10th Ci. 1969).
188. 16 U.S.C. § 673(c)(a) (1994). See Huff, supra note 147 at 26, 28 (noting significant
variation in the legislation mandate governing individual park units).
189. 16 U.S.C. § 36 (1994).
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nonetheless indicate that other specified considerations may take precedence.
B. Administrative Law Principles
Although the Leopold Report recommendations called for a major shift in
the Park Service's general preservation policy, the ensuing change in direction
should not undermine its legal validity. Under well-established administrative
law principles, a federal agency is free to change policy direction, so long as
the changes do not violate its organic mandate and it provides a reasoned ex-'
planation for the shift.'" Moreover, in the absence of clear statutory lan-
guage, the courts generally must defer to an agency's reasonable legal inter-
pretation of its own statutory mandates. 1 ' Thus, even significant administra-
tive policy shifts that can be squared with governing legal obligations should
ordinarily escape judicial reversal." Of course, because the Park Service's
preservation policy was revised nearly thirty years ago, these doctrines may
have limited application to this initial policy shift.'93
Nonetheless, measured by these administrative law principles, the Park
Service's original 1968 decision to adopt nonintervention and ecological resto-
ration preservation policies plainly passes muster.'94 The Organic Act, as in-
terpreted by the Secretary of the Interior, clearly supports a preservation policy
that gives precedence to maintaining and restoring ecological conditions in
national parks while minimizing human intervention into these processes.'95
Besides the Leopold Report, several Park Service documents explain the gov-
erning principles underlying the modified preservation policy and the rationale
for its adoption.'" However, even though the basic preservation policy may
be safe from challenge, proposed applications as well as modifications are still
subject to legal challenge. In fact, recent litigation involving Yellowstone's
bison management policy has raised the question of whether the Park Service
violated its Organic Act responsibilities by not constraining bison within the
park.97 Moreover, any shift or modification in the policy would at least re-
190. See Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 57 (1983);
Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 806-09 (1973).
191. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44
(1984); Federal Election Comm'n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 31-32
(1981). See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLuM. L.
REV. 2071 (1990).
192. Sunstein, supra note 191, 191, at 2101-04.
193. Not only are these doctrines of relatively recent origin, but the Park Service's Leopold
Report-based policy decision is probably no longer ripe for judicial review.
194. For a description of the Park Service's policy shift, see supra notes 40-50 and accompa-
nying text.
195. See supra notes 171-89 and accompanying text. Cf. Bicycle Trails Council v. Babbitt, 82
F.3d. 1445, 1468 (9th Cir. 1996) (sustaining a Park Service regulation limiting bicycle use in
national parks to protect natural resources); Michigan United Conservation Clubs v. Lujan, 949
F.2d 202, 210-11 (6th Cir. 1991) (sustaining a Park Service regulation prohibiting trapping in
national parks unless Congress has specifically authorized it).
196. See, e.g., 1988 NPS MANAGEMENT POLICIEs, supra note 51; 1968 NPS NATURAL AREA
POLICIES, supra note 9; 1964 Udall Memorandum, supra note 8.
197. In 1995, the state of Montana sued the National Park Service, alleging that
Yellowstone's nonintervention bison management policy violated its Organic Act responsibilities.
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quire a clear explanation and compliance with NEPA procedures prior to im-
plementation.
Under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA),'9 s a Park Service deci-
sion to translate its preservation policies into legally binding rules would re-
quire adherence to statutory rulemaking procedures and be subject to judicial
review.'9 To promulgate a rule, informal rulemaking procedures require
public notification and comment opportunities, as well as preparation of a con-
cise basis and purpose statement.2'e The Park Service has translated some of
its natural resource management responsibilities into legal rules,2"' but it has
not formalized its basic preservation policy in this manner. Although this lim-
its the agency's ability to enforce these policies against the public,0 2 it
means that the Park Service has retained considerable discretion in implement-
ing-and even changing-its approach to preservation. Indeed, the policy can
evidently be modified without public involvement or any meaningful threat of
judicial review so long as a reasonable explanation is provided.2 3 Some op-
portunity for public involvement may be available under NEPA during the
park planning process and when implementation decisions are made.2" But
The litigation was settled, with the Park Service agreeing to implement an interim, interventionist
bison management policy, including capturing, testing, ani slaughtering bison within the park.
Montana v. United States, No. 95-6-H-CCL (D. Mont. 1995). For a brief description of this con-
troversy, see supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text. In subsequent litigation, environmental
organizations sued the Park Service, alleging that its interventionist interim bison management
policy violates the Organic Act. Greater Yellowstone Coalition v. Babbitt, 952 F.Supp. 1435 (D.
Mont. 1996). That argument was rejected by a Montana federal district court, which concluded
that "park managers [have] broad discretion in determining how best to conserve wildlife and to
leave them unimpaired for future generations." Id. at 1441. The denial of interim injunctive relief
was affirmed on appeal. Greater Yellowstone Coalition v. Babbitt, 1997 WL 121046 (9th
Cir.(Mont.). On the Yellowstone bison controversy, see generally Keiter & Froelicher, supra note
13.
198. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-612 (1994).
199. Significantly, the APA rulemaking procedures do not apply "to interpretative rules, gen-
eral statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice." 5 U.S.C. §
553(b)(3)(A). For a general discussion of the legal difference between substantive rules, interpre-
tive rules, and statements of policy, see Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements,
Guidances, Manuals, and the Like-Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41
DUKE L.J. 1311 (1992).
200. 5 U.S.C. § 553. See generally BERk4ARD ScHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 161-222 (3d
ed. 1991). The Park Service, however, may not be legally obligated to adhere to the APA's infor-
mal rulemaking procedures: 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2) excepts matters involving "public property" from
these rulemaking procedures. See Wilderness Public Rights Fund v. Kleppe, 608 F.2d 1250, 1253
(9th Cit. 1979); Clipper Cruise Line, Inc. v. United States, 855 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1994).
While recognizing this exception, courts also have ruled that it should be narrowly construed.
United States v. Picciotto, 875 F.2d 345, 347 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Even if the Park Service is exempt
from § 553 compliance, it still must comply with 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1), which requires public
notification through the Federal Register of substantive rules or general statements of policy. In
any event, Park Service regulations addressing preservation policy are subject to judicial review
under an "arbitrary and capricious" standard. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994).
201. See, e.g., 36 C.F.R. pts. 2, 3, 6 (1996); see also Keiter, Ecosystem Management, supra
note 179, at 82-83.
202. Cf United States v. Picciotto, 875 F.2d 345 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (reversing a criminal con-
viction based on a Park Service regulation not adopted in compliance with APA requirements).
See generally Anthony, supra note 199.
203. See supra notes 190-93 and accompanying text.
204. See infra notes 205-12 and accompanying text.
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otherwise, the APA's commitment to public participation in rulemaking and to
judicial oversight seems to have limited application to the formulation of na-
tional park preservation policy, which can only exacerbate accountability con-
cerns.
C. Related Concerns: NEPA, Endangered Species, and Tort Liability
Although the Park Service has broad legal authority to define its own
preservation policy, additional statutory obligations may affect the scope and
implementation of the policy. When a park decides to adopt or pursue a spe-
cific nonintervention or restoration policy, its decision is potentially subject to
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) procedural requirements.' Un-
der NEPA, a major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment requires preparation of an Environmental Impact State-
ment (EIS).' ° This EIS requirement is designed to ensure fully informed ad-
ministrative decisions by requiring public disclosure of the environmental con-
sequences of proposed actions and public involvement in the decision pro-
cess.2' These NEPA procedural requirements are subject to judicial over-
sight,2'a though the courts have not consistently required federal agencies to
prepare full EISs before taking action.'
Significantly, the Park Service's general preservation policy has not been
subject to NEPA review. The 1988 Management Policies document, for ex-
ample, was not prepared under NEPA procedures." ° This means that the
general policy has escaped the harsh glare of public scrutiny that accompanies
NEPA disclosures, and that it has been effectively insulated from judicial
review. Moreover, very few General Management Plans for individual parks
have been accompanied by EISs. And the same is true for specific policy
applications, such as Yellowstone's northern range elk management policy.
But even when the Park Service policy calls for nonintervention or "no ac-
tion," NEPA procedural obligations would seem to attach, because such a
decision could have potentially significant enviromnental ramifications. t '
205. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1994). See generally WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMEN-
TAL LAw § 9 (2d ed. 1994).
206. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1994).
207. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989).
208. See, e.g., Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441 (9th Cir. 1988); Thomas v. Peterson, 753
F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1985).
209. See, e.g., Cabinet Mountains Wilderness v. Peterson, 685 F.2d 678 (D.C. Cir. 1982);
Park County Resource Council, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Agric., 817 F.2d 609 (10th Cir.
1987).
210. Some opportunity, however, for public comment on the policy proposal was provided,
though the agency made no formal response to these comments. 53 Fed. Reg. 9821 (1988). Earlier
policy documents, such as the 1968 NPS NATURAL AREAS PoLIcits, supra note 9, predated
NEPA and could not be expected to address NEPA concerns. See John Donahue, Wildlife in
Parks: Policy, Philosophy and Politics, 14(1) GEORGE WRIGHT FORuM 47, 53-55 (advocating
preparation of a programmatic action plan with NEPA documentation to examine wildlife manage-
ment alternatives for the national parks).
211. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18 (1996) (providing that failure to act can constitute agency ac-
tion). Whether NEPA compliance attaches to a federal nonintervention decision raises an inter-
esting legal question; it might be argued that no "action" has been taken that "significantly af-
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Ignoring NEPA may be counterproductive. The NEPA process provides
the Park Service with an opportunity to clarify its preservation policies, to
garner public support for them, and to respond directly to scientific and other
criticisms. It also provides the public with an opportunity to inject its values
and concerns into the decision process. Moreover, NEPA processes can-and
should-be employed to assess the full ecological dimensions of implementa-
tion decisions, to engage other affected agencies in the implementation pro-
cess, and to promote ecosystem management initiatives, which is particularly
important given the transboundary impacts that accompany many Park Service
preservation policies.2 2 In short, by ensuring broad involvement in defining
and implementing Park Service preservation policy, NEPA procedures can be
used to legitimize nonintervention and ecological restoration decisions.
The powerful Endangered Species Act (ESA),2 3 which is administered
by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, also impacts national park preservation
policy. Designed to protect any species facing possible extinction and its habi-
tat,"' the ESA prohibits federal agencies from jeopardizing a "listed" species
or from adversely modifying its habitat.215 It also prohibits anyone from
"taking" a "listed" species, which includes habitat modification." 6 Finding
that the Endangered Species Act is fundamentally preservationist in nature, the
Supreme Court has ruled that it gives species protection priority over other
considerations.2"7
fects" the environment. One court has ruled that the Secretary of the Interior's decision not to in-
tervene into Alaska's decision authorizing a wolf hunt on federal lands did not constitute a major
federal action for NEPA purposes. Defenders of Wildife v. Andrus, 627 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir.
1980). However, in the case of the Park Service's preservation policy, it seems clear that a federal
resource management action has occurred when park officials implement a nonintervention man-
agement policy for certain species of wildlife, such as elk.
212. In short, NEPA can be used to broaden the Park Service's environmental focus and to
promote interjurisdictional cooperation for its preservation policies. NEPA processes also can be
used to inject biodiversity considerations into resource management policy and decisions. See
Dinah Bear, Using the National Environmental Policy Act to Protect Biological Diversity, 8 TUL.
ENVTL. LJ. 77, 80-83 (1994); Robert B. Keiter, NEPA and the Emerging Concept of Ecosystem
Management on the Public Lands, 25 LAND & WATER L. REv. 43, 44-54 (1990); Cynthia
Carlson, NEPA and the Conservation of Biological Diversity, 19 ENvTL. L. 15 (1988); HEALTHY
ECOSYSTEMS AND SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIES I, supra note 121, at 69.
213. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1994). See generally George Cameron Coggins & Irma S. Rus-
sell, Beyond Shooting Snail Darters in Pork Barrels: Endangered Species and Land Use in Ameri-
ca, 70 GEO. LJ. 1433 (1982) (discussing the developments leading to the enactment of and the
implications of the Endangered Species Act).
214. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1994). Under the ESA, among other things, a species facing possi-
ble extinction is to be "listed" as either endangered or threatened, a recovery plan is to be pre-
pared, and critical habitat is to be designated. 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (1994); see Federico M. Cheever,
The Road to Recovery: A New Way of Thinking About the Endangered Species Act, 23 EcoLOGY
L.Q. 1 (1996); Katherine Simmons Yagerman, Protecting the Critical Habitat Under the Federal
Endangered Species Act, 20 ENVTL. L. 811 (1990).
215. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1994). See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 926 F.2d 429 (5th Cir.
1991); Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1985).
216. 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (a)(l)(B) (1994); see Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities,
115 S. CL 2407 (1995). See generally Federico M. Cheever, An Introduction to the Prohibition
Against Takings in Section 9 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973: Learning to Live with a
Powerful Species Preservation Law, 62 U. COLO. L. REv. 109 (1991) (discussing the history,
importance, and future of section 9).
217. See Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
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In national parks where ESA-listed species are present, the Endangered
Species Act has become the driving force behind species preservation efforts.
For example, Yellowstone's grizzly bear management and wolf reintroduction
programs are being implemented under the Endangered Species Act rather
than the National Parks Organic Act." Should a conflict arise between these
two statutes, the more specific and protective Endangered Species. Act provi-
sions would appear to take precedence over any less protective park manage-
ment policies.219 To facilitate controversial species reintroductions, such as
Yellowstone's wolf reintroduction, the ESA contains an "experimental popula-
tion" provision, which authorizes special rulemaking and limited taking to
address the concerns of nearby landowners and others.22 In addition, be-
cause the ESA prohibition on takings extends to private as well as public land,
it provides a legal basis for extending preservation efforts beyond park bound-
aries." Thus, when ESA-protected species are involved, the Endangered
Species Act can be viewed as supplementing and strengthening national park
preservation efforts.
The threat of tort liability, based upon the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA),m generally should not deter the Park Service from pursuing its
preservation policy. In the national park setting, the typical FTCA case in-
volves a personal injury claim based on the Park Service's alleged negligence
for not protecting visitors from wilderness hazards. 3 When faced with such
claims, the courts have consistently relied upon the FTCA's "discretionary
function" provision"' to reject attacks on the Park Service's resource man-
218. See supra notes 85-97 and accompanying text.
219. In other words, the ESA's species protection requirements should prevail over any na-
tional park management policies that might "jeopardize" or "take" a protected species. For exam-
ple, a Park Service decision to locate visitor facilities or to construct a road in critical habitat for
an ESA-listed species would be subject to challenge under the Endangered Species Act. Cf. Na-
tional Wildlife Fed'n v. National Park Serv., 669 F. Supp. 384, 390-91 (D. Wyo. 1987) (rejecting
both ESA and Organic Act claims in a challenge to Yellowstone's decision not to close the Fish-
ing Bridge campground despite its location in prime grizzly bear habitat). However, Park Service
limitations on visitor activities to protect endangered species are subject to review under an arbi-
trary and capricious standard and must be based on real not speculative evidence. Mausolf v.
Babbitt, 913 F. Supp. 1334 (D. Minn. 1996) (enjoining the Park Service from closing part of
Voyageurs National Park to snowmobiling to protect ESA-listed wolves because there was no
evidence of potential harm to wolves). Nonetheless, the Park Service would appear to have the
authority under the Organic Act to adopt and implement more protective policies than are required
under the Endangered Species Act, so long as the policy is reasonably related to conserving park
resources in an unimpaired condition and is supported by credible factual evidence. 16 U.S.C. § 1
(1994). In short, the Endangered Species Act establishes a maximum threshold but not a minimum
governing the protection of natural resources in national parks.
220. 16 U.S.C. § 1539() (1994). On the use of the "experimental population" provision to
facilitate wolf reintroduction in Yellowstone, see Steven H. Fritts, Management of Wolves Inside
and Outside Yellowstone National Park and Possibilities of Wolf Management Zones in the Great-
er Yellowstone Area, in WOLVEs FOR YELLOWSTONE?, supra note 73, at 1-9.
221. See infra Parts V.D, V.D.I.
222. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1994).
223. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 949 F.2d 332 (10th Cir. 1991); Zumwalt v. United
States, 928 F.2d 951 (10th Cir. 1991); Martin v. United States, 546 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1976);
Smith v. United States, 546 F.2d 872 (10th Cir. 1976).
224. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1994). See generally Gisele C. DuFort, Note, All the King's Forces
or The Discretionary Function Doctrine in the Nuclear Age: Allen v. United States, 15 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 477 (1988).
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agement policies. Under the discretionary function doctrine, government agen-
cies are absolved from liability for public policy judgments "grounded in so-
cial, economic and political policy."' In Martin v. United States,' for ex-
ample, Yellowstone officials were not responsible for a deadly grizzly bear at-
tack attributed to their decision closing the park dumps to bears. Concluding
that Yellowstone's grizzly bear management policy involved discretionary
judgments, the court observed that Congress did not intend to make the United
States "an insurer of the safety of all Yellowstone National Park visitors. '2'
In the national park setting, however, the courts have not consistently
accepted the discretionary function defense when the tort claim is based on a
failure to warn of a hazardous condition. In Smith v. United States, 21 for ex-
ample, the court found that the government's duty to warn visitors of a poten-
tial national park hazard (i.e. thermal pools) provided a separate basis for
potential liability and did not involve a discretionary policy judgment. But
where the hazard is apparent and merely reflects the fact that national parks
are wilderness settings, the courts generally have rejected failure-to-warn
claims.' Only in cases where the hazard was not evident and was known to
the Park Service have the courts found liability. Yet even in these cases, the
Park Service can avoid the risk of liability by providing an adequate warning.
Thus, the threat of FTCA liability for visitor injuries should not be a signifi-
cant limitation on national park preservation policy.
D. Beyond the Boundary: Regulation and Liability
In implementing its preservation policy, the Park Service must acknowl-
edge that park wildlife and ecological processes will not respect park bound-
aries. Predators may prey on domestic livestock outside the park, ungulates
may graze on adjacent private lands, and fire may bum beyond the boundary
and destroy adjoining property. When this occurs, park neighbors may respond
by killing park wildlife or suing for damages. These ecological and practical
realities raise two important legal questions.2" First, does the Park Service
have any legal authority to protect park resources beyond the boundary line?
Second, does the Park Service face any liability for damages that occur be-
yond park boundaries?
225. United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 814 (1984); see Berkovitz v. United
States, 486 U.S. 531, 536-39 (1988).
226. 546 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1976).
227. Martin, 546 F.2d at 1360. Similarly, in Johnson v. United States, 949 F.2d 332 (10th
Cir. 1991), the discretionary function doctrine was invoked to reject liability claims predicated on
the Park Service's alleged failure to regulate mountain climbing activities in Grand Teton National
Park. Id. at 337; see also Zumwalt, 928 F.2d at 954-56.
228. 546 F.2d 872 (10th Cir. 1976); see also Boyd v. United States ex rel. U.S. Army, Corps
of Engineers, 881 F.2d 895 (10th Cir. 1989).
229. See, e.g., Kielm v. United States, 984 F.2d 1100, 1102-06 (10th Cir. 1993); Johnson, 949
F.2d at 337-38; Zumwalt, 928 F.2d at 955-56.
230. Transboundary impacts also may raise legal issues under NEPA and the Endangered
Species Act. See supra notes 205, 231-43 and accompanying text for a brief discussion of how
these statutes may apply beyond park boundaries.
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1. Regulatory Authority on Adjacent Lands
Although national park wildlife ordinarily can be expected to stray beyond
park boundaries, the Park Service has only limited authority to regulate these
animals once they leave the park. Whether the expansive regulatory power that
the Park Service enjoys within its own domain extends beyond the boundary
line remains an uncertain and contentious issue. As a result, when wildlife
cross the boundary, they are ordinarily subject to state jurisdictional authori-
ty. 3' State wildlife agencies are not governed by a preservation mandate,
and they generally do not practice nonintervention management.232 Rather,
state wildlife agencies are primarily devoted to producing an annual big game
crop to meet the demand of local hunters. In some cases, state wildlife man-
agement policies can serve to compliment the Park Service's ecological goals,
as in the case of Yellowstone's northern elk herd. 33 In other cases, however,
these policy differences could threaten the integrity of national park ecosystem
components or processes.
To address these policy differences, the Park Service may consider ex-
tending its regulatory authority onto adjacent lands for ecological purposes.
Under the Property Clause, 34 Congress plainly has the authority to regulate
activities on adjoining nonfederal lands that could harm public lands or re-
sources. 13 Congress can also delegate its regulatory power to the federal
agencies that are responsible for those lands. 6 According to one court, a
general congressional grant of regulatory power is sufficient to enable federal
public land management agencies to regulate threatening activities on adjacent
nonfederal lands. In United States v. Lindsey,23 the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals upheld a Forest Service regulation prohibiting fires-even on nonfed-
eral lands-within the boundaries of a national recreation area.238
Congress has not expressly delegated extra-territorial regulatory powers to
the Park Service that might be invoked to protect park ecological resources
beyond park boundaries.239 Nonetheless, Congress has imposed a responsibil-
ity on the Park Service, through the 1978 amendments to the Organic Act, to
protect park resources against threatening activities, whether those activities
arise on park lands or adjacent lands." The so-called Redwood Amendment
231. 16 U.S.C. § 528 (1994); 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (1994). See generally Coggins & Ward,
supra note 117 (providing an historical overview of public land wildlife management policy and
arguing for consideration of wildlife when making any resource decision).
232. See generally Coggins & Ward, supra note 117; LUND, supra note 117.
233. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
234. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
235. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976); Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518
(1897); Minnesota v. Block, 660 F.2d 1240 (8th Cir. 1981); see GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS &
ROBERT L. GLicKsMAN, PuBLIc NATURAL REsouRcEs LAW 3-17 (1996).
236. See United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911).
237. 595 F.2d 5 (9th Cir. 1979).
238. Lindsey, 595 F.2d at 6; see also United States v. Arbo, 691 F.2d 862 (9th Cir. 1982);
Free Enter. Canoe Renters Ass'n v. Watt, 549 F. Supp. 252 (E.D. Mo. 1982), affd, 711 F.2d 852
(8th Cir. 1983).
239. However, the Park Service has been given general regulatory powers that might be ex-
tended beyond park boundaries under the Lindsey rationale. See Lindsey, 595 F.2d at 6.
240. National Park Service Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-250, § 101, 92 Stat.
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provides that "the protection, management and administration of [national
parks] shall be conducted in light of the high public value and integrity of the
National Park System and shall not be exercised in derogation of the values
arid purposes for which those areas have been established."24' Although
courts have ruled that the amended Organic Act imposes a legal duty on the
Secretary of the Interior to protect park resources, they have not affirmatively
obligated park officials to intervene into the natural resource management
judgments made by neighboring agencies.242 Given the contentious federal-
ism and property rights issues at stake, Park Service officials have been reluc-
tant to assert their authority aggressively beyond park boundaries.243 Thus,
although the Park Service may have the latent power to pursue its preservation
objectives beyond park boundaries, legal ambiguities as well as practical reali-
ties may effectively prevent it from doing so.2"
2. Tort and Takings Liability
Under its preservation policy, a Park Service decision not to intervene
with wildlife or natural processes raises the specter of liability for injuries that
occur outside park boundaries. Is the Park Service, for example, liable under
the Federal Tort Claims Act for damages caused by wildlife that wander out-
side the park or by wildfires that burn beyond the boundary? Or is the Park
Service liable, under constitutional takings doctrine, if park wildlife impair the
value of adjacent property? In each case, the answer appears to be no.
Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, the same analysis that applies to inju-
ries within national parks would apply to claims arising beyond park bound-
aries.2" Because the Park Service's nonintervention and ecological restora-
tion policies are based upon a legally permissible preservation policy judg-
ment, they should be protected under the discretionary function doctrine.2"
In the case of Yellowstone, the Park Service should be immunized from tort
liability if bison carrying brucellosis wander unchecked beyond park bound-
aries or if a lightning-caused fire should burn beyond park boundaries. In both
cases, the preservation policy decision can be traced directly to a judgment
163, 166 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § la-i (1994)); see Robert B. Keiter, On Protecting
the National Parks From the External Threats Dilemma, 20 LAND & WATER L. REv. 355, 370-75
(1985); George Cameron Coggins, Protecting the Wildlife Resources of National Parks from Ex-
ternal Threats, 22 LAND & WATER L. REv. 1, 15-19 (1987); William J. Lockhart, External Park
Threats and Interior's Limits: The Need for an Independent Park Service, in OUR COMMON
LANDS: DEFENDING THE NATIONAL PARKS, supra note 5. at 3, 30-36.
241. 16 U.S.C. § la-i (1994).
242. See Sierra Club v. Andrus, 487 F. Supp. 443 (D.D.C. 1980); see also Sierra Club v.
Department of the Interior, 424 F. Supp. 172 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
243. See Robert B. Keiter, Taking Account of the Ecosystem on the Public Domain: Law and
Ecology in the Greater Yellowstone Region, 60 U. COLO. L. REv. 923, 948-51 (1989); Sax &
Keiter, supra note 163, at 217-22; THE CONSERVATION FOUNDATION, NATIONAL PARKS FOR A
NEW GENERATION: VISIONS, REALTIES, PRosPEcTS 151 (1985).
244. But see supra notes 213-21 and accompanying text (suggesting that the Endangered Spe-
cies Act's protection against takings effectively extends federal regulatory power beyond national
park boundaries).
245. See supra notes 222-29 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 225-29 and accompanying text.
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consistent with the Park Service's organic responsibilities. The fact that no
FTCA claims were successfully litigated in the aftermath of Yellowstone's
1988 fires further supports the conclusion that tort liability concerns generally
should not deter the Park Service from pursuing its preservation policy.24
There is, however, one ruling that raises the specter of potential tort liabil-
ity. In Parker Livestock and Cattle Co., Inc. v. United States,2" a Wyoming
federal district court summarily rejected the argument that the discretionary
function doctrine barred a FICA claim based on transmission of a wildlife
disease and found that the Park Service had a duty to warn of the potential for
disease transmission. In Parker, a Wyoming rancher claimed that his cattle
herd contracted brucellosis from bison or elk that had wandered outside Yel-
lowstone National Park. The court did not explain its discretionary function
ruling, even though it is inconsistent with other Federal Tort Claims Act deci-
sions. It is particularly difficult to reconcile the Parker ruling, which effec-
tively reviews a national park wildlife management policy, with the ruling in
United States v. Martin,249 which clearly immunized Yellowstone's grizzly
bear management policy from tort suits.' Nonetheless, the Parker court ul-
timately ruled the rancher did not establish that park wildlife were responsible
for infecting his cattle herd." Thus, even without FTCA discretionary func-
tion immunity, causation proof problems make it difficult to challenge national
park preservation policies through the medium of a tort suit.
A constitutional takings claim is also unlikely to succeed against Park
Service preservation policies that might indirectly damage adjacent property.
Although the Supreme Court has recently reinvigorated constitutional takings
doctrine, these cases have involved government zoning limitations imposed on
private landowners. 2 In cases involving public land and resources, the
courts have continued to reject most takings claims." This is particularly
true in cases involving takings claims against federal officials responsible for
wildlife that allegedly damaged private property. In Mountain States Legal
Foundation v. Hodel,"4 for example, the court ruled that no taking occurred
when wild horses protected by federal law consumed forage on private land,
finding that a reduction in the value of property was not a taking. " 5 Similar-
247. Relatedly, the federal government does not offer compensation for livestock or other
damages attributed to reintroduced wolves. FISH & WLDLFE SERv., DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, THE
REINTRODUCTION OF GRAY WOLvES TO YELLOWSTONE NATIONAL PARK AND CENTRAL IDAHO:
DRAFr ENvIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 2-5 (1993).
248. 796 F. Supp. 477 (D. Wyo. 1992); see also Parker Land & Cattle Co. v. Wyoming
Game & Fish Comm'n, 845 P.2d 1040 (Wyo. 1993).
249. 546 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1976); see supra notes 226-27 and accompanying text.
250. For a detailed analysis of the Parker ruling and its treatment of the FTCA discretionary
function doctrine, see Keiter & Froelicher, supra note 13, at 38-45.
251. Parker, 796 F. Supp. at 488.
252. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
253. See GEORGE CAMERON CoGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW
228-51 (3d ed. 1993).
254. 799 F.2d 1243 (10th Cir. 1986).
255. Mountain States Legal Found., 799 F.2d at 1431.
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ly, in Christy v. Hodel,56 the court rejected a takings challenge to the En-
dangered Species Act, concluding that the Act's prohibition against killing
grizzly bears depredating on livestock was a legitimate exercise of federal
regulatory power. 7 Given the well-known risks associated with property
ownership in the Yellowstone region and other national park settings, adjacent
property owners can-and should--reasonably expect some losses attributed to
the national park's presence and its preservation management policies. 8
When these management policies are clearly established and well-known, any
other result would essentially make the government an unlimited insurer and
give adjacent landowners a virtual veto over national park preservation policy.
VI. PRESERVATION REVISITED: EXPANDING THE VISION AND PROCESS
A. A Policy at Risk
Despite its apparently firm legal foundation, the Park Service's preserva-
tion policies still appear curiously vulnerable. Persistent criticism has taken a
toll on national park preservation policy and called into question its validity in
today's world. In part, this is because the related concepts of nonintervention
and ecological restoration represent such a significant departure from earlier
resource management policies. In part, it is because the national parks are no
longer isolated islands, but must coexist with neighbors who are also part of
the larger ecological complex. And in part, it is because the scientific as-
sumptions and conclusions supporting specific preservation policies have not
been fully accepted. As a result, national park preservation policy is in danger
of being modified to accommodate more rather than less intensive manage-
ment, which could render the basic policy suspect as well as the Park
Service's commitment to it.
The greatest risk to the policy is its incremental or piecemeal erosion in
the face of local political pressure and scientific criticism. In Yellowstone's
case, significant adjustments already have been made to address adjacent land-
owner concerns in the case of bison, wolves, and fire. 9 In each instance,
the Park Service has modified its nonintervention approach to address
nonecological concerns, even agreeing to erect corrals to capture park bison.
At the same time, Yellowstone's ungulate management policies are also under
attack, primarily on scientific grounds for allegedly ignoring ecological con-
256. 857 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1988).
257. Christy, 857 F.2d at 1335.
258. See Joseph L. Sax, Ecosystems and Property Rights in Greater Yellowstone: The Legal
System in Transition, in THE GREATER YELLOWSTONE ECOSYSTEM, supra note 10, at 77, 77-82.
See generally Eric T. Freyfogle, Ownership and Ecology, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1269 (1993)
(discussing. private land ownership and its relationship to ecology); John A. Humbach, Law and a
New Land Ethic, 74 MINN. L. REv. 339 (1989) (explaining that existing use zoning will survive
under the U.S. Supreme Court interpretations of the takings clause); James M. McElfish, Jr.,
Property Rights, Property Roots: Rediscovering the Basis for Legal Protection of the Environment,
24 ENVTL. L. REP. 10231 (1994) (discussing the limits of the rights of property owners).
259. See supra notes 83-84, 88-89, 103-06 and accompanying text for descriptions of these
modifications.
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cerns. Should the Park Service decide to intervene in this case, then
Yellowstone's commitment to limited intervention will have been effectively
compromised in each instance where it has come under attack.
The risk to national park preservation policy is exacerbated by the Park
Service's traditional insularity, which- further exposes its policy to powerful
political, scientific, and other pressures. Historically, Park Service management
has rarely reached beyond park boundaries; resource policy and implementa-
tion decisions have been viewed primarily as internal park matters and not
subjected to much outside scrutiny.' ° Even when outside experts have been
consulted (e.g. the Leopold Report), the resulting policy recommendations
have ordinarily been promulgated internally without public involvement or
consultation." When national park preservation policy was refined in the
1988 Management Policies document,262 it was not subjected to formal pub-
lic involvement, through either NEPA review, APA rulemaking, or like
procedures." In addition, site-specific applications of the policy have not
always been subject to full NEPA review.2" At the same time, the Park
Service's science program has been repeatedly criticized because it lacks inde-
pendent stature and funding within the agency, has not taken full advantage of
independent scientists, and does not consistently subject park research to out-
side peer review.' With limited public involvement in the policy formula-
260. This traditional insularity may reflect several related factors: Until recently national parks
were physically isolated from most neighbors and park policies therefore did not often affect oth-
ers; operating under a single-use (preservation) mandate, park management decisions generally
have not been as controversial as those made by the multiple-use agencies; and environmental and
other watchdog organizations have been preoccupied elsewhere on the public domain because
development and other environmental pressures have been greater outside the national parks. See
generally Sax & Keiter, supra note 163.
261. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text for a description of the origins of the.
policy.
262. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
263. WAGNER Er AL., supra note 10, at 161-62. Indeed, the Park Service has not regularly
employed the law and legal procedures for resource management purposes. See Keiter, Ecosystem
Management, supra note 179, at 82-83; Sax & Keiter, supra note 163, at 217-22; see also
CLARKE & McCooL, supra note 3, at 205-207 (noting that the Park Service, in comparison to
other federal resource management agencies, has not fully integrated NEPA processes into its
policymaking or decisionmaking). However, in the case of the 1988 Management Policies docu-
ment, the Park Service did announce preparation of the document in the Federal Register and
solicit public comment. 53 Fed. Reg. 9821 (1988).
264. Rather than prepare full EISs on resource management decisions, the Park Service has
often prepared less rigorous environmental assessments, which provide fewer opportunities for
public involvement and entail less detailed environmental analysis. For example, Yellowstone's
revised fire management policy and interim bison management policies are based on environmen-
tal assessments rather than EISs. See supra notes 83-84, 103-06 and accompanying text. More-
over, many park General Management Plans have been based on EAs rather than EISs, which is
again true in Yellowstone's case. See supra note 60; see also WAGNER Er AL., supra note 10, at
161-62.
265. NATIONAL PARKS & CONSERVATION ASS'N, supra note 39, at 11; NATIONAL ACADEMY
OF SCIENCES, supra note 39, at 446; see also Ervin Zube, supra note 39; U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTE-
RIOR, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, AuDrr REPORT, NATURAL RESOURCE ACTIVITIES: NATION-
AL PARK SERvIE, Rvr. No. 90-,19 (1989). Recently, following creation of the Biological Re-
source Division in the U.S. Geological Survey, many Park Service were transferred to this new
entity, further diminishing the agency's own scientific resources. See Zube, supra note 39, at 20-
21. See also Huff, supra note 147, at 27 (noting that the Park Service "employs very few wildlife
biologists and has no Service-wide organizational structure to support wildlife management profes-
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tion process and diminished public confidence in the underlying scientific re-
search, it is difficult for the Park Service to rebut the twin charges that na-
tional park preservation policies lack scientific justification and are insensitive
to human concerns.
Of course, because the national parks are legislatively created entities,
political reality will dictate some compromise and adjustment in management
policy.2' Moreover, any preservation policy that is based on ecological goals
will require periodic adjustment as new scientific information becomes avail-
able and as environmental conditions change. But if incremental policy modifi-
cations and adjustments are not carefully conceived, supported by well-accept-
ed scientific data, and harmonized with fundamental ecological preservation
goals, then the policy itself may disappear in a welter of exceptions. As excep-
tions and implementation inconsistencies mount, preservation policies will
become even more vulnerable to legal and political attack and will require
more rather than less justification.267 Should this occur, the American public
will find the national parks subject to the same intensive management that
prevails on all other public lands.
B. Broadening the Policy Debate
When national park preservation policy is placed in a larger historical and
ecosystem context, several powerful arguments can be advanced to support the
basic nonintervention and ecological restoration policies. These arguments are
grounded in legal, scientific, and political considerations that highlight the
unique and important role national parks play in the nation's commitment to
promoting biological conservation and to advancing scientific knowledge.
The national parks occupy a unique legal position among the nation's
public lands and thus offer otherwise unavailable resource management oppor-
tunities. By law, the national parks are the only federal lands where wildlife
are preserved and not managed intensively for harvest purposes.2' On na-
tional forest and BLM multiple-use public lands, wildlife are managed by state
game and fish agencies primarily as a harvestable resource.2" In federally
sionalism...").
266. See John Freemuth, The National Parks: Political Versus Professional Determinants of
Policy, 49 PUBuc ADMIN. REv. 278 (1989). See generally James L. Huffman, The Inevitability of
Private Rights in Public Lands, 65 U. COLO. L. REv. 241 (1994) (concluding that as long as the
political process controls resources on public lands, special interest politics will play a role in
establishing management policy).
267. See supra Part V.B.
268. See supra note 159 and accompanying text. See also John Freemuth, Our national Park
Policy: Some Thoughts on Politics and the Role of Science, 14(1) GEORGE WRIGHT FORUM 34, 37
(1997) (arguing that the Park Service's statutory obligation to manage national parks "for future
generations" requires a "long term 'public interest' perspective," which distinguishes national park
management from the management standards governing other public land management agencies).
269. See supra notes 232-33 and accompanying text. Although the Forest Service has a
biodiversity conservation responsibility, 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(B) (1994), this mandate is quali-
fied by multiple-use language and has not been consistently enforced by the courts. See, e.g.,
Leavenworth Audubon Adopt-a-forest Alpine Lakes Protection Soc. v. Ferraro, 881 F. Supp. 1482
(W.D. Wash. 1995); Sierra Club v. Robertson, 845 F. Supp. 485 (S.D. Ohio 1994). But see Seattle
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designated wilderness areas, state game and fish agencies are also responsible
for wildlife management,' ° and the emphasis is on maintaining harvestable
populations of big game species. Even in national wildlife refuges, which are
designed to protect wildlife habitat, hunting is permitted as are other secondary
activities." The national parks are therefore the sole public land designation
where the legal opportunity exists to pursue a noninterventionist wildlife man-
agement policy."2 Moreover, as relatively isolated enclaves of undisturbed
lands, the national parks offer one of the few suitable locations for controver-
sial species recovery and reintroduction efforts.
Indeed, important national ecological preservation goals are inherently
linked to the Park Service's preservation policies. An emerging yet powerful
national commitment to biodiversity conservation is reflected in such laws as
the National Park Service Organic Act, Endangered Species Act, Wilderness
Act, Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, and National Forest Management Act." 3
Scientists agree that effective biodiversity conservation requires an ecosystem-
oriented strategy that transcends the boundaries of current land designa-
tions."" The national parks, which often contain extensive expanses of unde-
veloped lands, are vital components in these ecosystem-based conservation
efforts. In Yellowstone's case, for example, the park is a critical refuge for
grizzly bears, wolves, bison, and other wide-ranging and controversial species
that do not coexist easily with people. In essence, the park serves as a pro-
tected ecological core, where human intrusions into biological processes are
limited and where dwindling species can be nurtured back to health. A nation-
al park preservation policy emphasizing limited intervention and ecological
restoration should help ensure the integrity of this ecosystem core, and thus
supplement broader biological conservation goals.
The national parks also have enormous scientific value as large outdoor
Audubon Society v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297, 301 (9th Cir. 1991) (treating the NFMA biodiversity
provision as a substantive restraint on Forest Service resource management decisions). See gener-
ally Jack Tuholske & Beth Brennan, The National Forest Management Act: Judicial Interpretation
of a Substantive Environmental Statute, 15 PuB. LAND L. REV. 53, 68-77 (1994).
270. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(b)(8) (1994 & Supp. 1997).
271. 16 U.S.C. §§ 668dd-668ee (1994); Humane Society v. Lujan, 768F. Supp. 360 (D.D.C.
1991); Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 455 F. Supp. 446 (D.D.C. 1978). See generally Richard J.
Fink, The National Wildlife Refuges: Theory, Practice, and Prospect, 18 HARV. ENVrL. L. REV. 1
(1994).
272. The same is also true regarding national parks and fire management policy, though fed-
eral policy is moving toward allowing some natural and prescribed fires to bum on other public
lands. This is particularly true in designated wilderness areas, which are usually large enough to
allow lightning caused fires to bum without threatening private property or lives. See 1995 FEDER-
AL WILDLAND FIRE MANAGEMENT, supra note 103.
273. See Biodiversity Symposium, 8 TuL. ENvTL. LJ. 1 (1994); William M. Flevares, Eco-
systems, Economics, and Ethics: Protecting Biological Diversity at Home and Abroad, 65 S. CAL.
L. REv. 2039 (1992); Holly Doremus, Patching the Ark: Improving Legal Protection of Biological
Diversity, 18 EcoLoGY L.Q. 265 (1991); see also BIODIVERSITY AND THE LAW (W.J. Snape, ed.
1995); ENVIRONMENTAL PoLICY AND BIoDrvERsrry (R.E. Grumbine, ed. 1994). Beyond these
statutes, biodiversity considerations are now being integrated into NEPA processes. See Bear,
supra note 212; Carlson, supra note 212; OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, TECH-
NOLOGIES TO MAINTAIN BIOLOGICAL DIvERsITY (1987); see also Robert L. Fischman, Biological
Diversity and Environmental Protection: Authorities to Reduce Risk, 22 ENVTL. L. 435 (1992).
274. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
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biological laboratories.27 As a scientific matter, the Park Service's noninter-
vention and restoration policies represent an important experiment in under-
standing ecological processes on a broad scale. Not subject to extensive human
intervention, national park ecosystems provide scientists with the opportunity
to study how a basically unaltered ecosystem functions. This opportunity is
unique: Outside the national parks, most landscapes have been altered by in-
tensive human management to promote agricultural cultivation, resource ex-
traction, housing developments, and the like. National park ecosystems also
provide scientists with an important baseline for measuring the impact that
human intrusions have on ecological processes."6 By understanding how an
undisturbed ecosystem functions and evolves, scientists are better able to as-
sess the impact that human activities may have on ecological processes and to
determine when intervention may be necessary to protect critical compo-
nents.2"
As a practical matter, much of the data necessary to make informed eco-
logical intervention judgments concerning park ecosystems is not available.
Scientists now understand that ecosystem processes are dynamic and often
chaotic, tending toward disequilibrium rather than stability and balance.2 78 To
manage these dynamic ecological systems effectively, more rather than less
scientific information and historical data is necessary. But there is little long
term scientific data available to predict how national park ecosystems function
or how they will respond to human interventions or perturbations." 9 In short,
scientists often do not know enough about national park biological resources
and ecological processes to offer reliable predictions that can serve as the
basis for an informed interventionist policy. In the face of this uncertainty, the
national parks represent particularly appropriate locations for gathering this
scientific information over ecologically significant time periods.'
Moreover, the Park Service's commitment to minimal intervention repre-
sents a singular acknowledgment of the complexities involved in ecological
management. In the history of utilitarian resource management, scientific man-
agement techniques based on human manipulation of ecological systems have
often failed and imperiled important biological resources. Public land manage-
275. See, e.g., Boyce, supra note 149, at 203; NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 46,
at 261; NATIONAL PARKS & CONSERVATION ASS'N, supra note 39, at 6-7.
276. NATIONAL PARKS AND PROTECTED AREAS, supra note 70, at 415-49; NATIONAL PARKS
& CONSERVATION ASS'N, supra note 39, at 7, 11.
277. Jane Lubchenco et al., The Sustainable Biosphere Initiative: An Ecological Research
Agenda, 72 ECOLOGY 371, 397-401 (1991).
278. See DANIEL B. BoTKIN, DISCORDANT HARMONIES: A NEW ECOLOGY FOR THE TWENrY-
FIRST CENTJRY (1990); A. Dan Tarlock, The Nonequilibrium Paradigm in Ecology and the Par-
tial Unraveling of Environmental Law, 27 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1121 (1994). See generally Fred P.
Bosselman & A. Dan Tarlock, The Influence of Ecological Science on American Law: An Intro-
duction, 69 CH.-KENr L. REV. 847 (1994).
279. Boyce, supra note 149, at 184-89; NATIONAL PARKS & CONSERVATION ASS'N, supra
note 39, at 5-7; Huff, supra note 147 at 29.
280. This endorsement of long term monitoring and data gathering is not a recommendation
against any interventionist management; rather, it is consistent with the concept of adaptive man-
agement and the need for caution before intervening in the face of scientific uncertainty. See infra
notes 289-91 and accompanying text.
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ment agencies have not always accurately predicted or understood how ecosys-
tems will react to manipulation or disturbance. The Forest Service, despite its
sustained yield mandate and its extensive scientific research program, has not
been able to operate a sustainable timber harvest program on the national for-
ests." ' Similarly, the BLM's range management program has left federal
rangelands in poor ecological condition." As often as not, the scientific as-
sumptions underlying established thresholds of intervention have proven
wrong, leaving natural resource managers unsure how to manipulate complex
ecological systems. Given this recurrent pattern of failure in applying interven-
tionist management techniques, the Park Service's preservation policy should
not be faulted for advocating less rather than more intervention in the face of
uncertainty.
C. Toward Enhanced Legitimacy and Accountability
But these arguments-no matter how compelling-can not alone sustain
and validate national park preservation policy. Underlying legitimacy and
accountability concerns also must be addressed. The legitimacy concern re-
flects the fact that the scientific and other assumptions underlying preservation
policy have not been opened widely to outside review or scrutiny through
public involvement or related processes," which means the policy has not
been validated outside of the agency. The related accountability concern is
based upon the asserted lack of objectively verifiable management standards or
goals," ' which makes it difficult to determine whether national park
preservation policy is working or not." Additional public involvement and
scientific review opportunities would address most of these legitimacy and
accountability concerns; it would provide a forum to evaluate policy assump-
tions, it would obligate agency officials to respond to criticisms, and it would
promote public education and understanding.
Legal opportunities are available to open Park Service preservation policy
more broadly to public and scientific scrutiny. During the past several decades,
as public confidence in agency expertise throughout the federal bureaucracy
281. See PAUL W. HIRT, A CONSPIRACY OF OPTIMISM: MANAGEMENT OF THE NATIONAL
FORESTS SINCE WORLD WAR TwO 271-78 (1994); DAvID A. CLARY, TIMBER AND THE FOREST
SERVICE 195-99 (1986).
282. See BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, RANGELAND RE-
FORM '94: DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (1994); Joseph M. Feller, What is Wrong
with the BLM's Management of Livestock Grazing on the Public Lands?, 30 IDAHO L. REV. 555
(1993-94); U.S. HOUSE OF REP. COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, FEDERAL GRAZING PRO-
GRAM: ALL Is NOT WELL ON THE RANGE, 99TH CONG., 2D SEss., H. Rpr. 99-593 (1986).
283. See supra notes 260-65 and accompanying text.
284. See supra notes 123-29 and accompanying text.
285. To the extent that national park preservation policy is based on general, nonquantifiable
standards (i.e. limited intervention and ecological restoration) rather than specific, quantifiable
standards, the lack of accountability criticism is not entirely fair. As noted earlier, these general
preservation policies are significant departures from conventional natural resource management
approaches, and should therefore not be judged solely by traditional criteria. See supra notes 115-
22 and accompanying text. However, the Park Service still must be accountable for its policies,
which can be achieved by ensuring that the policies are subject to public scrutiny and judicial
oversight under NEPA, the APA, and related laws.
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has waned,' multiple laws have been passed opening administrative deci-
sion processes to public scrutiny and judicial review. The NEPA EIS process
and APA rulemaking procedures both offer opportunities for public review and
comment on national park preservation policy and specific applications of the
policy. 87 These laws also require the Park Service to respond to the public
comments,' a process designed to promote thoughtful and accountable ad-
ministrative decisionmaking. Alternatively, under the Federal Advisory Com-
mittee Act,' the Park Service could utilize a neutral advisory committee to
review the scientific conclusions and assumptions underlying controversial
preservation policies. The FACA imposes specific neutrality, openness, and
public notification requirements, which should ensure an open and even-hand-
ed assessment of basic policy assumptions and of the ramifications of specific
applications. Moreover, judicial review is available to ensure procedural com-
pliance and rational decisionmaking.
National park preservation policy can also be validated through the use of
adaptive management techniques.' Much of the criticism directed toward
the policy is based on fundamental disagreement over scientific assumptions
and interpretations." Whether or not, for example, Yellowstone's northern
range is on the verge of ecological collapse from ungulate overbrowsing raises
difficult scientific questions. Adaptive management, which contemplates regu-
lar monitoring and assessment of ecological conditions along with periodic
adjustments (or adaptations), can be employed to test scientific assump-
tions.' Other criticism of national park preservation policy reflects a basic
286. Neither the Park Service nor other federal agencies any longer enjoy an unqualified
public trust or ready deference to claims of agency expertise. An often skeptical public readily
understands that most policy decisions are based upon value judgments rather than objective, val-
ue-free determinations. See Freemuth, supra note 266; WAGNER ET AL., supra note 10, at 158-63.
287. See supra notes 198-12 and accompanying text for a brief description of the EIS and
APA rulemaking processes. Use of these procedures would provide Park Service officials with a
basis for determining whether the policy is consistent with contemporary public values. It also
would provide an opportunity to test the Park Service's scientific justifications for the policy
against the claims of its scientific critics. And it would provide an opportunity to coordinate na-
tional park policy with neighboring agencies, which is an important dimension of any ecological
management policy.
288. 40 C.F.R. § 1503.4 (1996) (requiring agencies preparing EISs to respond to comments);
5 U.S.C.A. § 553(c) (1994) (requiring a concise statement of the basis and purpose of the rule);
see also Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) (establishing the
"hard look" doctrine for judicial review purposes, which effectively requires federal agencies to
prepare an administrative record to facilitate judicial review in rulemaking challenges); ALFRED C.
AMAN, JR. & WnlLAM T. MAY-TON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 2.1.5 (1993).
289. 5 U.S.C. app. § 2 (1994); see Sheila Lynch, Note and Comment, The Federal Advisory
Committee Act: An Obstacle to Ecosystem Management by Federal Agencies?, 71 WASH. L. REv.
431 (1996).
290. On adaptive management, see generally KAI N. LEE, CoMPASS AND GYROSCOPE: INTE-
GRATING SCIENCE AND POLrIICS FOR THE ENVIRONMENT (1993); CJ. WALTERS, ADAPTVE MAN-
AGEMENT OF RENEWABLE RESOURCES (1986).
291. See supra notes 123-33 and accompanying text.
292. However, to the extent that adaptive management also contemplates aggressive interven-
tion as part of the experimental adjustment process, this approach-which runs contrary to the
Park Service's basic nonintervention policy-should only be employed after sufficient ecological
data has been acquired over a long enough time frame. Moreover, in a region like Greater Yellow-
stone with expansive and ecologcially intertwined public lands, it would generally be preferable to
experiment with manipulative management approaches on multiple-use public lands outside the
national park, while using the park as a baseline for long term study of nonintervention manage-
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disagreement over policy objectives and their impact on human interests.
Adaptive management, which acknowledges that human value judgments and
interests are critical dimensions of any natural resource policy, also contem-
plates the regular assessment and reevaluation of public concerns. This process
can be used to secure public involvement in formulating and implementing
preservation policy, which should ensure that it takes account of changing
public concerns. In short, an adaptive management approach can be used to
clarify policy objectives and assumptions, to address scientific complexity and
uncertainty concerns, and to build needed support from myriad constituencies.
To be sure, utilizing these legal and adaptive management processes to
validate national park preservation policy is not risk free. The processes can be
cumbersome and expensive; they will almost certainly entail some diminution
of managerial discretion; and they will subject the Park Service to additional
public and even judicial scrutiny. But when the controversy involves a dis-
agreement among scientific experts, the advisory committee and adaptive man-
agement processes provide a useful forum for addressing such problems. And
when the controversy is over public values and concerns, the various public
involvement processes offer an appropriate forum for identifying and address-
ing such differences. If the concern is that local rather than national resource
management values may prevail in these settings, the Organic Act's clear
preservationist mandate as well as the strong national constituency for national
park protection should protect against most local excesses.23 In sum, the
openness, neutrality, responsiveness, and judicial review requirements that
attach to these processes should promote accountability, which can only
strengthen and further legitimize national park preservation policy.
VII. CONCLUSION
National park preservation policy embodies a fundamental shift in natural
resource management philosophy. With its emphasis on minimizing human
intervention into ecological systems and its commitment to ecological restora-
tion, the policy has acknowledged a vital, new relationship between humans
and the environment. Not surprisingly, this unconventional and largely untest-
ed preservation policy has been met with skepticism and resistance from sev-
eral quarters. Yet drawing upon its flexible legal authority, the Park Service
has administratively charted a new course, and done so without express con-
gressional guidance. But the national parks are public lands, which means the
ment techniques.
293. Indeed, the legal processes described here are double-edged swords that can be invoked
by any interested party, including those who advocate less intervention and more aggressive resto-
ration efforts. If concerned about undue local influence, the Park Service would be well advised to
motivate its national constituency to participate in formulating and implementing critical preserva-
tion policies. Not only would this counterbalance parochial participants, but it also would provide
some protection against intermeddling by local congressional delegations. For a discussion of
these problems in the Yellowstone context, see Robert B. Keiter, Greater Yellowstone: Managing
a Charismatic Ecosystem, 3 UTAH ST. UNIv. NAT. REsouRcEs & ENVTL. IssuEs 75 (1995); R.
McGreggor Cawley & John Freemuth, Tree Farms, Mother Earth, and Other Dilemmas: The
Politics of Ecosystem Management in Greater Yellowstone, 6 Soc'Y & NAT. RESOURCES 41
(1993); see also supra note 32 (noting that Secretary of the Interior Lane asserted, as early as
1918, that "the national interest must dictate all decisions affecting public and private enterprise in
the parks").
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ultimate validity of the policy is as much a political as a scientific question.
Not only must these new ecological preservation policies be squared with
prevailing social norms and preferences, but they must be sustained or at least
tolerated in the arena of public opinion.
In the dynamic natural and political environment that engulfs the national
parks, the Park Service faces manifold challenges maintaining and implement-
ing its revised preservation policy. Often without complete knowledge, it must
address scientific complexity and uncertainty, and it must respond to compet-
ing social and economic concerns. In this volatile atmosphere, it must seek to
guard against incremental erosion of its basic commitment to nonintervention
and restoration. The existing legal structure not only provides firm support for
this new approach to preservation, but it is also flexible enough to allow fur-
ther experimentation, clarification, and adjustment. However, neither the law
nor the political system will long sustain an unaccountable policy or its conse-
quences. The Park Service, therefore, should take full advantage of the exist-
ing legal flexibility to garner public support and to respond to its critics. In the
final analysis, the continuing validity of national park preservation policy
depends on the agency's ability to justify these new conceptions of the human
relationship with nature.

ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT AND ITS PLACE IN THE
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE
JOHN FREEMUTH*
The National Park Service (NPS), along with other federal land manage-
ment agencies, has been called on to participate in a federal-land policy and
management experiment. A much heralded and so-called new management
paradigm, ecosystem management,' has emerged to capture both the time and
interest of practitioners and scholars of natural resource policy. This essay will
examine the role of ecosystem management within the NPS from the perspec-
tive of public policy and public administration. The paper begins with a brief
look at the development of the first major resource management regime in the
United States. A clear understanding of the development of that regime during
the Progressive Era at the turn of the century is important because it allows us
to compare the style and substance of that early era with today's attempt to
implement ecosystem management. Following this discussion will be a brief
overview of certain key institutional realities within which NPS must function.
The paper then examines the effort to bring ecosystem management to a unit
of the national park system by focusing on the development of the Vision
document and process in and around Yellowstone National Park. Following
that discussion, the current status of ecosystem management is examined, con-
cluding with an analysis of the likelihood of successful implementation of this
confusing, yet interesting, natural resource policy.
THE FIRST GOSPEL: PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATION
To some in various government bureaus, ecosystem management has an
almost religious appeal, as it is offered as the answer to a wide range of feder-
al land and resource policy issues and problems. Efforts to bring about ecosys-
tem management have important parallels with an earlier time in natural re-
source policy. NPS personnel, as well as park policy scholars interested in the
implementation of ecosystem management, would do well to revisit the time
of the Progressive Movement for clues as to how to develop and implement a
management regime which came to be accepted by most of American society.
For, if ecosystem management is not accepted by the American public, then it
* Professor of Political Science and Public Administration, Boise State University. B.A.,
Pomona College, 1972; M.A., Claremont Graduate School, 1975; Ph.D., Colorado State Univer-
sity, 1986. The author gratefully acknowledges the following individuals for reading and critiquing
a draft version of this manuscript: Jon Jarvis, Superintendent, Wrangell-St. Elias National Park and
Preserve, Alaska; Neal King, Superintendent, Hagerman Fossil Beds National Monument, Idaho;
and William Supemaugh, Badlands National Park, South Dakota. They represent some of the best
individuals in the public service.
1. See infra note 89.
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will likely fail.
We recall the Progressive Era as the time of Gifford Pinchot, Teddy Roo-
sevelt, and the growth of the Conservation Movement. It was also the first
time that an attempt was made to develop and apply somewhat universal
principles to the tasks of natural resource management. The Progressive Era
institutionalized expert-centered public land management. The federal bureau
which best represented the Progressive Era in land management is the United
States Forest Service (USFS). Samuel Hays, in his seminal work Conservation
and the Gospel of Efficiency, summarized the beliefs of this time when he
noted that:
Conservationists were led by people who promoted the "rational" use
of resources, with a focus on efficiency, planning for future use, and
the application of expertise to broad national problems. But they also
promoted a system of decision-making consistent with that spirit, a
process by which the expert would decide in terms of the most effi-
cient dovetailing of all competing resource users according to criteria
which were considered to be objective, rational, and above the give-
and-take of political conflict.2
In the case of the USFS, the expertise brought to bear on forest management
questions came, not surprisingly, from the science and profession of forestry.
One important observation, then, is that ecosystem management can be viewed
as a new iteration of the expertise theme of the Conservation Movement, with
other sciences such as ecology taking the place of forestry. The faith in exper-
tise and professional judgement, as it did earlier, remains at the core of eco-
system management.
Perhaps more important about the Conservation Movement, however, may
well be how its themes caught the public imagination. Advocates of ecosystem
management should pay close attention to that earlier time. An article written
about the Vision process in Greater Yellowstone, which took place in the late
1980s, offers us an insight into understanding those earlier successes of the
Conservation Movement.
Shortly after the end of the Yellowstone area Vision process, three Yel-
lowstone National Park officials who were intimately familiar with it wrote
about their grueling effort to manage it. Bob Barbee, John Varley, and Paul
Schullery, in discussing the role of public involvement in the Vision process,
quoted a passage from one of the letters of Teddy Roosevelt: "I want to go
just as far in preserving the forests and preserving the game and wild creatures
as I can lead public sentiment. But if I try to drive public sentiment I shall
fail, save in exceptional circumstances."3 This is a vital observation, because
it reflects Roosevelt's views on how a leader should bring about policy
change, in this case replacing indiscriminate resource use with the new policy
2. SAMuEL P. HAYS, Preface to the Atheneum Edition of CONSERVATION AND THE GOSPEL
OF EFFICIENCY vii (Atheneum 1980).
3. Robert D. Barbee et al., The Yellowstone Vision: An Experiment That Failed or a Vote




of resource conservation. One might well be able to influence public opinion
regarding policy change, indeed even "lead" public opinion, but one could not
force public opinion where it did not wish to go, as Roosevelt noted. Of equal
importance is the emphasis on engaging the public with proposed policy
changes, rather than merely pronouncing that change will happen.
Roosevelt's closest natural resource advisor also understood this observa-
tion about public opinion. Early in his career, Gifford Pinchot noted that "in
the long run, Forestry cannot succeed unless the people who live in and near
the forest are for it and not against it."' Pinchot, of course, helped lead the
effort for professional management of the national forests. But the key to
Pinchot's success lay not in his advocacy of professionalism and expertise, but
in the service of both to a democratic vision of forests and natural resources.
In the words of political theorist Bob Pepperman Taylor, "For Pinchot, the
conservation of natural resources is of fundamental democratic value because
it allows for the possibility of equality of opportunity for all citizens."' For-
ests were to be managed for the good and the use of all. Taylor added, "If we
remove the vision of Progressive democracy from Pinchot's work, we are left
merely with the scientific management and control of natural resources for no
other purpose than brute human survival."6 It is unfortunately true that later
foresters "became progressively more narrow in outlook as a result of the kind
of specialized education they [Pinchot] encouraged."7 Expertise was on the
ascendancy, while its service to a democratic vision receded. This change was
probably due to the very success of the vision of Pinchot. The point which is
vital is that early public land management was successful as public policy
because of its link to a democratic vision accepted by the majority of society
at that time. As Greg Cawley and I have noted in the George Wright Society
Forum:
The federal lands, whether as national parks, national forests, or eco-
systems, are owned by the American public. But they are also places
in which local communities have developed. In consequence, manage-
ment decisions are as much about defining the character of those
local communities as they are about defining land use practices. It
would be misdirected, of course, to allow local desires to dictate
national policy. However, it is not only misdirected but ultimately
counterproductive to dismiss local concerns as somehow not part of
the public discourse over national policy.
What early conservationists like Pinchot understood was that major
policy shifts required developing a discourse in which scientists, pro-
fessionals, local publics, and national publics could find common
meanings. It was not an easy task, nor did it occur overnight. Never-
theless, conservation did, at least for a time, define a consensus posi-
tion about the management of the federal estate. To expect that the
4. GIFFORD PiNcHcOT, BREAKING NEW GROUND 17 (1947).
5. BOB PEPPERMAN TAYLOR, OUR LIMrrs TRANSGRESSED 19 (1992) (emphasis added).
6. Id. at 26.
7. DAvID A. CLARY, TIMBER AND THE FOREST SERVICE 17 (1986).
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changes implied by ecosystem management will be realized without
an equally lengthy and difficult effort is to doom the project to fail-
ure.
8
It is thus clear that Progressive-era public lands management was centered as
much on a vision of what type of society we ought to desire, as it was on an
expert centered land management regime. It was a vision accepted by a major-
ity of Americans, representing an underlying consensus about how a large
amount, but not all, of our federal estate should be managed.
Early national park management history lies within--but not at the center
of-the Progressive realm. On the one hand, Pinchot opposed the notion of a
separate national park bureau, while supporting the damming of Hetch Hetchy
valley in Yosemite.9 The conclusion, obviously, is that appreciating the need
of others for national parks was one of Pinchot's blind spots. Thus, the parks'
democratic qualities spoken about so eloquently by Wallace Stegner were
ignored by Pinchot, because he couldn't conceive of resource preservation for
"enjoyment" as a valid use in his vision of conservation, unless an area was
also open for development at the same time.
On the other hand, the fledgling NPS was not able to institute the strong
educational/professional component which forestry, and a forestry degree,
represented for the Forest Service. Park rangers became known more as "gen-
eralists," and there was no specific educational requirement for new park rang-
ers at NPS. Thus, NPS was not able to obtain the degree of professional au-
tonomy achieved by the Forest Service.
However, the "founders" of NPS management in the post-Organic Act
Era, Stephen Mather and Horace Albright, certainly had a democratic compo-
nent which was central to their strategic vision about the purposes of the early
parks. ° Put simply, the parks were to be used in order to build up a constitu-
ency which would support them and the NPS. That vision was successfully put
into place. Ronald Foresta, in his landmark America's National Parks and
Their Keepers illustrates the power and significance of that earlier vision when
he reminds us that "[a] park is anthropocentric; its special quality comes from
its appeal to humans. It strikes people as grand or sublime, or it just makes
people happy to be there, for whatever reason."" In a later passage, Foresta
offered an insight which proponents of ecosystem management might take as a
warning of a trap to avoid: "By and large, the most vocal advocates of
biocentric management, the environmental activists, have been the most con-
temptuous of the park visitor."'2 In sum, the legacy of the parks has been
their use and preservation vision. One question is whether ecosystem manage-
ment should fit into this policy of use and preservation, or whether it some-
8. John Freemuth & R. McGreggor Cawley, Ecosystem Management: The Relationship
Among Science, Land Managers and the Public, GEORGE WRIGHT F., 1993, at 26, 31-32 (empha-
sis added).
9. HAYS, supra note 2, at 38, 193.
10. See, e.g., R. GERALD WRIGHT, WILDLIFE RESEARCH AND MANAGEMENT IN THE NA-
TIONAL PARKS 10-14 (1992).
11. RONALD A. FORESTA, AMERICA'S NATIONAL PARKS AND THEIR KEEPERS 268 (1984).
12. Id. at 270.
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how will alter this policy, without any clear articulation that alteration of park
policy has already occurred. That, of course, depends on who controls the
definition of the term.
Those interested in ecosystem management might also do well to examine
the history of park management and policy development for clues as to any
lessons about what policies have worked and why, as well as for how that
history may provide insights on ecosystem management. One example has just
been provided. Certainly, the extension of the park system into historic preser-
vation, urban parks, and the multiple use national recreation area, suggests that
ecosystem management may play a more central role in some types of units
than in others. Also, those who develop and think about management policy
ought to pay special attention to the successes and failures in implementation
of past policy initiatives such as the Leopold Report," or what has come to
be called by many the "vignettes of primitive America" policy. 4 Observers
of wildlife policy in the national parks have noted that the Leopold Report did
call for an active resource management stance; it was not a laissez faire or a
so-called "natural regulation" approach, as some came to call it.' The point
here is that many aspects of NPS culture contributed to (and continue to con-
tribute to) the role and place of science and resource management within the
bureau, and they have rendered the policy prescriptions made in the Leopold
report, and later reports, more difficult to achieve. How many of those organi-
zational barriers still remain perhaps needs more systematic research, especial-
ly if ecosystem management turns out to be about policy change. Organiza-
tional culture change is difficult enough in the private sector; in the public
sector it may often be impossible. 6
Second, there is a fundamental arbitrariness in the choosing of a certain
time-pre-European settlement, "primitive America"-as some sort of ideal
towards which to manage. The time period is both arbitrary and heavily value-
laden with severe implications for society. Yet such efforts continue, for ex-
ample, with the Forest Service-Bureau of Land Management's Upper Colum-
bia River Basin Ecosystem Management project discussions over returning
part of the Pacific Northwest to "pre-settlement conditions."'" The only way
such a management goal can, and should, be set would be through an active
public dialogue which discusses all of the possible economic and noneconomic
costs and benefits associated with such an approach. Perhaps such an approach
with the context of ecosystem management is more feasible in the units of the
13. ADVISORY COMM. ON WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, A STUDY
OF THE NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE SYSTEM (1969) [hereinafter Leopold Report].
14. See Douglas 0. Linder, New Direction for Preservation Law: Creating an Environment
Worth Experiencing, 20 ENVTL. L. 49, 58 (1990) (citing Richard W. Sellars, Science or Scenery?
A Conflict of Values in the National Parks, 52 WILDERNESS 29, 30 (1989)).
15. FREDERIC WAGNER ET AL., WILDLIFE PoLcIEs IN THE U.S. NATIONAL PARKS 26-27
(1995).
16. For an excellent introduction to the concepts of organization culture, see generally HAR-
RISON TRICE & JANICE BEYER, THE CULTURE OF WORK ORGANIZATIONS (1993).
17. See, e.g., Henry B. Lacey, New Approach or Business as Usual: Protection of Aquatic
Ecosystems Under the Clinton Administration's Westside Forests Plan, 10 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG.
309 (1995).
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park system than in multiple-use areas.
LIMrrs TO ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT: THE INSTITUTIONAL SETTING
Natural resource professionals struggle daily with trying to better under-
stand the ecosystem(s) within which their various management units are
placed. Yet it is the institutional setting, within which agencies such as NPS
function, which will have more influence on the development and success of
ecosystem management. For the purposes of this essay, the most important
aspect of that institutional setting is the role of a public sector bureau, NPS, in
American democracy. As surprising as it may seem to some readers, there is
an amazing theoretical and practical uncertainty about what that role should
be. Put simply, there is no mention of the public bureaucracy in the Constitu-
tion-at least in terms that would be recognizable as referring to the large
apparatus of modem government, with its important discretionary powers of
public policymaking. This gap means that there is no clear consensus in politi-
cal theory about the roles and powers of a large section of the modem Ameri-
can state, a section which has come to be as significant as Congress or the
courts. For example, some argue that the bureaucracy must pay due attention
to the demands and requirements of the Congress which created and continues
to fund it. 8  Others argue that bureaucracies have been delegated
policymaking authority and thus may use professional judgement in making
decisions. 9 What, then, is the best way is for NPS to understand and defend
the legitimacy of what it does in the name of park policy? This question de-
serves some consideration as the bureau moves towards ecosystem manage-
ment, or any other policy change for that matter.
EXPERTISE AND SCIENCE
One model of legitimacy which has great appeal to bureau professionals is
built around expertise. NPS decisions have legitimacy because NPS knows the
most about the parks, and has been given that decision-making authority by
Congress.2" Congress created both the parks and NPS, then delegated the
day-to-day management responsibility to the bureau. The bureau uses its pro-
fessional judgement (hence discretion) on how to manage the park system.
This model works well, to a point. Indeed, NPS is constantly at the top of the
most admired federal bureaus, perhaps due in part to what the public asso-
18. See, e.g., Philip Brashier, Comment, The United States Struggles with Past Judicial
Interpretations Defining the Modern Law of Immigration, 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 1357, 1378 (1996)
("An executive agency... which is supposed to carry out the intent of a congressional statute
must be restricted from overreaching and should not possess greater authority than the President
and Congress.").
19. See, e.g., Clayton L. Riddle, Comment, Protecting the Grand Canyon National Park
from Glen Canyon Dam: Environmental Law at Its Worst, 77 MARQ. L. REV. 115, 126 (1993)
("In 1916, Congress adopted the National Park Service Organic Act ... fully intending the newly
created NPS to coordinate and rationalize America's national park development. Congress envi-
sioned one agency administering existing and future park lands in accordance with a prevailing
feeling that the parks had a necessary place in America's development.").
20. National Park Service Organic Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
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ciates with NPS, but also because NPS must be doing a few things right. Yet,
as readers are well aware, there are many NPS decisions which are not left to
the bureau; there is not complete deference to the bureau's expertise because
of that expertise. I have argued elsewhere that many other actors in the politi-
cal system-members of Congress, their staff, political appointees, conces-
sionaires, environmentalists and others-constantly seek to interfere with NPS
decisionmaking'
This "interference" is common to many, but not all, federal bureaus. For
example, Barbara Romzek and Melvin Dubnick once described the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) as having what they term a
"professional accountability" system during the 1960s.22 Under this system
"public officials must rely on skilled and expert employees to provide appro-
priate solutions." 3 Under a professional accountability system, the general
public also shows deference to expertise and thus there is not nearly as much
outside interference in bureau decisionmaking.
Even though their histories are different, both NPS and the USFS today
are not expert-centered agencies but more responsive ones. A "responsive
agency," in the words of Romzek and Dubnick, is concerned with questions of
representation, access, and responsiveness to public demands.24 "The potential
constituencies include the general public, elected officials, agency heads, agen-
cy clientele, other special interest groups, and future generations. Regardless of
which definition of constituency is adopted, the administrator is expected to be
responsive to their policy priorities and programmatic needs."'
The notion of bureau responsiveness to other political actors fits our ex-
pectations of democratic theory. We do not expect our public bureaucracies to
do things without taking the opinions and values of others' into their decision-
making calculus. Expectations that ecosystem management will bring about
deference to the expertise of scientifically trained professionals needs to be
understood in this context. If such deference does develop, it will only happen
after a long public discourse with others-a "leading" of public sentiment, to
put it in Roosevelt's terms. 6 That appears to be the "proper" relationship be-
tween expertise and democracy. To phrase it differently, what do resource
managers do if the public decides that ecosystem management is not a worth-
while public policy?
Also, countless examples of expertise/professionalism have lead to bad
decisions, to the point that expertise itself is somewhat suspect in our society
at this moment. Consider the current arguments over forest health. The USFS
is essentially asking the American public to trust it to manage the forests to
make them more "healthy."27 The bureau notes that one reason the forests are
21. John Freemuth, The National Parks: Political Versus Professional Determinants of Poli-
cy, 49 PuB. ADMIN. REv. 278, 281 (1989).
22. Barbara S. Romzek & Melvin J. Dubnick, Accountability in the Public Sector: Lessons
From the Challenger Tragedy, 47 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 227, 230-31 (1987).
23. Id. at 229.
24. Id. at 229-30.
25. Id. at 229.
26. See supra text accompanying note 3.
27. See Richard Haeuber, Setting the Environmental Policy Agenda: The Case of Ecosystem
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not healthy is because of the many years of fire suppression.' But wasn't it
USFS who spent years suppressing fire and years telling the American public
that only "they" could prevent forest fires? Now it admits that policy was in
error.29 Can some in the public be blamed for being suspicious of claims of
forest health problems, even if those claims are accurate?
Finally, it is questionable whether many decisions which are presented as
"science-based" (a form of expertise) are that at all. They are often political
decisions at their core. For example, I am sure a science-based strategy could
be concocted to close a good percentage of many of the national parks in the
name of "biodiversity." This would look like a scientific decision but it would
not be. It would be a political decision redefining the mission and purpose of
the parks, without any public discussion of the need or desirability of the
change, with biodiversity as a "scientific stalking horse" for a certain set of
values (diminished resource use) which seek to subordinate other legitimate
public values (public enjoyment, natural resource use) in the name of a scien-
tific imperative. Science and expertise should best be understood in this con-
text then, as necessary but insufficient conditions for providing legitimacy for
NPS decisions. Without "good science," decisions are hard to justify, yet sci-
ence alone cannot make decisions for us.
There may be a more useful way to think about managing parks, however,
which can build on the expertise which NPS has. The 1916 Organic Act'
charges NPS to manage parks "for future generations."31 The clause gives
NPS a focus which is different than all of the other actors who claim to have
an interest, or power, over bureau decisions. It allows NPS to act in the name
of park resources, and in the name of visitor experiences with a long term
"public interest" perspective.32 But, it requires NPS to speak in those terms,
rather than solely in the language of expertise. There is no guarantee, of
course, that NPS perspectives on park management issues will prevail, but
such a public interest perspective is different than a perspective which looks
out for constituents or is based on political ideologies and agendas at play at a
certain time. The future generations who might visit the parks would become a
benchmark by which parks are managed today, and thus this long term per-
spective can legitimately be inserted into debates over park management. Ex-
pertise and science remain necessary tools, however, in this debate. NPS could
then present to its public(s) and other interests management decisions framed
with a long term perspective and designed to help those interests deliberate
over choices NPS must make. Ecosystem management then becomes framed
in terms of the public interest.
Management, 36 NAT. RESOURCES 1, 25 (1996).
28. William Hart, Smokey Bear Changes His Tune, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 16,
1984, at 45A.
29. Id.
30. 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
31. Id.
32. Organic Act of 1916, 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1994); The Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of
1960, 16 U.S.C. § 528 (1994).
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CASE STUDY: A VISION FOR THE FUTURE: ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT IN
GREATER YELLOWSTONE
Ecosystem management first received focused attention by federal land
managers during a symposium held at the University of Washington in the
mid-1980s. 33 A book with a series of articles written by key participants, and
edited by James K. Agee and Darryll Johnson, illustrates the cautious, yet
hopeful, approach taken by those involved with the concept at that time:
Therefore, ecosystem management in parks and wilderness should
explicitly reflect multiple, measurable goals defining both natural
environmental conditions and socioeconomic concerns. These goals
should acknowledge the fact that social values, political pressures,
and biological knowledge may be different ten to twenty years from
now, and that park and wilderness management should be responsive
to such changes within defined legal limits.34
Not too long after the book's publication, the first large scale experiment with
ecosystem management began in the area in and around Yellowstone National
Park.
THE YELLOWSTONE EXPERIMENT
The Yellowstone area has often reflected the most important public poli-
cies about the public lands of the United States. It is, as most readers know,
the location of the world's first national park, so designated by Congress in
1872. 3" The area is also the site of the first national forest of the United
States, proclaimed initially as the Yellowstone National Park Timber Land Re-
serve by President Harrison in 1891.36 We know these places today as inte-
gral parts of our federal lands, managed by the two most prominent land man-
agement bureaus, NPS and USFS. We also know these places as home for the
two dominant approaches to public land management in the United States.
The national parks are viewed as representing the "preservation" approach
to public land management. 7 These lands were often set aside from resource
development and other uses to be "conserved"-interestingly, today we say
33. See supra note 18, at vii. This publication is a collection of papers presented at the Eco-
system Management Workshop, held Apr. 6-10, 1987, at the University of Washington's Pack
Forest
34. James K. Agee & Darryll Johnson, A Direction for Ecosystem Management, in Ecosys-
TEM MANAGEMENT FOR PARKS AND WILDERNESS 229 (James K. Agee & Darryll R. Johnson eds.,
1988).
35. 16 U.S.C. § 21 (1994) (setting forth the parameters of Yellowstone, from the Act of
March 1, 1872, ch. 24, § 1, 17 Stat. 32); see also RICHARD A. BARTLETT, NATuRE's YELLow-
STONE 194-210 (1974) (presenting history of the creation of Yosemite and Yellowstone Parks).
36. See Robert B. Keiter, An Introduction to the Ecosystem Management Debate, in THE
GREATER YELLowsToNE ECOSYSTEM: REDEFINING AMERICA'S WILDERNESS HERITAGE 3 (Robert
B. Keiter & Mark S. Boyce eds., 1991).
37. SAMUEL TRASK DANA & SALLY K. FAIRFAX, FOREST AND RANGE POUCY: ITS DEVEL-
OPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 45 (2d ed. 1980); see also STEPHEN Fox, JOHN MUIR AND His
LEGACY: THE AMERICAN CONSERVATION MOVEMENT (3d ed. 1982) (relating a biography of John
Muir in the first part of the book, and a chronological history of the Conservation Movement in
part two).
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"preserved"-in more or less a natural state.3" Yet pure protection was not
the goal. These places were also to be visited or "enjoyed" by people, as stat-
ed in the 1916 Organic Act which created the bureau.39 This so-called "use
and conservation" management task facing the NPS has never been an easy
one, and has been well documented.' Yet there is no doubting that the na-
tional park idea well represents the preservation theme in public land manage-
ment.
The other theme is represented by what is known today as the "multiple-
use" approach to land management.' The essence of this approach is that
national forest lands allow for a wide variety of activities, which interestingly
were also viewed as "conservation."42 Those activities can include grazing,
timber harvesting and mining; they can also include wilderness recreation and
scientific research. 3 National forests can include preservation as a. goal, but
they also include a great number of other uses.
There is no better illustration of the importance of these differences than
the ongoing battle over the New World Mine proposal adjacent to Yellowstone
National Park.44 It is clear that bureau differences are well illustrated by the
positions of NPS and USFS on the proposed mine. NPS is opposed, while
USFS is not--they are undertaking various environmental reviews of the pro-
posal. Parenthetically, readers and observers of the debate over this project
might wish to note whether ecosystem management played any role in the
decision process, and how that role compared with the role of laws already in
place which are being used by proponents and opponents of the project. Cur-
rently, ecosystem management does not appear to have played a very major
role. Another case worth examining is NPS/USFS conflict over the protection
of the cave resources in Oregon Caves National Monument.45 Once again,
bureau missions appear to be driving the conflict, rather than ecosystem man-
agement.
Some students of national forest policy have argued that Congress did not
originally intend to create such a clear difference between the management of
the forests and the management of the national parks. Sally Fairfax has effec-
38. Id. at 45.
39. 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
40. See generally Robert B. Keiter, Beyond the Boundary Line: Constructing a Law of Eco-
system Management, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 293, 296-98 (1994) (detailing the history of ecosystem
management and putting forth an agenda for statutory reform thereof).
41. See 3 GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, NATURAL RESOURCES
LAW § 16 (1996). This section of the treatise gives a history and analysis of multiple-use, as well
as theorizing on its applicability in the future.
42. Id.
43. See The Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. § 528 (1994) (mandating
there be a multiple-use scheme of management utilized on National Forest Service land); DANA &
FAIRFAX, supra note 27.
44. See James Gerstenzang, 2 GOP Leaders Question Cost of Land Swap, L.A. TIMES, Jan.
24, 1997, at A3. For a critique of the current National Forest Service regulations and some sug-
gested reform measures, see generally Joel A. Ferre, Note, Forest Service Regulations Governing
Mining: Ecosystem Preservation Versus Economically Feasible Mining in the National Forests, 15
J. ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES & ENvTL. L. 351 (1995).
45. See Jeff Barnard, Logging Foes are a Mixed Group: Young, Old Protest in Northwest
Woods, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 4, 1996, at B1.
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tively argued the point that "during the 1890s ... both Congress and the pub-
lic viewed parks and forests as interchangeable." 4 It was the somewhat later
influence of Gifford Pinchot that transformed USFS into much more of a
"silviculture regime," as Fairfax puts it.' Scholars, however, continue to de-
bate the role and philosophy of Pinchot; he has also been seen as linking for-
est management to his vision of the public good.'
Readers familiar with public land history, and public land policy, know
that public land law is often ambiguous, contradictory, and inconsistent. Thus
both park and forest management has hardly been uniform or consistent. For
example, the USFS manages several national recreation areas such as the Saw-
tooth, in Idaho, that are almost indistinguishable from some national park
units. The NPS, on the other hand, must manage grazing, mining and even
hunting in some of its units.49 The point, however, is that the two dominant
approaches in United States public land management are found in the Yellow-
stone area.
Although interagency cooperation and communication may lie at the core
of many people's conception of ecosystem management today, such behavior
came relatively recently to Greater Yellowstone. It was not until the early
1960s that the region's managers saw the need for the creation of the Greater
Yellowstone Coordinating Committee (GYCC).5° Today's managers, howev-
er, have noted that "natural resource issues were not a major focus of atten-
tion" during the early days of the GYCC.5
That focus began to change in the early 1970s. Perhaps the most impor-
tant instigator of that change was growing alarm over the status of the grizzly
bear in and around the national park.52 Here was a natural resource issue
which demanded attention. What began to be recognized was that some type
46. Sally Fairfax, The Forest Service/National Park Service Relationships, in PARKS IN THE
WEST AND AMERICAN CULTURE 7 (Inst. of the Am. W. eds., 1985).
47. Id.
48. See BOB PEPPERMAN TAYLOR, OUR LImTS TRANSGRESSED: ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICAL
THOUGHT IN AMERICA 18-19 (1992).
49. JOHN FREEMUTH, ISLANDS UNDER SIEGE: NATIONAL PARKS AND THE POLITICS OF EX-
TERNAL THREATS 50-51 (1991) (discussing the implementation of policy, in the form of manage-
ment, in Glen Canyon, Utah).
50. Thomas T. Ankersen & Richard Hamann, Ecosystem Management and the Everglades: A
Legal and Institutional Analysis, I 1 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 473, 521-22 (1996); John Mamma
& Paul Grigsby, A Vision for Yellowstone's Forests, 15 PUB. LAND L. REv. 11, 16 (1994).
51. U.S. FOREST SERV., DEP'T. OF AGRIC. & U.S. NAT'L PARK SERV., DEP'T. OF INTERIOR,
VISION FOR THE FUTURE: A FRAMEWORK FOR COORDINATION IN THE GREATER YELLOWSTONE
AREA (1990) (draft) [hereinafter USFS & USNPS]
52. See Federico Cheever, The Road to Recovery: A New Way of Thinking About the Endan-
gered Species Act, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 47-48 (1996); Kyla Seligsohn-Bennett, Comment, Mis-
managing Endangered and "Exotic" Species in the National Parks, 20 ENVTL. L. 415 (1990)
(relating the threatened status of the grizzly bear and feral horse to mismanagement by the Na-
tional Park Service and calling for reform in order to attain species preservation); David P.
Sheldon, Comment, A Threatening Turn for a Threatened Species: The Impact of Natural Wildlife
Federation v. National Park Service, 10 PUB. LAND L. REv. 157 (1989) (addressing the policy of
the National Park Service towards the grizzly bear in light of the Ninth Circuit's decision); see
also R. Edward Grumbine, GHOST BEARS: EXPLORING THE BIODIVERSrrY CRISIS (1991) (illustrat-
ing a biodiversity crisis of epidemic proportion using the plight of the grizzly bear in the Greater
North Cascades).
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of "cross-boundary" management was needed, and that the interested public
was increasingly seeing the need for that management as well. 3
A FOCUSING EVENT: THE 1985 HOUSE OVERSIGHT HEARINGS
The problems facing species like the grizzly bear were obvious catalysts
for better coordination. Yet it was most likely the actions of a House subcom-
mittee which precipitated a more rapid response by federal land mangers in
the region. By 1985, Congress had begun to pay attention to the management
of the Yellowstone region. 4 In the fall of that year, the House Subcommittee
on Public Lands of the Interior Committee (now Resources) held hearings on
what was coming to be called by many the "Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem"
(GYE)." It is likely that Congressional concern at that time was in part cen-
tered on what was then called the "external threats" problem to national parks,
rather than an explicit need for ecosystem management.56 For example, in a
report prepared for Congress by the Congressional Research Service (CRS),57
much was made of legal park boundaries said to be inadequate because many
park resources crossed those boundaries.5" Yellowstone National Park was the
"heart" of an area whose plants, water, and wildlife depended on that entire
area.59 That area, not definitively defined, was the GYE. The GYE included
parts of six national forests (Beaverhead, Bridger-Teton, Custer, Gallatin, Sho-
shone, and the Targee), two national parks (Yellowstone and Grand Teton),
two wildlife refuges (the National Elk Refuge and Red Rocks Lake), a small
amount of Bureau of Land Management (BLM) land, private land, and was
part of three states.' Coordinating all of these disparate "sovereigns" in the
name of the core values of the heart of the ecosystem would seem a massive
undertaking.
It is essential to closely read the 1985 hearings in light of the later events
surrounding the publication of the Vision document for the GYE. We need to
determine if the members of Congress who were actively involved in the hear-
ings sent a clear message to the NPS and USFS regarding their expectations
for the area. Did, for example, Congress expect merely better interagency
coordination and consultation, or did it expect to see an entirely new manage-
ment approach for the area? Were the members unified in their concerns and
expectations, or were they divided? Did they have a clear understanding of
what constituted a ecosystem?
At the outset of the hearings, Subcommittee Chair John Seiberling (D-
53. Id.
54. See Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem: Oversight Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Pub.
Lands and the Subcomm. on Nat'l Parks and Recreation of the Comm. on Interior and Insular
Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1985) [hereinafter Oversight Hearing].
55. Id. at 1.
56. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, ISSUES SURROUNDING THE GREATER YELLOw-




60. Oversight Hearing, supra note 47, at 2-3.
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Ohio) remarked that "the issues that affect the Greater Yellowstone Area are
ones that transcend park boundaries."' He went on to note that the "so-called
Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem is not a statutory or official or even a clear
scientific designation."62 These two introductory remarks suggest both con-
cern with park protection, as well as recognition that the ecosystem concept
remained ambiguous in the mind of Seiberling. Later comments by Seiberling
confirm this assessment that these hearings, in his mind, were about threats to
parks:
When we started out with the National Park Protection Act [in 1982]
we tried to get a system of all the various agencies to coordinate with
the Park Service where there were possible threats to parks. Every-
body objected to that ... and said we ought to do this on a case-by-
case basis. So that is what we are doing.63
Congressman Richard Cheney of Wyoming noted in his opening remarks
that "an effort is going to have to be made by those who would recommend a
change to show that somehow the current system ... is not functioning prop-
erly."
A panel of public land managers was the first group to testify at the over-
sight hearings. William Penn Mott, then NPS Director, stated what might be
viewed as common themes of ecosystem management: "Technically, the eco-
system system should be referred to as a biographic province rather than the
ecosystem. Generally speaking, the art of the ecosystem management is in its
infancy mainly because one must first ask, 'How is that ecosystem defined?
By whom? From what perspective?"' Mott seemed be urging caution in two
directions. First, he questioned the choice of the word "ecosystem." Second,
he drew attention to the fact that the word "management" was fraught with
many conceptual difficulties. The questions Mott asked are at the core of the
debate over ecosystem management. They seek answers that are political at
their most fundamental.
Superintendent Barbee appeared to have trouble with the word ecosystem
as a useful term, noting it wasn't "something you can define definitely, at
least as a practical or pragmatic management tool, but it is a term that we are
having to deal with. I don't think it is going to go away."'' Barbee's observa-
tion on the inadequacy of ecosystem management as a management tool
should be remembered, in light of later events.
PUBLIC COMMENTS
A review of the testimony of interested groups and parties who were in-
vited to testify at these hearings conveys a sense that the groups and individu-
als invited had no uniform sense of ecosystem management. Some, like Franz
61. Id. at 1.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 40.
64. Id. at 3.
65. Id. at 16 (emphasis added).
66. Id. at 47 (emphasis added).
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Camenzind, a private ecologist, envisioned an idealized management regime
where the migratory birds who had winter range in Yellowstone would also
have their summer ranges in the American south protected.67 To him, such a
scenario was possible eventually. "Politically... we cannot accept all of these
areas at this moment for consideration of the ecosystem."' To the president
of the Wilderness Society, William Turnage, the solution was a change in the
management direction of USFS: "The Wilderness Society calls on the U.S.
Forest Service to change its priorities, to make ecosystem protection in the
Yellowstone its highest value rather than taxpayer-subsidized commodity pro-
duction." This comment later led Representative Cheney of Wyoming to ask
Tumage whether he would eventually ban timbering in Greater Yellow-
stone.70 Turnage responded that it was possible "within a decade."'" A 1996
vote by members of the Sierra Club to oppose logging in national forests sug-
gests that intense debate over forest management continues in this direction.72
Christopher Duerksen of the Conservation Foundation supported a pro-
cess-based approach calling for "consensus building in negotiation patterned
after the habitat protection plans of the Endangered Species Act and the Coast-
al Zone Management Act."'73 In testimony. as part of a later panel, Amos Eno,
Director of Wildlife Programs at the Audubon Society, said "we wish instead
to accentuate the positive by focusing on the concept of Yellowstone as an
ecosystem which could be managed within existing governmental frameworks
and statutory mandates. 74
Resource users had other concerns. Brad Penn, representing Rocky Moun-
tain Oil and Gas Association viewed an ecosystem approach as a further limi-
tation of resource development. "[M]ore restrictive management of multiple
use activities would have a devastating impact on local communities and mul-
tiple uses, including oil and gas activities."" In a certain sense, then, both
Penn and Turnage anticipated less resource use as the result of an ecosystem
approach. As Congressman Cheney put it, later in the hearing:
[Miany people perceive it as a way for some of the environmental
groups to seek to pursue a hidden agenda, which is to get ranchers
off the lands, close down timbering, and so forth. I think it is very
important to be precise as to what is intended here .... 7"
Cheney's comments echo those of Director Mott. They also suggest a problem
which may continue to haunt the development and implementation of current
ecosystem management policy. Cheney expressed concern that certain environ-
67. Id. at 90.
68. Id. (emphasis added).
69. Id. at 99.
70. Id. at 107.
71. Id.
72. Kim Murphy, Sierra Club Votes to Oppose Logging on Federal Lands; Timber: Action
Is a Turning Point for Moderate Group and Sets Stage for Tougher Bargaining Over U.S. Forests,
L.A. TIMES, April 23, 1996, at 3.
73. Oversight Hearings, supra note 44, at 103.
74. Id. at 138.
75. Id. at 113.
76. Id. at 122.
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mental groups were perceived as using ecosystem approaches as a stalking
horse for other issues. It would seem fair to conclude that in some people's
minds ecosystem management-like regimes meant a curtailment of multiple
use. Thus any definition of what other people would later try to develop for
ecosystem management would be colored by what people already thought it
meant. Had future federal agency efforts already been limited by these percep-
tions?
The 1985 oversight hearings did not lead to a firm conclusion or direction
about the management of the Yellowstone area. As the testimony above indi-
cates, opinion was widespread. To put it another way, these hearings do not
convey any sense of a "mandate" from Congress to the federal land manage-
ment agencies to do anything radically different.
Land managers did however, find further impetus in the hearings for in-
creasing coordination efforts. The impetus had begun earlier that spring, at a
meeting of the Greater Yellowstone Coordinating Committee where the
"Blackwater Concept" was developed. That concept called for a direction to
interagency coordination including (1) defining the Greater Yellowstone Area,
(2) desired future conditions for the area in the period 1995-2000, (3) what the
area would look like in the years 1995-2000 under current plan implementa-
tion, (4) changes need to reconcile (2) and (3), and (5) actions needed to im-
plement those changes.77
The next stage in the evolution of policy in the Greater Yellowstone Area
(GYA) was the publication of a document which listed all of the federal land
management plans for the region. That document, called the "Aggregation,"
made no policy decisions, but simply provided one place where key aspects of
forest and park plans could be found. It was a precursor to events which
would capture the attention of the nation for a time.
BATTLE OVER THE VISION
The Blackwater Concept led to the creation of a group, or "team", which
would manage the development of a new framework for the coordination and
management of the Yellowstone area. From that document it was hoped that
relevant forest and park plan revisions would be made.
The planning team, headed by Jack Troyer of USFS and Sandra Key of
NPS, developed a public involvement and response process. That process in-
cluded a number of meetings, briefings, open houses and so on. What emerged
was a list of fourteen draft goals written by the forest supervisors and park
superintendents of the region. Those goals became the key components of a
mailing sent to interested members of the public for comment. In addition,
another round of meetings was held. The result was the release of the draft
version of Vision for the Future: A Framework for Coordination in the Great-
77. National Park Service,"Cooperation in the Greater Yellowstone Area," Memo from Di-
rector, National Park Service, to Director, Bureau of Land Management (1986)and Mealey, Steve,
interview with author, (1993). Mealey was Forest Supervisor on the Shoshone National Forest in
1986 and was Supervisor of the Boise National Forest at the time of the interview.
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er Yellowstone Area, in the summer of 1990.8 That document would set the
stage for a major federal land policy battle.
The draft Vision document proposed three primary goals79 for future
management of the GYA on lands under either USFS or NPS administration:
1) Conserve the Sense of Naturalness and Maintain Ecosystem Integrity,' 2)
Encourage Opportunities That Are Biologically and Economically Sustain-
able,8' and 3) Improve Coordination. 2 It then went on to identify numerous
sub-goals and "coordinating criteria." Implementation of this strategy offered
the bureau's promise that the "GYA can serve many people well at the same
time that its fundamental values are adequately protected." 3 Yet, the docu-
ment also recognized that "there will be disputes and controversies over [the
proposed] management direction." 4
Robert Keiter has suggested that the political climate of the GYA has
been shaped by three influences. First, environmentalist pressures to "protect
the ecosystem;" second, fears of traditional multiple-use constituents that their
use might be curtailed; and third, desires by the agencies themselves to assert
better control over the management process (the return of the progressive
model).,5 Traces of these influences are clearly evident in the Vision docu-
ment. For example, the terms Greater Yellowstone Area and Greater Yellow-
stone Ecosystem (GYE) were used interchangeably throughout the document.
Also, the overall approach proposed in the document was described as an
attempt to "pioneer ecosystem management."' These concerns were close to
those expressed by the environmental community. Yet at the same time, they
met the concerns of traditional multiple-users: "Opportunities for recreation
and commodity development, including timber harvesting, grazing and mineral
development will be provided for on appropriate federal lands."" Finally, the
attempt to define and clarify explicit management goals was certainly a step in
the understandable direction of reinforcing agency control over the manage-
ment process.
In short, the draft Vision document appeared to offer a rather sophisticated
response to the political landscape surrounding Yellowstone. However, the
document failed to recognize a fundamental tension in federal land administra-
tion and in consequence it exacerbated, rather than resolved, conflict. As a
78. USFS & USNPS, supra note 23.
79. USFS & USNPS, supra note 51, at iii. An earlier version of this discussion of the Vision
process can be found in R. McGreggor Cawley & John Freemuth, Tree Farms, Mother Earth, and
Other Dilemmas: The Politics of Ecosystem Management in Greater Yellowstone, 6 Soc'Y &
NAT'L RESOURCES 41 (1993).
80. Id. at 3-7 to 3-24.
81. Id. at 3-25 to 3-36.
82. Id. at 3-37 to 3-42.
83. USFS & USNPS, supra note 23, at 3-1.
84. Id.
85. Robert B. Keiter, Taking Account of the Ecosystem on the Public Domain: Law and
Ecology in the Greater Yellowstone Region, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 923, 933 (1989) (discussing
ecosystem management and its implementation in the national parks through legal mechanisms).
86. USFS & USNPS, supra note 20, at 4-2.
87. Id. at 3-1.
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starting point, consider the term ecosystem. The draft Vision document defined
ecosystem as
Living organisms (biotic) together with their nonliving environment
(abiotic) forming an interacting system inhabiting a defined area of
interest. There is not an obvious boundary to separate an individual
ecosystem from its surroundings. Scientists have used the term to
refer to systems as small as an individual pond, and as large as the
planet."
At this point we find several administrative and management issues. First, and
perhaps most obvious, the document's definition created an administrative
dilemma by prescribing a management regime for an area lacking boundaries
based on scientific consensus. This criticism has also been leveled at ecosys-
tem management more generally."' Indeed, at one point the document admits
that "the actual boundaries of this area are the subject of ongoing discussion
among many parties." Second, the promise that the USFS and USNPS will
not abandon their separate and often quite distinct mandates rings rather
strangely, since potentially the most intriguing aspect, however idealistic, of
the proposal was that the USFS, at least in the Yellowstone region, was will-
ing to abandon its traditional management regime in favor of an ecosystem
regime.9 Herein lies a third issue.
The broad, almost tautological definition of ecosystem offered in the draft
Vision document is certainly consistent with current scientific conclusions
regarding the complex and interrelated structure of nature. Yet, as Keiter ar-
gues: "[Sicience itself cannot define a new ethic (or management priorities) in
an area like Greater Yellowstone. Science attaches no significance or value to
the many human interests that figure prominently in policy judgments about
the public lands." Science strives to construct a picture of the physical
world based on empirical observation. A management regime, in contrast,
must pay attention to the impact human values and interests have on allocating
meanings to scientific observations. For example, scientific observation is
supposed to remain more or less content with the conclusion that a sixteen
ounce container has eight ounces of fluid in it. From a management perspec-
tive, however, the crucial question may very well be whether the container is
"half-full" or "half-empty." It is this question which determines the appropriate
course of action-whether or not more fluid is needed or, to extend the analo-
gy, whether or not someone should stop drinking the water. The problem, of
course, is that "half-full/half-empty" are value judgments derived from the
interests of people. As such, they are open to a discourse at any given moment
and over time, unless we assume that values and interests remain constant,
88. Id. at G-2.
89. See Allan K. Fitzsimmons, Sound Policy or Smoke and Mirrors: Does Ecosystem Man-
agement Make Sense?, 32 WATER REsouRcEs BuLLEnN 217, 218 (1996) (discussing the diffi-
culty of reconciling ideas on ecosystem management with public policy concepts).
90. USFS & USNPS, supra note 51, at 1-1.
91. Id. at 4-1.
92. Keiter, supra note 85, at 1003.
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which is a difficult assumption to make in the context of ecosystem manage-
ment. Scientists, and managers who center decisions solely on science, do not
have any special position in negotiations over value questions, something
which may not be as evident a fact as it might appear.93
There was a variant of the "half-full/half-empty" dilemma at work in the
Yellowstone controversy. Consider the following passage:
The Vision, therefore, does not define resource protection and re-
source use as being mutually exclusive. Instead it introduces princi-
ples and processes that will help ensure that no matter what the re-
source use-be it the recreational needs of an individual, protection
of biological diversity for the greater good of human society, or tim-
ber harvest for national and international markets--ecosystem values
are considered first in how the resource is used.94
From a scientific standpoint, this statement is essentially accurate, because
production science and ecology are potentially compatible. Nevertheless, as a
statement of management priorities, it set the stage for confrontation rather
than compromise, because it appeared to preclude the public negotiation re-
quired above.
Once again, the broad definition of ecosystem, in combination with the
suggestion that a "measure" of naturalness was the "extent to which natural
processes... are functioning without major disruptions by humans," created
room for suspicions among some members of the public regarding the actual
outcome of ecoiystem management.9 This language could have been inter-
preted as a subtle (perhaps even covert) call for excluding increasing portions
of the GYA from traditional multiple-use activities. Whether or not such an
interpretation was "accurate" is ultimately beside the point. What is important
is that this interpretation had (and has) currency among public land interests.
Indeed, the Wyoming Legislature passed a resolution calling for the withdraw-
al of the draft Vision document. Primary among the justifications for this ac-
tion was the belief that the "[Vision] document will create a de facto Yellow-
stone National Park management philosophy on adjacent forests, diminishing
or totally excluding multiple use activities."
When placed in the context developed here, the Wyoming resolution can
be understood as multiple use advocates protesting the potential shift to a
management regime grounded in ecosystem management Another way to say
this is that multiple use advocates saw ecosystem maiagement as a negative,
while ecosystem advocates saw it as a positive. What is so important about the
protest is the currency it (and similar protests) has in the intermountain West,
an area which is seemingly central to ecosystem management. Whether the
author or readers agree or disagree with the resolution is not the point; the
93. Robert Lackey, Seven Pillars of Ecosystem Management, LANDSCAPE & URB. PLAN. (in
press).
94. USFS & USNPS, supra note 51, at 4-1 (emphasis added).
95. Id. at 3-9.
96. H.R.J. Res. 16, 51st Leg., Gen Sess. (Wyo. 1991).
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point is that many people may well view ecosystem management as a problem
in federal land management, rather than as the solution it purports to be.
Moreover, the Vision document is not the only source of apprehension for
multiple use advocates. In the mid-1980s, a group composed primarily of
natural resource professionals in the NPS formed the Yellowstone Park Preser-
vation Council (YPPC) to counter what they believed to be a "pro-develop-
ment" bias in park management.97 A related development is the recent cre-
ation of the Association of USFS Employees for Environmental Ethics
(AFSEEE) as a protest against a perceived overemphasis on timber harvesting
in National Forest management." The point here is that the YPPC and
AFSEEE both represent outcroppings of ecosystem management within the
management agencies. It is not difficult to understand, therefore, why multiple
use advocates might view the Vision document as something more than an
effort to balance ecology and production science. They appear to pay attention
to what is said by others. To take this point further, some USFS managers
familiar with the Vision process have noted that the Greater Yellowstone Co-
alition was perceived as being very influential in the writing of the docu-
ment.99
There is one final issue, relating to both the science and management
concern, and the character of the conflict over Yellowstone, which warrants
attention. "What happens," asks former NPS official William Brown,
when park science is viewed as an end in itself rather than as a tool
of park management? When significant numbers of scientific and lay
people view certain parks primarily as scientific benchmarks, gene
pools, and relict environments of inestimable value to mankind in a
trembling biosphere?
Answering his own questions, Brown continues.
An extreme scenario might go like this: First, certain parks or seg-
ments thereof are designated ecological reserves. Second, scientific
study, not enjoyment and use, becomes the controlling purpose in
such reserves. Third, traditional park management is relieved in favor
of a science management board. m
In short, an over zealous application of ecosystem management in GYE might
alter the traditional park management regime as well as forest management. It
is clear that some in NPS see this as a desired outcome.
The broader issue here centers on the public character of the federal lands
and the agencies expressed desire to "satisfy the wishes of human soci-
97. Freemuth, supra note 21, at.
98. Pat Ford, Jeff DeBonis: 'So Far It's All Talk,' HIGH COUNTRY NEws, Feb. 26, 1990, at
1; see also Jim Stiak, Forester Challenges His Agency to a Discussion, HIGH COUNTRY NEws,
June 5, 1989, at 1 (relating the efforts of Jeff DeBonis in protecting the public domain's old-
growth forests).
99. Interview with Steve Mealey, supra note 77.
100. William Brown, Preamble Grist, GEO. WRIGHT F., at 21-22.
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ety."'' By almost any definition, the GYA is an ecosystem worth protecting.
Moreover, as the first national park and national forest in the United States,
which nonetheless has remained relatively unharmed, the GYA is an ideally
suited site for experimentation with new management techniques. The question
to be asked, however, is whether a possible narrowing of the area's use and
enjoyment by people serves the public's interest, or the interests of land man-
agers and scientists. In a related vein, was the process initiated by the draft
Vision document intended to solicit the public's perspective on the future of
the GYA, or rather intended to convince the public that the management
professionals' view should determine the GYA's future? As Benjamin Barber
has suggested, "Where there is certain knowledge, true science, or absolute
right, there is no conflict that cannot be resolved by reference to the unity of
truth, and thus there is no necessity for politics."'" Those who believe that
ecosystem management has reached the status of unchallengeable truth might
do well to pay close attention to Barber's concern.
It is apparent that the original Vision document, while very farsighted,
suggested a consensus that did not yet exist. Thus it became liable, on the one
hand, to environmentalist criticism that it lacked "clout" due to its vagueness,
and on the other hand, to multiple-use group criticism that it was too pro-envi-
ronment.' 3 illustrative of the problem is an observation made by Marshall
Gingery, assistant superintendent of Grand Teton National Park. Conceding the
likely demise of the Vision document, Gingery noted "it will still come down
to how much pressure the public will put on us to manage the right way.'
This remark suggests a possible failure to recognize that the public is not yet
willing to grant ecosystem management the status of "certain knowledge," and
therefore, there is as yet no "right" way to manage the area.
In September 1991 a revised Vision document was released. The final
Vision document was a drastic revision of the original text, having been short-
ened from over 80 pages to 10 pages. Moreover, the original goal to "Main-
tain Ecosystem Integrity"' 5 was replaced with the principle to "Maintain
Functional Ecosystems,"'" a shift predicated on the admission that "there is
more than a single ecosystem in the GYA."'' In short, this new version of-
fered a "statement of principles and guidelines to coordinate management of
the national forests and parks in the GYA," which also "reinforces the separate
missions of the USFS and NPS."' 8
101. USFS & USNPS, supra note 51, at 4-1.
102. BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY 129 (1984).
103. Michael Milstein, A Fading Yellowstone 'Vision,' HIGH COUNTRY NEws, June 3, 1991,
at 1.
104. Id.
105. USFS & USNPS, supra note 51, at 3-7.
106. U.S. NAT'L PARK SERV., DEP'T OF INTERIOR & U.S. FOREST SERV., DEP'T OF AGRIC., A
FRAMEWORK FOR COORDINATION OF NATIONAL PARKS AND FORESTS IN THE GREATER YELLOW-
STONE AREA 4 (1991) [hereinafter FRAMEWORK].
107. U.S. NAT'L PARK SERV., DEP'T OF INTERIOR & U.S. FOREST SERV., DEP'T OF AGRIC.,
SUMMARY OF COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT GREATER YELLOWSTONE FRAMEWORK 1 (1991) [herein-
after SUMMARY].
108. FRAMEWORK, supra note 106, at 1.
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This change in direction might be, as one disgruntled environmentalist
suggested, "another example of the industry-controlled politicians affecting the
outcome from the. agency."' ' But it might also suggest that the political pro-
cess was, at that point, functioning as it should. Indeed, a purpose of demo-
cratic and participatory politics is to make "preferences and opinions earn le-
gitimacy by forcing them to run the gauntlet of public deliberation and public
judgement.""' The revised Vision document simply acknowledged that eco-
system management had not earned legitimacy in the eyes of the public at that
point.
What occurred at Yellowstone, then, was a showdown over the political
legitimacy of ecosystem management. Consider, for example, Robert Barbee's
(Yellowstone's Superintendent), Paul Schullery's (Yellowstone environmental
specialist and journalist) and John Varley's (Yellowstone Chief of Research in
1991) thoughtful and spirited discussion of what went wrong with the Vision
process. In their view, the only players that openly endorsed the draft Vision
document were the NPS and USFS. But even that support was not complete:
"[T]hough forest supervisors and park superintendents involved were strongly
committed to the Vision, many staff members weren't."''.
Some local environmental groups endorsed the Vision process, but most of
the national groups simply "bowed politely toward the process," while refusing
to "jump in with both feet and take a major part in the dialogues.""' This is
remarkable departure from some of the strong support given ecosystem protec-
tion at the House hearings. It also reminds us of the difficulties faced by fed-
eral land managers as they attempt to offer their versions of land management
policy; most of the time they are criticized and second guessed, while rarely
being supported. In this case, lack of support may have a lot to do over the
uncertainty surrounding ecosystem management and its definition. There were
also "commodity groups of many persuasions" who mounted a "powerful
regional campaign" by convincing their members that the proposal represented
a "giant land-grab, another Federal lockup."" 3
In short, the Vision process submitted ecosystem management to public
judgement which determined that the idea, in its current form, had not yet
earned legitimacy. Aside from a relatively small group of agency personnel,
the members of the Yellowstone community were either not interested in the
principles of the draft Vision document, or openly hostile to them. To proceed
with the proposal under these conditions, therefore, would be tantamount to
turning control of the GYA over to a small group of resource professionals,
which of course is an increasingly problematic action throughout the area of
resource policy.
This assessment is based on the premise that the Yellowstone controversy
109. Dan Whipple, All Sides Fault Final 'Vision' Document, CASPER STAR TRIB., Sept. 12,
1991, at Al.
110. Barber, supra note 102, at 136.
111. Barbee et al., supra note 3, at 84.
112. Id. at 82, 85.
113. Id.
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represented a public deliberation. There is another possibility however. As
Barbee, Schullery, and Varley argue, "Public sentiment did not have a great
deal to do with the process. The American public, the owners of the parks and
foresters of the greater Yellowstone area, played virtually no role at all."
'" 4
This is a reference, of course, to the fact that "attempts to hold hearings on the
Vision in other parts of the country-far from intense local pres-
sures-failed.""5
Moreover, this view of the situation has received additional support. A
fifteen month investigation into "alleged improprieties in the directed reassign-
ments" of Lorraine Mintzmeyer and John Mumma by the Subcommittee on
the Civil Service of the U.S. House of Representatives "revealed a conspiracy
by powerful commodity and special interest groups and the Bush Administra-
tion to eviscerate the DRAFT Vision document."" 6 Some of the steps in this
"conspiracy" were "(1) closing previously planned national hearings to avoid
anticipated positive public comment; (2) employing outside groups to 'rig' the
appearance of negative public opinion at a few, select, local public meetings;
(3) maneuvering the scientific interdisciplinary team out of the revision pro-
cess, and (4) using the manufactured, negative, public comment to explain
why the revisions were allegedly necessary."' ' It might be noted, parentheti-
cally, that part of the evidence used to support these charges was the account
by Barbee, Schullery, and Varley.
Several issues emerge at this point. First, it seems that dubbing opposition
to the draft Vision document a "conspiracy" is overstating the case. For exam-
ple, Barbee, Schullery, and Varley note that the "governors of Montana, Wyo-
ming, and Idaho wrote a joint letter criticizing the process."' ' It is doubtful
that these actions were part of a conspiracy. The then governor of Idaho, Cecil
Andrus, a life-long Democrat and President Carter's Secretary of Interior,
hardly strikes one as a likely participant in any conspiracy of the Bush Admin-
istration.
Second, the suggestion that "negative public opinion" was "manufactured"
simply demonstrates a lack of understanding about the Vision process and
public land conflicts in general. The entire Vision document process confirms
that its version of ecosystem management encountered opposition from the be-
ginning. Barbee, Scullery, and Varley note that "repeated meetings ... with
mining associations and other commodity extraction groups" led inevitably to
the conclusion that "you can meet forever with opponents, and if they truly
disagree with your position, you will not change their position.""' Finally, as
noted above, anyone familiar with contemporary public land conflicts knows
114. Id. at 85.
115. Id.
116. STAFF OF REPRESENTATIVE SUBCOMM. ON THE CIVIL SERV., 99T- CONG., REPORT ON
INTERFERENCE IN ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS BY POLITICAL APPOINTEES 2 (Subcomm. Print
1992).
117. Id.atl1.
118. Barbee et al., supra note 3, at 82.
119. Id. at 84-85.
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that ecology and ecosystem have often been political code words guaranteed to
meet opposition from commodity user groups. In short, if negative public
opinion was manufactured, the draft Vision document was what helped pro-
duce it.
Third, and perhaps most intriguing, the account by Barbee, Schullery, and
Varley, as well as the Subcommittee's report, contains a view of the public
which is understandable but problematic. On the one hand, if the national
parks and forests are owned by the "American public," then how can there be
"outside groups?" On the other hand, what criteria are used to determine that
opponents of the draft Vision document, which included governors and legisla-
tors as well as commodity users, are excluded from the American public?
The point here, of course, is that the political boundaries in question were
not between the "American public" and some other public, but rather between
supporters and opponents of the draft Vision document. Stated differently,
supporters understood that local hearings would be heavily populated by their
opponents. The public input during the early stages of the Vision process made
that abundantly clear. Their belief, then, was that hearings held in places out-
side of the region would be populated by interests sympathetic to the process.
If Barbee, Schullery, and Varley's assessment was an accurate reading of
the political landscape, then it was not at all clear that hearings outside of the
region would have produced different results. One of their key complaints was
that national environmental groups expressed very little interest in the propos-
al. What is missing here, then, is evidence that these groups would have been
more interested in the proposal had the hearings been held in some other loca-
tion. At the same time, given the intensity of opposition to the proposal, there
is every reason to believe that opponents might well have been "brought in by
the bus-load" wherever the hearings were held. 2
In sum, it seems that the various accounts about what went wrong with
the Vision process lead back to an earlier contention-the managers involved
simply did not understand the dynamics of public discourse. Rather than trying
to build a public consensus around the idea of ecosystem management, the
Vision process ended up playing one part of the public against other parts. It is
not surprising, therefore, that the document became the focal point of divisive-
ness and acrimony, replete with charge and countercharge about conspiracies.
We must remember that ecosystem management is a public policy idea. As
Deborah Stone reminds us about the role of ideas in political discourse
Ideas are the very stuff of politics. People fight about ideas, fight for
them, and fight against them .... Every idea about policy draws
boundaries. It tells us what or who is included or excluded in a cate-
gory. These boundaries are more than intellectual-they define people
in and out of a conflict or place them on different sides.'
Finally, the Vision process forces us to think about the role of Congress in
120. Id. at 82.
121. DEBORAH A. STONE, POLICY PARADOX AND POLITICAL REASON 25 (1988).
1997]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
these sorts of policy debates. The most important way that policy is legiti-
mized in the United States is when Congress passes a law after time for public
debate. Although Congress held oversight hearings on the management of the
Greater Yellowstone Area, it never gave any indication that it wished the two
federal agencies to embark on the Vision process. Should the two bureaus have
sought a clear signal from Congress, before proceeding, by trying to interest it
in ecosystem management legislation? That has certainly been tried successful-
ly in the past. Yet others might argue that USFS and NPS exercised leadership
when they developed the Vision document. Parts of the public, however,
seemed to view the Vision process as a major policy shift and have rebelled. It
has already been noted that it wasn't clear whether the two bureaus thought
what they were doing was a major change in policy direction. Was their ver-
sion of ecosystem management about process or substance, interagency coordi-
nation or a deliberate change in resource management focus? It seems clear
that without congressional support for substantive change, that change would
be impossible to sustain, and thus the only change would be that of process.
ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT SINCE THE VISION DAYS
The election of Bill Clinton, in November of 1992, greatly accelerated the
adoption of ecosystem management. Vice-President Gore's National Perfor-
mance Review called for the federal government to develop a "proactive ap-
proach to ensuring a sustainable economy and a sustainable environment
through ecosystem management."'" This Administrative directive began the
federal rush towards ecosystem management, eclipsing the smaller and more
piecemeal efforts such as that around Yellowstone. Much of that effort initially
focused on the Pacific Northwest and the controversy over protecting the
spotted owl.'23 In 1993, a federal interagency ecosystem management task
force was formed to study and make recommendations concerning what would
come to be called the "ecosystem approach." This section focuses on NPS ef-
forts regarding ecosystem management, while drawing on other federal activi-
ties where important.
In September of 1994, the Ecosystem Management Working Group of the
Resource Stewardship Team of the Vail Office issued its draft report, Ecosys-
tem Management in the National Park Service. The report was one of a num-
ber issued by working groups and teams formed as a result of the Vail, Colo-
rado, meeting titled "National Parks for the 21st Century," which coincided
with the seventy-fifth anniversary of the creation of NPS in 199124
122. INTERAGENCY ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT TASK FORCE, 2 THE ECOSYSTEM APPROACH:
HEALTHY ECOSYSTEMS AND SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIES 1 (1995).
123. For two diverse but greatly informative accounts of that controversy, see STEvEN LEWIS
YAFFEE, THE WISDOM OF THE SPOTTED OWL: POLICY LESSONS FOR A NEW CENTURY (1994);
AISTON CHASE, IN A DARK WOOD: THE FIGHT OvER FORESTS AND THE RISING TYRANNY OF
ECOLOGY (1995).
124. The Vail conference resulted in a report from the Sterling Committee of the 75th An-
niversary Symposium, National Parks For The 21st Century (1992), to the Director of the Nation-
al Park Service. A number of working groups issued reports on a number of topics, including eco-
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The report defined the NPS version of ecosystem management by first
noting that because ecosystems were interconnected, bureau managers needed
to "shift from a primary park-or resource-specific approach to a wider systems
and process approach to management."'" Hence the need for ecosystem
management, which was defined as a "[lhong term approach, with the goal to
preserve, protect, and/or restore ecosystem integrity and also maintain sustain-
able societies and economies."'26 One of the key ways to ensure this would
happen was through a "fluid zone of cooperation."'27 This concept led to the
assertion that attempts to define a "definitive ecosystem boundary" were "rare-
ly constructive or useful," hence the need for multiple boundaries for multiple
ecosystem processes.
28
Herein lies a major problem which plagues ecosystem management. The
NPS assertion that clear boundary definition was unnecessary contradicts both
the Blackwater Concept discussed earlier, as well as a recent report by the
General Accounting Office (GAO), discussed below, that delineating ecosys-
tem management boundaries were a "prerequisite" for planning, budgeting,
and so forth."2 This is no mere quibble, and may lie at the core of problems
in both defining and implementing ecosystem management.
Boundary definition is stunningly problematic. For example, parts of east-
ern Idaho fall into both the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem and the Upper
Columbia River Basin Ecosystem, which residents of this area would seeming-
ly wish reconciled. The acreage of the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem alone
has been identified as being from 5 to 19 million acres, depending on which
group is doing the reporting.
Allan Fitzsimmons has remarked on the differences between USFS, U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service, and Environmental Protection Agency ecosystem
maps. He notes the observation of Bruce Hannon that "the delimitation of the
system is strictly at the discretion of the observer, i.e. the system boundaries
and the list of internal elements may be chosen at will."'30 It is hard to see
how much public support can be expected for ecosystem management when
there is fundamental disagreement over whether or not one needs definable
and clearly fixed boundaries for ecosystems, or whether there even are clearly
defined ecosystems which are agreed upon. Also, given widespread public
distrust of the federal government, the power given federal "observers" to
define things in whatever way they may wish might create even more backlash
system management.
125. NAT'L PARK SERV., ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT WORKING GROUP OF THE RESOURCE
STEWARDSHIP TEAM, ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT IN THE NAT'L PARK SERV. 5 (1994).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 11.
128. Id.
129. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT- ADDITIONAL ACTIONS
NEEDED TO ADEQUATELY TEST A PROMISING APPROACH, at 32 (1994), available in 1994 WL
810514.
130. Fitzsimmons, supra note 89, at 218 (quoting Bruce Hannon, Accounting in Ecological
Systems, in ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS: THE SCIENCE AND MANAGEMENT OF SUSTAINABILITY 234,
238 (Robert Costanza ed., 1991)).
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once the uncertainty of key principles of ecosystem management becomes
widely understood.
Recently, the USFS definition of ecosystem management added to the
uncertainly by pointing to the need for defined boundaries using the phrase
"defined area or region of interest" in the bureau definition.1 3 1 Again, one is
tempted to ask--defined by whom, using what criteria-while at the same
time noting that USFS is arguing that definition is important. The N P S
report had several other important orientations. The first continued a growing
trend in NPS which recognizes that park resources are impacted from sources
and activities internal and external to park units. Second, the call for more
research and monitoring extended another trend which has been growing over
the past few years. Third, the report acknowledged that park units were human
constructs (Congress creates national parks, they are not "natural"), as well as
part of a larger world with human and nonhuman components.
ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT ON THE GROUND
NPS claims to have applied what it terms "ecosystem management princi-
ples" in a number of areas, although the final bureau ecosystem management
report is apparently still being written."' It is not clear what the bureau
means by the claim as yet, given the continued lack of clarity concerning the
definition of ecosystem management. What appears implied by the assertion,
however, is more cooperation and sharing of information and concerns, both
within the NPS, and between NPS and other entities-governmental and other-
wise. For example, NPS reported on park units in the Colorado Plateau region
of the West, where better coordination and sharing of information and research
data are being actively promoted. Whether that sharing of information is eco-
system management or just better intra-agency communication is an interesting
question, and worth consideration. If ecosystem management turns out to real-
ly be about coordination, sharing of information and so forth, it is hard to see
how anyone can be opposed. But, that said, what remains unclear are whether
ecosystem management is anything more.
The report of the Vail ecosystem management working group provides a
number of regional examples of ecosystem management. It notes that two
regions of concern to NPS, South Florida and the Southern Appalachians, are
"sharing budget plans" and "coordinating closely on planning projects.' 33
Again, this report suggests more of a process change where bureaus cooperate
more than they have before, while the substance of policy outcome remains
unclear.
131. See U.S. FOREST SERV. & BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, SUMMARY OF THE DRAFT
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR THE UPPER COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN 16 (1997) (stating
that ecosystems can be "viewed as organized within a hierarchy, with each level having a variety
of time and space scales"). The phrase "defined area or region of interest" was noted in an unpub-
lished document located at the office of the Upper Columbia River Basin Assessment Team pro-
ject office in Boise, Idaho.
132. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 129, at 4-5.
133. INTERAGENCY ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT TASK FORCE, supra note ?, at 8.
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A key reason for some of the institutional "slowness," however, does not
have much to do with a lack of understanding of ecosystem management. NPS
has just completed a major reorganization effort, while at the same time com-
plying with numerous Administration/management directives such as Total
Quality Management 34 and the National Performance Review.'35 The ef-
fects of increasing "management-by-buzzword" demands placed on federal
bureaus like NPS, by Administrations of both political parties, are something
which deserves much more attention. As one example, it is not clear how the
personnel and budgets cuts brought about by the National Performance Review
have been meshed with the ecosystem management policies of the current
administration. That is, all federal bureaus with environmental protection re-
sponsibilities are being asked to do more with less resources.'36 Often those
resources include the loss of personnel with political and administrative expe-
rience who could have helped with the implementation of ecosystem manage-
ment. Public bureaus appear to spend an increasing amount of time complying
with the new management initiatives, rather than concentrating on core areas
of bureau mission requirements; in this case, managing parks.
An examination of one these new management initiatives, this time from
Congress, shows how difficult it may to be for NPS to implement ecosystem
management, as it is currently understood, and to mesh it with other require-
ments. In 1993, Congress passed the Government Performance and Results
Act of 1993 (GPRA);' NPS is one of several "pilot" bureaus attempting to
implement the Act. GPRA is a congressional mandate to link the mission of a
bureau to outcome-related goals, how the goals will be achieved, and program
evaluations of whether the goals are achieved or not. 31 For example, one
goal of the NPS mission has already been interpreted through GPRA proce-
dures as "protect park resources."'39 From this goal statement, a number of
park unit-specific actions that can be documented and evaluated through bud-
gets, quantitative measures of performance, and so on, are supposed to follow.
The congressional intent of the GPRA is to measure and evaluate outcomes
rather than outputs."4 In this example, one would evaluate "results"-was a
resource protected-rather than "processes" (money spent, personnel activities,
and so on).
134. Quality Envtl. Mgmt. Subcomm., President's Commission on Environmental Quality,
Total Quality Management: A Framework for Pollution Prevention (1993) (creating a task force
by Clinton Administration).
135. AL GORE, THE NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW, FROM RED TAPE TO RESULTS: CRE-
ATING A GOVERNMENT THAT WORKS BErrER AND COSTS LESS (1993) (directing all agencies to
implement ecosystem management).
136. This is a rather common, yet anonymous, complaint of officials in NPS and other bu-
reaus.
137. Government Peformance and Results Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107 Stat. 285
(1993).
138. Id. §§ 2, 3, 4.
139. U.S. Nat'l Park Serv., GRPA-izing the NPS Strategic Plan (1995) (unpublished NPS
document).
140. Government Performance and Results Act, § 2(b)(3).
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There are, of course, problems with the GPRA. In the field of education,
we might term this the "teach the test problem." Let us suppose a Board of
Education mandated a similar approach to measuring teacher success by re-
quiring a certain percentage of students to score above the seventieth percen-
tile on a standardized test. If the percentage is not reached then the teacher has
not met the required outcome measure. One way for a teacher to increase the
percentage would be to spend a lot of time focusing on passing the test by
essentially teaching the test to students. We would likely be able to see a high-
er student success rate, but we would have no way of knowing whether the
students were actually better educated. More fundamentally, it has never been
clear that tests can measure all attributes of an education, or that what is mea-
sured is what ought to be, but cannot be, measured. Thus, NPS might find
ways to measure certain attributes of resource protection, but will that be be-
cause those attributes are easier to quantify?
These outcome measures are all actions that look as though they are under
NPS management control. Cross boundary issues and actions related to them,
such as air pollution, may also be able to be documented, but they relate to
another aspect of GPRA, as well. Under that act, each federal bureau is to
have a plan which, among other things has an "identification of those key
factors external to the agency and beyond its control that could significantly
affect the achievement of the general goals and objectives" (such as protecting
park resources).'4' This is clearly a fortuitous time for NPS to document
more clearly what aspects of protecting park resources are beyond bureau con-
trol, since this law requires such documentation. NPS should seize this oppor-
tunity to clarify the scope and extent of the "external threats"' problem, an
action which might help clarify what is or is not resolvable by the principles
of ecosystem management. Yet what is most striking about how NPS is
dealing with this new law is how bureau action compares with ecosystem
management efforts. The "cooperative" or "collaborative" aspects of ecosys-
tem management may not fit well with the GPRA. NPS training materials
have already interpreted actions such as "forge strong collaborative relations
with all partners and integrate them in all operations" as not appropriate
GPRA goal criteria.'42 Compare this statement with the following one from
the NPS ecosystem management document which is also very similar to some
government-wide ecosystem management definitions: "Ecosystem Management
is a collaborative approach to natural and cultural resource manage-
,,143ment ....
By GPRA standards, it is hard to show how such collaboration has been
accomplished, and what the measurable outcomes would be. The difficult
question for NPS is whether it ought to spend more time on process (collabo-
ration) or on results (outcomes), because Congress has asked one thing and the
141. 5 U.S.C. § 306(a)(5) (1994) (emphasis added).
142. U.S. Nat'l Park Serv., Examples of Goals Not Meeting GRPA Criteria (1997) (internal
NPS document).
143. ECOSYSTEM, supra note 125, at 3.
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Clinton Administration, another. Yet, until a better definition of ecosystem
management is achieved, it may make sense for NPS to pay more attention to
GPRA. There are several reasons why the bureau might wish to do so. First,
there is a growing critique of ecosystem management from a number of direc-
tions and perspectives, which illustrates that the term is amorphous and some-
what questionable scientifically. '" Allan Fitzsimmons has made the follow-
ing scathing observation about the USFS's 1995 rule calling for the implemen-
tation of ecosystem management throughout the forest system. The
rule calls for the Forest Service to oversee the National Forest System
in order to sustain undefined conditions on undefined landscape units
that exist in limitless numbers in undefined locations and that are
dynamic and constantly changing over time and space in unclear
ways.... This is an unintelligible bias for managing the National
Forest System.
Put simply, because of fundamental vagueness in key parts of its definition,
ecosystem management is becoming a target, and one possibility would be to
move slightly and subtly away from the line of fire, rather than spend inordi-
nate bureau resources and energies trying to define and implement a policy
that many view as both ill-defined and without necessary public support at this
time.
Second, the GPRA, while flawed, sets out a process that appears a bit
more specific; a process that the bureau as well as its interested public might
be able to use to get a better understanding of what actually is being valued,
as well as accomplished, by NPS. GPRA might even provide NPS a means to
define what it means by ecosystem management and how the bureau will mea-
sure whether ecosystem management is successful. Given the huge public
disagreement over the goals and purposes of much of the federal estate, this
understanding would be no mean accomplishment.
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
Ecosystem management may be an idea whose time came, began to pros-
per, and then came under severe criticism, all in short order. The initial days
of ecosystem management seemed much like other periods of policy develop-
ment in the United States. In this case, land managers, resource managers and
scientists, and scholars began to explore new ways to think about and manage
the resources under their care. Ecosystem management was, at that point, an
idea about federal land and resource management which, while exciting, need-
ed more refinement before being implemented.
Then came the Yellowstone experiment analyzed above. It would be fair
to characterize the Yellowstone effort as a policy experiment, one that perhaps
"failed," yet at the same provided much information about how one might try
such a thing the next time. In other words, policy learning could have led to
144. See generally CHASE, supra note 81; LACKEY, supra note 51.
145. FITZSIMMONS, supra note 47, at 221.
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policy refinement. But then other events intervened, and ecosystem manage-
ment hit the policy "fast track" with the Clinton Administration. Bureau learn-
ing opportunities were lost in this orchestrated environment.
Analysis of Clinton Administration efforts leads to some puzzling ques-
tions. First, it remains unclear what ecosystem management actually is, and
whether it is more about changes in bureau decision processes or decision
outcomes. The current definition of ecosystem management is both vague and
process-oriented. As was already mentioned, any policy that would ensure
inter-bureau coordination and communication is laudable and uncontroversial.
The logic of such a position implies that more could be done, but it is unlikely
that a fundamental reorganization of the federal land management bureaus will
take place. Although many have asked whether it is essential that the United
States have four land bureaus, the political capital needed to effect that sort of
change is hard to come by.
What remains unanswered is whether or not ecosystem management will
lead to changes in policy. On the one hand, federal officials constantly refer to
the "integration" of economic, social and environmental goals. Yet on the
other hand, we are warned by other advocates of ecosystem management to
avoid giving equal weight to economic and environmental goals. In the words
of Ed Grumbine, "[wie must avoid the democratic trap of giving equal weight
to all interest groups: many would destroy biodiversity for short-term econom-
ic gain."'" Understandably, such a stance makes many people nervous about
the real goals of ecosystem management, even if federal officials rightly deny
that they hold such views. Grumbine's position once again assumes the stance
of ultimate "truth" which denies the need for democratic discourse, a stance
warned against earlier by Benjamin Barber. What remains unclear are whether
ecosystem management implies a "trumping" of resource use by resource pro-
tection, and whether the American public has acquiesced in such a policy
change.
It remains unclear how ecosystem management will benefit NPS
decisionmaking. Park management issues coalesce around the proper balance
between visitor enjoyment and resource protection, and the appropriate level of
visitor services which will also leave park resources available for the enjoy-
ment of future visitors. The heady goals of balancing cultural socioeconomic
and ecological systems are absurdly overdrawn for the real management ques-
tions facing NPS. Paradoxically, the balancing of goals creates the opportunity
for economic interests to argue that parks should do more to contribute to the
economic well-being of the "system" they are in. Perhaps what is most need-
ed-though not likely to happen-is a long period where federal bureaus like
NPS are spared from any more management buzzwords until they are able to
deal with their core missions. Superintendent Barbee's testimony at the 1985
House hearings noted that ecosystem management was something federal land
146. FrrZSIMMONS, supra note 89, at 220 (quoting Edward Grumbine, Protecting Biological




managers were going to have to deal with. 47 At the same time, he felt that
the concept was somewhat questionable as management tool. These are sound
observations. Perhaps we need to think about ecosystem management more
than we have.
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About 270 million Americans and foreign guests visit the 368 units of the
National Park System every year.2 Catering to the visitor's needs for food,
lodging, transportation, recreation, and other services is big business.3 The
National Park Service (NPS), the agency within the Department of the Interior
that manages the national parks, contracts with private entities called conces-
sionaires4 to provide those services. In 1989, the NPS possessed about 1,000
long-term contracts and many more short-term licenses.' National Park con-
cessionaires grossed about $1.4 billion and paid fees to the government of $35
million, a 2.4% return, in that year.6 The National Tour Association estimates
that the presence of national parks contributes over $10 billion and 230,000
jobs to nearby communities.7 Tourism in the United States generally generates
about $417 billion in gross receipts.'
Several aspects of Park Service concession policies have been highly con-
troversial in recent years. Most complaints revolve around asserted overdevel-
opment of visitor facilities,9 monopolistic concessionaire arrangements and
practices,' ° artificial stimulation of visitor demand," meager financial return
1. Parts of this article were adapted from GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS & ROBERT L.
GUCKSMAN, PuBLIc NATURAL RESOURCES LAW ch. 17 (1990, supplemented) [hereinafter PNRL].
* Tyler Professor of Law, University of Kansas. A.B. 1963, Central Michigan University;
J.D. 1966, University of Michigan.
** Wagstaff Professor of Law, University of Kansas. A.B. 1973, Union College; M.A. 1974,
Harvard; J.D. 1977, Cornell Law School.
2. James T. Yenckel, Fearless Traveller: The Park System Squeeze, Visitors Will Feel the
Pinch of Budget Cutbacks, WASH. POST, May 19, 1996, at E01. The six federal agencies that
grant concession contracts recorded 1.6 billion visits to federal lands in 1991. Park Issues: Before
the Subcomm. of National Parks, Forests, and Public lands of the House Comm. on Natural Re-
sources, Hearings on H.R. 1527 & 2028, 104th Cong. (1995) (statement of David Unger, Forest
Service).
3. See, e.g., Raymond Rasker, A New Look at Old Vistas: The Economic Role of Environ-
mental Quality in Western Public Lands, 65 U. COLO. L. REv. 369 (1994).
4. The federal law refers to concession contractors as "concessioners," 16 U.S.C. §§ 20-20g
(1994), but the dictionary and these writers prefer the original term, "concessionaires." See, e.g.,
WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY 376 (1977).
5. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERAL LANDS: IMPROvEMENTS NEEDED IN MAN-
AGING CONCESSIONS 4 (June 1991) [hereinafter GAO, IMPROVEMENTS].
6. Id. at 2. In 1993, more than 9,000 concessionaires on federal lands grossed in excess of
$2 billion. H.R. REP. No. 104-280, pt. 1, at 566 (1995).
7. Hearing on Recreation Fees at Public Parks Before the Subcomm. on National Parks,
Forests, and Lands of the House Comm. on Natural Resources., 104th Cong. (1995) (statement of
James D. Santini, NTA Rep.).
8. Id.
9. See infra part HA.
10. See infra part IIB.2.b.ii.
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to the government, 2 inadequate facility maintenance, administrative secrecy
in the contracting processes, 3 and general lack of competition. 4 A bill to
reform NPS concessions law was passed overwhelmingly by both Houses of
Congress in 1995 but died as the session expired. 5 Rival bills on the same
subject were pending in 1996.16
This article explicates current law governing NPS concessions and assess-
es ideas and proposals for reform. Part I outlines the factual background con-
cerning the National Park System, the NPS, and current concession operations,
and compares the NPS situation with that of the other three major federal land
management agencies. The second part investigates NPS concession law and
policy in some detail. The National Parks System Concessions Policy Act of
1965"7 and related rules create a unique contractual milieu for the agency, the
contractors, and the public. Part I catalogues the complaints that various
parties have leveled against the current system. It also recounts and evaluates a
wide spectrum of proposals for change.
I. THE NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM AND ITS CONCESSIONAIRES
A. The National Park System
America's national parks often have been characterized as the best idea
the United States Congress ever had. 8 Since the creation of Yellowstone and
Yosemite National Parks a century and a quarter ago, Congress has expanded
the National Park System to 368 units encompassing over 83 million acres; a
majority of the park acreage is in Alaska. The process is ongoing: 5.5 million
acres in the California Desert Conservation area were designated as Mohave
National Park in 1994,"9 and sentiment for park establishment in other areas
is a political constant.2' The rest of the world took notice and flattered the
United States by emulation: virtually every country on the globe now has its
own national parks.
11. See infra part IIIC.1.
12. See infra part IIB.2.d.
13. See infra notes 198-200 and accompanying text.
14. See infra part llD.1.
15. 141 CONG. REc. S1945 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1995) (statement of Sen. Bennett).
16. H.R. 2028, 104th Cong. (1995) (introduced by Rep. Hansen); H.R. 773, 104th Cong.
(1995) (introduced by Rep. Meyers); S. 309, 104th Cong. (1995) (introduced by Sen. Bennett); see
also Reform in Concessions Mgmt. in Fed. Agencies: Oversight Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
National Parks, Forests, and Lands of the House Comm. on Resources, 104th Cong. (1996); and
Concession Reform is Needed: Testimony of Victor S. Rezendes Before the Subcomm. on National
Parks, Forests, and Lands of the House Comm. on Resources, 104th Cong. (1996) (detailing sev-
eral aspects of the debate over the issue of concessions reform).
17. National Park System Concession Policy Act of 1965, 16 U.S.C. §§ 20-20g (1994).
18. See, e.g., David J. Simon, Preface to OUR COMMON LANDS: DEFENDING THE NATIONAL
PARKS xii (David J. Simon ed., Island Press, 1988) (defending the national park concept); Paul C.
Pitchard, The Best Idea America Ever Had, Nat'l Geographic, Aug. 1991, at 36 (supporting the
establishment of national parks).
19. California Desert Protection Act of 1994, 16 U.S.C. §§ 410aaa - 410aaa-83 (1994); see
140 CONG. REC. S14961-03 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1994).
20. E.g., H.R. 1449, 104th Cong. (1995) (establishing Tallgrass Prairie National Preserve);
H.R. 2763, 104th Cong. (1995) (establishing Boston Harbor Islands National Recreation Area).
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Establishment of national parks in the United States might not have been
possible without the tourist industry. The Northern Pacific Railroad was an
enthusiastic booster of the original Yellowstone bill because its owner correct-
ly foresaw that a large number of people would need the railroad to visit this
fabled, mysterious place." The informal alliance between environmentalists
and preservationists and tourist service providers has endured, with occasional
strains, ever since.
By 1900, Congress had created five more national parks in addition to
Yellowstone. The park unit creation process exploded in this century, and the
expansion promises to continue into the 21st century. In 1906, Congress dele-
gated to the President the power to designate areas as national monuments.2
After 1916, when Congress formalized the National Park System,23 the monu-
ments were included within it. National park creation became politically popu-
lar, in part because local citizens realized that park designation usually resulted
in increased economical activity near, as well as in, the park area.24 In the
early 1980s, Interior Secretary James Watt decried that popularity, stating that
he would end "park barrel politics" and new "park-a-month" policies.'
Congress gradually added new zoning categories for park system units in
addition to parks and monuments. The more important of the twenty current
categories other than parks proper are national preserves, national recreation
areas, wild and scenic river segments, national seashores, and national battle-
field monuments. National preserves (e.g., Big Cypress26 ) are similar to na-
tional parks, but Congress differentiated the categories to allow more human
uses, notably hunting, on the preserves than in the parks.' National recre-
ation areas (NRAs) primarily are of two kinds: lands surrounding and includ-
ing reservoirs, for example, Lake Mead' set aside for recreational pursuits;
and excess federal holdings near urban areas (e.g., Golden Gate NRA9). Na-
tional rivers (e.g., Buffalo NR") and wild and scenic river segments3" are
ribbon-like parks along selected river corridors. 2 Battlefield monuments (e.g.,
Gettysburg33) are premised more on historical than ecological or recreational
21. See ALFRED RUNTE, JR., TRAINS OF DiscovERY, WESTERN RAILROADs AND THE NA-
TIONAL PARKS 19 (rev. ed. 1990).
22. Antiquities Act of 1906, 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-433 (1994).
23. National Park Service Organic Act of 1916, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1-4 (1994).
24. See John L. Giesser, The National Park Service and External Development: Addressing
Park Boundary Area Threats Through Public Nuisance, 20 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 761, 770-71
(1993).
25. George Cameron Coggins & Robert L. Glicksman, Federal Recreational Land Policy:
The Rise and Decline of the Land and Water Conservation Fund, 9 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 125,
166 (1984); see also George Cameron Coggins & Doris K. Nagel, "Nothing Beside Remains":
The Legal Legacy of James G. Watt's Tenure as Secretary of the Interior on Federal Land Law
and Policy, 17 B.C. ENvTL. AFP. L. REV. 473 (1990).
26. 16 U.S.C. §§ 698f - 698m-4 (1994).
27. See, e.g., 36 C.F.R. § 7.86(e) (1996) (hunting in Big Cypress National Preserve).
28. 16 U.S.C. §§ 460n - 460n-9 (1994).
29. 16 U.S.C. §§ 460bb - 460bb5.
30. 16 U.S.C. §§ 460m-8 - 460m14.
31. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-1287 (1994).
32. See generally PNRL, supra note 1, ch. 15.
33. 16 U.S.C. §§ 430g - 430g-10 (1994).
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significance. Other categories of lands that Congress has added to the National
Park System include lake shores, trails, historical sites, a cultural area, a train
museum, and scenic highways.34 Offshore parks, called national marine sanc-
tuaries, are not included within the park system.35
In spite of its continuing growth, the National Park System is still the
smallest federal land management system by acreage. National wildlife refuges
(90 plus million acres), national forests (about 190 million acres), and Bureau
of Land Management public lands (about 270 million acres) are all larger but
less well known. Even the relative newcomer, the Wilderness Preservation
System, created in 1964,36 has more acreage (about 100 million acres),37 but
roughly forty million of its acres are within the park system.
Resource management within the national park system has come under
increasing attack in recent years. Some writers decry the wildlife management
practices of the NPS.3" Other critics are concerned about external threats to
park amenities stemming from such causes as adjacent timber harvests,39
power plant emissions,' water diversions,4' ranching,42 and commercial
and residential development.43 Controversy over facilities and concessions
policy also has erupted in several instances in recent years, the most notable
being the replacement of the Yosemite concessionaire."
B. The National Park Service (NPS)
Congress chartered the NPS in 1916.' The NPS is a line agency within
the Department of the Interior. Its structure, a hierarchy, runs from the lowliest
temporary worker to the Interior Secretary. In 1994, the NPS had a budget of
about $972 million, which rose to about $1.1 billion in fiscal year 1996.'
The agency takes in about 33 cents per visit, but each visit costs the NPS
about $4.12.'
34. See generally WILLIAM EVERHARDT, THE FAMILY TREE OF THE NATIONAL PARK SYS-
TEM (1972).
35. Pursuant to the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§
1431-1447 (1994), marine sanctuaries are under the jurisdiction of the Department of Commerce.
36. Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1994).
37. See George Cameron Coggins & Robert L. Glicksman, Power, Procedure, and Policy in
Public Lands and Resources Law, 10 NAT. RESOURCES & ENv'T 3, 82 (1995); William H.
Rodgers, Jr., The Seven Statutory Wonders of U.S. Environmental Law: Origins and Morphology,
27 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1009, 1010 (1994).
38. See ALsToN CHASE, PLAYING GOD IN YELLOwSTONE (1986).
39. See Sierra Club v. Department of the Interior, 398 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Cal. 1975), modi-
fied, 424 F. Supp. 172 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
40. See Central Ariz. Water Conserv. Dist. v. EPA, 990 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1993).
41. See United States v. South Fla. Water Management Dist., 28 F.3d 1563 (11th Cir. 1994).
42. See Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, 792 F. Supp. 834, 835 (D.D.C. 1992).
43. See United States v. County Bd. of Arlington County, 487 F. Supp. 137 (E.D. Va. 1979)
[hereinafter Arlington County]. See generally PNRL, supra note 1, § 14.03; JOHN L. FREEMUTH,
ISLANDS UNDER SIEGE (1991); Giesser, supra note 24; Robert B. Keiter, On Protecting the Na-
tional Parks from the External Threats Dilemma, 20 LAND & WATER L. REv. 355 (1987).
44. See infra Part II.B.2.b.
45. National Park Service Organic Act of 1916, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1-4 (1994).
46. GAO, IMPROVEMENTS, supra note 5, at 23, 30.
47. Id. at 30.
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The NPS is headquartered in the nation's capital. The NPS headquarters
staff develop NPS policies, programs, and regulations, and coordinate NPS
activities with Congress, the Office of Management and Budget, and other
government entities. The Headquarters Office consists of the Office of the
Director and five Associate Directors. The Office of the Director includes the
Director and Deputy Director, the Assistant Director for External Affairs, and
the Chief of the Office of International Affairs.' The Associate Directors
include Park Operations and Education,49 Natural Resource Stewardship and
Science,5° Cultural Resource Stewardship and Partnerships,5 Professional
Services,52 and Administration. 3
The NPS field units (or parks) are organized into a maximum of 16 "eco-
logical-cultural-geographical clusters of 10-35 units each." 4 Seven Field Di-
rector Offices supervise budgetary matters, media relations, and policy direc-
tion for the field units within their boundaries." Sixteen System Support Of-
fices, each headed by a Superintendent, provide professional, technical, and
administrative services, serve as liaisons with other agencies and interests, and
participate in ecosystem management for a specific cluster of field units. 6
The larger parks have staff members for law enforcement, 7 interpretation,
and maintenance, as well as biologists, ecologists, and even landscape archi-
tects.
58
The National Park System Act endows the NPS with the mission to pre-
48. National Park Service Reorganization, 60 Fed. Reg. 40,601 (1995).
49. This Associate Director supervises the Statistical Unit and the Field Operations Technical
Support Center in Denver, Colorado; the National Interagency Fire Center in Boise, Idaho; and the
Interpretive Design Center in Harpers Ferry, West Virginia. Id. at 40,601-02.
50. This Associate Director is in charge of environmental quality in park system units and
supervises the Chief Scientist for the NPS and the Natural Resources Program Center in Denver
and Fort Collins, Colorado. Id. at 40,602.
51. This Associate Director supervises grants administration, rivers, trails, and conservation
assistance, and state program review. He or she also oversees the Cultural Resources Program
Support Center, the Partnership Programs Service Center, and the National Center for Preservation
Technology and Training. Id.
52. This official is responsible for land resources and strategic planning and supervises Cen-
ters for Planning, Design and Construction (in Denver) and Information and Telecommunications
(in Denver and Washington, D.C.). Id.
53. This Associate Director is the Chief Financial Officer for the NPS and supervises two
Administrative Service Centers in Denver and the District of Columbia, as well as several Nation-
al Program Centers for Accounting Operations and Employee Development. Id.
54. Id. "The cluster serves as a framework for cooperation and decision-making rather than a
staffed organizational entity." Id; see also Change in Organizational Title from Regional Director
to Field Director, 61 Fed. Reg. 28,504 (1996).
55. The Seven Field Director Offices are for the Northwest (in Philadelphia), Southeast (in
Atlanta), Midwest (in Omaha), Intermountain (in Denver), Pacific West (in San Francisco), Alaska
(in Anchorage), and National Capital (in Washington, D.C.). National Park Service Reorganiza-
tion, 60 Fed. Reg. at 40,602.
56. Id. Regulations governing management of each NPS unit are published at 36 C.F.R §§
7.1-7.100 (1996).
57. In 1994, the FBI began training park rangers to investigate crimes in or near the parks.
Until recently, most criminal matters involving the parks were theft-related, but the focus of law
enforcement in the parks has shifted to activities that result in resource degradation, including
waste dumping, acid mine drainage, wetlands destruction, and oil spills. See 24 Env't Rep. (BNA)
2075 (1994).
58. See Audubon Wildlife Report - 1986 at 468.
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serve the scenery, wildlife, and other attributes of "parks, monuments, and
reservations" for the benefit of present and future generations.59 That mission
involves an inherent tension between recreation and preservation, a tension
highlighted in the matter of concession facility development and promotion.'
The 1965 Concessions Policy Act authorizes facility development but specifi-
cally subordinates development to the basic preservational purposes of national
park establishment.6'
The mission of the NPS has been diluted and fragmented by additional
tasks and duties assigned to it by Congress over the years. The NPS acts as
the overseer for federal areas in Washington, D.C.,' the landlord for spas
and resorts,63 the custodian of important (and some historically marginal)
houses and sites,' the patrolman for two scenic highways,' the curator of a
railroad museum,' and the administrator of a cultural area.6' Twenty years
ago, former Professor Futrell suggested that the agency and the nation would
be better served if the NPS reverted to its earlier, purer mission.' A bill in-
troduced in 1995 would have required a study to determine whether and to
what extent the Park Service should divest itself of its less significant hold-
ings.'
Congress gave the NPS ample regulatory authority and discretion, al-
though the agency seldom possesses sufficient funds to carry out its mandate
fully.7" The agency is severely restricted in the fees it can charge for park
admission,7 and its appropriations have fallen drastically compared to visitor
59. 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
60. See infra Part II.A.
61. National Park Systems Concessions Policy Act, 16 U.S.C. § 20 (1994).
62. 40 U.S.C. § 804 (1988).
63. 16 U.S.C. §§ 361-374 (1994).
64. See Weir Farm National Historic Site Establishment Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-485,
104 Stat. 1171 (1990).
65. 16 U.S.C. §§ 460a-1 to 460a-Il (1994).
66. 16 U.S.C. §§ 410vv to 410vv-8 (1994) (Marsh-Billings National Historic Park).
67. 16 U.S.C. §§ 284-284j (1994) (Wolf Trap Farm Park).
68. J. William Futrell, Parks to the People: New Directions for the National Park System, 25
EMORY LJ. 255, 269-71, 316 (1976).
69. H.R. 260, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). The proposed National Park System Reform
Act is described at 141 CONG. REc. H9083-01 (1995). Congress evidently dropped the divestiture
notion in the face of concerted public opposition.
70. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NATIONAL PARKS - DIFFICULT CHOICES NEED TO
BE MADE ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE PARKS (1995) [hereinafter GAO, DuiFFCULT CHOICES]. The
GAO reported in 1995 that
[t]here is cause for concern about the health of national parks for both visitor services
and resource management. The overall level of visitor services was deteriorating at most
of the park units that GAO reviewed. Services were being cut back, and the condition of
many trails, campgrounds, and other facilities was declining.
Id. Between 1988 and 1995, the dollar amount of the NPS maintenance backlog increased from
$1.9 billion to over $4 billion. The GAO attributed this increase to a combination of additional
operating requirements placed on parks by laws and administrative requirements and increased
visitation, which drives up the parks' operating costs. The GAO concluded that the principal op-
tions for dealing with the problem are increasing the amount of financial resources going to the
parks, limiting or reducing the number of units in the park system, and reducing the level of visi-
tor services. Id.
71. 16 U.S.C. §§ 4601-6a, 4601-6c (1994). Cf 16 U.S.C. § 460k-3 (1994) (Interior Secretary
may establish reasonable charges and fees for public use of national wildlife refuges).
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levels.72
Unlike the other federal land management agencies, the NPS is not re-
quired to defer to state law in wildlife management or similar matters."3 The
courts are virtually unanimous in their deference to NPS exercises of its dis-
cretionary authority in this area. Courts have deferred to the NPS in its efforts
to remove wild horses,74 enforce quotas on river rafting,75 ban hunting,76
trapping, 7 and fishing,7' allow promotional advertising, 79 regulate0 and
terminate" concessionaires, allow snowmobile use, 2 and restrict biking.'3
The agency has complete authority over access.8' The only instances located
in which courts enjoined NPS proposals involved plans for a hotel" and for
increased stock animals in park wilderness areas."
The NPS enjoys a unique niche in the pantheon of federal land manage-
ment agencies. Its mission is far more circumscribed than those of the Fish
and Wildlife Service (FWS), the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), and the
Forest Service (FS). These all have some responsibilities for production of
commodities from the natural resources under their jurisdictions;' 7 the NPS
does not. Consequently, the NPS is relatively immune from the political pres-
sures imposed by loggers and miners, although it has experienced difficulties
caused by ranchers," water diverters," hunters,' developers, '  and
states.' Further, the NPS is far more visible (and politically protected) than
the other agencies because it is the custodian of the nation's most beloved
scenic treasures.
72. See 140 CONG. REc. S4102, S4106, S4108 (daily ed. Apr. 12, 1994) (statement of Sen.
Wallop).
73. See PNRL, supra note 1, § 18.02[4][b][iJ.
74. Wilkins v. Lujan, 995 F.2d 850, 852-53 (8th Cir. 1993).
75. Wilderness Pub. Rights Fund v. Kleppe, 608 F.2d 1250, 1251, 1254 (9th Cir. 1979).
76. United States v. Brown, 552 F.2d 817, 819, 821-23 (8th Cir. 1977).
77. NRA v. Potter, 628 F. Supp. 903, 909-14 (D.D.C. 1986).
78. Organized Fishermen of Fla. v. Hodel, 775 F.2d 1544, 1546 (11th Cir. 1985).
79. Friends of Yosemite v. Frizzell, 420 F. Supp. 390, 395-96 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
80. See Universal Interpretive Shuttle Corp. v. Washington Metro Area Transit Comm'n, 393
U.S. 186, 188-89, 194 (1968).
81. See YRT Servs. Corp. v. United States, 28 Fed. Cl. 366, 417-18 (1993).
82. Voyageurs Region Nat'l. Park Ass'n v. Lujan, 966 F.2d 424, 426, 428 (8th Cir. 1992).
But cf. Mausolf v. Babbitt, 913 F. Supp. 1334, 1335-36, 1344 (D. Minn. 1996) (remanding closure
of lakeshore area to snowmobiling for lack of adequate explanation from the lower court).
83. Bicycle Trails Council v. Babbitt, 82 F.3d 1445 (9th Cir. 1996).
84. See Christianson v. Hauptman, 991 F.2d 59, 61 (2d Cir. 1993); Biderman v. Morton, 507
F.2d 396, 398 (2d Cir. 1974).
85. Sierra Club v. Lujan, 716 F. Supp. 1289, 1291, 1293 (D. Ariz. 1989).
86. High Sierra Hikers Ass'n v. Kennedy, No. C-94-3570 CW, 1995 WL 382369 (N.D. Cal.
June 14, 1995), vacated pursuant to settlement, 1996 WL 421435 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 1996).
87. See generally PNRL, supra note 1, chs. 19-20, 22-25.
88. For example, ranchers bitterly opposed the reintroduction of wolves into the Yellowstone
National Park ecosystem. See id. § 15C.04[3].
89. See Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 131-38, 143 (1976).
90. See NRA v. Potter, 628 F. Supp. 903, 910-11 (D.D.C. 1986).
91. See Arlington County, 487 F. Supp. at 141-44.
92. United States v. Denver, 656 P.2d 1, 4 (Colo. 1982).
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C. National Park Concessions
It is difficult to describe all of the concession contracts and licenses en-
tered into by the NPS. The NPS uses the "contract" mechanism for larger,
long-term agreements that often contemplate construction or maintenance of
physical facilities.93 Commercial use licenses, on the other hand, are used to
authorize smaller scale services, usually without construction of fixtures or
improvements."' The presence of a national park obviously benefits tourist
businesses in nearby communities,95 but this subsection discusses only the
services delivered or facilities operated within the boundaries of park system
units.
1. Facilities
Most facilities within national parks were constructed by the NPS, but
some concessionaires are required by their contracts to construct, repair, main-
tain, or improve physical facilities. Record title to such improvements remains
in the United States, although the concessionaires, as beneficial owners, have
certain statutory rights to compensation if the agreement is terminated.9 Park
roads, perhaps the most important facilities from the perspective of the aver-
age visitor, almost always are built and maintained by the agency.' Likewise,
visitor centers and campgrounds tend to be constructed and operated by the
NPS.98 Still, the galaxy of products and services demanded or desired by visi-
tors is vast, and concessionaires usually provide them. These include the basic
human needs of food and shelter: private entrepreneurs commonly provide
restaurants, hotels, motels, and permanent tent installations. In some park sys-
tem units, concessionaires also operate ski areas, marinas, boat and snowmo-
bile rentals, gift and souvenir shops, photo labs, and gas stations."
2. Services
Many facilities in parks exist to provide services. Nevertheless, certain
service concessions are less dependent upon physical facilities. For example,
some canoe renters are located outside parks and merely launch or pick up
canoes within parks."° Similarly, float trips often travel through parks but
depend on base facilities outside- parks to store equipment and organize trips
93. See infra Part I.C.I.
94. See infra Part I.C.2.
95. See Rhonda Bodfield, New Funds Will Keep Canyon Open, TUCSON CITIZEN, Jan. 3,
1996, at 1B (stating that Grand Canyon tourists add $250 million to Arizona economy).
96. 16 U.S.C. § 20e (1994); see infra Part II.B.2.c.
97. See Maria E. Mansfield, A Primer of Public Land Law, 68 WASH. L. REv. 801, 843
(1993).
98. Id.
99. See YRT Servs. Corp. v. United States, 28 Fed. Cl. 366 (1993).
100. See Free Enter. Canoe Renters Ass'n v. Watt, 711 F.2d 852 (8th Cir. 1983); United
States v. Carter, 339 F. Supp. 1394 (D. Ariz. 1972).
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(as do air tours).' Guides and outfitters,"r2 firewood merchants, °3 shuttle
bus companies," houseboat" and boat slip rentals," camper and fish-
ing goods suppliers," marine fuel distributors,'as hot shower providers,"
trail ride and horse boarding services,"0 pack animal providers,"' and sani-
tary napkin providers"' all supply goods or services for use inside the parks.
D. Concessions in Other Federal Land Management Systems
Six federal land management agencies grant concession contracts to pri-
vate entities; 80% of such contracts are let by the NPS, the FS, and the
BLM." 3 The General Accounting Office (GAO) identified about 9,000 such
agreements in 1991, but its information concededly was incomplete."' The
100 largest concessions generated about sixty-five percent of total reve-
nues." 5 In fiscal year 1994, the GAO identified 10,427 concession agree-
ments entered into by the six land management agencies, representing ninety-
two percent of all such agreements with the federal government."6 NPS and
FS concession operations accounted for about ninety percent of these six
agencies' reported concessionaires' gross revenues and fees paid to the gov-
ernment.' "'
Although eleven different federal statutes impact public land conces-
sions,"' no other agency is subject to a statute comparable to the NPS's
Concessions Policy Act. This section briefly summarizes the concessions law
and policy of the three other major land management agencies-the FS, the
BLM, and the FWS. Special purpose policies of the Bureau of Reclama-
tion" 9 and of the Army Corps of Engineers' are not discussed except
101. See Grand Canyon Dorries, Inc. v. Walker, 500 F.2d 588 (10th Cir. 1974); Concession
Permit, 61 Fed. Reg. 1401 (1996).
102. See United States v. Patzer, 15 F.3d 934 (10th Cir. 1993).
103. See Lewis v. Babbitt, 998 F.2d 880 (10th Cir. 1993).
104. See Yosemite Park & Curry Co. v. United States, 582 F.2d 552 (CI. Ct. 1978).
105. See Roosevelt Recreation Enterprises, 56 Fed. Reg. 55,685 (1991).
106. See Lake Mohave Boat Owners Ass'n v. National Park Serv., 78 F.3d 1360 (9th Cir.
1995); Lake Mead Nat'l Recreation Area Operation of a Marine at Willow Beach, 61 Fed. Reg.
37,923 (1996).
107. See Concession Permit, 61 Fed Reg. 1401 (1996); Concession Contract Negotiations, 54
Fed. Reg. 18,941 (1989).
108. Concession Contract Negotiations, 54 Fed. Reg. 18,941 (1989).
109. See Proposal to Award Concession Permits, 61 Fed. Reg. 30,637 (1996).
110. See 61 Fed. Reg. 37,077 (1996); Notice of Intention to Extend Existing Concession
Contracts, 61 Fed. Reg. 26,204 (1996).
111. See Notice of Intent to Issue a Prospectus for the Operation of Pack Station Servs. and
Facilities within Sequoia Nat'l Park, 61 Fed. Reg. 24,950 (1996).
112. See Concession Permit Proposal, 60 Fed. Reg. 52,411 (1995).
113. GAO, IMPROVEMENTS, supra note 5, at 4.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 5.
116. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CONCESSIONS CONTRACTING: GOVERNMENTWIDE
RATES OF RETURN (1996) [hereinafter GAO, CONCESSIONS CONTRACTING].
117. Id.
118. GAO, IMPROVEMENTS, supra note 5, at 3.
119. See, e.g., 138 CONG. REC. S11,006, S1 1,030 (daily ed. July 31, 1992) (proposing legisla-
tion concerning concession operation at Lake Berryessa).
120. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. H10,995, HI 1,073 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1995) (proposing legis-
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where they may intersect with or influence the other agencies.
1. Forest Service
Ski areas are the most important types of concessions in the national for-
ests.'2t Before 1986, the FS typically granted ski area operators a term per-
mit for the use of eighty acres for the main facilities and revocable special use
permits for the area necessary for ski runs, lifts, and so forth.'" The Nation-
al Forest Ski Area Permit Act of 198623 gives the Agriculture Secretary au-
thority to issue forty-year leases for the amount of acreage he "determines
sufficient and appropriate.' 24 Ski area developers must pay fair market value
for the permit privilege."z
For other types of concessions, the FS has general authority to regulate
occupancy and use of the national forests 126 and specific authority to permit
visitor facility development.2 7 Except for casual recreational use, uses of the
national forests for profit require permits.
128
2. BLM
The BLM lacks a specific concessions statute. BLM's power to authorize
the provision of visitor services stems from its general authority under the
Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA).' 9 Therefore, BLM
concession law is found in the agency's rather cursory regulations"3 and in
decisions of the Interior Board of Land Appeals (IBLA). 3' Fair market value
guides the permit fee for permits conveying a possessory interest in land,'
but special recreation permits are available at administrative cost.'33 The au-
thorized BLM officer possesses large discretion in the issuance of permits and
land use authorizations.
34
lation concerning commercial concessions at Corps of Engineers Projects); Park Issues Before the
Subcomm. on Nat'l Parks, Forests, and Lands of the House Comm. on Resources 1995 WL
446825 (F.D.C.H.) (July 25, 1995) (statement of Barry J. Frankell, Army Corps of Engineers).
121. In 1995, 143 ski areas occupied about 183,000 acres of national forestland. S. REP. No.
104-183, at 3 (1995). This amounts to about 0.1 % of all FS lands. H.R. REP. No. 104-280, pt. 1,
at 566 (1995).
122. See Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735, 756, 758 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
123. National Forest Ski Area Permit Act of 1986, 16 U.S.C. § 497b (1994).
124. Id. § 497b(b)(3).
125. Id. § 497b(b)(8). See generally PNRL, supra note 1, § 17.04[31[b].
126. 16 U.S.C. § 551 (1994).
127. Id. § 497.
128. See United States v. Hells Canyon Guide Serv. Inc., 660 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1981). Cf. 36
C.F.R. § 251.53 (1996) (listing Forest Service authorities for issuance of special use permits).
129. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1732, 1733, 1740 (1994).
130. 43 C.F.R. §§ 2820, 2920, 8372 (1995).
131. See PNRL, supra note 1, § 17.04[4].
132. 43 C.F.R. § 2920.0-6 (1995).
133. Id. § 8372.4.
134. Id. §§ 2920.2-2, 2920.5-4, 8372.5(b).
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3. FWS
The FWS regulations merely recite that concessions contracts may be
granted "where there is a demonstrated justified need for services or facili-
ties," 3 that "a person granted economic use privileges" needs to observe the
agreement conditions," 6 and that concessionaires cannot discriminate on ra-
cial or similar grounds.'7
II. THE LAW OF CONCESSIONS IN THE NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM
The law governing the granting of concessions contracts for facilities and
services in the national parks is much more extensive than the parallel body of
law applicable to the other federal land management agencies. The Conces-
sions Policy Act grants broad authority to the NPS to contract with conces-
sionaires located both within and outside the parks. Although the exercise of
this authority creates the potential for conflict with the NPS's obligation to
subordinate the provision of resources within its jurisdiction for recreational
use to preservational needs, the courts have been loathe to interfere with the
balance struck by the agency.
Concessions contracts with the NPS form a unique niche in the laws gov-
erning contractual relations. They differ from other contracts with the federal
government in that the application of normal federal procurement rules is
unclear. They depart from contracts between purely private entities because
concessionaires may have rights typically not available to other contractors,
such as protections against loss of investment and preferential renewal rights.
Part R of this article describes the unique attributes of NPS concessions con-
tracts, while Part HI analyzes the policy implications of those attributes.
A. Propriety of Facility Development
Concessionaire charters for recreational facilities and services raise two
fundamental issues: first, when and where such facilities are permissible and
appropriate; and, what the relative rights and responsibilities are of the con-
cessionaire, the government, and the user public. The propriety of furnishing
recreational facilities is partly a function of the law governing the particular
land management system. Usually, it is also a function of land management
agency discretion. The FS and the BLM must balance the recreational benefits
against the environmental or resource costs of such facilities in the context of
multiple use, sustained yield management of all surface resources. The NPS
(and, to a lesser extent, the FWS) must insure that recreational development
does not unduly detract from its preservational mission. The underlying policy
considerations and conundrums are delineated in Professor Sax's excellent
1980 book, Mountains Without Handrails.3 Groups challenging proposed
135. 50 C.F.R. § 25.61 (1995).
136. Id. § 26.25.
137. Id. § 3.3(a).
138. JOSEPH L. SAX, MOUNTAINS WrrHour HANDRAILS: REFLECTIONS ON THE NATIONAL
PARKS (1980).
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recreational facilities on federal lands because of asserted environmental prob-
lems have had little success.
The National Park System Act authorizes the Secretary of Interior to man-
age the parks and other units in the system for present enjoyment as well as
preservation.' It also explicitly empowers the Secretary to contract for rec-
reational services.Y The NPS Concessions Policy Act (CPA) 4' subordi-
nates facility development to the basic preservation mission:
Congress hereby finds that the preservation of park values requires
that such public accommodations, facilities, and services as have to
be provided ... should be provided only under carefully controlled
safeguards against unregulated and indiscriminate use .... It is the
policy of the Congress that such development shall be limited to
those that are necessary and appropriate for public use and enjoy-
ment ... and that are consistent to the highest practicable degree
with the preservation and conservation of the areas. 4 2
The judiciary has not defined the outer boundaries of the resulting discretion
to encourage recreational use at the arguable expense of preservation. 43 Only
one court has enjoined an NPS-approved facility or contract on grounds that
approval would have exceeded the statutory limits or contravened the statutory
purposes.'"
Many environmentalists assert that some national parks and other federal
areas have become festooned with restaurants, shops, campgrounds, ski areas,
roads, lodges, and like facilities to an entirely inappropriate degree. 45 They
argue that the preservation purpose of park establishment should outweigh
visitor accommodation desires for development beyond bare necessities. What-
ever the intrinsic merits of that argument, it must be made in a political or
administrative forum to succeed because the courts appear emphatically disin-
clined to overturn NPS discretion in licensing recreational facilities." Some
of the allegedly more abusive situations, however, apparently have not been
the subjects of litigation.47
139. 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
140. Id. §§ 3, 17b.
141. National Park System Concessions Policy Act of 1965, 16 U.S.C. §§ 20-20g (1994).
142. Id. § 20.
143. Cf Conservation Law Found. v. Secretary of the Interior, 864 F.2d 954 (1st Cir. 1989)
(upholding National Park Service plan that authorized off-road vehicle use on Cape Cod National
Seashore); Sierra Club v. Watt, 566 F. Supp. 380 (D. Utah 1983) (upholding regulation allowing
leasing of "locatable" minerals within national recreation area); Friends of Yosemite v. Frizzell,
420 F. Supp. 390 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (challenging construction of sanitation and housing facilities in
national park).
144. Sierra Club v. Lujan, 716 F. Supp. 1289 (D. Ariz. 1989). Cf. High Sierra Hikers Ass'n,
1995 WL 382369 (enjoining increase in use of stock animals in wilderness area).
145. See Michael Mantell, Preservation and Use: Concessions in the Nat'l Parks, 8 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 1 (1979); THE CONSERVATION FOuND., NAT'L PARKS FOR A NEW GENERATION (1985).
146. The political process is not a negligible factor in such disputes. Public pressure led to a
new Yosemite National Park concessionaire contract that will raise the government's revenue
share about 2500 %. U.S. Picks Concessionaire for Yosemite Park, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1992, at
A22.
147. The influence of the concessionaire at Yosemite, and the intensive road and facility de-
velopment at Yellowstone, are examples of arguable abuses of discretion. See ALFRED RUNE,
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Judicial opinions in several cases endorse NPS actions relating to recre-
ational facilities and concessionaires. Park Service discretion to limit recre-
ational activities and facilities by commercial enterprises has been upheld in
every litigated instance located."4 In the Grand Canyon Access case,"'9 the
reviewing court upheld an NPS allocation of most rafting rights to commercial
outfitters, even though the general quota meant reduced rafting opportunities
for individuals. Similarly, a court refused injunctive relief to a cruise ship
operator to which the NPS denied permits to enter Glacier Bay because of a
previous collision."5 Conversely, environmentalists' efforts to force closure
of a campground in Yellowstone to assist grizzly bear recovery were unavail-
ing,15' and a California court found no need for the NPS to restrict its
concessionaire's advertising campaigns in the face of allegations linking ad-
vertising to overuse of Yosemite National Park.'52
Research has disclosed only a single instance in which NPS discretion in
allowing more intensive recreation through facility development has been
judicially disturbed.5 3 That instance should give the NPS pause, however.
The agency entered into a contract for construction of a hotel without NEPA
compliance and in seeming conflict with the policies of the master plan for the
area. Its later environmental evaluation evidently was limited to where the
hotel should be located, not whether it should be built.'54 The court prelimi-
narily enjoined construction by the concessionaire because it thought that dual
noncompliance was probably arbitrary and capricious.' This decision is
only a blip on the screen of deference, but it illustrates that NPS discretion has
some bounds."5
Despite the absence of a significant body of case law questioning the
propriety of the NPS's exercise of its authority to grant concessions, the devel-
NATIONAL PARKS: THE AMECAN EXPERIENCE 169 (2d ed. 1987) (addressing Yosemite); CHASE,
supra note 38 (addressing Yellowstone).
148. E.g., Free Enter. Canoe Renters Ass'n v. Watt, 771 F.2d 852 (8th Cir. 1983); United
States v. Carter, 339 F. Supp. 1394 (D. Ariz. 1972). See also Seva Resorts, Inc. v. Hodel, 876
F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1989).
149. Wilderness Pub. Rights Fund v. Kleppe, 608 F.2d 1250, 1254 (9th Cir. 1979); see also
United States v. Garren, 893 F.2d 208 (9th Cir. 1989) (upholding procedures for allocating use of
Rouge River between commercial and non-commercial uses).
150. Clipper Cruise Line, Inc. v. United States, 855 F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 1994).
151. National Wildlife Fed'n v. National Park Serv., 699 F. Supp. 384 (D. Wyo. 1987). The
court stressed that the Secretary's discretion in balancing "promotion" and "preservation" was
"very broad." Id. at 391; see also Grand Canyon Dottles, Inc. v. Walker, 500 F.2d 588 (10th Cir.
1974) (disallowing an injunctive claim under implied contract to keep dam discharges steady).
152. Friends of Yosemite, 420 F. Supp. at 393.
153. Sierra Club v. Lujan, 716 F. Supp. 1289 (D. Ariz. 1989).
154. Sierra Club, 716 F. Supp. at 1291-92.
155. Id. at 1293.
156. In High Sierra Hikers Ass'n, the district court enjoined the Park Service from increasing
the number of stock animals allowed in wilderness areas of the Sequoia and Kings Canyon Na-
tional Parks because the agency failed to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1994). The court acknowledged NPS fimdings that the increase would
result in little or no change in use patterns and that the impact of any change on the environment
would be sufficiently mitigated to be "badly flawed." High Sierra Hikers Ass'n, 1995 WL 382369,
at *9. In addition, the agency failed to address adequately the affect of the increase on a threat-
ened species of bighorn sheep. Id. at *13-*14. The decision holds limited precedent value, howev-
er, since it is unpublished and was later vacated.
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opment of the facilities and the provision of services covered by these con-
tracts may conflict with the NPS's raison d'dtre, the preservation of America's
unique national heritage. Incantations of judicial deference to agency balancing
of objectives can easily substitute for meaningful analysis of the limits of
agency discretion. The subordination of the NPS's recreational mandate to its
preservational mission in the CPA, however, takes the form of a policy state-
ment '7 rather than being an enforceable, non-discretionary decree. The
courts are loathe to translate such precatory admonitions into "real law." Ab-
sent legislative reform, litigants probably will continue to have a better chance
of successfully challenging the particular provisions of an NPS concessions
contract as contrary to agency regulations and guidance than they have of
blocking the issuance of the contract on the ground that it exceeds the
agency's statutory authority.
B. The NPS Relationship with Concessionaires and Permittees
1. Park Service Authority
The CPA of 1965' a clarifies contractual rights and responsibilities of
private entrepreneurs in national park system units.'59 Recognizing that the
parks faced danger of irreparable damage from heavy visitation, Congress in
the CPA reaffirmed conservation as the primary park management goal."w
Facility developments must be consistent to the "highest practicable degree"
with preservation goals.
16 1
The CPA is not the exclusive authority for awarding park concessions.
The National Park System Act of 1916 instructs the Secretary to "promote" as
well as "regulate" park use and empowers the Secretary to make necessary
rules, 62 "grant privileges, leases, and permits,"1 63 and enter into contracts
for visitor accommodation.'" The NPS regularly granted monopolies and
preference renewal rights to concessionaires before enactment of the CPA."6
Legislation establishing individual park system units may provide additional
157. 16 U.S.C. § 20.
158. Id. §§ 20-20g.
159. Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, National Parks Concessions Policies, S.
REP. No. 89-765 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3489-3501. See generally National Parks
and Conservation Ass'n v. Kleppe, 547 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
160. 16 U.S.C. § 20 (1994). NPS regulations reflect this priority:
[Ilt is the policy of the Secretary of the Interior, as mandated by law, to permit conces-
sions in park areas only under carefully controlled safeguards against unregulated and
indiscriminate use so that heavy visitation will not unduly impair park values and re-
sources. Concession activities in park areas shall be limited to those that are necessary
and appropriate for public use and enjoyment of park areas in which they are located
and that are consistent to the highest practicable degree with the preservation and con-
servation of the park areas.
36 C.F.R. § 51.2 (1996).
161. 16 U.S.C. § 20 (1994).
162. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1, 3 (1994).
163. Id. § 3.
164. Id. § 17b.
165. See United States v. Gray Line Water Tours, 311 F.2d 779 (4th Cir. 1962).
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authority and guidance on concessions for those units."s The National Visi-
tor Center Facility Act,67 for instance, governs tours within Washington,
D.C. and it preempts contrary local law.'
The United States Supreme Court has affirmed the Secretary's broad pow-
ers to contract with concessionaires."69 That power extends not only to all
lands and waters within the park system, 7 ' it also covers businesses that
only enter the park to pick up canoes launched outside the park.'7' The Sec-
retary may prohibit solicitation of tourist business on federal property.'72
Whether or to what extent NPS concessionaire contracting is subject to
general government contract and procurement law are issues that apparently
have not been completely resolved. In a 1978 decision, the Court of Claims
stated that it was "not convinced that the NPS ... can avoid normal, legally
mandated, procurement procedures, simply by characterizing the procurement
of transportation services for the public as the granting of a 'concession' to a
specific contractor."'7 The concession in that case differed from the norm in
that the NPS had agreed to pay the concessionaire for providing shuttle bus
services. Because the general procurement contract requirements applied, the
contract was invalid for violation of those restrictions. Despite that invalidity,
the contractor could recover in quantum meruit for the reasonable value of the
services performed. 74 The same court, in 1982, opined that a Bureau of the
Budget Circular on cost recovery applied to an NPS agreement to provide
electricity to a concessionaire.'75 In 1989, the interior Board of Contract Ap-
peals ruled that NPS concessions agreements were procurement contracts and
thus within the ambit of the federal Contract Disputes Act (CDA) .
76
Several developments cast doubt on whether the full panoply of federal
procurement law applies to NPS concession contracts. First, the NPS altered
its regulations to read that its concession contracts "are not Federal procure-
ment contracts ... within the meaning of statutory or regulatory requirements
applicable to Federal procurement actions."' 7  Administrative interpretations
are ordinarily entitled to some judicial deference. 7 1 Second, the Court of
Federal Claims thereafter ruled in YRT that the NPS was not subject to the
166. See 16 U.S.C. § 22 (1994) (Yellowstone National Park).
167. National Visitor Center Facility Act of 1968, 40 U.S.C. §§ 801-831 (1994).
168. United States v. District of Columbia, 571 F.2d 651, 657 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
169. Universal Interpretive Shuttle Corp., 393 U.S. at 188-90.
170. Carter, 339 F. Supp. at 1397.
171. Free Enter. Canoe Renters Ass'n, 711 F.2d at 856; cf Carter, 339 F. Supp. at 1399
(holding that the NPS may regulate service contract for rental of boats on lake within national
recreation area, even though contract may be entered into outside the area).
172. Washington Tour Guides Ass'n v. National Park Serv., 808 F. Supp. 877, 881 (D.D.C.
1992).
173. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 582 F.2d at 558.
174. Id. at 560-61.
175. Id. at 928; see also Concessions Rate Administration Program, 58 Fed. Reg. 64,800,
64,800 (1993) (describing OMB Circular A-25, User Charges, which outlines the scope of user
charges for government services such as utilities).
176. Appeal of R & R Enters., 96 Interior Dec. 313 (1989). See generally PNRL, supra note
1, § 9.03 (discussing the Contract Disputes Act of 1978, 41 U.S.C. §§ 601-613 (1994)).
177. 36 C.F.R. § 51.1 (1996).
178. See Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965).
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Competition in Contracting Act or the federal acquisition regulations.' Al-
though the Board of Contract Appeals refused to follow YRT the following
year, its ruling was limited to pre-regulation contacts; those concession agree-
ments were subject to the CDA.IW The Interior Department continues to in-
sist that concessions contracts awarded pursuant to the CPA are not subject to
the Federal Acquisition Regulations applicable in other procurement con-
texts. "' Third, the Comptroller General has concluded that the procedures
mandated by the Competition in Contracting Act'82 do not apply to NPS con-
cessions agreements."
No "better view" of this technical difficulty is readily apparent. The CPA
preceded the CDA and neither mentions the other. NPS concessions agree-
ments clearly are for "the procurement of services" (and often for "the pro-
curement of construction... of real property"), terms defining the scope of
the CDA."' On the other hand, the services are for third parties and the pub-
lic, not for the agency itself. Contrary to the usual service contract, the con-
tractor pays the landlord for the privilege of operating. Concessions agree-
ments are more like leases and permits than ordinary bilateral contracts. On
balance, the NPS should stick to the interpretation in its regulation unless
Congress decides otherwise or a court definitively rules otherwise.
2. The Contractual Relationship
a. General
The CPA grants or clarifies certain rights accruing to those contracting
with the NPS. The Act, adopted in reaction to the disruption in park conces-
sions experienced during World War IH,' was intended to allow concession-
aires a fair return on their investments (but not excessive profits), while insur-
ing that NPS concessions facilities would be affordable and available to ordi-
nary, middle class users. '
Concessionaires contracting with the NPS are better situated than many
parties to private bilateral contracts. Concessionaires have a compensable pos-
sessory interest in improvements they make,'87 are protected against loss of
investment,8 are guaranteed a reasonable opportunity to make a profit,89
179. YRT Servs. Corp. v. United States, 28 Fed. Cl. 366, 392-93 (1993).
180. Appeal of National Park Concessions, Inc., 101 Interior Dec. 92, 106 (1994).
181. See YRT Servs. Corp. 28 Fed. Cl. at 392 (1993); see also Concessions Contracts and
Permits, 57 Fed. Reg. 40,496, 40,498 (1992) (stating that "concessions contracts are not federal
procurement contracts" and "statutory and regulatory requirements relating to federal procurement
actions do not apply to concessions contracts or permits").
182. Competition in Contracting Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 1175 (1984) (cod-
ified at scattered sections throughout titles 31 and 41 of the U.S.C).
183. YRT Servs. Corp., 28 Fed. Cl. at 392-93 (1993).
184. 41 U.S.C. § 602(a) (1994); see PNRL, supra note 1, § 9.03[2].
185. Lake Mohave, 78 F.3d at 1366. The Lake Mohave opinion contains a good description of
the background and legislative history of the CPA. Id. at 1366-67.
186. Id. at 1366.
187. 16 U.S.C. § 20e.
188. Id. § 20b(a).
189. Id. § 20b(b).
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have preferential renewal status,"' and may receive preference rights to offer
new services.' Congress in 1965 thought that these rights were necessary to
induce concessionaires into providing adequate service in the adverse commer-
cial conditions under which businesses in remote areas often operate. To
obtain these benefits, a business must enter into an actual written contract with
the Park Service because a contractual relationship will not be implied circum-
stantially. Nevertheless, when a written contract is held invalid, the con-
cessionaire may be entitled to quantum meruit recovery. 94
Concession agreements typically come in two varieties: contracts and
permits called "commercial use licenses." The NPS regulations governing
concession arrangements,'" as revised in 1992,' use the single term "con-
cession contract" to refer in most instances to both contracts and permits."
The agency has not published all of the rules governing the issuance and ad-
ministration of these agreements. The NPS can operate in this somewhat cava-
lier fashion because the courts agree with the agency that the public property
exemption from rulemaking in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)" 8
allows the NPS to operate informally.'" Despite this judicial stamp of ap-
proval, the agency seems more inclined now than it has been previously to
publish its concession arrangement rules. It continues to maintain, however,
that nothing requires it to do so.'
The NPS concession contract regulations are silent on contract terms and
requirements. Instead, the regulations briefly cover definitions, 0 ' contract
solicitation where no right of preference exists, 2 solicitation when a right of
preference exists, °2 3 preferential rights for new services,'" assignment of
190. Id. § 20d.
191. Id. § 20c.
192. See THE CONSERvATION FOuND., supra note 145, at 178.
193. Yachts Am., Inc. v. United States, 779 F.2d 656, 661 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
194. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 582 F.2d at 560. See generally PNRL, supra note 1, ch. 9
(describing the law of contract remedies).
195. 36 C.F.R. pt. 51 (1996).
196. Concession Contracts and Permits, 57 Fed. Reg. 40,496 (1992).
197. Id. at 40,498.
198. 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2) (1994).
199. See NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 776 n.1 (1969) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing); Wilderness Pub. Rights Fund v. Kleppe, 608 F.2d 1250, 1253 (9th Cir. 1979); Clipper Cruise
Line, Inc. v. United States, 855 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1994). A federal magistrate recommended
in 1996, however, that the Park Service's concession contracting manual, NPS-48, be declared
subject to the notice and comment rulemaking requirements of the APA and that its provisions not
be applied to concessionaires pending lawful readoption of the manual. National Park Conces-
sions, Inc. v. Kennedy, No. A-93-CA-628JN, 1996 WL 560310, at *51 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 26,
1996). (The magistrate's decision did not mention the public property exemption or cite to the
cases construing it.).
200. See Revision of Certain Concession Policies, 60 Fed. Reg. 37,469 (1995); Concessions
Rate Administration Program, 58 Fed. Reg. 64,800 (1993).
201. 36 C.F.R. § 51.3 (1996).
202. Id. § 51.4.
203. Id. § 51.5.
204. Id. § 51.6.
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concession contracts,2°' and information collection2" and availability. 7
For new contracts, an NPS prospectus defines the contractual terms and condi-
tions.' The three principal factors used in judging applications are less than
definitive:
(1) The experience and related background of the offeror;
(2) The offeror's fimancial capability; and
(3) Conformance to the terms and conditions of the prospectus in
relation to quality of service to the visitor.'
b. Solicitation and Award of Concession Contracts
i. In the Absence of Preference Renewal Rights
The NPS published a standard form concession contract to guide its offi-
cers in drafting large concession contracts. Each individual contract contains
unique provisions and the agency frequently alters the standard provisions."'
The regulations specify in some detail how the agency must solicit and award
contracts. The procedures differ in some respects depending upon whether an
existing concessionaire holds a right of preference to renew its contract. 1
Where no preference right exists, the agency must advertise through vari-
ous publications, and must issue a prospectus describing the concession opera-
tions sought and the material provisions of the contract."' If exceptional cir-
cumstances exist, the agency may negotiate a concession contract with any
qualified party without public notice or advertising." 3 The principal factors
for selecting the best offer in response to the solicitation include: "[t]he expe-
rience and related background of the offeror, the offeror's financial capability,
and conformance to the terms ... of the prospectus in relation to quality of
service to the visitor.
21 4
The NPS reserves the right to reject all offers and resolicit or cancel a
solicitation at any time. 5 Failure of the selected contractor to execute a final
205. Id. § 51.7.
206. Id. § 51.9.
207. Id. § 51.8.
208. Id. § 51.4(a).
209. Id. § 51.4(b).
210. Final Revision of National Park Service Standard Concession Contract, 58 Fed. Reg.
3140 (1993).
211. See 36 C.F.R. 51.4 and 51.5. The regulations define a right of preference as:
the right of an existing satisfactory concessioner to a preference in the extension or
renewal of its contract or a new contract concerning all or part of substantially the same
accommodations, facilities and services as provided by concessioner under the terms of
its existing contract if the [NPS] Director chooses to continue to authorize all or part of
such accommodations, facilities and services in an extended, renewed or new contract as
necessary and appropriate concession activities.
36 C.F.R. § 51.3(b) (1996).
212. Id. § 51.4(a).
213. Id. § 51.4(f).
214. Id. § 51.4(b).
215. Id. § 51.4(c).
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contract within the time specified by the NPS results in cancellation and
resolicitation." 6 The NPS must forward concession contracts with anticipated
annual gross receipts of $100,000 or more or for a five-year term or more to
the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources and the House Com-
mittee on Natural Resources before execution."7
The NPS may terminate the award of a concession contract before execu-
tion by the government and either resolicit or cancel the solicitation. No offer-
or obtains compensable or other legal rights if a contract that has been solicit-
ed is subsequently resolicited or canceled."' In Seva Resorts,"9 the Ninth
Circuit held that the Secretary acted within the scope of the CPA when a con-
tract signed by the concessionaire but not the government, due to fears relating
to the concessionaire's ability to perform, was canceled."'
The most comprehensive treatment of the NPS concession contracting
process, the 1993 YRT Services Corporation concessions case,2 ' occurred in
the absence of a preference renewal right. The Yosemite concessionaire,
MCA, received much criticism after it became known that in 1992 MCA paid
the government only three-fourths of one percent of its gross revenues of over
ninety-two million dollars."' The long-time concessionaire, now under for-
eign ownership, bowed to public pressure and agreed to relinquish the prof-
itable concession."'
With preference renewal no longer in the picture, the contracting process
was opened to all. The NPS conducted the search in two phases. It first re-
quired applicants to show that they were managerially competent and had
equity capital of at least twelve million dollars." 4 Thereafter, the applicants
responded in writing to the NPS Statement of Requirements (SOR), a long
invitation to bid containing sixteen evaluation criteria.' Some of the criteria
were quite broad and vague, for example, "the extent to which the [bidding]
entity reflects an understanding of the [NPSJ mission and a concessioner's role
in carrying out that mission." ' The process of evaluating submissions is
outlined in an agency manual, NPS-48.2' Evaluation panels determine
whether bidders meet each criterion, prepare a matrix, and, based on an as-
sessment of the benefits to the public and the impact on the park of each pro-
216. Id. § 51.4(d).
217. 16 U.S.C. § la-7(c) (1994); 36 C.F.R. § 51.4(d).
218. 36 C.F.R. § 51.4(d).
219. Seva Resorts, Inc. v. Hodel, 876 F.2d 1394, 1399-1400 (9th Cit. 1989).
220. Seva Resorts, Inc., 876 F.2d at 1400-01.
221. YRT Servs. Corp. v. United States, 28 Fed. Cl. 366 (1993).
222. See Carl Nolte, New Firm Replaces Curry Co. as Yosemite Concessionaire, L.A. DAILY
NEws, Oct. 1, 1993, at N7.
223. See Frank Clifford, Curry Co. Turns Over Yosemite Concessions Parks, L.A. TIMEs, Oct.
2, 1993, at A18.
224. YRT Servs. Corp., 28 Fed. Cl. at 372.
225. Id. at 374-76 (listing evaluation criteria).
226. Id. at 376.
227. Id. at 372. "NPS-48 is a 900-page concession management manual containing detailed
instructions for how to judge comparability" of concessionaire proposals, including rates. Lake
Mohave, 78 F.3d at 1363 n.3. The NPS has published in the Federal Register the chapter of NPS-
48 that governs the establishment of rates charged by concessionaires. Concessions Rate Adminis-
tration Program, 58 Fed. Reg. 64,800 (1993). See infra Part II.B.2.d.
1997]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
posal, recommend to the executing official which bid to accept.' The NPS
contracting process is relatively flexible, with criteria other than fees likely to
be determinative in the semi-subjective evaluations."2 9
The NPS decided that only one bidder, Delaware North, met all sixteen
criteria and awarded it the concession.23 YRT, a disappointed bidder,
brought suit for an injunction, claiming that the process was flawed and the
decision arbitrary.f' In a lengthy opinion, Judge Horn of the Court of Feder-
al Claims rejected those allegations. Characterizing CPA agreements as
"unique,""23 the judge opined that "because the criteria for determining bid-
der responsibility are not readily susceptible to reasoned judicial review and
essentially involve a matter of business judgment,... affirmative determina-
tions of responsibility generally will not be overturned absent allegations of
fraud or bad faith."233 In the end, the decision was relatively easy since the
losing bidder did not demonstrate the requisite capital and sought to change
the proposal terms. YRT also did not prove any of the four factors set forth in
the earlier Keco234 decision for overturning a contract award on the ground
that the government treated the bidder arbitrarily: "(1) whether the government
procuring officials acted in bad faith.. .;235 (2) whether there was a reason-
able basis for the government's decision; (3) the degree of discretion given to
the procurement officials by applicable statutes and regulations; and (4) wheth-
er government officials violated pertinent statutes or regulations ...."236
The YRT decision demonstrates that, at least when an existing concession-
aire is not entitled to preferential treatment in the contract renewal process, the
NPS has discretion to choose among prospective concessionaires analogous to
the freedom a private business has in selecting its contractors. Absent proof of
a violation of agency regulations, unsuccessful bidders will have a difficult
time foisting themselves upon an unwilling NPS.
ii. Monopolies and Preference Renewal Rights
Concessionaires, at the Secretary's option, may be given monopolies and
preferential contract renewal rights. 7 The Secretary appears to have virtual
carte blanche to grant long-term monopolies of public services in national
parks.238 In Lake Berryessa,239 for example, the Ninth Circuit upheld the
228. YRT Servs. Corp., 28 Fed. Cl. at 372.
229. See Concession Contracts and Permits, 57 Fed. Reg. 40,496, 40,500 (1992) (stating
"franchise fees will continue to be only a secondary factor in the evaluation of offers.").
230. YRT Servs. Corp., 28 Fed. Cl. at 380-81.
231. Id. at 369.
232. Id. at 393.
233. Id. at 394.
234. Keco Indus., Inc. v. United States, 492 F.2d 1200, 1203-04 (1974).
235. Cf National Park Concessions, Inc. v. Kennedy, No. A-93-CA-628JN, 1996 WL 560310,
at *15 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 1996).
236. YRT Servs Corp., 28 Fed. Cl. at 387.
237. 16 U.S.C. §§ 20c, 20d.
238. National Parks and Conservation Ass'n v. Kleppe, 547 F.2d 673, 676 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(citing 16 U.S.C. § 20c). But see Willow Beach Resort, Inc. v. United States, 5 Cl. Ct. 241, 245
(1984) (rejecting the argument that preference renewal right gave existing contract holder a mo-
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government's action requiring the removal of all docks and structures from a
federal lake except those of the licensed concessionaires." NPS regulations
limit the circumstances in which concession contracts may be assigned.'
The CPA requires the Interior Secretary to "encourage continuity of oper-
ation and facilities and services by giving preference in the renewal of con-
tracts or permits... to the concessioners who have performed their obliga-
tions under prior contracts or permits to the satisfaction of the Secretary." 42
The Secretary, "in his discretion," may extend or renew a contract or permit or
grant a new contract or permit to the same concessionaire upon termination of
a previous contract or permit."3 This opportunity to provide additional ser-
vices usually takes the form of a right of first refusal.'" One court has inter-
preted these provisions as making the grant of a right of preference for new or
renewal contracts mandatory, while the decision whether to renew is discre-
tionary." In other words, the government has the discretion not to renew at
all, but if it does, it must afford a right of preference to a concessionaire who
has performed satisfactorily. The regulations track the statute by distinguishing
between a "right of preference""M and a "preferential right."247 The former
applies to renewal of existing concessions and the latter refers to "new or
additional services. 'a2
When the agency considers renewal of an existing concession, the Secre-
tary must publish a notice of intent to grant or renew concession contracts and
invite bids. 249 The preference renewal right runs only to concessionaires who
have performed "to the satisfaction of the Secretary."' Thus, before issuing
a prospectus, the NPS must determine, based on annual evaluations during the
term of the contract, whether the existing concessionaire has performed in a
satisfactory, marginal, or unsatisfactory manner. If the agency rates the
concessionaire's performance as unsatisfactory in the year preceding issuance
of the prospectus, or marginal during the two preceding years, the
nopoly on the performance of marine services on portion of the Colorado River).
239. Lake Berryessa Tenants' Council v. United States, 588 F.2d 267 (9th Cir. 1978).
240. Id. at 270 (holding that the action did not amount to a taking).
241. 36 C.F.R. § 51.7 (1996); see also Final Revision of National Park Service Standard
Concession Contract, 58 Fed. Reg. 3140, 3147 (1993) (explaining that "there is no inherent right
to assign or sell to a third party the rights and obligations of a govemment contract").
242. 16 U.S.C. § 20d.
243. Id.
244. See S. REP. No. 89-765, at 5 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3489, 3492-93
(The security of tenure provided by preference renewal rights "permit[s] both the government and
the concessionaire to know where they will stand in the future and thus to assure continuity of
park operations.").
245. Current-Jacks Fork Canoe Rental Ass'n v. Clark, 603 F. Supp. 421, 425 (E.D. Mo.
1985). The court disavowed dicta to the contrary in Free Enter. Canoe Renters Ass'n v. Watt, 711
F.2d 852, 858 n.8 (8th Cir. 1983). See Current-Jacks, 603 F. Supp. at 426-27.
246. 36 C.F.R. § 51.3(h).
247. Id. § 51.3(c).
248. Id.
249. 16 U.S.C. § 20d (1994). The NPS invites bids only from those within a "zone of active
consideration" for award of a contract. See Washington Tour Guides Ass'n v. NPS, 808 F. Supp.
877, 882 (D.D.C. 1992).
250. 16 U.S.C. § 20d.
19971
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
concessionaire's overall performance is unsatisfactory."' If the
concessionaire's overall performance over the term of the contract was satis-
factory, it is entitled to preference in the renewal of its contract.52 "[I1f,
after a prospectus which recognizes a right of preference is issued," a conces-
sionaire receives an unsatisfactory rating in an annual evaluation, the NPS
"shall cancel the solicitation or contract award and reissue the solicitation
without a right of preference." 3 A concessionaire with an overall perfor-
mance rating that is less than satisfactory is not entitled to a right of prefer-
ence.
254
Concessionaires must keep detailed records documenting contractual per-
formance.5 Some of these records are available to the public," 6 although
information concerning profits, salaries, or expenses of existing concession-
aires need not be disclosed. 7 NPS regulations additionally mandate contin-
uous, complex reporting on all phases of concessionaire operations and autho-
rize periodic audits."
Satisfactory performance does not automatically entitle the existing con-
cessionaire to the contract. The incumbent must meet the Secretary's contract
bid criteria; it has no right to renewal on terms identical with the. original
contract, but is limited to an opportunity to meet the terms of competing pro-
posals. 9 More specifically, a concessionaire with a right of preference must
submit a timely offer which meets the terms and conditions of the prospectus.
If the concessionaire fails to do so, its right of preference is waived, and the
agency must award the contract to the party submitting the best responsive
offer.2" If the agency received no other responsive offer, it may resolicit
without affording any right of preference, unless the resolicitation consists of
terms and conditions that differ substantially from the terms of the initial pro-
spectus.26" ' The same procedures apply where a concessionaire with a right of
preference receives a contract but fails to execute it within the time period
established by the NPS.262
The regulations require equal evaluation of all responsive offers received
where a right of preference applies.263 If a person other than the holder of
251. 36 C.F.R. § 51.5(a).
252. National Park Concessions, Inc., 1996 WL 560310, at *11-'12 (ruling by a federal mag-
istrate that issuance of a marginal rating was arbitrary given the concessionaire's minor transgres-
sions).
253. 36 C.F.R. § 51.5(a).
254. Id.
255. 16 U.S.C. § 20g.
256. 36 C.F.R. § 51.8.
257. Concession Contracts and Permits, 57 Fed. Reg. 40,496, 40,502 (1992).
258. 36 C.F.R. § 51.9.
259. Canyoneers, Inc. v. Hodel, 756 F.2d 754, 759 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Lewis v. Babbitt,
998 F.2d 880, 882 (10th Cir. 1993) (declining to decide whether the concessionaire with a prefer-
ence right must match an unresponsive proposal). Requiring the concessionaire to match an unre-
sponsive proposal would make little sense. A non-responsive proposal should be treated as no
proposal at all.
260. 36 C.F.R. § 51.5(c).
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. § 51.5(d).
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the right of preference submits the best offer, that party gains entitlement to
the contract, provided the agency provides the existing concessionaire an op-
portunity to amend its offer to meet the terms and conditions of the best of-
fer.2" In Hotcaveg,2" the disappointed incumbent bidder argued that this
regulation conflicted with Congress's desire to encourage the continuity of
concessionaires. The district court, however, upheld the Secretary's decision to
cut off the incumbent's preference renewal right due to the unresponsive na-
ture of its bid, stating that "[a]lthough continuity is a goal, it cannot be sought
recklessly."2' If the existing concessionaire submits on a timely basis an
amended offer that is at least substantially equal to the best offer and the
existing concessionaire is capable of carrying out its terms, it is entitled to the
contract.
267
Preferential fights are governed by different rules. Those rights apply
when the NPS decides to contract for new or additional accommodations,
facilities, and services of generally the same character as provided by an exist-
ing concessions contract, and the existing concessionaire by contract has a
fight to provide those additional services.2' In those circumstances, the
agency must describe the new or additional services and the terms and condi-
tions upon which they are to be provided, and give the existing concessionaire
a reasonable opportunity to offer to provide the services.2" If the existing
concessionaire makes such an offer, the procedures that apply to contracts not
subject to preference rights apply. 270 In Willow Beach Resort,27' the court
held that the NPS did not violate a concessionaire's preferential fights by re-
jecting its "non-responsive" proposal and awarding a contract for new services
to another company.
The dividing line between a right of preference applicable to renewal of
existing concessions and a preferential fight applicable to new or additional
services is not always clear. In Hamilton Stores,2 3 two operators held con-
cession contracts within Yellowstone National Park. The performance of one
operator was deemed unsatisfactory, and the NPS assigned its operations to a
new concessionaire.274 When the new concessionaire began expanding its
services, the remaining old concessionaire objected, claiming that its fight of
preference had not been observed in the original assignment. The Tenth Cir-
cuit in 1991 affirmed a judgment dismissing the claim because the expanded
services were not new or additional, but rather a continuation of existing con-
cessions, and the claimant's contract limited the preference to renewal of the
264. Id.
265. Hotcaveg v. Kennedy, 883 F. Supp. 428 (E.D. Mo. 1995), affd, 72 F.3d 133 (unpub-
lished table decision), 1995 WL 739991 (8th Cir. Dec. 15, 1995).
266. Hotcaveg, 883 F. Supp. at 430.
267. 36 C.F.R. § 51.5(d).
268. Id. § 51.6.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Willow Beach Resort, Inc. v. United States, 5 Ci. Ct. 241 (1984).
272. Willow Beach, 5 Cl. Ct. at 245.
273. Hamilton Stores, Inc. v. Hodel, 925 F.2d 1272 (10th Cir. 1991).
274. Hamilton Stores, 925 F.2d at 1274-75.
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same 275same concessions.
The CPA does not provide disappointed bidders with a private right of
action, but they can seek judicial review pursuant to the APA.2 76 Failure to
follow solicitation and award procedures requires remand for reconsidera-
tion 7 Reversal on substantive grounds creates more difficulties. In the 1977
Fort Sumter Tours case,278 the court enjoined the Secretary from awarding a
contract to a competitor of the incumbent on the basis that the procedures used
raised a substantial question whether the NPS adequately observed the
incumbent's preference rights.279 Fort Sumter Tours notwithstanding, judicial
review of contractor selection tends to be deferential."s The disappointed
bidder bears the burden of showing that the agency's selection was irrational
or involved statutory or regulatory violations, and therefore that the agency
breached its duty to consider the proposal fairly and honestly."1 Proof that
the procuring officials acted in bad faith or that no reasonable basis for the
award existed satisfies that burden.2
c. Possessory Interests
Under the CPA, a concessionaire has "all incidents of title" to structures,
fixtures, or similar improvements constructed or acquired by it "except legal
title," which is retained in the United States.283 Equitable title vests in the
concessionaire even if not recognized in the contract.2' Legislation adopted
in 1986 requires that all concession contracts provide that termination for
cause extinguishes all possessory interests beyond depreciated book value.S
If the government otherwise terminates the contract, the concessionaire re-
ceives entitlement either to an agreed amount or to "sound value ... not to
275. Id. at 1281-82.
276. Glacier Park Found. v. Watt, 663 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1981); cf. National Parks & Con-
servation Ass'n v. Hodel, 679 F. Supp. 49, 54 (D.D.C. 1987) (asserting that there is no private
right of action for the public to challenge concession contracts).
277. See Glacier Park Found. v. Watt, 663 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1981).
278. Fort Sumter Tours, Inc. v. Andrus, 564 F.2d 1119 (4th Cir. 1977).
279. Fort Sumter Tours, 564 F.2d at 1125. The NPS apparently must provide a copy of a
competing applicant's proposal to an incumbent seeking to exercise its preference rights, although
the agency may delete confidential financial information and trade secrets. Lewis v. Lujan, 826 F.
Supp. 1302, 1308 (D. Wyo. 1992), affd, 998 F.2d. 880 (loth Cir. 1993).
280, Piscataway Co. v. United States, 861 F.2d 265 (unpublished table decision), 1988 WL
109267 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding that a statute authorizing the NPS to cooperate with the State of
Maryland to promote preservation of the Piscataway National Park authorized the agency to enter
into a cooperative agreement with the State to renovate and manage a marina instead of renewing
a contract with a former concessionaire). Judicial review of a preaward NPS procurement decision
is particularly limited in scope. YRT Servs. Corp., 28 Fed. Cl. at 386-87 (citing RADVA Corp. v.
United States, 17 Cl. Ct. 812, 818 (1989), affd, 914 F.2d 271 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
281. YRT Servs. Corp., 28 Fed. Cl. at 387 (citing Quality Transp. Servs., Inc. v. United States,
12 Cl. Ct. 276, 281 (1987)).
282. YRT Servs. Corp., 28 Fed. Cl. at 387 (citing Keco Indus.; Inc. v. United States, 492 F.2d
1200, 1203-04 (Ct. Cl. 1974)).
283. 16 U.S.C. § 20e.
284. National Parks and Conservation Ass'n v. Kleppe, 547 F.2d 673, 676 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
285. Act of Oct. 18, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-500, 100 Stat. 1783-247 (1986); Act of Oct. 30,
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-591, 100 Stat. 3341-247 (1986).
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exceed fair market value. 286 A 1981 Court of Claims decision confirmed
that "sound value" is not book value. 7
A pre-CPA decision illustrated the meaning of "book value.""2 8 The
plaintiff's concession agreement terminated in 1958; it provided that the plain-
tiff had a possessory interest (not legal title) and that upon termination, the
Secretary would compensate the concessionaire "for its possessory interest in
such improvements in an amount not less than their book value." ' Plaintiff
claimed that he was entitled to replacement cost as compensation. The court
rejected this claim, holding that the concessionaire was due only the depreci-
ated value of his original investment, roughly 1/40 of what he sought.' °
Contract principles, not statutory provisions, determined the outcome.29 '
After enactment of the CPA, the Court of Claims reached a different re-
sult in Fordyce,' where the contract also specified that compensation for
extinguishment of the possessory interest would be "not less than book val-
ue. 293 The government argued for book value as the standard, but the court
determined instead that book value set only the minimum, and that the "sound
value" rule of the CPA established the appropriate standard.294 The court
refused to speculate on how to calculate "sound value," except that the statute
specifies that it cannot exceed fair market value. Because book value is subject
to accounting manipulation, sound value is undefined, and market value is an
empty abstraction in the absence of a market, the interaction of contractual and
statutory provisions is unnecessarily confused and confusing.
On remand, the lower court determined "sound value."2" The statute
says that sound value shall be "determined upon the basis of reconstruction
cost less depreciation evidenced by [the improvement's] condition and pro-
spective serviceability in comparison with a new unit of like kind, but not to
exceed fair market value."2 This standard differs drastically from "book
value" since it ignores depreciation of the asset claimed for tax purposes and
instead deducts from reconstruction (or replacement) cost physical depreciation
of the improvement. In Fordyce, reconstruction cost would have been high,
and deduction of physical depreciation of the massive bathhouse at issue
would still leave a substantial sum, an amount far in excess of what the
government's experts testified was fair market value.297 Plaintiff argued that
fair market value did not apply in this instance because there was no market.
The court disagreed, holding that a bathhouse was not a "special-use property"
lacking a clear market such as a sewer or a church, because "market
286. 16 U.S.C. § 20e.
287. Fordyce v. United States, 650 F.2d 1191 (Ct. Ci. 1981).
288. Bishop v. United States, 164 Ct. CI. 717 (1964).
289. Bishop, 164 Ct. CI. at 722.
290. Id. at 737-38.
291. See also Schoeffel v. United States, 193 Ct. CI. 923 (1971).
292. Fordyce, 650 F.2d at 1195.
293. Id. at 1194. Most pre-CPA contracts specified book value as the standard.
294. 16 U.S.C. § 20e.
295. Fordyce v. United States, 7 CI. CL 591, 600 (1985).
296. 16 U.S.C. § 20e.
297. Fordyce, 7 Cl. Ct. at 594-96.
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comparables" existed in the area."' "Highest and best use" determines mar-
ket value.' 9 Holding that the highest use for a bathhouse was as an office
building (although the NPS intended to convert it to a visitor center), the court
accepted the government's valuation and awarded $152,000.3'0
When the NPS amended its standard form concession contract in
1993,-" it altered the method for measuring the compensation due a conces-
sionaire for its possessory interest by replacing sound value with a redefined
"fair value. ' '3" Instead of basing compensation on the appreciated value of
the improvements, the new standard contract authorizes a calculation based on
the actual cost of constructing an improvement, less straight line depreciation
over the estimated useful life of the improvement according to Generally Ac-
cepted Accounting Principles. According to the NPS, sound value compensa-
tion likely provides higher compensation to the concessionaire than the new
fair value measure, although the latter continues to ensure that the concession
holder will be able to recover the investment it makes in a concession build-
ing. The NPS explained its jettisoning of the sound value compensation provi-
sion contained in the old contract form because sound value compensation
imposes unnecessary financial liability on the government, inhibits fair com-
petition in the award of concession contracts, and impairs the NPS's ability to
undertake changes in the location and uses of concession facilities required for
preservation of park resources and their enjoyment by park visitors. 3 The
latter adverse effect occurred because if the NPS sought relocation of a con-
cession facility, it had to pay compensation in the amount of the sound value
of the structures removed.'
d. Opportunity to Profit and Franchise Fees
Loss-of-investment protection is more tenuous than protection of posses-
sory interests. At the Secretary's discretion, the contract may include a clause
providing for protection against loss of investment in structures, fixtures, im-
provements, supplies, and other tangible property. However, protection is af-
forded only against subsequent discretionary secretarial actions or policies.05
Additionally, the CPA requires the Secretary to exercise his authority in a
manner consistent with a reasonable opportunity for the concessionaire to real-
ize a profit commensurate with the capital invested and the obligations as-
sumed.3 6 While this provision prevents the Secretary from sabotaging or
298. Id. at 598-99.
299. Id. at 599.
300. Id. at 600-01.
301. Final Revision of National Park Service Standard Concession Contract, 58 Fed. Reg.
3140 (1993).
302. The new calculation methodology has been challenged as inconsistent with the CPA in a
suit brought by the National Park Hospitality Association. GAO, CONCESSIONS CONTRACrING,
supra note 116.
303. Final Revision of National Park Service Standard Concession Contract, 58 Fed. Reg. at
3142-43.
304. Id. at 3145.
305. 16 U.S.C. § 20b(a).
306. Id. § 20b(b).
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undermining the concessionaire's operation, it does not guarantee a profit, only
an opportunity to realize a profit.3"
The CPA also governs the establishment and adjustment of franchise fees.
Franchise fees must be determined based on consideration of the "probable
value" of the contract to the concessionaire.' Probable value "is the oppor-
tunity for net profit in relation to both gross receipts and capital invested.""'3°
The government must subordinate consideration of its revenue to the objec-
tives of protecting the area related to the contract and providing adequate
services for visitors at reasonable rates." ' Contracts must provide for recon-
sideration of franchise fees at least once every five years.3" '
The Concession Guidelines contained in NPS-48" 2 establish a methodol-
ogy for calculating concessionaire franchise fees.3"3 Chapter eighteen of
NPS-48, which governs the approval of concessionaire rates, has been pub-
lished in full in the Federal Register.3"4 The manual describes the objective
of rate approval as "assur[ing] that concessioner rates and charges to the pub-
lic are commensurate with the level of services and facilities provided, as well
as reasonable and comparable with similar services and facilities provided by
the private sector.
'315
Rates are established pursuant to one of seven methods. The preferred
method is a "review of similar services." This method applies where compa-
rable businesses exist in a competitive market and focuses on the quality of
service and amenities in establishing prices.3"6 Its purpose is to offset the
possibility of monopoly pricing by concessionaires.3"7 The second method,
"simplified review of similar services," is a quick, relatively cost-efficient
method of review which is available for low volume sales when a service is
not covered by the full review method.3"' Simplified review of similar ser-
vices entails a comparison of the concessionaire's prices with those of selected
private businesses located, if possible, on non-federal lands.319 Third,
307. Yachts Am., Inc. v. United States, 779 F.2d 656, 662 (Fed. Cir. 1985); National Parks &
Conservation Ass'n v. Kleppe, 547 F.2d 673, 684 (D.C. Cir. 1976); cf. National Park Concessions,
Inc. v. Kennedy, Civ. No. A-93-CA-628 JN, 1996 WL 560310 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 1996) (deter-
mining that NPS denied concessionaire reasonable opportunity to earn a profit by refusing to
allow it to use Special Account Fee fund to pay for improvements and by failing to approve its
food rates).




312. See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
313. Lake Mojave, 78 F.3d at 1363 n.3. The manual assesses the comparability of a
concessionaire's rates with those of other facilities under similar conditions.
314. Concessions Rate Administration Program, 58 Fed. Reg. 64,800 (1993). But a federal
magistrate found that the Park Service did not comply with the APA's notice and comment
rulemaking procedures in issuing NPS-48 and recommended that the agency be enjoined from
applying its provisions to a concessionaire until that defect was cured. Kennedy, 1996 WL
560310, at *50.
315. Concessions Rate Administration Program, 58 Fed. Reg. at 64,800.
316. Id. at 64,802.
317. Id. at 64,803.
318. Id. at 64,802-03.
319. Id. at 64,811.
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"specified rate on authorization" is used when the business involves a limited
number of unique items or services (such as seaplane excursions, horseback
rides and mountain-climbing), a simple rate structure, and no comparable busi-
nesses are readily available.32°
"Merchandise pricing" is the preferred method for establishing retail pric-
es for goods (e.g., curios and groceries) in which there exists the industry
practice of setting prices according to the desired margin for a product line by
a percent markup.31 Merchandise pricing is not permitted for service-related
businesses in which quality of service and amenities are important factors
(e.g., restaurants, hotels, transportation, marina operations, etc.). 3" If a high-
ly competitive market exists in the immediate vicinity of the park and the
pricing of unique items (e.g., handicrafts) is routinely negotiated between the
vendor and the customer, the "competitive market declaration" method may be
used.323 The competitive market method reduces the agency's administrative
burden in determining rates because competition forces the concessionaire to
charge comparable rates.324 The "indexing" method is used in conjunction
with, or subsequent to, rates established by another method. It is especially
useful for interim rate approvals and situations when the agency faces manage-
ment constraints on time, travel, or money.32 The final authorized method of
establishing prices is by "financial analysis." This method involves a process
by which the agency determines on an ad hoc basis if the prices are compara-
ble with the industry after considering and exhausting all other methods.326
Rate approval decisions may be appealed to the Regional Director.327
A concessionaire unsuccessfully challenged the application of both the
CPA's franchise fee provisions and NPS-48 in the 1995 Fort Sumter Tours
case.32 The Secretary notified the concessionaire (FST) that it was consid-
ering renegotiation of the franchise fee pursuant to the CPA. Instead of negoti-
ating with the government, FST filed a declaratory judgment action to deter-
mine its rights under the contract. After the government increased the fee,
FST's action became an administrative appeal of the increase decision. FST
argued first that the CPA prohibits the NPS from considering profits when
determining franchise fees. The court found this argument to be inconsistent
with the plain language of the CPA.329 FST also claimed that NPS-48
impermissibly sought to limit concessionaire. profits, but the court determined
that the function of the guidelines was to provide a framework for the report-
ing of financial data and the determination of an appropriate franchise fee.
Contrary to FST's contention, the agency properly used a comparison of the
320. Id. at 64,803, 64,813.
321. Id. at 64,803.
322. Id. at 64,814.
323. Id. at 64,803.
324. Id. at 64,815.
325. Id. at 64,803.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 64,802.
328. Fort Sumter Tours, Inc. v. Babbitt, 66 F.3d 1324, 1327 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct 1848 (1996).
329. Fort Sumter Tours, 66 F.3d at 1329 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 20b(b), (d)).
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concessionaire's returns with the profits of other companies in the industry as
a factor in determining an appropriate fee. 33 According to FST, the CPA
authorizes unilateral reconsideration but not adjustment of franchise fees. The
court, however, deferred to the Secretary's contrary interpretation because a
provision authorizing unilateral reconsideration would be meaningless in the
absence of the ability to adjust. 33' Finally, the court rejected FST's claim that
the contract provision relating to adjustment of franchise fees was so broad
that it afforded the government "an absolute right to sabotage the entire con-
tract. '332 The contract included sufficient procedural constraints and safe-
guards to "provide a check on random adjustment of fees. 333
Similar in effect was the 1982 Yosemite Park34 decision. The NPS
raised the rates it charged its concessionaire for electricity, using a different
computation based on comparable private costs. The court agreed with the
agency that this readjustment was "reasonable" within the meaning of the
contract.
According to Interior Department investigators in their testimony before
Congress in 1990, the Interior Department is losing tens of millions of dollars
each year as a result of poorly drafted concession contracts.333 The inadequa-
cy of the fee provisions of these contracts is even more troublesome because
there is no private right of action under the CPA to challenge a concession
contract on the ground that it charges unreasonably low fees. 31 Similarly,
members of the public may not sue for breach of a concession contract as
third party beneficiaries.337
In 1993, the NPS amended the standard concession contract that provides
a guide for the execution of large concession contracts. 3 ' Among other
things, the 1993 contract reduces the compensation to which concessionaires
are entitled upon termination of possessory interests.339 In 1995, the NPS an-
nounced that it had begun a review of all of its policies concerning concession
management activities.34 In the interim, it eliminated a policy (set forth in
330.' Id. at 1329. The concessionaire argued that such a comparison would tailor profits to the
average profitability of the industry, thereby encouraging mediocrity and discouraging efficiency.
Id.
331. Id. at 1330.
332. Id. at 1331.
333. Id. at 1332. The concessionaire argued that the contract was inconsistent with the com-
mon law of contracts because it allowed for modification without consideration from the party
opposing the modification. But the court regarded a fee adjustment as an action that takes place
pursuant to the terms of the contract itself, rather than as a modification of the contract. Id.
334. Yosemite Park & Curry Co. v. United States, 686 F.2d 925 (Cl. Ct. 1982).
335. John Lancaster, Profiteering in the Parks?; Concessionaires' Contracts Cost U.S. Tens
of Millions, Hill Is Told, WASH. POST, May 25, 1990, at A19.
336. National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Hodel, 679 F. Supp. 49, 54 (D.D.C.
1987)(citing Glacier Park Found. v. Watt, 663 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1981)).
337. Id. at 54 (citing Berberich v. United States, 5 Cl. Ct. 652, 655 (1984), affd mem., 770
F.2d 179 (unpublished table decision) (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
338. Final Revision of National Park Service Standard Concession Contract, 58 Fed. Reg.
3140 (1993).
339. See supra Part H.B.2.c.
340. Revision of Certain Concession Policies, 60 Fed. Reg. 37,469 (1995); Concession Con-
tract Policies, 60 Fed. Reg. 3435 (1995).
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Chapter 24 of NPS-48) which limited a concessionaire's franchise fee to 50%
of its pre-tax, pre-franchise fee profit.34' Although the policy was intended as
a guideline to aid in the establishment of fees, it was interpreted as setting a
firm cap. The agency conceded that the policy lacked either an empirical or a
theoretical justification and that it could result in the recovery of fees that
amount to less than probable value. According to the NPS, the policy favored
large concessionaires and reduced the fees payable to the government over a
five-year period by as much as $1.8 million on one concession contract
alone.342 Franchise fees may now exceed the old fifty percent figure, provid-
ed the amount is otherwise consistent with a reasonable opportunity for profit
and with the objectives of providing adequate and appropriate service to park
visitors.343 Despite the change in policy, concessionaires With less than
$100,000 in annual gross receipts must still pay only two percent of those
receipts as fees. 3"
The 1995 interim policy change also clarified that the NPS need not ap-
prove an interim rate schedule. This clarification addressed the practice of
some concessionaires of accepting deposits for individual reservations without
securing the rates for the facility or service reserved, but including in the con-
firmation notice a caveat that rates are subject to change without notice. This
policy had led to increased rates that were not always justified.345
Finally, the NPS eliminated the interim right to appeal the selection of
comparable businesses. Pursuant to the CPA,3  the NPS determines rates
primarily by comparison with the rates charged for facilities and services of
comparable character under similar conditions, giving consideration to factors
such as the length of the season, peakloads, average percentage of occupancy,
accessibility, availability and cost of labor and materials, and type of
patronage.3 7
The pre-1995 procedures allowed concessionaires to appeal the selection
of comparables 3" and, if that appeal failed, to file a second appeal of the ap-
proved rate. A concessionaire whose appeal of the approved rate was rejected
could also appeal the basis of the comparables selected. The elimination of the
"comparable appeal" was meant to remove that duplicative appeal and expe-
dite the appeals process.349
Commentators have criticized Park Service concessions policy on the
grounds that relationships are too cozy, concessionaires are over-insulated
from competition, and commercial development is harmful to park purpos-
es.3"' Given the extremely broad secretarial latitude to regulate concessions
341. Revision of Certain Concession Policies, 60 Fed. Reg. 37,469 (1995).
342. Concession Contract Policies, 60 Fed. Reg. at 3435.
343. Id.
344. Revision of Certain Concession Policies, 60 Fed. Reg. at 37,470.
345. Id.
346. 16 U.S.C. § 20b(c).
347. Revision of Certain Concession Policies, 60 Fed. Reg. at 3435.
348. "The selection of comparables is the cornerstone of the entire process." Concessions Rate
Administration Program, 58 Fed. Reg. 64,800, 64,803 (1993).
349. Concession Contract Policies, 60 Fed. Reg. at 3436.
350. See, e.g., Mantell, supra note 145; A. RUNTE, supra note 147.
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in existing law, and judicial reluctance to interfere with exercise of that discre-
tion (except to require procedural compliance), the issue is more political than
legal. This Part has described some recent NPS reforms intended to enhance
competition and the Park Service's share of concession revenues. Nevertheless,
if the law of national park concessions is to be changed in anything other than
an incremental manner, park advocates will have to convince Congress to
change it.
III. REFORM OF NATIONAL PARK CONCESSIONS LAW AND POLICY: THE
QUESTIONS
Evidently, no one who is willing to put his or her opinions in print is
satisfied with NPS concessions law and policy. Park users, environmentalists,
concessions contractors, academics, the General Accounting Office (GAO),
legislators, and the NPS itself-all decry one or more aspects of the current
situation. Nearly all concerned agree that some share of concession revenues
ought to be returned to the national park system for maintenance and other
needs. Most seem to agree that the anti-competitive aspects of the current
system deprive the national park system of needed revenue while making ser-
vice improvement more difficult. Preferential rights and possessory interests in
particular are the objects of critical outrage. Most commentators apparently
accept the appropriateness and desirability of contracting with private entities
for visitor services, but many disagree on the optimum degree of facility de-
velopment. In the overall scheme of things, overcrowding (which may contrib-
ute to overuse of park resources) and facility deterioration are more important
than return to the government, but the latter problem certainly is not negligi-
ble.
A. A Hierarchy of Reform Questions
The present system, whereby the NPS chooses private entities to provide
visitor services, began as a pragmatic administrative solution and later was
embodied into the CPA. Interested parties now are virtually unanimous that
the CPA is inadequate and should be heavily amended if not repealed. The
reform fervor naturally raises a galaxy of questions. Competing versions of
pending concessions reform legislation provide conflicting answers to some
but not all such questions.
In assessing Park Service concessions law and policy, the issues can be
divided into three categories: preliminary, greater, and lesser. The preliminary
questions are very basic and can generally be answered without analysis.
Those questions include:35" '
351. Another preliminary question is whether Congress should have a uniform concessions
policy for all land management agencies. The concessions reform bill introduced by Rep. Hansen
in 1995, which is discussed below, would have put all of the concession-granting federal land
management agencies under a single legal regime. H.R. 2028, 104th Cong. (1995). Rep. Meyers'
competing bill, also discussed below, is confined to the National Park System. H.R. 773, 104th
Cong. (1995). The other federal land management agencies have strongly resisted a unitary sys-
tem, claiming that their situations and practices are necessarily and rightfully different. Uniformity
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Should the park system have any developed visitor facilities?
Assuming some agreed level of facility development, should that
development, maintenance, and operation be carried out by private or
public entities?
The "greater" questions that any reform effort must answer, explicitly or
implicitly, go to the basic structure and outlines of a new concessions regime.
They include:
What are the optimum degrees of recreation facility development and
provision of recreational services in national parks?
Are special incentives still necessary to induce businesses to bid for
NPS concession contracts?
To which uses should concession franchise fees (and entrance fees)
be directed?
To what extent, if at all, should the United States rely on private
entrepreneurs to provide capital improvements?
Which entities should be responsible for which aspects of setting
prices for tourist services?
Should the NPS be required to comply with the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act in promulgating concessions regulations?
Should NPS concession contract mechanisms be required to comply
with all or some of the panoply of federal laws otherwise applicable
to government contracts?
To what extent should NPS concessions law be spelled out by statute
rather than delegated to administrative discretion?
Should NPS concessions contracts take the form of arms-length busi-
ness transactions?
Answers to the greater questions will, to an extent, dictate the answers to
the lesser questions. The characterization as lesser questions does not indicate
importance. However, because they relate more to means than to ends, they
necessarily have a lower priority. Assuming that the initial premises will lead
to a concessions system resembling, at least in broad outline, the current sys-
tem, the lesser questions will include:
Should preference rights to renewal or to provision of additional
services be allowed, and, if so, to what extent?
Should the NPS treat large and small concessionaires differently, and,
if so, to what extent?
When, if ever, are departures from competitive bidding justified?
has obvious benefits to all concerned, but some of those differences are unquestionably real. Al-
though uniform concessions policy is beyond the scope of this article, the answer ought to depend
upon whether the benefits to be derived from the simplicity of administering a uniform system
would exceed the costs of applying such a system to agency contracts not well suited to the tem-
plate chosen. See supra notes 119-120 and accompanying text; Statement of David Unger, Forest
Service, Before the Subeomm. on National Parks, Forests, and Public Lands of the House Comm.
on Resources, July 25, 1995.
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Should the value of improvements be measured by straight-line de-
preciation or by some other method?
Should franchise fees be based on percentages of gross receipts or on
net profits or on some other basis?
What appeal mechanism, if any, would best provide an efficient
means of dispute resolution?
What mechanism will provide the best evaluation of concessionaire
performance?
Members of Congress, the GAO, NPS personnel, current concessionaires,
the National Parks and Conservation Association, and many more groups and
individuals have debated some of these issues at length over the past decade in
several forums. The remainder of this section takes up each of the foregoing
questions in the context of that continuing debate. Because the answer to any
of those questions necessarily implicates a value judgment of a policy or polit-
ical nature, there necessarily is no single right answer. Sharply differing ver-
sions of reform legislation were introduced in 1994 and 1995. Representative
Meyers's (R. Kan.) 1995 bill, H.R. 773,352 is the same as a bill that passed
overwhelmingly in the House in 1994 but did not survive to enactment.
353
Representative Hansen (R. Utah) introduced a competing measure, H.R. 2028,
in 1995 that is far more favorable to existing concessionaires.3 4 It formed
the basis for the Visitor Facilities and Services Enhancement Act of 1995,'31
which was passed by both houses of Congress as part of a reconciliation bud-
get bill but was vetoed by President Clinton. 356 The two bills together offer a
starting point for analysis of reform possibilities and approaches. The follow-
ing subsections summarize the major arguments and positions adduced by
legislators, commentators, witnesses, etc., and the authors will also assess the
merits of the competing positions. The next subsection examines the two
"preliminary" questions, and following subsections attempt to provide reason-
able answers or approaches to the "greater" and "lesser" questions identified
above.
B. The Preliminary Questions
1. Outlaw Facility Development?
It is far too late in history to argue that national parks should be left total-
ly in a state of nature, without any facilities or amenities for human visitors.
National parks were established for present enjoyment as well as preserva-
352. H.R. 773, 104th Cong. (1995).
353. Statement of Rep. Jan Meyers Before the Subcomm. on National Parks, Forests, and
Public Lands of the House Comm. on Resources, July 25, 1995, 1995 WL 443431.
354. H.R. 2028, 104th Cong. (1995).
355. See H.R. REP. No. 104-280, pt. 1, at 581 (1995).
356. President Clinton vetoed H.R. 2491, the Seven-Year Balanced Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1995, which included the Visitor Facilities and Services Enhancement Act of 1995. THE WHITE
HOUSE OFFICE OF COMMUNICATIONS, PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO CONGRESS ON VETO OF H.R.
2491 (1995) (1995 WL 723231).
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tion,357 and most Americans could not use them without some support servic-
es, whether guides or buses or roads or food.3 58 As a matter of elementary
fairness, closing the parks, our nation's crown jewels, to all but hardy back-
packers would be politically and popularly disastrous. Neither the Hansen nor
Meyers bill considered the possibility of parks free of all facilities.
And, of course, the primitive recreation function is already served by the
National Wilderness Preservation System.359 In 1964, Congress prohibited
development in wilderness areas, and the only human activities allowed are
forms of nonmotorized recreation.' Roughly half the acreage of the park
system has been designated as wilderness, 1 so those opportunities for a
primitive wilderness experience are alive and well in the parks for those who
choose to forgo facilities and amenities.
Even if abolition or phasing out of facilities in national parks were desir-
able, it would be highly impractical. The existing investment, which, under
current law and the Fifth Amendment would have to be condemned, 2 runs
into many millions of dollars. Razing and reclamation would add billions more
to the federal bill.
2. Ban Private Entrepreneurs?
The powers-that-be have long assumed that private enterprise should pro-
vide national park services and facilities whenever and wherever it might be
profitable and appropriate to do so. Both the Meyers and Hansen bills proceed
on this assumption. Even though sentiment for turning that job over to the
NPS or any other public agency seems to be completely lacking in any politi-
cal quarter, and recent proposals have urged privatization of public resources
rather than the reverse,363 it still may be useful to examine the implicit as-
sumption that private entities are the best service and facility providers before
conforming all proposals for concessions reform to that assumption.
As matters now stand, private concessionaires receive monopolies to cater
to captive markets for any service that someone will pay for. The NPS, on the
other. hand, builds the main infrastructure such as roads and bridges and pro-
vides services such as visitor centers, lectures, trail maintenance, hiker rescues,
firefighting, security, campgrounds, clean ups, and so forth. All of these facili-
ties and amenities are free to the visiting public-and to concessionaires. The
concessionaires take large profits away from the parks while paying the United
States a relative pittance that goes into the general fund, not to the park sys-
357. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1 to la-I.
358. See, e.g., J. SAx, supra note 138.
359. Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a) (1994); PNRL, supra note 1, ch. 14B.
360. 16 U.S.C. § 1133 (c).
361. As of 1992, Congress had designated 39 million acres of the park system as official
wilderness. PNRL, supra note 1, §§ 2.04[21, 14B.02[2]. Congress carved additional wilderness
areas out of the California Desert Conservation Area in 1994. California Desert Protection Act of
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-433, 108 Stat. 4471 (1994).
362. On the subject of federal liability for takings, see PNRL, supra note 1, §§ 4.04-4.06, ch.
10B.
363. E.g., S. 1031, 104th Cong. (1995); H.R. 2032, 104th Cong. (1995) (bills that would
transfer to the states title to lands currently administered by the BLM).
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tem.' The NPS collects admission fees at many units, but those small fees
also go to the Treasury in Washington, D.C.365 These facts support the argu-
ment that the NPS should provide the profitable as well as the unprofitable
services to visitors. Public utilities traditionally were required to serve custom-
ers in relatively unprofitable outlying areas in exchange for the grant of exclu-
sive access to more profitable population centers.3" Permitting private con-
cessionaires to reap the profits of a monopoly market without bearing a fair
share of the cost of providing service to a captive market runs against this
tradition; allocating the risk of gain as well as loss to the government would
be consistent with it. Running a restaurant or gift shop is less complicated and
demanding than running a spy satellite system or building a dam. Government
personnel could pump gas, cut firewood, or run a canoe livery just as well as
corporate employees, and they would likely have more solicitude for the
parks' natural resources and values.
Certainly, elimination of private concessionaires would simplify many
conundrums and avoid many sources of inefficiency. To avoid knotty compen-
sation problems, it would be advisable, if not necessary, to impose such a
prohibition on a prospective basis only. Existing concession contracts would
be permitted to run their course but would not be renewed. If private conces-
sions were phased out in this manner, the whole bidding system and its thou-
sands of pages of regulations and its episodic bouts of litigation could be
jettisoned (although the government would still have to enter into procurement
contracts for construction materials, supplies, and the like). Most of the major
concessionaire problems identified by critics of the current system-monopoly,
possessory interests, preference renewal rights, low fees, and so forth-would
be mooted.
Due to the political environment, the counter arguments will likely pre-
vail, even though they are not nearly as strong as some of their advocates
seem to believe. The truism that this country is founded on private enterprise,
not socialistic public enterprise, has been forgotten or ignored whenever the
Congress has realized that private companies cannot or will not accomplish
what it deems to be a national priority. TVA, the irrigation of the West, Com-
sat, the Postal Service, rural electrification, Head Start, FDIC, agricultural
extension offices, and indeed, the national parks themselves, are but a few
examples. Still, the federal government has seldom ventured into profit-making
activities, and tradition militates against it. That tradition owes much to the
364. The federal government earned a 3.6% rate of return on all of its concessionaires' gross
revenues in fiscal year 1994. It earned only a 2.8% rate of return on the six land management
agencies' concessions. By way of contrast, the states of California, Maryland, Michigan, and Mis-
souri received a 12.7% rate of return on a similar range of concessions contracts during that peri-
od. GAO, CONCESSIONS CONTRACrING, supra note 116.
365. Those fees are restricted by law. 16 U.S.C. § 4601-6a.
366. The practice of restricting service to the most profitable segments of a market is called
cream-skimming. See City of Morgan City v. South La. Elec. Coop. Ass'n, 31 F.3d 319, 324 (5th
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 275 (1995); Associated Gas Distribs. v. F.E.R.C., 824 F.2d
981, 1035 (D.C. Cir. 1987), modified, 41 F.E.R.C. # 61,351 (1987); see also Danya B. Matthew,
Doing What Comes Naturally: Antitrust Law and Hospital Mergers, 31 HOUS. L. REv. 813, 833
(1994); Tony Prosser, Social Limits to Privatization, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 213, 237 (1995).
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initial premise that government cannot operate as efficiently as private indus-
try, another shibboleth more often recited than proven. The functioning of the
federal government when it acts in its sovereign capacity is designed to be
inefficient as a safeguard against tyranny.367 Similar safeguards are less nec-
essary when the government acts as a proprietor, and the government's exer-
cise of its sovereign functions do not disable it from acting efficiently as a
proprietor. Moreover, private sector monopolies are hardly a paradigm of
efficient behavior.3 s Monopolistic concessionaires have not offered evidence
that their performance is superior to what the government could achieve if it
appropriated the profit-making potential of park concessions to itself.
Even if concessionaires could supply such proof, it is not clear that eco-
nomically efficient provision of goods and services is the appropriate yardstick
of concessionaire performance. In national park concessions policy, service at
the least cost, generating the highest profits, should not necessarily be high on
the public priority list. Public policy should be more concerned with the quali-
ty of visitors' park experiences than with who provides them and at what
profit margin. "National Park Service, Inc." is not going to displace private
concessionaires on any large scale. Still, the idea that the agency is capable of
providing services if and when private services are absent or unsatisfactory is
not immoral or un-American, and it should not be automatically rejected. It
might even be worthwhile establishing a pilot project where the Park Service
operates expired concessions contracts at selected parks for several years.3"
At the end of that time, Congress could assess, using whatever criteria it de-
vises to gauge conformity with the objectives of park concession operations,
how the NPS concessions performed compared to previous private concessions
at the same parks and to contemporaneously operated private concessions at
other parks.
In any event, it seems clear that national parks will continue to have de-
veloped facilities for visitors and that private entities will continue to provide
the lion's share of facilities and services. But, as earlier noted, nearly all con-
cerned argue or concede that the present system is seriously flawed. How,
then, should the system be changed? That question cannot be answered until
Congress decides what the national parks should be, and for whom.
Concern with day-to-day crises often causes relative disregard for ultimate
ends. Managers (and academics) often lack the time (or inclination) to envi-
sion the best resolution of the entire problematic subject, when they are beset
367. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-37 (1952) (Frankfurt-
er, J., concurring).
368. "[F]irms in a monopoly position can restrict output, increase profits, and consequently
impose a social welfare loss by charging higher than competitive prices." SiDNEY A. SHAPERO &
JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, REGULATORY LAW AND POLICY 43-44 (1993).
369. Congress has often authorized pilot projects to determine whether to embark on new
directions in natural resource law and policy. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 2669 (1994) (establishing pilot
projects for production and marketing of industrial hydrocarbons and alcohols from agricultural
commodities and forest products); 16 U.S.C. § 1682 (1994) (implementing wood residue utiliza-
tion pilot projects); 16 U.S.C. § 5403(j)(2)(E) (1994) (describing pilot projects for innovative
approaches to management of maritime and underwater cultural resources at national parks and
similar sites).
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with putting out the daily fires. A vision of the optimum policy for conces-
sions in the national park system is, of course, a statement of political and
policy preference, but the task cannot be avoided if coherence is desired for
any particular proposal.
The object of concessions reform should not be to punish present or past
concessionaires for their real or imagined sins. They were, after all, merely
taking advantage of a favorable package of benefits that Congress had decided
was necessary and appropriate. Instead, the object should be promoting the
public interest in future concessions. Although the public interest in any par-
ticular situation can be uncertain and controversial, the public interest in this
case inheres in the nature of the national parks and the reasons they were
reserved as parks. The parks were reserved, first, for the enjoyment of the
American people. The organic Park Service statute specifically states that the
"curiosities" in the parks must be available to all and cannot be monopolized
by any one group."' Equally clearly, Congress never intended the national
parks to be amusement parks, devoted entirely to human entertainments and
comforts. Parks were created because Congress deemed each such area to be
unique and awe-inspiring in its natural attributes, and Congress specified that
those attributes (scenery, wildlife, etc.) were to be preserved for the enjoyment
and wonder of future generations.37 ' Hotels, gift shops, and canoe rentals
may be enjoyable and may even conceivably inspire wonder, but they are not
natural objects or systems worthy of preservation. Indeed, commercial enter-
prises are antithetical to basic park reservation purposes just as often as they
are necessary to full enjoyment of the parks by some.
The major objects of national park concessions policy, therefore, should
be to restrict and confine as much if not more than to enable. While the policy
should ensure equal access and full enjoyment for all Americans, it should
also strictly forbid overdevelopment of facilities. And while such a policy
must be fair to concessionaires, it should not overcompensate them either by
charging the government too little or by allowing them to charge the patrons
too much. These of course are fine lines, but line-drawing cannot be avoided
when achievement of conflicting aims is desired.
C. The Greater Questions
1. Limit or Lessen Facility Development?
The appropriate degree of development is a political question on a par
with whether any development should be allowed. Political questions should
be answered by Congress. In this case, Congress has already spoken to the
issue generally by requiring the Secretary of the Interior to encourage the pri-
vate provision and operation of "desirable" facilities and services for the ac-
commodation of park visitors,3" but its general answer controls relatively
few specific problematic instances.
370. 16 U.S.C. § 3 (1994).
371. Id. § 1.
372. Id. § 20a.
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The National Park Service's charter speaks both to recreation ("enjoy-
ment") and preservation.373 Where the two collide, present recreation should
yield to future preservation.3"4 The harm to the scenic and biotic resources
caused by intensive recreation is incompatible with future preservation, but
current preservational policies are usually compatible with future recreation
possibilities. In any event, the CPA codifies the notion of preservational prece-
dence in the realm of facility development.3 "
The competing Meyers and Hansen bills diverge very sharply in describ-
ing the desired ends of a park concessions policy. Hansen's H.R. 2028 spells
out only two purposes: (1) recognizing the importance of public-private part-
nerships; and (2) utilizing a competitive process to ensure fair prices, a fair
return, and "a reasonable opportunity for the economic viability of the con-
cessioner. ' ' 6 This assumes the appropriateness of existing and future facili-
ties. In contrast, the Meyers bill, H.R. 773, is replete with references to the
original park preservation purpose. Under this bill, Congress would find that
facilities "should be provided only under carefully controlled safeguards
against unregulated and indiscriminate use.., and... should be limited to
locations and designs consistent to the highest practicable degree with the
preservation and conservation of park resources and values.""'
Whether any particular recreational or commercial development is desir-
able or excessive is necessarily a circumstantial inquiry. If the appropriateness
of the proposal is in doubt, the better view, given the statutory strictures, is to
decide against it or to move the facility outside park boundaries. In many
cases, lands surrounding or adjacent to parks are under the control of the
BLM, the FWS, or, especially, the Forest Service. Gas stations, restaurants,
gift shops, and even campgrounds seem better suited for lands not subject to
the NPS's fundamentally preservational mandate. Coordination of concessions
policy among the federal land management agencies may be inconvenient and
require statutory amendments, but it will likely result in the achievement of a
better balance between resource protection and the provision of efficient and
adequate services to federal land users than the current patchwork arrange-
ments do.
By the same token, the.Park Service should accelerate its efforts to reduce
private motor vehicles in parks. Shuttle bus systems can transport hikers to
trailheads, campers to sites outside the back country, students to visitor cen-
ters, and all to the more popular attractions. Situations such as the overcrowd-
ing in Yosemite Valley and traffic jams around Old Faithful in Yellowstone
373. Id. §§ I to la-1.
374. See William Andrew Shutkin, Note, The National Park Service Act Revisited, 10 VA.
ENVTL. LJ. 345 (1991) (arguing that Congress intended to subordinate use to preservation in the
park system). The Eighth Circuit recently recognized that the national parks were "established for
both recreational and conservationist purposes. These purposes will sometimes, unavoidably, con-
flict, and even the Government cannot always adequately represent conflicting interests at the
same time." Mausolf v. Babbitt, 85 F.3d 1295, 1303 (8th Cir. 1996).
375. 16 U.S.C. § 20a.
376. H.R. 2028, 104th Cong. § 2 (1995).
377. H.R. 773, 104th Cong. § 2(a) (1995) (emphasis added).
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should not be tolerated. In some cases, rationing of recreational opportunities
will be necessary. The NPS naturally is loathe to deny access to its clientele,
but some situations demand restrictions on visitor numbers.378 The Park Ser-
vice closes hiking trails when continued use creates a risk of resource degrada-
tion and also limits back country camping permits to avoid overuse. There is
no reason not to regulate access to services and amenities when a failure to do
so would create similar risks.
2. Are Special Incentives Still Necessary?
No.
379
3. Keep the Franchise Fees?
Virtually all concerned seem to agree that concessionaire franchise fees
(and entrance fees) should be kept within the park system, not remitted to
Treasury's general accounts. The GAO reported in 1996 that the rate of return
on fiscal year 1994 concessions contracts was 3.3 times higher when the con-
tracting agencies were allowed to retain over fifty percent of fees than when
they were not. "[A]gencies authorized to retain fees reported obtaining more
fees in proportion to their concessioners' gross revenues than agencies [includ-
ing the land management agencies] that were not authorized to retain
fees."3 ° The GAO concluded that agencies not able to use concessions fees
have less incentive to collect them, while those authorized to use fees to sup-
port agency operations "put forth extra effort to obtain a high rate of return on
1,381concessions.
The Meyers bill, H.R. 773, would have created a special account; half the
fee proceeds would be rebated to the park unit of origin, and half used any-
where in the park system "on the basis of need. '382 Additionally, H.R. 773
would have empowered the Secretary to establish park-by-park Park Im-
provement Funds from franchise fees.383 The Hansen bill, H.R. 2028, includ-
ed a similar provision, except that seventy-five percent of the receipts would
be reserved for use in the area of origin.384 The other differences between
the rival provisions were not substantial.
These writers suggest that, while retention of fees within the NP system is
an excellent and necessary step, it is only a first step. Even vastly increased
fees will not begin to make a substantial dent in the backlog of needed park
maintenance and rehabilitation.385 If Congress seriously intends to maintain
378. Cf. Wilderness Pub. Rights Fund v. Kleppe, 608 F.2d 1250 (9th Cir. 1979) (stating that
since boating and rafting on the Colorado River posed a threat to the ecology of the river, the
NPS could limit usage to 96,600 user days per year).
379. See infra Part III.C.8.
380. GAO, CONCESSIONS CONTRACTING, supra note 116.
381. Id.
382. H.R. 773, 104th Cong. § 9(a) (1995).
383. Id. § 9(b)
384. H.R. 2028, 104th Cong. § 10 (1995).
385. See supra note 70 (describing the backlog of NPS maintenance needs).
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the national parks as the nation's crown jewels, further funding from some
other source or sources will be requisite. A national heritage preservation fund,
along the lines of the Land and Water Conservation Fund,386 would be ap-
propriate.
4. Who Should Own Park Improvements?
The "possessory interest" given concessionaires by current law has been a
considerable stumbling block to the introduction of competitive forces in NPS
concessions policy.3 7 Current concessionaires and their lenders and organiza-
tions remain zealous in defense of this concept, arguing that it is both neces-
sary and fair. The Hansen version recites that the policy of the United States
is "to encourage the private sector to develop, own and maintain" park facili-
ties."'8 Should the concession contract terminate, the Hansen bill would allow
the contractor to remove the improvements or be paid by the successor con-
cessionaire "fair market value" as determined by independent appraisal.3"9
The appraiser is to use an "income approach."3" As to NF and BLM lands,
the Hansen bill would have allowed the Secretaries to sell outright the lands
and facilities to concession holders, the value again to be determined by ap-
praisal.39
The Meyers bill, on the other hand, clearly states that title is to be vested
and is to remain in the United States.3" For concessionaires with existing
possessory interests on the date of enactment, their rights upon termination
remain governed by prior law.393 For new contracts involving existing pos-
sessory interests, however, the value of the improvement is to be reduced
annually by the straight-line depreciation provided by the tax code.39 The
improvement cannot be revalued upon transfer to another concessionaire,395
but the Secretary can suspend the depreciation mechanism if necessary to
obtain a satisfactory bid.396 All new structures are treated the same way: the
concessionaire's interest is limited to depreciated value as determined by the
straight-line method.397
In essence, Representative Hansen would give concessionaires permanent
property interests in whatever improvements they erect or purchase on the
federal lands-and, for NF and BLM lands, the Hansen approach would go
further and allow the concessionaires to obtain full fee title. The Meyers ap-
386. 16 U.S.C. §§ 4601-4 to 4601-11. See Coggins & Glicksman, supra note 25.
387. See supra notes 301-304 and accompanying text.
388. H.R. 2028 § I1(a).
389. Id. § Il(c)(1).
390. Id. § 1(c)(2).
391. Id.
392. H.R. 773, 104th Cong. § 15 (1995).
393. Id. § 12(a). This approach has the merit of minimizing takings questions. See supra note
362 and accompanying text.
394. H.R. 773 § 12(b)(1)(B).
395. Id. § 12(b)(1)(D).
396. Id. § 12(b)(2).
397. Id. § 12(c).
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proach would phase out private ownership of the facilities on park lands. From
the public interest standpoint, the Meyers approach is clearly preferable. Pos-
sessory interests now operate to reduce or eliminate competition among puta-
tive concessionaires, and permanent monopolies nearly always result in price-
gouging to the captive public. The GAO reported that in fiscal year 1994, new
and extended concessions agreements that granted possessory interests to pri-
vate contractors resulted in a rate of return of 3.8%, while the government
reaped a 4.5% rate of return on contracts that did not provide for such a
grant.39 Whether or not privatization is a good idea for NF and BLM lands,
it most certainly is a bad and politically unacceptable approach to the national
parks.
3 9
5. Who Should Set Service Prices (and How)?
The Hansen bill generally would let concessionaires set rates and prices
for services to the public.4' Prices pursuant to "concession service agree-
ments" (formal written contracts) would be subject to secretarial approval only
if insufficient competition existed in the vicinity."0 The approval determina-
tion would be based primarily on "comparable" services, but other factors
could be considered. The Meyers bill assumes secretarial approval of all ser-
vice charges and instructs the Secretary to consider the same factors as listed
in the Hansen bill.'
It seems abundantly clear both that the concessionaire must have some
primary controls over the prices it charges and also that some oversight mech-
anism is necessary to protect the captive public from monopolistic price-goug-
ing. "Comparable" rates are an uncertain guide because many out-of-national-
park services simply are not comparable to in-park services. A raft trip
through the Grand Canyon, for instance, is not really comparable even to a
raft trip of similar length further up the Colorado River, much less in other
venues. In contrast, prices for goods (hot dogs, film, etc.) usually can be rated
on comparability. Loose administrative oversight to curb the worst abuses
probably is the best available mechanism in the circumstances, and the compa-
rable rate at least is an objective starting point for reference.
6. External Procedures: Should the NPS Comply with the APA or
General Government Contract Law?
Section 12(d) of the Hansen bill would deny GAO jurisdiction under the
Competition in Contracting Act of 1984,'0 supersede seven other resource
laws,' exempt the NPS from NEPA compliance in connection with contract
398. GAO, CONCESSIONS CONTRACTING, supra note 116 at 34.
399. See generally Coggins & Nagel, supra note 25.
400. H.R. 2028, 104th Cong. § 5 (1995).
401. Id.
402. H.R. 773, 104th Cong. § 13 (1995).
403. Competition in Contracting Act, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 1175 (1984) (codified as
amended in scattered section of 31 U.S.C. and 41 U.S.C.).
404. H.R. 2028 § 16.
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renewals, 5 and require the agencies to promulgate a single set of imple-
menting regulations.' The Meyers bill would exempt the NPS from the
general federal leasing statute,' and require regulation promulgation in sev-
eral situations," but it otherwise does not address those procedural compli-
ance issues.
Whatever legislative reasons underlie the APA public property exemption
from rulemaking requirements,' they are not sufficient to overcome the
presumption that legal rules governing national parks should be accessible
without undue effort by any interested party. Neither prospective contractors
nor the general public should have to resort to obscure and unpublished agen-
cy manuals to determine the rules of the concessions contract game. The Park
Service, by expanding its use of rulemaking procedures in recent years, 1 °
implicitly recognizes the validity of that proposition. There is no good reason
why the NPS should not be required to make its rules public and available.
The advisability of subjecting concessions contracts to general government
contracting law is a more abstract and more difficult question.41 ' Given the
specifics in either the Meyers or Hansen bills, however, and the safeguards
each contains (Meyers more than Hansen), it seems unduly duplicative and
inefficient to import other sets of criteria probably intended for use in ordinary
government procurement, not provision of visitor services.
7. Statutory Rules or Administrative Discretion?
Neither the Hansen nor the Meyers bill directly confronts the questions
whether and to what extent Congress should delegate administrative "flexibili-
ty" to the National Park Service. Implicitly, the Hansen bill, by calling for
"partnerships" and not limiting facility development; opts for much adminis-
trative discretion except in the realm of impinging on concessionaire rights
and interests. 412 This version avoids "micromanagement" while allowing con-
tractors property rights that could preclude effective, discretionary regulation.
The Meyers bill is stricter on both the agency and its concessionaires. It too
necessarily delegates considerable administrative authority, but it has both
clearer directives on how such authority is to be exercised and also limits
assertions of private property rights in various ways.
We submit that the Meyers approach is preferable, although it probably
does not go far enough in channeling administrative discretion. The history of
federal public land law in general is replete with instances where agencies
have abused administrative discretion to accommodate commodity land us-
405. Id. § 7(e).
406. Id. § 18(a).
407. H.R. 773 § 16.
408. Id. §§ 6(a), 7(b), 8(b).
409. 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2) (1994). See supra notes 198-199 and accompanying text. See gen-
erally Arthur Earl Bonfield, Public Participation in Federal Rulemaking Relating to Public Prop-
erty. Loans, Grants, Benefits, or Contracts, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 540 (1970).
410. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
411. See supra notes 177-184 and accompanying text.
412. H.R. 2028, 104th Cong. § 2 (1995).
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ers.413 The extremely low return to the government from national park con-
cessions can be added to that list. Some degree of flexibility and discretion is
inevitable, otherwise the land managers would be mere ciphers. Nevertheless,
Congress traditionally has erred on the side of too much flexibility and too
few concrete legal guidelines.
8. "Partnerships" or Arms-Length Relations?
In any assessment of the Hansen and Meyers concessions reform legisla-
tion, a very basic question is whether the relationships between the United
States and its contractors are to be paternalistic or businesslike. Paternalism
(through subsidies, preferences, forgiveness, gifts, etc.) traditionally has been
rife throughout federal land law,4 4 and contemporary instances still abound.
In most cases, special treatment of this ilk has done more harm than good,
leaving such legacies as sterile, eroding grazing land, wasteful, inappropriate
agricultural practices, mine-scarred landscapes, poisoned watercourses, and
ugly clearcuts. We submit that the far superior policy is for the United States
to act in a businesslike arms-length fashion when dealing with for-profit insti-
tutions, whatever their size.
D. The Lesser Questions
1. Preference in Renewal or New Services?
The Meyers version recites that "a competitive selection process" is good
public policy and goes on to reject flatly preference in renewals4 " or in con-
tracting for additional services,"6 subject to two exceptions. Providers of
"outfitting guide, river running, or other substantially similar services within a
park" are entitled to preference renewal if their performances were satisfac-
tory.""4 7 Small concessionaires (gross receipts under $500,000) similarly
have a right to meet competing bids.4 ' The Hansen bill stresses "economic
viability" as well as the need for a "competitive process."4 9 That process is
watered down, however, by the provisions which would award existing con-
cessionaires "renewal incentives." If the prior concessionaire exceeded the
contract requirements, it would be entitled to a renewal incentive of twenty
percent "of the maximum points available" under performance evaluations; 20
a concessionaire who merely "meets" those agreement requirements would get
five percent.42 The Hansen bill would also empower the Secretary to "modi-
fy" existing agreements to allow the concessionaire to provide "closely relat-
413. See, e.g., PNRL, supra note 1, §§ 19.01[2], 21B.04[1J.
414. See generally id.
415. H.R. 773, 104th Cong. §§ 2(b)(5), 7(g) (1995).
416. Id. § 70).
417. Id. § 7(h).
418. Id. § 7(i).
419. H.R. 2028, 104th Cong. § 2(2) (1995).
420. Id. § 7(d)(2)(A).
421. Id. § 7(d)(2)(B).
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ed" services, evidently without any competitive process.422
Hansen's bill implicitly recognizes the anticompetitive effects of prefer-
ences by reducing their scope considerably. Still, the Meyers approach is pref-
erable (although it arguably does not go far enough) because it is a clear state-
ment that largely avoids the squabbles that will be inevitable in the Hansen
partial credit scheme. The existence of the preference renewal right was a
primary reform impetus; rooting it out as completely as possible should be the
first task of such reform. The GAO reported that in 1994, new NPS contracts
that included preferential rights of renewal generated a 3.8% rate of return.
Contracts without a preference resulted in a 6.4% rate of return." These fig-
ures confirm the obvious: "concessions agreements entered into on a competi-
tive basis had higher rates of return than those that were not competed.1
4 4
Preferential renewal rights deprive prospective concessionaires of much of
their incentive to spend time and money preparing bids because of the likeli-




Representative Meyers's preference for guide services makes little differ-
ence in practice because such services seldom constitute monopolies and usu-
ally do not require elaborate in-park facilities. Preference renewal for relative-
ly small concessionaires, however, effectively insulates what may be the least
efficient providers from competition by other small businesses.
2. Distinguish Between Large and Small Contracts?
Representative Hansen's H.R. 2028 differentiates between "concession
service agreements" and "concession licenses." '426 The former is the usual
concession contract while the latter may be given for "infrequent" activities
where either any number can supply the goods or services involved or the
situation lacks "competitive interest." 27 Concession licenses may not exceed
three years4' and are nontransferable,4' but no fee setting mechanism is
indicated. The Meyers bill, on the other hand, makes size distinctions in sever-
al contexts. As mentioned above, concessionaires who either have annual gross
receipts of less than $500,000 or provide guide services (evidently assumed to
be small entities) remain entitled to preference renewal rights.43" H.R. 773
would also provide different rules for "concession contracts" and "commercial
use authorizations.""43 The latter would be relatively rare because the secre-
tarial authority to issue them would be tightly restricted. They would be avail-
able only if:
422. Id. § 7(f).
423. GAO, CONCESSIONS CONTRACTING, supra note 116, at 35.
424. Id. at 6.
425. Id. at 7.
426. H.R. 2028 § 4.
427. Id. § 4(a)(2).
428. Id. § 4(b)(1).
429. Id. § 6(b).
430. H.R. 773, 104th Cong. §§ 7(h), 7(i) (1995).
431. Id. §§ 3(2), 6.
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The applicant has gross revenues of not more than $25,000 (or oper-
ates outside a park, using the park only incidentally);
432
The use will have "minimal impact" on park resources and is consis-
tent with park preservation; 433 and
In the aggregate, the uses do not harm park values.434
Only a "reasonable" fee need be paid for commercial use authorizations,
which are limited to two-year terms.433
The United States and individual states long have had laws and policies
that discriminate in favor of smaller business entities, the Small Business
Administration subsidies being only one of many examples. That policy pref-
erence is rife in many areas of public natural resources law, from reclamation
limitations4 36 to mining claim assessment work fees. 47 Still, it is not be-
yond reasonable contention that such discrimination is inappropriate when
dealing with for-profit businesses. As argued above, it is a bad idea to make
renewal preferences available and such preferences should be jettisoned en-
tirely from NPS concessions law. The case is even stronger for abolishing
preferences for relatively small concessionaires because the competitors being
precluded usually are also small businesses.
The distinction between contracts and licenses, however, is sensible in
several contexts. The difference between, say, a hotel complex concession and
permission to conduct horse rides along park trails is enormous in most ways
of measuring. Representative Meyers' limitations on licenses, stressing mini-
mal impact on park resources, would be consistent with basic park poli-
cies-although the $25,000 gross revenue limitation seems overly restrictive.
3. Should Departures from Competitive Bidding be Allowed, and If So,
When?
Both the Hansen and Meyers bills are full of exceptions to competitive
bidding, and, indeed, the main contract award mechanisms of each contain
subjective standards that detract from pure competition. Preferences, posses-
sory interests, and noncompetitive licenses (not to mention the natural advan-
tages of an entrenched operation) also lower the quantum of competition. In
line with the recommendation above that the United States eschew paternalism
in favor of treating businesses as businesses, we submit that any concessions
reform legislation expressly adopt competitive bidding as the norm and tightly
restrict any administrative discretion to depart from that norm. An obvious
situation where a departure probably will be justified is when no bids are
received in response to a proposal.43 But such exceptions should be rare.
432. Id. § 6(c)(1).
433. Id. §§ 6(b)(1) to 6(b)(2)(B).
434. Id. § 6(b)(2)(D).
435. Id. §§ 6(b)(2)(A), 6(d).
436. See PNRL, supra note 1, §§ 21B.03[4], 21B.04[3].
437. See id. § 25.0316].
438. Cf PNRL, supra note 1, § 20.03[31 (discussing the Forest Service's authority to reject
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4. Depreciation or Appraisal as a Valuation Method?
The Hansen bill in essence continues the present system whereby a con-
cessionaire whose contract is terminated is entitled to compensation for the
"fair market value" of any improvements to be used by the successor, and it
establishes income-approach appraisal as the method for determining that val-
ue.439 The Meyers bill, on the other hand,. would phase in straight-line depre-
ciation as the valuation method for concessionaire built improvements.' The
difference is fundamental. The Hansen approach gives contractors a perpetual
near-fee interest in facilities on park lands, while the Meyers approach would
result in eventual public ownership of those facilities. For all of the reasons
elicited in sections IIB.2.c and IIIC.4 above, straight-line depreciation is a far
better measuring standard. Indeed, we urge Congress to consider whether to go
an additional step and deduct from initial cost of improvement the depreciation
actually claimed by the concessionaire on its income tax returns.
5. Franchise Fees: Gross or Net?
Both the Meyers and Hansen bills finesse the problem of franchise fee
calculation. The Meyers version recites that:
Franchise fees, however stated, shall not be less than the minimum
fee established by the Secretary for each contract. The minimum fee
shall be determined in a manner that will provide the concessioner
with a reasonable opportunity to realize a profit on the operation as a
whole, commensurate with the capital invested and the obligations
assumed under the contract."
This standard, of course, says virtually nothing. The Hansen bill is only a little
more forthcoming. The Secretary is to set a minimum fee based on "histori-
cal" data, but the final fee will be the amount actually bid.' 2 The fee there-
after can be modified only for inflation unless the concessionaire agrees." 3
Publicity about seemingly absurdly low franchise fees fueled the concern
that led to these reform proposals, yet neither directly confronts the prob-
lem. 4 In other contexts, Congress has set minimum royalties for mineral
extraction"' and park entrance fees are also dictated by legislation.' A
private lessor seldom guarantees its lessee commensurate profits. The Meyers
version, with its generous grant of discretion to the NPS to set minimum fees,
is better than the Hansen version, but a statutory provision setting a minimum
at some percentage of gross revenues appears even more preferable.
all bids on timber sale contracts).
439. H.R. 2028, 104th Cong. § 11(c)(1995).
440. H.R. 773, 104th Cong. § 12 (1995).
441. Id. § 8(a).
442. H.R. 2028 § 9(b).
443. Id. § 9(c).
444. See supra notes 221-223 and accompanying text.
445. See PNRL, supra note 1, §§ 22.03[3][d], 23.03[2][b][iv], 24.0413][b1.
446. 16 U.S.C. § 4601-6a.
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6. How to Resolve Disputes?
The Hansen bill provides for establishment of a Board of Concession
Appeals which, although similar to the Interior Board of Land Appeals, would
be "an independent administrative review board."" 7 It would have jurisdic-
tion over all concessions matters except "expiration of a concession authoriza-
tion." Thereafter any person may seek judicial review in the Court of Fed-
eral Claims pursuant to the Tucker Act. 9 "Concession license" decisions
would be reviewed in federal district court. ° Then, in a curious provision,
the Hansen bill says that "[i]f the Secretary concerned breaches a concession
authorization, the Secretary shall pay just compensation to the concession-
er.' '451 The Meyers bill contains no equivalent provision, leaving matters to
review under the Administrative Procedure Act or to contract damage actions
under the Tucker Act. It does instruct the Secretary to promulgate dispute
resolution regulations in the sole context of contract awards.45
We agree with Representative Hansen that a reform bill ought to spell out
a dispute resolution mechanism, but we disagree with the version he has pro-
posed. First, the "just compensation" provision is unprecedented, unwarranted,
and little short of silly. Just compensation is the appropriate remedy for a Fifth
Amendment taking;453 damages are appropriate for a breach of contract. The
agency is already liable for contract breaches under the current law.41 4 Sec-
ond, creation of an independent board makes scnse only if the legislation cov-
ers all concession-granting agencies--a question beyond the scope of this
article. Third, the exception from review of concession authorization expiration
is at best mysterious: if preference rights are to be retained at all, then those
with some form of preference certainly have a legitimate interest in seeking
review if they are terminated.
A faster and cheaper alternative mechanism would be assignment of a
single administrative law judge to the National Park Service to make the initial
ruling on NPS/concessionaire disputes, with one appeal to the Secretary. The
statute should specify periods of time in which both the ALJ and the Secretary
must rule. Thereafter, review would be in the appropriate federal court, de-
pending on whether the relief sought is equitable (federal district court) or
damages (Court of Federal Claims).
447. H.R. 2028 § 12(a)(1).
448. Id. § 12(a)(2).
449. Id. § 12(c)(2).
450. Id. § 12(c)(3).
451. Id. § 13.
452. H.R. 773, 104th Cong. § 7(a)(2) (1995).
453. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
454. See PNRL supra note 1, ch. 9.
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7. How to Evaluate Concessionaire Performance?
The Meyers and Hansen bills do not differ very drastically in the matter
of evaluating concessionaire performance. The Meyers bill requires only "peri-
odic" (as opposed to annual) evaluations, does not define performance criteria,
and generally gives the Secretary more authority to discipline or terminate
unsatisfactory concessionaires." The Hansen version contains sketchy crite-
ria and in general is more solicitous of concessionaire interests. 56 Neither
provision adds much to either bill, and neither seems to change current law
very much.
The Court of Federal Claims in the 1993 YRT case457 formulated a rath-
er restrictive test for the judicial review of NPS selection of concessionaires,
which, according to the court, "essentially involve[s] a matter of business
judgment. ''M This deferential review posture is appropriate, but for reasons
somewhat different from those stated by the court. As indicated above,459 the
Park Service ought to engage in arms-length transactions with its concession-
aires, rather than bestowing upon them unwarranted and preferential treatment
not available to businesses normally operating in a competitive market. But
Park Service concessions are not just businesses designed to maximize profit
for their operators. Instead, they have been authorized by Congress to enhance
the recreational experiences enjoyed by Park Service visitors, and that ought to
be an important touchstone of concessionaire performance. It is therefore ap-
propriate, as Meyers's bill does, to vest in the NPS considerable discretion to
select, evaluate, and terminate concessionaires in conformity with that goal.
The agency's efforts to implement its responsibilities typically will require a
balancing of potentially conflicting aspects of recreation, such as the provision
of more campgrounds and the preservation of unspoiled natural areas. In exer-
cising that discretion, the Park Service should of course assess the
concessionaire's managerial competence and financial solvency;' poorly
supplied concessions facilities that are in physical disrepair are not likely to
meet the demands of park visitors, and they may detract from visual enjoy-
ment of the parks. These are likely to be the easy cases, however. How should
the NPS regard an efficient concessionaire whose operations appear to reflect
less than an optimal sensibility for the scenic wonders amidst which the con-
cession is located? The criterion referred to in the YRT case--the extent to
which the concessionaire understands the NPS mission and the concessioner's
role in carrying out that mission--is obviously quite amorphous, but at
bottom the priorities it reflects are sound. Concessionaire evaluations should
be based on factors that include quality of visitor services, financial perfor-
455. H.R. 773 § 14.
456. H.R. 2028, 104th Cong. § 8 (1995).
457. YRT Servs. Corp. v. United States, 28 Fed. C1. 366 (1993); see supra Part n.B.2.b.i.
458. YRT Servs. Corp., 28 Fed. C1. at 394.
459. See supra Part II.B.8.
460. See YRT Servs. Corp., 28 Fed. C. at 371-72.
461. id. at 376.
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mance, and compliance with the provisions of the contract and applicable
laws. 2
CONCLUSION
Millions of visitors each year stream through the national parks. Many if
not most of them seek out goods or services to embellish some aspect of their
visits. The management of national parks concessions is therefore big busi-
ness. The consensus of opinion from all corners seems to be that this business
has not been functioning smoothly. The excessive development of concessions
facilities, the shielding of concessionaires from normal competitive processes,
the provision of an inadequate share of concessions revenues to the govern-
ment, and the inability of the Park Service to devote the government's revenue
share to needed facility maintenance and other park improvement projects all
have been raised as negative features of the status quo.
Although a consensus in favor of reform has emerged, the shape of that
reform has been harder to agree upon. The two major reform vehicles debated
in Congress during the 104th Congress represent incremental reform, although
one of the reform bills, H.R. 1028, seems more heavily weighted in favor of
concessionaire interests than the other, H.R. 773. We have suggested in this
article that a broader inquiry is called for, one which takes nothing for granted
and which questions even heretofore unassailable premises such as the as-
sumptions that the parks ought to be developed and that concessions facilities
are best run by private entrepreneurs. We also recognize, however, that, even
revolutions in administrative structuring hailed as fait accomplis often wind up
as revolutions that never were. Radical reforms engendered by reassessments
of initial premises are therefore unlikely.
The less fundamental but still important questions implicated in national
park concessions reform include determination of the optimal level of recre-
ation facility development and recreational services, of the uses to which con-
cession fees should be allocated, of the locus of responsibility for and the
mechanisms that govern the establishment of fees for goods and services, and
of the degree to which concessionaires should be treated in a manner apart
from other government contractors. It will be impossible for policymakers to
resolve these questions without an overriding conception of the role that the
parks should play, which in turn may entail establishing a hierarchy among the
functions served by the national parks. In our view, the most fundamental
tension is between developing the parks in a manner that increases access to
park resources and developing them in a manner that removes from the parks
the natural attributes responsible for their designation as national parks in the
first place. There is certainly ample room in many instances to achieve the
first goal without sacrificing the second. If, however, conflict becomes un-
462. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 104-280, pt. 1 (1995), available in 1995 WL 646552 (§
9306(a)(1) of the Visitor Facilities and Services Enhancement Act of 1995).
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avoidable, then we submit that the preservation purposes of the parks should
take precedence over their recreational aspects, as Congress appears to have
intended both when it enacted the Park Service's organic act and when it
adopted the CPA. Having faced the essential policy conundrums involved in
resolving this tension, policymakers should find it relatively easy to answer the
more prosaic questions raised in section IlD above, or at least to conclude
that these questions can be addressed by analogy to government contract
mechanisms in other areas.
THE PROBLEM OF STATUTORY DETAIL IN NATIONAL
PARK ESTABLISHMENT LEGISLATION AND ITS
RELATIONSHIP TO POLLUTION CONTROL LAW
ROBERT L. FISCHMAN*
INTRODUCTION
Legal scholarship examining national park management focuses almost
exclusively on the so-called "Organic Act" describing the overarching mandate
for the National Park Service ("NPS" or "Service"). Title 16 of the United
States Code prominently proclaims in its first section the famous kernel of this
1916 law, significantly clarified in 1978, that the purpose of national parks,
monuments, and reservations is
to conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the
wild life therein and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such
manner and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the
enjoyment of future generations.'
This visionary mandate is what most commentators home in on when they
discuss national park management.2 Certainly, it is what Wallace Stegner had
in mind when he referred to the national parks as "the best idea we ever
had."3
But the bright fame of this broad statement of purpose has blinded many
scholars to several hundred sections that follow it in Title 16. These are the
* Associate Professor, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington. A.B., 1984,
Princeton University; M.S., J.D., University of Michigan, 1987. I thank my colleagues who of-
fered wide-ranging insights on my ideas at an Indiana University School of Law colloquium. Fred
Cate offered particularly constructive comments on an earlier draft. I also thank Professor Jan
Laitos for inviting me to present my work in this symposium. Students Peter Dykstra, Thomas Ice,
and Christian Freitag provided able research assistance. I received generous support through an
Indiana University School of Law Summer Faculty Fellowship.
1. 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1994) [hereinafter Organic Act].
2. See, e.g., Dennis J. Herman, Loving Them to Death: Legal Controls on the Type and
Scale of Development in the National Parks, 11 STAN. ENVTL. LJ. 3, 4 (1992); Robert B. Keiter,
National Park Protection: Putting the Organic Act to Work, in OUR COMMON LANDS: DEFENDING
TE NATIONAL PARKS 75 (David J. Simon ed., 1988); John Lemons & Dean Stout, A Reinterpre-
tation of National Park Legislation, 15 ENvTL. L. 41, 42 (1984); William Andrew Shutkin, Note,
The National Park Service Act Revisited, 10 VA. ENVTL. LJ. 345, 361 (1991); see also Clayton L.
Riddle, Comment, Protecting the Grand Canyon National Park from Glen Canyon Dam: Environ-
mental Law at Its Worst, 77 MARQ. L. REv. 115, 126-29 (1993) (describing constraints on NPS
power to protect parklands).
3. William J. Lockhart, External Park Threats and Interior's Limits: The Need for an Inde-
pendent National Park Service, in OUR COMMON LANDS: DEFENDING THE NATIONAL PARKS 3, 3
(David J. Simon ed., 1988) (quoting Wallace Stegner, The Best Idea We Ever Had, 46 WILDER-
NESS 4 (1983)).
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sections that establish to which lands the overarching mandate will apply and,
increasingly in recent years, detail how the Organic Act will apply to the spe-
cifically reserved units managed by the Service. The Organic Act would be
nothing more than a distant vision, with no on-the-ground application, were it
not for the establishment statutes that have created 54 national parks, 73 na-
tional monuments, and a variety of other reservations in the 374-unit national
park system.
4
There are good reasons why the literature on national park management
focuses on the Organic Act. Certainly, the overarching mandate is one of the
most important statements of American cultural values enacted as environmen-
tal law. Also, it is the fundamental interpretive rule in exercising and review-
ing the proprietary management discretion of the Service. The Organic Act,
unlike establishment legislation, applies comprehensively to the entire geo-
graphic sweep of the national park system.5 Finally, the Organic Act sets up
an elegant tension between providing for enjoyment (often interpreted as recre-
ation) and leaving units unimpaired (often interpreted as preservation). This
tension has stoked the furnace of countless heated arguments over manage-
ment direction for the Service.6
Unfortunately, this deserved interest in the NPS organic legislation has
almost completely eclipsed searching analysis of establishment legislation.
This Article is an initial step toward addressing the importance of establish-
ment- legislation. Although examination of establishment legislation cannot
substitute for application of the Organic Act, it is critical to understanding the
changing role of Congress in the actual management of the national park
system and important trends in environmental law. The first Section of this
Article outlines the importance of establishment legislation to legal scholar-
ship. Section Two describes the general trend in environmental law for Con-
gress, through greater statutory detail, to assume an ever larger role in specify-
ing how agencies should implement delegated programs. This Section also
4. List of Units in the National Park System (visited Nov. 10, 1996)
<http://www.nps.gov/legacy/npslist.html> [hereinafter List]. All of the reserved lands managed by
the Service, not just designated "national parks," are part of the national park system. 16 U.S.C. §
lc(a) (1994). All national park system units are subject to the same organic legislation to the ex-
tent that it does not conflict with provisions specifically applicable to them. Id. § lc(b)7. Specifi-
cally applicable provisions generally appear in establishment legislation.
5. 16 U.S.C. § lc(b). Units of the park system range.from the modest, such as Fort Stanwix
National Monument, New York, to the vast, such as Wrangell-St. Elias National Park, Alaska.
List, supra note 4. Delaware is the only state unrepresented in the over 80 million acres of the
national park system. Id.
6. Compare Herman, supra note 2 (arguing for narrow Service discretion in balancing com-
peting interests), with Douglas 0. Linder, New Direction for Pre~ervation Law: Creating an Envi-
ronment Worth Experiencing, 20 ENVTL. L. 49, 49 (1990) (arguing for a new balancing approach
emphasizing the human experience), and Riddle, supra note 2 (arguing for legislative restructuring
of park management), and Robin Winks, Dispelling the Myth, NAT'L PARKS, July/Aug. 1996, at
52 (arguing that the tension is contrived because unimpairment concerns supersede all else). See
generally, George Cameron Coggins, Protecting the Wildlife Resources of National Parks from
External Threats, 22 LAND & WATER L. REv. 1, 15-27 (1987) (proposing legislative changes and
approaches to reduce external threats); Robert B. Keiter, Beyond the Boundary Line: Constructing
a Law of Ecosystem Management, 65 U. CoLO. L. RaV. 293, 296-312 (1994) (discussing the
current state of ecosystem management under the Organic Act).
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reviews the trend as it has appeared in pollution control legislation and de-
scribes the parallel trend in establishment legislation, highlighting similarities
and differences. Section Three explores the reasons for the growth in statutory
detail in environmental law, and establishment legislation in particular. In both
the pollution control and national park context, specific congressional manage-
ment mandates become more prevalent in legislation addressing second-gener-
ation problems. Second-generation problems are those that remain after Con-
gress and agencies address the relatively low-cost, easy issues in a field. Sec-
tion Four discusses the effects of the growth of statutory detail on the NPS.
On balance, this growth frustrates the objective of systemic management of
national park units. Section Five outlines a course of reform to facilitate sys-
temic management.
SECTION I: LEARNING FROM NPS ESTABLISHMENT LEGISLATION
There are two reasons why scholars should turn their attention to 'NPS
establishment legislation. First, from a purely descriptive point of view, estab-
lishment legislation indicates the changing attitude of Congress toward parks.
Establishment legislation is an increasingly important but almost uniformly
overlooked source of objectives for management of the national park system.
One simply cannot understand the priorities and decisions that guide planning
for the national park system without reviewing establishment legislation. Sec-
ond, as a classic example of the proprietary strand of environmental law,7 es-
tablishment legislation provides an instructive contrast with pollution control
law. Existing literature describing the reasons for and the effects of statutory
detail in pollution control law provides a benchmark for evaluating the role of
Congress in the management of the national park system. The study of estab-
lishment legislation highlights important areas of unity in these two disparate
strands.
A. The Role of Congress in the Management of the National Park System
Any single statute is a snapshot of the congressional landscape at the time
of its enactment. Important legislation, such as the Organic Act, conveys a
great deal about the compromises and accommodations necessary to secure
enactment. However, because Congress seldom amends overarching legisla-
tion, these statutes have limited use as indicators of trends. Establishment
statutes, because Congress regularly enacts them, serve well as indicators of
the expanding role of congressional involvement in national park system man-
agement. Perhaps the most important trend revealed by establishment legis-
lation over the past few decades is the expansion in the number of units com-
posing the national park system.'
Less noted but equally important, however, is the tendency in recent de-
7. The proprietary strand of environmental law governs management of publicly owned
resources.
8. See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
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cades for Congress to specify in greater detail the management tasks for newly
established units of the national park system. In its simplest form, establish-
ment legislation would specify the metes and bounds of an area to be reserved
or acquired for management by the Service under the Organic Act.9 However,
during the past twenty-five years, Congress has rarely limited its lawmaking to
simple area designation in establishment legislation. As the discussion in Sec-
tion Two of this article will show, Congress increasingly tailors management
instructions to the Service for each unit established. Congress may specify
management constraints on park administration with respect to visitor activities
such as fishing, hunting, or grazing.' ° It also may set out a particular process
for planning, involving public hearings and consultations; and, it may require
the management plan itself to address certain issues."
The greater congressional attention to management detail in establishment
legislation gives rise to an increasingly important but frequently overlooked
source of law for management of the national park system. Although the Or-
ganic Act remains an important interpretive tool, Service decision-makers must
look first to establishment legislation to determine whether it speaks to an
issue that an NPS unit needs to deal with. 2 In the past decade, commentators
have increasingly called for management reform to strengthen the Service's
efforts in preservation. As the biological diversity of the United States contin-
ues to erode, for instance, the national park system becomes ever more valu-
able to maintain the biological integrity of representative ecosystems through-
out the country. 3 An examination of establishment legislation reveals that
simple clarification of the Organic Act to stress the preservation prong of the
Service's dual mandate, or even amending the Organic Act to embrace explic-
itly biological diversity, would not be sufficient to achieve comprehensive
reform. Establishment legislation, which guides the management and planning
for individual parks would also need to be revisited. 4
9. The establishment legislation for Haleakala National Park illustrates this bare-bones ap-
proach. See 16 U.S.C. § 396b, c (1994).
10. The establishment legislation for Great Basin National Park for instance, discusses zon-
ing waters for fishing and limiting grazing. See id. § 410mm-l(b), (c) (1994).
11. The establishment legislation for Channel Islands National Park, for instance, provides a
deadline for a management plan, requires consultation with certain interested parties, mandates
certain contents of the plan, requires public hearings in particular locations to discuss certain is-
sues, specifies low-intensity and limited entry management, prohibits entry fees, and mandates
certain studies. See id. § 410ff, ff-2, ff-3, ff-6.
12. Id. § lc(b); NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, MANAGEMENT
POLICIES 2:6 (1988) [hereinafter MANAGEMENT PoLIcIEs] ("Congressionally directed plans will be
given a priority that enables their completion within the required time frame."). See, e.g., NATION-
AL PARK SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, FINAL GENERAL MANAGEMENT
PLAN/ENVtRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT: CARLSBAD CAVERNS 4 (1996) [hereinafter FINAL
GENERAL MANAGEMENT PLAN] (recognizing establishment legislation to describe park purpose);
Todd Wilkinson, Crowd Control: With a Pilot Program at Arches National Park, the National
Park Service Is Charting a Promising New Course for Visitor Management, NAT'L PARKS, Ju-
ly/Aug. 1995, at 36, 39 (describing a resource management program in Arches National Park that
begins with a re-examination of the establishment legislation).
13. See Robert B. Keiter, The Old Faithful Protection Act: Congress, National Park Eco-
systems, and Private Property Rights, 14 PUB. LAND L. REV. 5, 5-8 (1993); Linder, supra note 6,
at 63-69.
14. Organic Act reform could, say, mandate restoration and preservation of biological diver-
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Furthermore, the current climate of fiscal austerity heightens the impor-
tance of establishment legislation. As federal budgets for NPS management
constrict, the Service has ever-diminishing resources to dedicate to discretion-
ary activities. 5 Management mandates contained in establishment legislation
are always a high funding priority compared to discretionary activities; but, as
budgets become tighter, the mandates may be the only activities that the Ser-
vice can afford. Even where the establishment legislation contains recommen-
dations and not mandates, these expressions of congressional preference must
be accorded high priority. As federal budgets chop lower priority programs off
the Service's agenda, increasingly the activities actually funded will be those
mentioned in establishment legislation. These establishment activities are the
inner core of programs most protected from the fiscal ax.
Perhaps most important from a park management perspective, the trend of
increasing congressional management through establishment legislation thwarts
efforts to manage the national park system as a system rather than a mere
collection of lands. Whether to conserve representative ecosystems or create an
outdoor university for environmental and cultural appreciation, any compre-
hensive attempt at management of the national park system must stumble over
the scores of hurdles erected by establishment legislation provisions. To some
extent, this is precisely the design of increased congressional involvement in
NPS unit management: to impede executive branch power to change the
course of land management policy.
But, the units managed by the Service purport to be part of a national
park system. A system is a group of interrelated elements forning a collective
entity; 6 a complex unity formed of many diverse parts subject to a common
plan or' serving a common purpose; an aggregation or assemblage of objects
joined in interdependence. 7 Establishing a framework within which units can
interrelate is important not simply to fulfill the semantic promise of a national
park system. It also allows each unit to contribute to a purpose broader than
mere individual conservation of a unit's particular resources in its local con-
text. At its outset, the national park system was infused with cultural meaning:
sity. If Congress provided that this mandate superseded all establishment legislation provisions
incompatible with achieving the biological diversity goals, it might solve the problem of amending
each establishment statute separately. This blanket solution, however, would not express con-
gressional intent as clearly as identifying just which establishment legislation provisions should be
deemed incompatible. In any event, the existence of the establishment legislation management
provisions cannot be overlooked in any reform proposal. See infra Section IV for consideration of
a wider range of possible Organic Act reforms.
15. When the NPS celebrated its 75th anniversary, it participated in an intensive evaluation
of its performance, commonly identified by the name of the town where the park management
syumposium was held: Vail, Colorado. At the time, the results of the study were published in
1993, the core operating budget of the agency had "remained flat.in real terms since 1983" while
recreational visits to the system had risen 25 percent. NATIONAL PARK SERVICE STEERING COM-
MrITEE, NATIONAL PARKS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: THE VAIL AGENDA 11 (1993) [hereinafter
THE VAIL AGENDA]. In 1994, the Service fielded one ranger for every 80,000 visitors to the sys-
tem, compared with one ranger for every 59,000 visitors in 1980. Michael Milstein, National Park
Service Is Put on a Starvation Diet, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, May 16, 1994, at 3.
16. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1823 (3d ed. 1992).
17. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2322 (1986).
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monumentalism was the principle that linked park units."8 Over time, the
principle of protecting healthy functioning ecosystems emerged as an
aspirational, systemic theme. 9 However, as this theme emerged, scores of
new units were added to the system, many (such as the 112 historical parks
and sites) with no monumental scenery or ecological significance.
In recent years, many critics of the national park system have called for
paring down the number of units managed by the Service.2" However, with-
out a clear consensus on just what is the purpose of the system, any effort to
decommission units will miss the mark. This points to the need for reform and
clarification of the Organic Act to better describe the goals of the national
park system. After that is accomplished, the critics who complain of dilution
of the mission of the Service through pork-barrel parks can look to establish-
ment legislation for clues as to which units are the least consistent with the
broad charge of the NPS. Extensive management mandates in establishment
legislation may be an indication that a unit does not fit very well within the
existing framework of the national park system.
B. The Instructive Contrast with Pollution Control Law
The relative silence in legal scholarship on the trend toward more detailed
management mandates in establishment legislation for the NPS contrasts stark-
ly with the widely noted trend in pollution control law of more congressional
involvement in regulatory matters. One task of this Article is to describe the
extent to which these two trends are actually manifestations of a single devel-
opment in the relationship between Congress and agencies in environmental
law.2' The contrast in the literature reflects a wider gulf between the pollution
control and the natural resource management strands of environmental law.
This gulf frustrates the borrowing of insights from one strand that might apply
to the other. This Article explores the extent to which fruitful cross-fertiliza-
tion may result from efforts to reweave these divergent strands of environmen-
tal law.
Beginning with the proliferation of federal statutes regulating polluting
activities in the early 1970s, environmental law commentary and practitioners
have split into two distinct branches, or strands. The first, and newest, deals
with pollution control. It is generally characterized by legislation authorized by
the Commerce Clause22 that employs agencies to regulate activities to control
18. ALFRED RUNTE, NATIONAL PARKS: THE AMERICAN ExPERIENcE 33-35 (2d ed. 1987).
19. See id. at 65-67; Robert B. Keiter & Mark S. Boyce, Greater Yellowstone's Future: Eco-
system Management in a Wilderness Environment, in THE GREATER YELLOWSTONE ECOSYSTEM:
REDEFINING AMERICA'S WILDERNESS HERITAGE 379, 379-82, 402-07 (Robert B. Keiter & Mark
S. Boyce eds., 1991).
20. See 141 CONG. REC. H9085 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1995) (statement of Rep. Hansen);
JAMES M. RIDENOUR, THE NATIONAL PARKS COMPRONISED: PORK BARREL PoLITIcs AND
AMERICA'S TREASURES 16-19 (1994).
21. See infra Section m. The broader trend of increasing statutory detail outside of environ-
mental law is undeniable but beyond the scope of this article.
22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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pollution. The other strand, with roots in the conservation movement of the
early twentieth century, is generally characterized by legislation authorized by
the Property Clause23 that employs agencies to act as proprietors of natural
resources. These distinctions are reflected in the organization of agencies as
well as the committee structures of Congress.
Historically, pollution control law has focused on controlling use of the
environment as a sink for environmentally undesirable substances. Natural
resources law has focused on controlling use of the environment as a source of
environmental goods. Increasingly, however, these distinctions are fading. One
reason for this merging is that, after early, relatively easy successes, each
strand now requires coordination with the other to achieve its goals. For in-
stance, reducing water pollution in order to sustain high quality uses of a river
may require restrictions on public logging in the watershed (natural resources
law) as well as the application of best technology to dischargers along the
river (pollution control law).24 Similarly, maintaining viable populations of
wildlife essential to a national park (natural resources law) may require restric-
tions on air emissions (pollution control law).'
Another trend pulling together the divergent strands of environmental law
is the heightened recognition of ecological integrity (or biological diversity) as
a goal that undergirds the maintenance of environmental quality. Ecological
integrity depends upon resource use that both designates for preservation core
refuge areas and minimizes destructive impacts of commodity uses. It also
depends upon pollution control that considers effects of pollutants on wildlife
and plants as well as the more traditional human health criterion.26 Many en-
vironmental law programs, such as regulating dredge or fill activities,27 blur
the distinction in the sense that they employ the tools of one field (such as
permitting from pollution control) to zone and manage natural resources (such
as wetlands). These programs complicate the simplified model of two distinct
strands but nonetheless may be placed on a spectrum defined by the two
branches.
23. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
24. Siltation is the leading cause of impairment of rivers and streams in the United States.
U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, NATIONAL WATER QUALITY INVENTORY: 1992
REPORT TO CONGRESS 3. In its 1992 inventory, the Environmental Protection Agency [EPA] at-
tributed impairment through silviculture as the source of seven percent, and resource extraction as
the source of eleven percent, of the assessed river miles impaired by pollution. Id. at 20. In many
states, these activities are managed on federal public lands. Another example of a public land
management activity that impacts ambient environment quality is prescribed burning, which con-
tributes to air pollution problems in many parts of the country. See, e.g., GRAND CANYON VlSI-
aIrLTY TRANSPORT COMMISSION, PROPOSED RECOMMENDATIONS ii, 49-51 (April 1996 Draft for
Public Comment); JANICE PETERSON & DAROLD WARD, USDA FOREST SERVICE PACIFC NORTH-
WEST RESEARCH STATION, AN INVENTORY OF PARTICULATE MATTER AND AIR ToXIc EMISSIONS
FROM PRESCRIBED FIRES IN THE UNITED STATES FOR 1989.
25. Atmospheric deposition of mercury interferes with the reproductive success of Florida
panthers in Everglades National Park. C. Facemire et al., Impacts of Mercury Contamination in
the Southeastern United States, 80 WATER AIR & SOIL POLLUTION 923, 925 (1995).
26. Robert L. Fischman, Biological Diversity and Environmental Protection: Authorities to
Reduce Risk, 22 ENVTL. L. 435, 487-88 (1992) (addressing biological resource protection through
the use of EPA authorities).
27. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1344(a)-(t) (1994).
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National park legislation, however, is not such a complicated program. In
fact, it illustrates the classic natural resources law characteristics. The Service
is an agency in the Interior Department with a proprietary ethic, operating
under legislation that focuses on allowing certain uses of public resources.
Therefore, the extent to which aspects of NPS law currently are converging
with aspects of pollution control law demonstrates the strength of their fun-
damental affinity after twenty-five years of isolated specialization. The conver-
gence is partly driven by issues such as the effects of polluting activities on
NPS goals (e.g., visibility of scenic wonders in the Southwest), and the effects
of NPS resource management on ambient environmental standards (e.g., winter
air quality in West Yellowstone, Montana).
This Article reveals another respect in which NPS law illustrates conver-
gence. Establishment legislation, the day-to-day, on-the-ground guidance for
Service management, has come to resemble, more and more, pollution control
statutes in its level of detail. Congress is far more engaged today in the details
of park management in a manner similar to its increased involvement in set-
ting pollution control standards. Certainly, some of the explanations for this
trend in national park system management are not applicable to the pollution
control context. However, many of them are. A more integrated view of envi-
ronmental law aids in the understanding of both the similarities and differenc-
es.
Finally, this analysis of establishment legislation raises the normative
question of how much detail Congress ought to inscribe in statutes delegating
authority for agencies to implement. A pluralist model of interest group nego-
tiation might suggest that there is little to say about what Congress should
prescribe to agencies: whatever compromise is reached by a fair political pro-
cess is appropriate for legislation. But, a comparison of Congress and agencies
suggests that too much statutory detail impedes an agency from realizing its
institutional strengths in technical expertise and flexibility. Section Four of this
Article will outline the benefits and detriments of statutory detail in environ-
mental law. The most serious problem with statutory detail in establishment
legislation is that it thwarts systemic management for the national park units.
SECTION II: A DESCRIFTION OF THE TREND TOWARD GREATER STATUTORY
DETAIL
Establishment legislation, at its core, delegates to the NPS authority to
manage a unit of the national park system. But, at the same time that Congress
gives power to the Service, it also limits that power through management
mandates. In a similar way, in pollution control legislation, Congress typically
creates the framework for a regulatory program and delegates its implementa-
tion to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Increasingly, Congress
specifies details about how, what, and when the EPA should regulate. This
Section describes and compares the ways in which Congress has limited dis-




A. Congressional Management of Pollution Regulation
Many commentators have observed the rise of statutory detail in pollution
control law.' For anyone who works with these "statutes of numbing com-
plexity and detail"'29 it is a difficult trend to ignore. The increased congressio-
nal involvement in the details of pollution regulation takes many guises.
From the earliest days of modem federal pollution control legislation,
Congress established deadlines to constrain the discretion of the EPA. Instead
of delegating entirely to the agency the task of prioritizing activities, Congress
mandated that certain actions, especially standard-setting, be conducted within
certain time frames. The 1970 Clean Air Act established deadlines for overall
compliance, and, within the framework of those deadlines, created strict time-
tables for state preparation and EPA review of implementation plans.' The
1972 Clean Water Act called for "fishable, swimmable" waters everywhere by
July 1, 1983,3" and more detailed deadlines for the implementation of tech-
nology-based standards for over 500 separate categories of industries.32 By
1989, Congress and the courts had imposed 800 deadlines on the EPA.33 Sub-
sequent enactments brought yet more deadlines.34
Most of these deadlines were too ambitious for the EPA to meet. 35 As a
result, the agency missed many deadlines and also adopted more streamlined
procedures for standard-setting than those "apparently contemplated by the
statute. '3 6 Still, the deadlines aided congressional oversight of the EPA by
28. See, e.g., ROGER W. FINDLEY & DANIEL A. FARBER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ENVI-
RONMENTAL LAW v (4th ed. 1995); ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENvIRONMENTAL REGUIATION:
LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 102-114 (2d ed. 1996); ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER Er AL., ENVIRONMEN-
TAL LAW AND PoLIcy: NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIErY xxvii-xxix (1992); 1 WILIAM H. RODGERS,
JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR AND WATER § 3.1A, at 43-44 (Supp. 1996); J. William Futrell,
Environmental Law History, in SuSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 3, 43 (Celia Campbell-Mohn
et al. eds., 1993); Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert L. Glicksman, Congress, the Supreme Court, and
the Quiet Revolution in Administrative Law, 1988 DUKE L.J. 819. See generally, Joseph L. Sax,
Environmental Law in the Law Schools: What We Teach and How We Feel About It, 19 ENVTL.
L. REP. 10,251 (1989) (discussing professors' frustration with teaching environmental law in light
of complex, changing statutes).
29. Sax, supra note 28, at 10,251.
30. WILuAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 3.6, at 198 (2d ed. 1994).
31. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (1994).
32. Id. § 1311(b) (1994).
33. Richard J. Lazarus, The Tragedy of Distrust in the Implementation of Federal Environ-
mental Law, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 311, 323 (1991) (citing William K. Reilly, The Turn-
ing Point An Environmental Vision for the 1990s, Address for the Marshall Lecture before the
Natural Resources Defense Council, Nov. 27, 1989, in 20 ENv'T REP. (BNA) 1386, 1389 (Dec. 8,
1989)); see Shapiro & Glicksman, supra note 28, at 828-30 nn.42-48 (citing numerous deadlines
established by Congress for the EPA).
34. RODGERS, supra note 28, § 3.1A, at 44 ("The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments call for
more than one hundred seventy-five new regulations, in excess of thirty guidance documents,
some thirty-five studies and reports, and more than fifty new research and investigation initia-
tives."). A substantial number of these requirements have deadlines attached to them.
35. Howard Latin, Regulatory Failure, Administrative Incentives, and the New Clean Air Act,
21 ENvTL. L. 1647, 1651-52 (1991) (discussing the many reasons why agencies fail to meet dead-
lines).
36. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 122-36 (1977) (upholding the
EPA's technology based effluent limitations under § 301 of the Clean Water Act even though they
were promulgated without prior adoption of § 304 guidelines to set out the methodology the agen-
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establishing clear benchmarks. They also facilitated environmental group mon-
itoring and enforcement of the pollution control programs through citizen suit
provisions.
Beginning in the 1980s, particularly with reauthorization legislation for the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)" and the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)," and
continuing into the 1990, with the Clean Air Act revision,39 Congress began
to employ with greater frequency statutory tools that restricted EPA discretion
more than mere deadlines.' Congress employed "hammer" provisions to im-
prove the EPA's compliance with deadlines. A hammer provision operates by
providing a draconian (prohibitive) rule tat will take effect on a particular
date unless the agency has promulgated a substitute regulation. For instance,
the 1984 RCRA amendments would have virtually banned the land disposal of
any hazardous waste for which the EPA had not promulgated a treatment
standard by a specified date.4' A hammer provision creates incentives for
regulated entities to promote compromise to ensure swift agency action rather
than delay. The hammer provisions of RCRA were entirely successful in spur-
ring the EPA to meet the deadlines for promulgating treatment standards.42
In some instances, Congress goes beyond time frames and specifies in
detail which substances the EPA should regulate. This is what Professors
Shapiro and Glicksman label restriction of regulatory discretion.43 While Con-
gress determines for the agency whether to regulate certain pollutants, it gives
the agency discretion over how to regulate the pollutants. For instance, in the
1984 RCRA amendments, Congress specified particular solvents, dioxins, and
"California-list" wastes for the EPA to establish treatment standards by certain
dates." The EPA, though, retained a great deal of control over the process
for setting the treatment standards themselves. Similarly, the 1990 Clean Air
Act amendments listed 189 hazardous air pollutants for the EPA to establish
emission standards.43 Before Congress established the list of pollutants, the
EPA had promulgated emission standards for only six hazardous air pollutants
since Congress first authorized it to regulate these contaminants.'
In other instances, Congress specified how the EPA should regulate pollu-
cy would use in determining § 301 standards).
37. Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments for 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 StaL 3221
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1994)).
38. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980); Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 StaL 1613 (1986)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994)).
39. Act of Nov. 15, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1994)).
40. See, Lazarus, supra note 28, at 340-42 (commenting on congressional prescription).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 6924 (1994).
42. ROBERT L. FiscHMAN ET AL., AN EwNmO ENTAL LAW ANTHOLOGY 130-31 (1996).
43. Shapiro & Glicksman, supra note 28, at 822.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 6924(e)-(f). "California-list" wastes were regulated at the time under a Cali-
fornia state land disposal program. Schedule for Land Disposal, 51 Fed. Reg. 19,300 (1986) (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6924(d)).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1). The EPA can modify or accept petitions to modify the list. Id. §
7412(b)(2).
46. See RODGERS, supra note 30, at 135-37.
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tion. This type of statutory detail restricts what Shapiro and Glicksman call
legislative discretion.47 For instance, in the 1984 RCRA Amendments, Con-
gress gave the EPA some discretion in classifying certain substances as haz-
ardous. But, once the agency classifies a substance as hazardous, it must re-
quire tanks used to store the substance to obtain approved leak detection and
other protective systems.'
More commonly in pollution control statutes, when Congress restricts
legislative discretion it also restricts regulatory discretion. For instance, the
1984 RCRA amendments outright banned the disposal of bulk or
noncontainerized liquid hazardous wastes in any landfill.5 ° This approach
leaves virtually no discretion for the agency outside of enforcement. Congress
was exceedingly specific on what the regulations regarding disposal of con-
tainerized liquid hazardous wastes in landfills should state: "Such regulations
shall also prohibit the disposal in landfills of liquids that have been absorbed
in materials that biodegrade or that release liquids when compressed as might
occur during routine landfill operations."'" In these 1984 RCRA Amend-
ments, Congress went so far as to set out design standards for hazardous waste
landfills.
B. Congressional Management of NPS Units
During the same period when modern federal pollution control law
emerged and amassed layers of statutory details through amendments and
reauthorizations, NPS establishment legislation similarly evolved toward great-
er statutory detail. Although the pollution control field has displayed a prolif-
eration of statutes protecting various media and dealing with a diverse assort-
ment of polluting activities, most of the statutory detail has encrusted on the
dozen or so central statutes, which Congress revisits periodically for planned
reauthorizations and occasional amendments. In contrast, although Congress
has amended several existing NPS establishment statutes to add specific man-
agement mandates,52 it is legislation establishing new units that best manifests
the trend toward increased statutory detail.
Before illustrating the trend of increased statutory detail in NPS establish-
ment legislation, it is important to acknowledge two related, but different and
more widely noted trends. First, in recent decades Congress has added a great
47. Shapiro & Glicksman, supra note 28, at 822.
48. 42 U.S.C. § 6924(o)(4); see Shapiro & Glicksman, supra note 28, at 837 n.86.
49. Shapiro & Glicksman, supra note 28, at 837.
50. 42 U.S.C. § 6924(c)(1).
51. Id. § 6924(c)(2).
52. Congress frequently amends establishment statutes to adjust boundaries. But, for the
purposes of this Article, I am concerned only with amendments that mandate or constrain specific
management activities. See, e.g., Acadia National Park, Pub. L. No. 99-420, 100 Stat. 955 (1986)
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 341 (1994)); Voyageurs National Park, Pub. L. No. 97-405,
96 Stat. 2028 (1983) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 160a-1 (1994)); Redwood National
Park, Pub. L. No. 95-250, 92 Stat. 163, 163-66 (1978) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 79b
(1994)); Canyonlands National Park, Pub. L. No. 92-154, 85 Stat. 421 (1971) (codified as amend-
ed at 16 U.S.C. § 271a (1994)).
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many units to the national park system. A review of park unit establishment
shows a surge in the early- and mid-1930s,5 3 followed by lull until the mod-
em heyday in the 1960s and 70s. The rate of new park unit establishment then
dropped with the start of the Reagan Administration, but remained greater than
the lull of the 1940s and 50s.
Second, the national park system has evolved from the basic bipartite
design of parks and monuments to a diverse taxonomy of fifteen different
categories, including a miscellaneous category for sui generis units such as the
White House and Prince William Forest Park, Virginia. 4 Although these
sheer numbers and categories account for much of the proliferation of provi-
sions in the first part of the Conservation Title of the U.S. Code,55 the focus
of this Section is a shift in the content of the establishment legislation toward
greater specificity in management instructions to the Service. Although this
shift appears in the full range of national park system categories, this Section
limits discussion of statutory detail to national parks and monuments.56 Be-
cause these units are the oldest categories, there is a longer span of history to
observe. Even more importantly, the purposes of these reservations tends to
provide a better fit with the Organic Act goals than do any of the other cate-
gories.5 7 If there is a true system to be discerned in the assemblage of nation-
al park units, it should be manifest in national parks and monuments.
Many of the statutory tools Congress uses to limit the proprietary discre-
tion of the NPS bear a close resemblance to the ones in pollution regulation.
For instance, Congress has increasingly employed deadlines to limit the
Service's discretion.58 Deadlines most frequently set time limits on the Ser-
vice to publish mandated studies and management plans. The use of deadlines
in establishment legislation was relatively rare until the 1980s." 9
53. Contributing significantly to this surge was the transfer of over 30 military parks and
cemeteries from the War Department to the Service in 1933.
54. See infra text accompanying note 173 for a description of many of these categories.
55. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. §§ 21-460 (1994).
56. Unlike the other categories of reserved units of the National Park System, which are
designated by Congress, the President may exercise authority under the 1906 Antiquities Act to
reserve as national monuments landmarks, structures, and other objects of historic or scientific
interest situated on public lands. Id. § 431 note. Many national monuments, however, have estab-
lishment legislation endorsing their designation. Where they do not, the executive orders serve as
substitutes for establishment statutes. A small number of national monuments are not managed by
the Service and are therefore not part of the national park system. See, e.g., Proclamation No.
4611, 3 C.F.R. § 69 (1978) (establishing Admiralty Island National Monument, managed by the
U.S. Forest Service); Proclamation No. 6920, 61 Fed. Reg. 50,223 (1996) (establishing Grand
Staircase-Escalante National Monument, managed by the Bureau of Land Management).
57. Some categories, such as national historic sites, national battlefields, and national memo-
rials are too small to be key elements in a system. Other categories, such as military parks, scenic
trails, and parkways serve purposes too specific to contribute significantly to understanding the
systeic relationship between establishment legislation and the Organic Act. Still other categories,
such as national lakeshores, national seashores, national preserves, and national recreation areas,
are excluded from the analysis because they contain few units or are relatively recent inventions,
and therefore frustrate reasonable comparison of trends through time. See generally 16 U.S.C. §§
21-460 (identifying the park system categories).
58. MANAGEMENT POUCIES, supra note 12, at 2:6 ("Congressionally directed plans will be
given a priority that enables their completion within the required time frame.").
59. An interesting topic for further research would be to determine how many of the con-
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Just as Congress has restricted the EPA's regulatory discretion by specify-
ing what substances will be subject to restrictions, so too it has restricted the
Service's discretion by specifying what uses will be addressed by studies and
plans. Commentators frequently call for more research on the condition of
park resources and the effects of visitors and environmental stressors on the
national park system.' Chronically tight budgets make the congressionally
mandated studies the top funding priorities. Common subjects specified in
establishment legislation for study are suitability of lands for inclusion in a
park unit,6 potential wilderness designations," transportation,63 and park
resources. ' In the absence of this statutory detail, the Service would have
greater discretion for setting its research priorities systemically. In many cases,
the subjects mandated by Congress reflect key issues that the Service would
be remiss in neglecting, such as the study of rock art in Petroglyph National
Monument or erosion and sedimentation in Redwood National Park. However,
Congress does mandate action on other subjects that might not warrant a great
deal of attention from the standpoint of system management in an era of fiscal
austerity. One example is the 1988 mandate in amendments to the Olympic
National Park establishment legislation to study the location, size, and costs of
gressional deadlines the NPS actually met. If the Service's compliance record is better than the
EPA's, it may explain the absence of the more draconian tools, such as hammers, in the establish-
ment statutes.
60. See COMMISSION ON RESEARCH AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT POLICY IN THE NATION-
AL PARK SYSTEM, NATIONAL PARKS: FROM VIGNErrES TO A GLOBAL ViEw 6-8 (1989) [hereinaf-
ter VIGNETTES] (calling for broad-based, on-going research by the NPS); THE VAR. AGENDA,
supra note 15, at 32 ("The National Park Service must engage in a sustained and integrated pro-
gram of natural, cultural, and social science resource management and research aimed at acquiring
and using the information needed to manage and protect park resources."); Herman, supra note 2,
at 6-11 (discussing that from the inception of the National Park System, preservationists warned of
the dangers of excessive use); National Parks and Conservation Association, Parks in the Next
Century, NAT. PARKS, MarJApr. 1988, at 18, 20 (calling for a threefold increase in natural, cul-
tural, and social science research staff).
61. See, e.g., Grand Canyon National Park, Pub. L. No. 93-620, 88 Stat. 2090 (1975) (codi-
fied as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 228b(c) (1994)).
62. See, e.g., Death Valley National Park, Pub. L. No. 103-433, 108 Stat. 4485 (1994) (cod-
ified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 410aaa (1994)); Conagree Swamp National Monument, Pub. L.
No. 100-524, 102 Stat. 2606 (1988) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 431 note (1994));
Biscayne National Park, Pub. L. No. 96-287, 94 Stat. 600 (1980) (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. § 410gg-3 (1994)); Channel Islands National Park, Pub. L. No. 96-199, 94 Stat. 77 (1980)
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 410ff-5 (1994)); Voyageurs National Park, 84 Stat. 1972
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 160f(b)).
63. See, e.g., Grand Canyon National Park, 88 Stat. 2091 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§ 228b(c)) (regulating dangerous or detrimental aircraft use); Arches National Park, Pub. L. No.
92-155, 85 Stat. 422 (1971) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 272c (1994)) (designating drive-
ways); Voyageurs National Park, 84 Stat. 1973 (1971) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §
160j(l) (authorizing provisions for roads); Canyonlands National Park, Pub. L. No. 88-590, 78
Stat. 938 (1964) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 271c (1994)) (providing for construction of
roads).
64. See, e.g., Petroglyph National Monument, Pub. L. No. 101-313, 104 Stat. 276 (1990)
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 431 note (1994)) (establishing a Rock Art Research Center);
Channel Islands National Park, Pub. L. No. 96-199, 94 Stat. 75 (1980) (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. § 410ff-2 (1994)) (providing for a natural resources study report); Capitol Reef National
Park, Pub. L. No. 92-207, 85 Stat. 740 (1971) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 273b (1994))
(discussing grazing privileges); Redwood National Park, Pub. L. No. 90-545, 82 Stat. 931 (1968)
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 79c(e) (1994)) (discussing erosion and sedimentation).
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a year-round visitor center in the Kalaloch area.6
Mandated studies on particular subjects are related to planning, because
new information on the condition of resources or the effects of activities will
raise issues that a plan must address. For instance, a study of the effects of
grazing is likely to lead to information relevant to restricting, expanding,
and/or zoning with respect to grazing in the park unit. Congress increasingly
goes beyond specifying what the Service should study to list topics that the
Service must address in its management plan. Beginning in 1978, Congress
has required every unit of the national park system to prepare and "revise in a
timely manner" a general management plan (GMP). 6 Congress requires that
each plan include, but not limit itself to, four items: measures for resource
preservation, indications of types and intensities of development, identification
of and implementation commitments for visitor carrying capacities for all areas
of the unit, and potential boundary modifications.67 These 1978 requirements
replaced an older provision which mandated plans that focused on develop-
ment of visitor facilities." After 1978, planning has been more broadly di-
rected toward resource management and conservation. Although Service policy
commits units to discuss a more detailed list of topics in plans, such as zoning
and environmental impacts,' Congress supplements the four-part planning
mandate only through establishment legislation." Although Congress did not
explicitly mandate that the GMPs bind the subsequent management actions of
the Service, as it has done with planning mandates for the BLM and the For-
est Service,7' the GMPs nonetheless play a principal role in guiding manage-
ment.
The specific mandates for plan content in establishment legislation vary
widely but demonstrate the same trend of increased congressional involvement
over the past few decades. Congress began mandating the contents of plans
two years before it required GMPs for all units. Since then, it has increas-
ingly specified certain topics that must be addressed in the GMPs. Common
topics include identification of adjacent lands necessary to accomplish the
65. Olympic National Park Wilderness Act, Pub. L. No. 100-668, 102 Stat. 3961 (1988).
66. 16 U.S.C. § la-7(b).
67. Id.
68. Act of Oct. 7, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-458, 90 Stat. 1942 (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. § la-7 (1994)).
69. MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 12, at 2:8.
70. Congress has mandated additional details in comprehensive planning for units established
or expanded under the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act of. 1980. 16 U.S.C. §
3191. Also, the National Environmental Policy Act requires that the Service consider a range of
alternatives and their environmental consequences when proposing a major federal action signifi-
cantly affecting the quality of the human environment. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1994). Service policy is
to prepare environmental impact statements for all GMPs. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).
71. 2 GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS & ROBERT L. GLIcKsMAN, PuBLIc NATURAL RESOURCES
LAW § 10F.02[3] (1995).
72. Congaree Swamp National Monument, 90 Stat. 2518 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§ 431 note) (requiring the Service to prepare a management plan indicating: property adjacent or
related to the monument which is necessary to fulfill monument purposes, the number of visitors




purposes of the unit, location and cost of facilities, and the carrying capacity
of the unit for different types of activities. These topics all would likely be
addressed in a GMP even without a congressional mandate. Other establish-
ment statutes, however, specify contents for the plan that seek to focus the
attention of the Service on particular management issues that might not other-
wise receive special consideration. The 1978 amendments to the Redwood
National Park establishment legislation, in addition to mandating the usual
topics to be covered in the GMP, also required the Service to include:
the specific locations and types of foot trail access to the Tall Trees
Grove, of which one route shall, unless shown by the Secretary to be
inadvisable, principally traverse the east side of Redwood Creek
through the essentially virgin forest, connecting with the roadhead on
the west side of the park east of Orick."
This is an example of deeper congressional involvement in park management.
Similarly, Congress required Petroglyph National Monument to prepare a
GMP containing an implementation plan for the American Indian Religious
Freedom Act of 1978,"4 proposals for a visitor's center, and a plan for a
Rock Art Research Center."
Another type of congressional mandate specifies not what the subjects of
park unit management should be but rather how the Service should engage in
management and planning decisionmaking. This type of statutory detail is
analogous to the restrictions on legislative discretion of the EPA discussed
above. 76 Congress imposes procedural mandates primarily in three ways.
First, many establishment statutes require Service consultation with a state or
tribe in preparing a management plan77 or a study.7 The establishment legis-
73. 16 U.S.C. § 79m(b)(4) (1994).
74. 42 U.S.C. § 1996, as amended by Pub. L. No. 103-344, 108 Stat. 3125 (1994).
75. 104 Stat. 276 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 431 note (1994)).
76. See supra Section HA.
77. See Joshua Tree National Park, Pub. L. No. 103-433, 108 Stat. 4487 (1994) (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. § 410ff-3(c) (1994)) (requiring that the Secretary of State consult with the
Metropolitan Water District in developing emergency access plans); Petroglyph National Monu-
ment, 104 Stat. 272 (1990) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 461 note (1994)) (stating that the
management plan be prepared in consultation with the New Mexico Preservation Office, an advi-
sory committee, and other interested parties); El Malpais National Monument, Pub. L. No. 100-
225, 101 Stat. 1539 (1987) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 460uu-41 (1994)) (requiring
management plans to be developed in consultation with the Advisory Council on Historic Pres-
ervation, local Indian people, the New Mexico Historic Preservation Office, and the State of New
Mexico); Acadia National Park, Pub. L. No. 97-335, 96 Stat 1627 (1982) (codified as amended at
16 U.S.C. § 341 note (1994)) (requiring the preparation of a report establishing the carrying ca-
pacity for the Isle au Haut portion of Acadia National Park in consultation with the town); Chan-
nel Islands National Park, 94 Stat. 76 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 410ff-3(c)) (stating that
the Secretary must consult with the Nature Conservancy and the State of California in preparing a
GMP); Congaree Swamp National Monument, 90 Stat. 2517 (1976) (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. § 431 note (1994)) (requiring consultation with the governor of South Carolina in prepar-
ing GMP).
78. See Channel Islands National Park, 94 Stat. 75 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §
410ff-2(a)) (requiring consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, the State of California, and
others on a study of natural resources); Arches National Park Establishment Act, 85 Stat. 422
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 272) (requiring consultation with appropriate State and Fed-
eral entities on a study of road alignments); Canyonlands National Park, 85 Stat. 421 (codified as
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lation for Great Basin National Park is typical, requiring consultation with ap-
propriate state agencies before implementation of the GMP.79 Frequently,
Congress will require the Service to consult with an appropriate state agency
before restricting fishing in a park unit.'
Second, a strong trend in recent establishment legislation (particularly
since 1986) is the creation of advisory commissions for unit management."'
Congress can shape national park system management by specifying the com-
positions of advisory committees to oversee and offer management advice to
park units. For instance, the establishment legislation for the Little Bighorn
Battlefield National Monument stipulates that its eleven-member advisory
commission include six representatives from Native American tribes that par-
ticipated in the Battle of Little Bighorn or now live in the area, two nationally
recognized artists, and three individuals with knowledge of history, historic
preservation and landscape architecture. 2 Advisory commissions generally
are given the duty to advise the NPS on matters of park management,83 as
well as to help develop and implement a new or revised GMP. 4
Third, and less commonly, establishment legislation may require the Ser-
vice to report back to Congress itself.' For example, the 1978 Redwood Na-
tional Park amendments required that the NPS submit its GMP to the relevant
House and Senate committees by Jan. 1, 19 8 0 .' In addition, Congress man-
dated the Service to submit annual written reports to Congress for ten years on
amended at 16 U.S.C. § 271) (requiring consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, the State of
California, and others on a study of natural resources).
79. Great Basin National Park, Pub. L. No. 99-565, 100 Stat. 3181, 3182 (1986) (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. § 410mm-1 (1994)) (prohibiting adoption of GMP provisions relating to
grazing, and fish/wildlife management until after consultation with the State agency having juris-
diction over fish and wildlife).
80. See Great Basin National Park, 100 Stat. 3181; Biscayne National Park, 94 Stat. 599
(codified as amended 16 U.S.C. § 410gg-2(a)); Congaree Swamp National Monument, 90 Stat.
2517 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 410mrm-i); Voyageurs National Park, 84 Stat. 1970
(1971) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 160g).
81. See Death Valley National Park, 108 Stat 4487 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §
410aaa-6); Joshua Tree National Park, 108 Stat. 4489 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §
410aaa-27); Little Bighorn Battlefield National Monument, 105 Stat. 1631 (1991) (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. § 431 note); American Samoa National Park, 102 Stat. 2879, 2882 (1988)
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 410qq-2(g)); Poverty Point National Monument, 102 Stat.
2803, 2804 (1994) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 431 note (1994)); Acadia National Park,
Pub. L. No. 99-420, 100 Stat. 955, 959 (1986) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 341 note).
82. Little Bighorn Battlefield National Monument, 105 Stat. 1631 (1991) (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. § 431 note).
83. See American Samoa National Park, 102 Stat. 2882 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §
410qq-2(g) (1994)); Acadia National Park, 100 Stat. 959 (1986) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§ 341 note).
84. See Joshua Tree National Park, 108 Stat. 4489 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §
410ff-27); Death Valley National Park, 108 Stat. 4487 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §
410aaa-6).
85. See Petroglyph National Monument, 104 Stat. 276 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §
431 note) (requiring report to Congress on location, condition, and technical assistance needed for
care of related rock art located outside of the monument boundaries); Grand Canyon National Park
Enlargement Act, 88 Stat. 2091 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 228g) (requiring report to
Congress of any dangerous or detrimental aircraft use); Canyonlands National Park, 85 Stat. 42
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 271f) (requiring report to Congress on road alignments).
86. 16 U.S.C. § 79m(b).
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the status of: payment for property acquired; actions taken regarding land
management practices and watershed rehabilitation efforts; efforts to mitigate
adverse economic impacts; special employment requirements; a new bypass
highway and an agreement for the donation of state lands; and the GMP. s7
Finally, just as Congress has become more assertive by regulating directly
in pollution statutes, it has also in some establishment legislation made zoning
and management decisions directly. This contrasts with the traditional, and
still-predominant, approach of delegating management decisions in reliance on
the expert judgment of the Service and/or on the procedural safeguards of
planning and consultation. Consider Congress's approach to the question of an
entrance fee to Channel Islands National Park. Use of the approaches de-
scribed above might require the NPS to study the issue of an entrance fee, or
even to make the fee decision in consultation with an advisory committee or
some other entity (such as a state agency). Instead, though, Congress simply
declared: "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no fees shall be
charged for entrance or admission to the park."'
In the western contiguous states, newly established or enlarged parks and
monuments often occur where ranchers have existing federal permits to graze
cattle. Congress frequently specifies precisely how much longer grazing will
be allowed in these units." Although the Service retains authority to regulate
the conditions of grazing, Congress here makes the principal management
decision of condoning grazing use for a specified period of time.
Two observations emerge from this Section's exploration of statutory
detail in establishment legislation. First, and more important, the establishment
statutes manifest a strong trend of increased congressional involvement in
national park system management. This Section discussed only provisions
unambiguously containing requirements or mandates. These provisions contain
the statutory term "shall." There are additional provisions in establishment
legislation that illustrate the trend of statutory detail but that use the more
permissive terms, "may" or "is authorized to." Congress likely uses these
87. Id. § 79m(a).
88. Id. § 410ff-6 (1994).
89. See, e.g., Death Valley National Park, 108 Stat. 4486 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§ 410aaa-5) (stating that "grazing shall continue at no more than the current level"); El Malpais
National Monument, 101 Stat. 1542 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 460uu-32) (extending
existing permits until December 31, 1997); Great Basin National Park, 100 Stat. 3182 (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. § 410mam-l) (allowing grazing to the same extent as permitted on July 1,
1985); Fossil Butte National Monument, 86 Stat. 1069 (grazing shall be allowed for at least ten
years); Capitol Reef National Park, 85 Stat. 740 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 273(b))
(grazing permits to be allowed for one lease period with the possibility for one renewal); Arches
National Park, 85 Stat. 422 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 272b) (permitting grazing privi-
leges to continue for the remainder of the term and one subsequent period); Canyonlands National
Park, 78 Stat. 938 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 271b) (permitting grazing privileges to
continue for the remainder of the term and one period subsequent).
90. See, e.g., Petroglyph National Monument, 104 Stat. 272 (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. § 431 note) ("is authorized to undertake research and assist in the management and protec-
tion of Rio Grande style rock art sites"); Everglades National Park and Expansion Act, 103 Stat.
1947 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 410r-6) ("is authorized to enter" into concession con-
tracts with owners of tour and airboat facilities); North Cascades National Park, 102 StaL 3963
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1132 note) ("is authorized" to remove and dispose of trees to
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terms to indicate a desire for, without actually mandating, the Service to en-
gage in a particular task. Congress may even express this desire explicitly, as
when it states that the Service "is authorized and encouraged to enter into co-
operative agreements... for the protection and interpretation of the Grand
Canyon."' Even where Congress does not link permissive language with ex-
plicit encouragement, it still may influence NPS management. The Service
generally seeks the good favor of Congress, particularly for appropriations or
boundary expansion. The Service likely would try to avoid harsh congressional
oversight hearings. Noncompliance with permissive statutory details in itself
may not create problems for the agency in Congress. However, the Service
surely would first seriously consider management preferences expressed in
establishment legislation and then establish a record to justify noncompliance.
This, in itself, helps shape national park system management.
Second, the statutory detail Congress has incorporated into establishment
legislation parallels in kind the statutory details circumscribing the EPA's
discretion in implementing pollution regulation. The common use of deadlines,
the specification of what substances or subjects to address in implementation
and management, and the specification of how the agencies are to proceed
with their tasks suggest that the better ventilated discussion of the increased
statutory detail in pollution control may illuminate issues associated with man-
agement of the national park system. The next Section reviews explanations
offered to explain this trend in the pollution control field and discusses wheth-
er they may aid in understanding the similar trend in NPS legislation. It also
offers an explanation that ties together both strands of environmental law.
protect power lines); Olympic National Park, 102 Stat. 3961 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §
1132 note) ("is authorized" to upgrade, maintain, and replace an underground pipeline); El
Malpais National Monument, 101 Stat. 1548 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 460mm-I) ("is
authorized and encouraged" to enter into cooperative agreements with other Federal, state, and
local agencies, Indian tribes, and non-profit entities; "is authorized" to establish an advisory com-
mittee comprised of Indians to help implement access rules); Great Basin National Park, 100 StaL
3182 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 410ram-2) ("may" maintain existing water-related range
improvements); Kenai Fjords National Park, 94 Stat. 2379 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §
431 note) ("is authorized" to develop access to and allow use of mechanized equipment on the
Harding Icefield); Grand Canyon National Park Enlargement Act, 88 Stat. 2090 ("is authorized to"
enter into cooperative agreements with other entities to protect the canyon); Voyageurs National
Park, 84 Stat. 1970 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 160 (1994)) (authorizing roads as are
needed for public access); Voyageurs National Park, 84 Stat. 1972 (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. § 160 (1994)) ("may" include subjects of winter sports, seaplane use, and watercraft use in
comprehensive plan; "is authorized" to make provisions for any roads as are necessary for public
access); Great Smoky Mountains National Park, 83 Stat. 100 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §
403h-15) ("is authorized to" convey rights-of-way to Tennessee; "is authorized to" construct an
entrance to the park in North Carolina); Canyonlands National Park, Pub. L. No. 88-590, 78 Stat.
934 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 271) ("may" select the location(s) for entrance road(s)
and construct any structure necessary for the park; "is authorized" to consult with the Secretary of
Agriculture on the location and extension of a forest development road); Carlsbad Caverns Nation-
al Park, 77 Stat. 818 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 407e-407h) ("is authorized to" convey a
right-of-way to New Mexico); Wupatki National Monument, Pub. L. No. 87-136, 75 Stat. 337
("may" accept donation of a road right-of-way).
91. 16 U.S.C. § 228e (1994).
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SECTION HI: EXPLANATIONS FOR THE GROWTH IN STATUTORY DETAIL
The literature that describes the trend of increasing statutory detail in
pollution control law also offers a range of explanations for the trend. While
many of these explanations apply as well to the parallel trend in national park
system management, a comparison of the two strands of environmental law
reveals a broader pattern that accounts for increasing statutory detail. In both
the pollution control and the national park system legislation, increased statu-
tory detail is associated with second-generation problems. Second-generation
problems arise after initial approaches that address abatement or conservation
have reached the limits of relatively low-cost solutions. This Section will de-
scribe the transition from first- to second-generation legislation after first re-
viewing the more frequently offered, specific explanations for increased statu-
tory detail.
As a preliminary matter, we can reject some explanations for the rise in
statutory detail in the pollution control area which are not applicable to nation-
al park establishment legislation.' Professors Shapiro and Glicksman explain
increased congressional management of the EPA beginning in the 1980s, in
part, as a reaction to shifts in oversight by federal courts and the president's
Office of Management and Budget (OMB). President Reagan's appointments
of judicial conservatives, increased deference to agencies under these judges
and the Chevron" doctrine, and tightening standing requirements for citizens
seeking review of agency action94 all left a void in judicial oversight of the
EPA that Congress sought to fill by establishing more specific requirements in
legislation."' At the same time, Congress sought to counter-balance more in-
tensive scrutiny of EPA's proposed regulations by the OMB, an executive
92. We can also put aside a possible explanation for statutory detail generally, which has
little application in pollution control law. When Immigration and Naturalization Service v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983), declared unconstitutional the legislative veto, Congress lost a
tool of retrospective oversight. Although this might contribute somewhat to the greater prospective
limitations through statutory mandates, the legislative veto was not a common tool in pollution
control law before Chadha. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSITUTE, 1 LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PRO-
TECrION 4-9, 4-10 (Sheldon M. Novick, ed. 1996) (citing only two legislative veto provisions in
pollution control law: the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act § 25, 7 U.S.C. §
136(w) (1994), and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
§ 305, 42 U.S.C. § 9655 (1994)). In natural resources law, the legislative veto appears significant-
ly and repeatedly in the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-
1784 (1994), but I found no trace of it in NPS establishment legislation. Retrospective oversight
through reporting requirements, however, does appear in establishment legislation. See, e.g.,
Petroglyph National Monument, 104 Stat. 276 (requiring a report to congressional committees of
the location, condition, and the technical assistance needed for care of related rock art located
outside of the monument boundaries); Redwood National Park, 92 Stat. 170 (codified as amended
at 16 U.S.C. § 79m) (requiring Service to submit plan to congressional committees); Grand Can-
yon National Park Enlargement Act, 88 Stat. 2090 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 228g)
(requiring a report to Congress of any dangerous or detrimental aircraft use); Canyonlands Nation-
al Park, 85 Stat. 421 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 2710 (requiring a report to Congress on
a road alignment study).
93. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 845
(1984).
94. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); Lujan v. National Wild-
life Fed., 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
95. Shapiro & Glicksman, supra note 28, at 845-70.
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office closely controlled by the White House and widely viewed as hostile to
strict pollution abatement. 9
While these developments certainly can spur Congress to assert greater
control over agency behavior through more specific mandates in statutes, they
are of little relevance to national park system management. Proprietary man-
agement of federal resources has traditionally enjoyed greater deference than
the regulation of the private sector that EPA conducts. In particular, the Ser-
vice has never been a popular target for judicial review. Interest groups hardly
relish the prospect of challenging the agency that retains a wholesome reputa-
tion in the public mind. Moreover, the Service has always enjoyed great defer-
ence by the federal courts, even as other land management agencies have lost
some of their traditional insulation from judicial oversight.' Therefore, the
trends that diminished the oversight role of courts over the EPA have had little
impact on NPS behavior, which has been enjoined by courts only in excep-
tional cases.9
Furthermore, OMB oversight has focused on "notice and comment," infor-
mal rulemaking under section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act.'
Most management decisions and all national park unit GMPs are made outside
of this regulatory framework."° So, the Service has not faced the intense
oversight by the OMB that has shaped the behavior of the EPA.
Another role played by the OMB, however, the compilation of the
president's proposed federal budget, has had some, though minor, relevance in
explaining increased statutory detail. Historically, an important tool of con-
gressional control over agency behavior has been appropriations. If Congress
is displeased with the direction an agency is taking, it may threaten to reduce
the agency's budget. This tool, however, became less effective in the environ-
mental area throughout the Reagan and Bush administrations because budget
requests by the executive branch consistently fell below actual appropriations.
The congressional threat of reducing budgets is a less effective tool when the
administration actually wants lower appropriations than Congress in the first
place. With reduced maneuverability in the appropriations process for shaping
environmental policy, Congress might turn to actual authorization legislation in
order to influence agencies. This may explain some of the increased statutory
detail in both pollution control and in NPS establishment legislation.
Regardless of the disparity between executive budget requests and con-
96. Id. at 842; Robert V. Percival, Checks Without Balance: Executive Office Oversight of
the Environmental Protection Agency, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 127, 194-97 (1991); see
Environmental Defense Fund v. Thomas, 627 F. Supp. 566, 571 (D.D.C. 1986) (providing a spe-
cific example of OMB hostility to environmental regulation). Recent charters for OMB oversight
can be found in Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981), reprinted as amended in 5
U.SC. § 601 (1994); and Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (1993), reprinted as
amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601.
97. See 2 COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 71, at §§ 10F.02[3], 14.01, 14.02[2].
98. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Lujan, 716 F. Supp. 1289, 1293 (D. Ariz. 1989) (enjoining the
Service from allowing construction of new facilities on the north rim of the Grand Canyon until it
complied with the National Environmental Policy Act and its own management policies).
99. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994).
100. Id. § 553(a)(2).
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gressional appropriations, the overall fiscal austerity of the past fifteen years
created a vicious cycle that now drives Congress to impose ever more man-
dates on both the EPA and the NPS. As budgets get tighter, agencies are able
to do less.' Therefore, statutory mandates, which are always a priority for
agencies, command a greater proportion of total agency activities. With a
diminishing likelihood that agencies will have the resources to engage in dis-
cretionary tasks, a member of Congress seeking to influence an agency to do
something will be more motivated to place a mandate in legislation than to
lobby the agency informally. The cycle worsens as Congress legislates more
mandates and squeezes further the agency's ability to engage in discretionary
activities. This dynamic has been noted in the context of legislative deadlines
for the EPA."2 Every time Congress imposes a new deadline on the EPA,
the agency is less able to accomplish tasks for which no statutory deadline ex-
ists. Therefore, Congress must continue to impose deadlines whenever it wants
the agency actually to do something. The EPA priorities are now so driven by
meeting congressional deadlines that the agency cannot comprehensively plan
effectively to implement broad goals, such as reducing exposure to contami-
nants that generate the greatest health risks. 03 The growth in statutory detail
in NPS establishment legislation evinces this same dynamic, especially in the
deadline and mandated study provisions.
The most widely noted reason why Congress has not given the EPA flexi-
bility to set its own priorities based on broad principles, such as risk reduction,
is distrust of the ability and the resolve of the agency to achieve the goals of
environmental protection. Although distrust is a characteristic tension of divid-
ed government, when one party controls the White House and another the
Congress, the policies and appointments of the Reagan administration raised
the level of distrust in the environmental area to unprecedented heights." 4
Professors Shapiro and Glicksman document the extensive legislative history
showing that Congress believed that the EPA refused to act when it should
have, delayed regulations, and implemented pollution control programs in a
manner inconsistent with the intent of authorizing legislation." 5 The scandals
involving EPA Administrator Anne Gorsuch-Burford and her deputies also
severely eroded congressional trust." The polarization of congressional-ex-
ecutive relations in the early 1980s accelerated the momentum of the trend of
increased statutory detail.
101. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (describing NPS budget trends).
102. William D. Ruckelshaus, Risk, Science, and Democracy, IssuES IN So. & TECH., Spring
1985, at 19.
103. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, SETING PRIORTES, GETrING RE-
SULTS: A NEW DmECTION FOR THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 8, 131 (1995).
104. James J. Florio, Congress as Reluctant Regulator: Hazardous Waste Policy in the
1980's, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 351, 352-53 (1986); Percival, supra note 96, at 147-54; Erik H.
Corwin, Note, Congressional Limits on Agency Discretion: A Case Study of the Hazardous and
Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, 29 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 517, 524-28 (1992). The antecedents to
the rise in congressional distrust of the EPA in the 1980s date back to the birth of the agency. See
Lazarus, supra note 33, at 323.
105. Shapiro & Glicksman, supra note 28, at 826-27.
106. Futrell, supra note 28, at 50.
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Although Congress distrusted Secretary of the Interior James Watt to
implement an environmental agenda at least as much as Anne Gorsuch-
Burford, the NPS did not become a lightning rod for implementation contro-
versy to the extent that the EPA did. Certainly, the Department of the Interior
made a number of controversial decisions that undercut national park system
stewardship."° However, with its longer tradition of non-partisan profession-
alism, its widespread public support for conservation, and its less threatening
proprietary mandate, the NPS found itself more insulated from both stark
policy reversals and intense congressional reaction than the EPA."a Still, it
is likely that the spirit of distrust in the pollution control area permeated NPS
establishment legislation somewhat and amplified the trend toward statutory
detail.
Another contributing factor noted in the pollution control area also helps
explain increased congressional management of the national park system. Con-
gress legislates more detailed management mandates because it can. The pro-
liferation of professional committee staffs in all areas of national legislation
increases statutory detail."l Longstanding or ambitious committee or sub-
committee chairs may also sponsor investigations and long-term projects that
lead to detailed legislation.'
For all the applicability of the manifold explanations for statutory detail in
pollution control law to NPS establishment legislation, there are still a couple
of missing pieces to the puzzle. One explanation for the statutory detail in
establishment legislation relates to the Organic Act, which has no analog in
pollution control. It may well be that the tension between providing for enjoy-
ment (recreation) and leaving units unimpaired (preservation) creates an im-
possible paradox for the NPS to solve. When important issues are irreconcil-
able under the Organic Act (including the 1978 clarifying amendments), Con-
gress needs to intervene with specific instructions for the Service. This may be
an important factor in major NPS issues, such as restoration of the Ever-
glades."' However, it fails to explain the majority of the statutory mandates
107. JONATHAN LASH Er AL., A SEASON OF SPOILS: THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S AT-
TACK ON THE ENVIRONMENT 279-298 (1984); John Kenney, Interior Sub Rosa: Political Ap-
pointees Use the Parks as Pawns, NAT. PARKS, SeptJOcL 1989, at 12.
108. Congress legislated, in part, in response to a high level of public concern about the dan-
gers of toxic pollution. See Shapiro & Glicksman, supra note 28, at 842; Corwin, supra note 104,
at 532.
109. See Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1,
43-45 (1982); James P. Hill, The Third House of Congress Versus the Fourth Branch of Govern-
ment: The Impact of Congressional Committee Staff on Agency Regulatory Decision-Making, 19 J.
MARSHALL L. REv. 247, 247-48 (1986); Shapiro & Glicksman, supra note 28, at 841.
110. Examples include former representatives Philip Burton and John Seiberling in the area of
NPS establishment legislation and former representative James Florio in the area of hazardous
waste legislation. Congressional oversight of the EPA is particularly zealous. Richard J. Lazarus,
The Neglected Question of Congressional Oversight of EPA, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 205,
206, 210-12 (1991).
111. The 1989 amendments to the establishment legislation expanded the size of Everglades
National Park; closed the park to the operation of airboats, subject to certain variances; and modi-
fied water delivery projects in the region to restore the natural hydrologic conditions. Everglades
National Park, 103 Stat. 1946 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 410r-5 to 410r-8).
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that involve less profound issues of national park system management, such as
the establishment of advisory commissions or the preparation of particular
studies. It does highlight, though, the close relationship between the lack of
statutory detail in the overarching mandate and the need for greater elaboration
in the implementing statutes.
The second missing piece of the puzzle of statutory detail more robustly
applies to both pollution control and natural resource management. In both
areas, Congress turns to greater statutory detail after it has delegated to agen-
cies the straightforward, "first-generation," problems. "Second-generation"
' 2
problems are those that remain after Congress and agencies address the rel-
atively lower-cost, easier issues in a field. In the pollution control context, the
classic first-generation problems were the stationary point sources of contami-
nation that were employing virtually no abatement technology before 1970.
Professor Elliott observes that these "easy sources: the large coal-fired utility
boilers, the large chemical plants, the refineries," have been successfully regu-
lated to reduce large discharges." 3 We are then left with ."small, diffuse
sources that will prove very difficult to regulate using traditional tech-
niques."" 4 When Congress legislated in general terms that the EPA should
begin requiring polluters to apply abatement technology, the "first burst" of
marginal environmental improvement was great. However, as Professor Krier
observes, the next increment of improvement is more difficult to accomplish
due, in part, to increased marginal costs of abatement and, in part, to polluters
learning how to evade expensive regulation.' Therefore, Congress returns to
draft more elaborate schemes to catch evaders, squeeze less environmental
improvement out of greater marginal costs, exempt industries that face severe
financial hardship, and experiment with new programs to prospect for new
"first bursts."
In the NPS context, the first-generation problems were the earlier-desig-
nated units which had fewer existing uses that would be incompatible with
national park system status." 6 There have always been some political con-
flicts over foreclosing potential economic uses of lands designated as national
112. Other commentators have used the terms "first-generation" and "second-generation" to
refer to different aspects of environmental law. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stew-
art, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1333, 1352-55 (1985) (describing two phas-
es of a reform proposal to create a market-based system of pollution control through tradeable
permits).
113. E. Donald Elliott, Environmental Law at a Crossroad, 20 N. KY. L. REv. 1, 10 (1992).
114. Id.; see also, Samuel A. Bleicher, Regulation of Pollution: Is the System Mature or
Senile, 10 VA. ENVTL. L.J. i, iii (1990) (noting that the first wave of environmental statutes
"quickly ran up against many economic and technical realities that made enforcement politically
unacceptable").
115. See James E. Krier, The Political Economy of Barry Commoner, 20 ENVrL. L. 11, 17,
23-24 (1990) ("[GJenerally speaking, the marginal costs of control go up the more one has already
controlled. It is one thing to cut emissions from a source by ninety percent, for example, and quite
another to cut the remaining ten percent by ninety percent again ...."); Arnold Reitze Jr., Envi-
ronmental Policy-4t Is Time for a New Beginning, 14 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 111, 116-117 (1989).
116. See generally JOHN ISE, OUR NATIONAL PARK POLIcY: A CRIcAL HISTORY (1961)
(presenting a thoroughly comprehensive history of park administration that describes all of the
serious conflicts affecting the first-generation park units).
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parks or monuments. Alfred Runte makes a strong case for the "worthless
lands" hypothesis, that Congress was willing to withdraw from economic de-
velopment as national parks only those areas for which there was no evidence
of commercial value for mining, farming, and logging."7 He reviews the leg-
islative history of a number of early parks, including Yellowstone,"8
Sequoia,"9 Mt. Rainier,2 ° and Crater Lake, 2 ' to show that boundaries
and park proponents' arguments were crafted to avoid the taint of economic
develoipment obstructionism.
But, beginning in the 1960s and 1970s, conflicts which had been mapped
outside of park boundaries began creeping into existing units as well as creat-
ing problems for additions to the park system. For instance, in 1933, when
President Hoover established Death Valley National Monument, a portion of
the eastern border was shifted to exclude an existing mining operation. 22 By
1975, Tenneco Corp. was poised to increase mining on claims it owned within
the monument. Congress held hearings on mining in the parks and enacted the
National Park Mining Regulation Act.'2 3 The legislation struck a compromise
between mining interests and preservationists, who sought a prohibition of
mining in the national park system. For Tenneco, the new law did little more
than regulate its mining, which it could continue on all claims it was currently
working.'24 Congress also required the Service to identify portions of the
monument that might be abolished "to exclude significant mineral deposits and
to decrease possible acquisition costs."'" Alfred Runte notes that "[t]hose
portions of Death Valley that survived, in short, apparently would contain
nothing of lasting economic value."'2
Over the past thirty years, as economic development and other forms of
use incompatible with national park system status have pervaded more of the
public domain, the conflicts over uses to be allowed in new units have in-
creased. Congress already has added the easy lands to the national park sys-
tem.' Newly designated units are more difficult in the sense that there are
more stakeholders who currently use the land. More people have more expec-
tations of continued use of the public lands than ever before. Users of lands
subject to proposed establishment legislation, which might interfere with or
prohibit continued use, face an easier task organizing to gain special provi-
117. RUNTE, supra note 18, at 1-9.
118. Id. at 48-55.
119. Id. at60-64.
120. Id. at 65-67.
121. Id. at 67-68.
122. Id. at 193.
123. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1912 (1994).
124. The statute gave the Service authority to regulate mining to ensure that it is conducted so
as to prevent or minimize damage to the environment and park resources. Id.
125. Act of Sept. 28, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-429, 90 Stat. 1342 (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. § 1905 (1994) (expired two years after enactment)). The California Desert Protection Act,
discussed infra notes 151-155 and accompanying text, abolished Death Valley National Monument
in 1994. 90 Stat. 1342.
126. RUNTE, supra note 18, at 194.
127. Id. at 213.
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sions than do the more diffuse interests concerned about the collective benefits
of the national park system."
Even relatively small units, such as Petroglyph National Monument may
present Congress with complex land use problems because of their proximity
to development which may threaten park unit resources. Petroglyph National
Monument's 7000 acres lie on an escarpment along the western edge of Albu-
querque. Residential development bumps up against the eastern boundary of
the monument, and development of the city is planned to ,leapfrog over to the
west of the monument as well. 29 The close proximity of such a large num-
ber of people creates intense disputes over the appropriate balance between
recreation (in this case, access to pristine areas of the monument, and horse
and bicycle trails) and preservation (in this case, protection of rock art from
vandalism and erosion). 3 Perhaps the most acute conflict arises over pro-
posals to develop more trails in and to build a new road through the monu-
ment. These proposals generate heated opposition from those who want the
monument managed to accommodate the earth-based religious practices of
local Pueblo Indians, who view the monument area as sacred. 3' Not surpris-
ingly, these conflicts shaped the 1990 establishment legislation. To protect the
rock art, Congress mandated not only a resource protection program in the
GMP but also a plan to establish a Rock Art Research Center.'32 Congress
also authorized the Service to participate in the dispute over the proposed road
through the monument.'33 Finally, the establishment legislation includes ave-
nues for Native Americans to advance their interests in monument manage-
ment. 134
To compromise with ranchers holding federal grazing permits in the area
established as Great Basin National Park in 1986, Congress required the NPS
to allow grazing to continue to the same extent as was occurring on July 1,
1985. 31 In addition to removing management discretion to reduce grazing
from the Service, Congress also required the agency to submit, within three
128. Professors Krier and Gillette note this problem of collective action in the pollution con-
trol context. James E. Krier & Clayton P. Gillette, Essay, The Un-Easy Case for Technological
Optimism, 84 MINct. L. REV. 405, 426 (1985). See generally, RuSSELL HARDIN, COLLEcrvE
ACTION (1982) (analyzing the theory of collective action itself); MANCUR OLSON JR., THE LOGIC
OF COLLECTlVE AcTION (1965) (analyzing the general theory of collective action).
129. Tony Davis, Sunbelt Confrontation, HIGH COUNTRY NEws, Nov. 1, 1993, at 1, 10-13.
130. Id.; Ruth Haas, An Urban Park Is Surrounded by Controversy, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS,
Dec. 12, 1994, at 13.
131. Haas, supra note 130, at 13.
132. Petroglyph National Monument, Pub. L. No. 101-313, § 108, 104 Stat. 272, 276 (1990)
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 431 note (1994)).
133. Id. § 106, 104 Stat. 275. "The Secretary may participate in land use and transportation
management planning conducted by appropriate local authorities for lands adjacent to the monu-
ment and may provide technical assistance to such authorities and affected landowners for such
planning." Id.
134. Id. § 108(c), 104 Stat. 276 (consultation on GMP with Indian tribes); id. § 110, 104 Stat.
277 (establishment of an advisory commission including "one member, who shall have profession-
al expertise in Indian history or ceremonial activities, appointed from recommendations submitted
by the All Indian Pueblo Council"); id. § 108(a)(4), 104 Stat. 276 (inclusion in the GMP of a plan
to implement the Native American Religious Freedom Act).
135. 16 U.S.C. § 410mm-l(e) (1994).
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years, to relevant congressional committees a management plan that included
discussion of grazing." The establishment legislation also states: "Existing
water-related range improvements inside the park may be maintained by the
Secretary or the persons benefitting from them, subject to reasonable regula-
tion by the Secretary."'37 A final provision on grazing authorizes negotiations
to occur for the purpose of exchanging grazing permits on land within the
park for allotments outside of the park. 3 In these restrictions, Congress es-
tablished an oversight mechanism, substituted its own mandate for the
agency's judgment on grazing, and limited the agency's ability to respond to
public opinion."'
The Petroglyph and Great Basin examples from the past decade illustrate,
in part, the trend of greater statutory detail described in Section Two of this
Article. But, they also illustrate how the second-generation problem of a more
complex existing land use overlay for park units creates conflicts that Con-
gress addresses in establishment statutes. Although Congress has addressed
land use conflicts in the national park system for many decades, the increasing
numbers of conflicts generate more detailed amendments to existing units and
more elaborate establishment statutes for new units. Congressional mandates
often may be the only way to win the necessary support to create new park
units."4° Nonetheless, the statutory detail does hamper systemic management
of the national park system by the Service. The next Section considers this and
other burdens of statutory detail, as well as the benefits.
SECTION IV: THE EFFECTS OF STATUTORY DETAIL
Statutory detail in establishment legislation benefits the national park
system in many respects. Most important, as the second-generation problem
illustrates, statutory detail that manifests delicate political compromise allows
meritorious additions to the system that, without compromise, might not garner
sufficient support for establishment. As a representative democratic institution,
Congress might give voice to interests that would otherwise go unrecognized
by the Service. Particularly in national park system management, where appli-
cation of the Organic Act may not offer clear management guidance, statutory
detail can provide helpful guideposts for agency discretion. 4'
Agency decision-makers often welcome congressional mandates on con-
troversial issues because the mandates relieve the officials of responsibility for
politically sensitive decisions. For instance, in the Barataria Marsh Unit of
Jean Lafitte National Historical Park and Preserve establishment legislation,
136. Id. § 410mm-l(c).
137. Id. § 410mm-l(g).
138. Id. § 410mm-l(f).
139. Jon Christensen, A Bitter Rancher and a Failed Compromise, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS,
Apr. 3, 1995, at 11 ("Since Great Basin National Park was put on the map, staff have been inun-
dated with complaints" about grazing.).
140. See id.
141. Shapiro & Glicksman, supra note 28, at 844 (citing the benefit of congressional man-
dates in pollution control statutes).
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Congress explicitly commanded the Service to continue to permit hunting,
fishing, and trapping. 4 This shields the NPS from the criticism it would re-
ceive if it resolved the land use dispute itself.'43 Professors Shapiro and
Glicksman observe that "[d]eadlines can assist agency decisionmaking by miti-
gating outside pressures to avoid reaching a decision and giving the agency a
reason to end its analysis and make a difficult, but necessary decision."'"4
Particularly because the effects of many resource management decisions are
indeterminate," deadlines may speed the process of formulating and imple-
menting management plans.
Of course, there are problems associated with all of these benefits. Al-
though Congress is, indeed, a democratically elected institution, its committee
structure operates much like medieval fiefdoms. Committees wield power,
particularly over issues such as park establishment that are not at the fore of
social controversy, that receive little scrutiny by Congress at large, and that
therefore create "serious problems of political responsibility."" The splint-
ered jurisdiction and closely guarded turf of congressional committees, which
drive the routine legislative process, insulate much establishment legislation
from the deliberative spotlight." 7 As Professor Stewart observes, this leaves
the statutory details to "a submerged micropolitical process without open and
regular procedures.""' In establishment legislation, this process favors
stakeholders with concentrated interests in park unit management, who can
most easily organize to lobby subcommittee chairs and staff." Thus, the
"Christmas Tree" provisions criticized in detailed pollution control statutes and
designed to benefit particular regions and stakeholders50 also appear in de-
tailed establishment legislation.
For instance, the detailed California Desert Protection Act'' grandfa-
thers specific mining claims, by name, to protect them from more stringent
regulation resulting from the designation of the Mojave National Preserve.'52
Congress sought to satisfy regional concerns by establishing advisory commis-
sions with members that include an elected official for each county within the
142. Jean Lafitte National Historical Park, Pub. L. No. 95-625, 92 Stat. 3536 (1978) (codified
as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 230(d) (1994)). See note 89 for other examples of congressional graz-
ing prescriptions.
143. Professor Yaffee observed that statutory prohibitions, although they restrict agency dis-
cretion, may help agencies that would otherwise not muster the political will to drive a hard bar-
gain with stakeholders. STEvEN LEWIs YAFFEE, PRoflBrnvE PoLCv 149-62 (1982).
144. Shapiro & Glicksman, supra note 28, at 830.
145. Professor Latin discusses this as a reason why environmental agencies avoid resolving
disputed issues. Latin, supra note 35, at 1659.
146. Richard B. Stewart, Beyond Delegation Doctrine, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 323, 332 (1987).
147. See J. William Futrell, The Administration of Environmental Law, in SUSTAINABLE ENVI-
RONMENTAL LAW, supra note 28, 93, 97-102.
148. Stewart, supra note 146, at 332.
149. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
150. See David Schoenbrod, Goal Statutes or Rules Statutes: The Case of the Clean Air Act,
30 UCLA L. REv. 740, 748-51 (1983); Stewart, supra note 146, at 332.
151. Death Valley National Park, Pub. L. No. 103-433, 108 Stat. 4471 (1994) (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 41aaa to 410bbb-6 (1994)).
152. Death Valley National Park, 108 Stat. 4491 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 410aaa-
49 (1994)).
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unit and representatives of private property owners, grazers, and miners, for
Death Valley National Park,'53 Joshua Tree National Park, 5 4 and Mojave
National Preserve.'55 These commissions advise the Service on the develop-
ment and implementation of comprehensive management plans. Also, tacked
onto the end of the statute are provisions establishing a New Orleans Jazz Na-
tional Historical Park, and a "Christmas Tree" provision (however worthy) that
has no bearing on California desert protection.
Moreover, the statutory mandates inserted by the congressional commit-
tees assert control of national park system management at the expense of the
president. The Department of the Interior officials would otherwise exercise
discretion in the service of the chief executive. Professor Mashaw asserts that:
The president has no particular constituency to which he or she has
special responsibility to deliver benefits. Presidents are hardly cut off
from pork-barrel politics. Yet issues of national scope and the
candidates' positions on those issues are the essence of presidential
politics. Citizens vote for a president based almost wholly on a per-
ception of the difference that one or another candidate might make to
general governmental policies.
56
Although this might be true as a general matter, the particular issues of park
management are so low on the national agenda that the Service might be as
susceptible to the compromise of national interests for parochial politics as
Congress. 7
An important criticism of statutory detail contrasts the review for rational-
ity that agency regulations would need to pass before these sorts of provisions
could be implemented. This criticism applies more strongly in the pollution
control area, where the EPA makes most of its decisions through rulemaking,
and where the OMB is extensively involved in cost-benefit review. Even in
the area of judicial review, the NPS enjoys an especially high degree of defer-
ence. "' Still, judicial review, even of informal unit-specific management,
will nonetheless require an administrative record showing that the agency's
decision was "based on a consideration of the relevant factors,"'59 and "a
reasoned assessment of competing values."'" Of course, statutory manage-
ment prescriptions need not meet even this deferential standard.
In the case of the NPS, far more important than the relative benefits of an
agency's national political agenda and judicial oversight, is its technical exper-
tise. However strengthened the staffs of congressional committees have be-
153. 16 U.S.C. § 410aaa-6.
154. Id. § 410aaa-27.
155. Id. § 410aaa-58.
156. Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 95 (1985).
157. See, e.g., Joseph L. Sax & Robert B. Keiter, Glacier National Park and Its Neighbors: A
Study of Federal Interagency Relations, 14 ECOLOGY L.Q. 207 (1987).
158. See 2 CoGiNs & GtICKSMAN, supra note 71, at § 10F.02[3].
159. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
160. See Mashaw, supra note 156, at 93.
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come over the past thirty years, they still cannot compare with the thousands
of people employed by the Service in positions both to observe resources and
people, and to engage in scientific management. The literature on the relative
institutional strengths of agencies (as compared to Congress) stresses the supe-
rior managerial efficiency and expertise of agencies.'
Former Representative Florio notes that decisions in Congress are based
on compromise rather than application of technical expertise to answer impor-
tant questions.62 Certainly, some of the issues addressed in establishment
legislation are value judgments not susceptible to the application of physical or
social science expertise. However, many are not. The increase in management
mandates comes at a time when the Service, like the other federal land man-
agement agencies, must transform from an agency driven by the seat-of-the-
pants experience of hierarchical managers to one that applies the interdisci-
plinary findings of technical staff who specialize in a range of fields.6 3 Stat-
utory detail hampers the ability of the NPS to base its decisions on the find-
ings of biologists, ecologists, educators, geologists, archeologists, historians,
anthropologists, and economists. The National Research Council describes the
potential benefits of a science-based management model: "Although an ade-
quate science program alone cannot ensure the integrity of the national parks,
it can enable faster identification of problems, greater understanding of causes
and effects, and better insights about the prevention, mitigation, and manage-
ment of problems."'" The Council also notes that, although a dozen major
reviews of NPS science and management over a period of 30 years all advo-
cated strengthening science to improve management, few of the recurring
recommendations have been implemented."
Furthermore, statutory detail impairs the flexibility required to manage
resources in the face of changing (usually growing) public demands to use
park units, and increased scientific understanding of the condition of resources
and the impacts of use on resources. Once management issues are resolved by
Congress, they are frozen in place and much more difficult to modify than
agency decisions.'" The emerging consensus favoring the use of adaptive
management as a form of ecosystem planning necessitates continual monitor-
ing and iteration of management decisions as hypotheses. 67 Professor Keiter
notes that ecosystem management must draw heavily on scientific principles
and research so that it "can be designed and adjusted to minimize disruption
161. See Mashaw, supra note 156, at 82; Shapiro & Glicksman, supra note 28, at 844;
Corwin, supra note 104, at 521-22.
162. Florio, supra note 104, at 379. This may be one of the few issues on which former
Democratic Representative Florio and former Republican Senator Symms agreed. Id. at 371.
163. THE VAIL AGENDA, supra note 15, at 11.
164. NATIONAL RESEARCH CouNcIL, SCIENCE AND THE NATIONAL PARKS 2 (1992).
165. Id. at 6; see also VIGNETTES, supra note 60, at 1 (recommending both a new research
program to support ecosystem management and a shift in NPS professional staffing from general-
ists to specialists); THE VAIL AGENDA, supra note 15, at 107 (recommending more research to aid
management);.
166. Florio, supra note 104, at 379-80.
167. See KAI N. LEE, COMPASS AND GYROSCOPE: INTEGRATING SCIENCE AND POLITICS FOR
THE ENVIRONMENT 53 (1993).
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of natural processes.""'
Statutory detail frustrates more than just the ability to adapt and apply
technical expertise to changing circumstances and new information with re-
spect to individual units. It also frustrates the ability of the Service to set pri-
orities for comprehensive planning. The VAIL AGENDA cited "new, costly, and
sometimes ill-conceived responsibilities" that thwart the Service's ability to set
funding priorities." Austere budgets force the agency to direct its precious
resources toward politically mandated activities rather than toward activities
that are most rational from a scientific management perspective. If the Service
is to shift from its traditional, reactive role as a custodian without a compre-
hensive agenda, it must have broad flexibility to set its own priorities. 70
Statutory constraints limit the Service's capability to realize the potential of
the GMP process to set priorities for individual park units.
Even more deleterious is the manner in which Congress frustrates the
ability of the Service to manage its units together in an integrated system.'
Commentators have criticized congressional management in the pollution con-
trol area, where statutory detail thwarts comprehensive planning that would
focus EPA regulation in areas where the greatest amount of environmental
benefits result per unit of agency effort (or national expense).'72 The relative-
ly slight benefit of clarifying management objectives on the scale of a park
unit that comes from detailed establishment legislation counterbalances a fun-
damental problem with the national park system. The combination of a vague
Organic Act mandate coupled with the bewildering assortment of unit catego-
ries makes coordinated system management a Herculean task. Like a rotten
roof riddled with leaks, the current framework cries out for replacement. Al-
though one can applaud Congress's actions to patch individual holes through
establishment statutes, the overall effort ultimately is ill-suited to curing the
structural defect.
Over the past 75 years, a proliferation of land management categories
have accreted around the core national park and monument units of the nation-
al park system. The national park system now includes units designated as:
National Preserve: National preserves are areas having character-
168. Keiter, supra note 6, at 302; see also National Parks and Conservation Association, Vi-
GNE rES, supra note 60, at 20 (recommending adequate funding for scientific research to provide
effective resource management); NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 164.
169. THE VAIL AGENDA, supra note 15, at 36.
170. Marion Clawson identified custodial management as a predominant theme in federal
public land policy in the middle of this century. MARION CLAWSON, THE FEDERAL LANDS REVIs-
ITED 31-37 (1983). I borrow the term to suggest management focused on responding to particular
issues that arise rather than management that takes an active role in setting the agenda for a sys-
tem of lands.
171. THE VAIL AGENDA notes that, in addition to the hurdles created by statutory details, the
"Service, partly through its own inaction and partly due to constraints emanating from the execu-
tive branch during the 1970s and 1980s, has lost the credibility and capability it must possess in
order to play a proactive role in charting its own course, in defining and defending its core mis-
sion." THE VAIL AGENDA, supra note 15, at 11.
172. See, e.g., NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, supra note 103, at 1, 132;
Alden F. Abbott, The Case Against Federal Statutory and Judicial Deadlines: A Cost-Benefit
Appraisal, 39 ADMIN. L. REv. 171, 192 (1987); Shapiro & Glicksman, supra note 28, at 844.
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istics associated with national parks, but in which Congress has per-
mitted continued public hunting, trapping, [and] oil/gas exploration
and extraction. Many existing national preserves, without sport hunt-
ing, would qualify for national park designation.
National Historic Site: Usually, a national historic site contains a
single historical feature that was directly associated with its subject.
Derived from the Historic Sites Act of 1935, a number of historic
sites were established by secretaries of the Interior, but most have
been authorized by acts of Congress.
National Historic Park: This designation generally applies to
historic parks that extend beyond single properties or buildings.
National Memorial: A national memorial is commemorative of a
historic person or episode; it need not occupy a site historically con-
nected with its subject.
National Battlefield: This general title includes national battle-
field, national battlefield park, national battlefield site, and national
military park. In 1958, an NPS committee recommended national
battlefield as the single title for all such park lands.
National Cemetery: There are presently 14 national cemeteries in
the National Park System, all of which are administered in conjunc-
tion with an associated unit and are not accounted for separately.
National Recreation Area: Twelve NRAs in the system are cen-
tered on large reservoirs and emphasize water-based recreation. Five
other NRAs are located near major population centers. Such urban
parks combine scarce open spaces with the preservation of significant
historic resources and important natural areas in locations that can
provide outdoor recreation for large numbers of people.
National Seashore: Ten national seashores have been established
on the Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific coasts; some are developed and
some relatively primitive. Hunting is allowed at many of these sites.
National Lakeshore: National lakeshores, all on the Great Lakes,
closely parallel the seashores in character and use.
National River: There are several variations to this category:
national river and recreation area, national scenic river, wild river,
etc. The first was authorized in 1964 and others were established
following passage of the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968.
National Parkway: The title parkway refers to a roadway and the
parkland paralleling the roadway. All were intended for scenic motor-
ing along a protected corridor and often connect cultural sites.
National Trail: National scenic trails and national historic trails
are the titles given to these linear parklands (over 3,600 miles)
authorized under the National Trails System Act of 1968.
Other Designations: Some units of the National Park System bear
unique titles or combinations of titles, like the White House and
1997]
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Prince William Forest Park.17
The interrelationship between these categories, let alone between the units
themselves, is tenuous at best. The categories provide for such diverse purpos-
es as corridor protection, historic preservation, urban access to recreation,
buffer zone maintenance (many national preserves serve this function), and
scenic motoring. No other public land system is fragmented into subeategories
to the extent of the national park system. The national forest system, managed
by the U.S. Forest Service, for instance, consists almost exclusively of national
forests managed under a mandate of multiple use and sustained yield of natu-
ral resources.' Furthermore, periodic national reports provide national stra-
tegic objectives for the national forest system.'" Individual forest plans each
contribute to the national objectives. 76  Congress has subjected few
individual national forests to site-specific mandates. Even the national
wilderness preservation system, where management is divided among the
several federal public land agencies (including the NPS) and where each unit
is established by statute, is unitary in its management nomenclature and
mandate for strict preservation.
Still, it is conceivable that the multiple categories of reservations in the
national park system could be managed as interrelated elements. Key to most
conceptions of a system is a unifying common plan or purpose. The Organic
Act mandate to conserve and provide for enjoyment serves as guidance for
permissible park uses but fails to articulate an answer to the systemic question:
what are parks for? Professor Sax's advocated purpose of parks to cultivate
our reflective or contemplative faculties is broad enough to unify both the
historical and the natural units.'" But, without that or some other, more ex-
clusive objective to provide systemic guidance, it will continue to be impossi-
ble to make comprehensive, reasoned management and funding choices. More-
over, the absence of cohesion among the units invites even more congressional
tailoring of establishment statutes and "park-barrel"'"" additions that fall
short of national significance. Over time, the vicious cycle operates to create
more diffusion.
173. Designation of National Park System Units (visited Nov. 13, 1996)
<http//www.nps.gov/legacy/nomenclature2.htnl#top>. The best discussion of this nomenclature
appears in DWIGHT F. RETE, OuR NATIONAL PARK SYsTEm 40-58 (1995).
174. 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (1994).
175. Id. §§ 1601, 1602, 1606.
176. Id. § 1604(e).
177. See JosEPH L. SAX, MouNTAINs WITHOUT HANDRAILS: REFLEcIONS ON THE NATIONAL
PARKS 108 (1980).
178. RIDENOUR, supra note 20, at 16-19; James M. Perry, A Shrine Suffers As Pork for Parks
Is Larded Unevenly, WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 1991, at Al (discussing, inter alia, Steamtown and
Weir Farm National Historic Sites). Criticism of "park-barrel" politics dates at least as far back as
the debate over federal funding of the Blue Ridge Parkway. ISE, supra note 116, at 417.
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SECrION V: SYSTEMIC REFORM
The Steering Committee of the Vail Agenda despaired at structural re-
form. After politely characterizing the hodgepodge of units Congress has
placed in the national park system as encompassing a "markedly diffuse range
of public values," the group stated: "Effective management of such a diffuse
system requires the abandonment of any hope for a single, simple management
philosophy."'7 Of course, this is true if we seek to arrive at a systemic man-
agement philosophy by finding common objectives that suit the existing units
in the system. If, instead, we were to create a philosophy based on normative
principles of what we would wish a park system to accomplish for the nation,
then we could use the systemic philosophy as a basis for deciding which units
are suitable for park system management and which are better suited for other
management systems.
Some units might be transferred to the Bureau of Land Management or
the U.S. Forest Service for multiple use-sustained yield management.s Oth-
er units, primarily valuable as feeding, breeding, and resting refuges for partic-
ular animals might be transferred to the Fish and Wildlife Service.'' Lands
with wilderness character could be managed as wilderness within the park
system if they advanced the systemic goals; otherwise, wilderness lands could
be managed by any of the federal land management agencies. 2 Perhaps a
new recreation-oriented agency would need to be established to manage some
current park units whose characteristics would not contribute to systemic
goals.1
8 3
There are a number of possible systemic philosophies the nation could
adopt for the national park system. 4 Commentators have discussed systemic
park management goals based on an ethic of place,8 8 a biodiversity restora-
tion-ecosystem maintenance goal,' 86 an educational purpose,8 7 a cultiva-
tion of the contemplative faculties,' wilderness restoration, 8 9  and
179. THE VAIL AGENDA, supra note 15. at 9. Dwight Rettie observed that "Iflor all of its
history, the national park system has been essentially an improvisation." RETrIE, supra note 173,
at 14.
180. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1994) (creating the Federal Land Policy and Management Act
of 1976, which established management scheme for the BLM); Id. §§ 528-531, 1600-1614
(creating the Multiple-Use, Sustained Yield Act of 1960, Forest and Rangeland Renewable Re-
sources Planning Act of 1974, and National Forest Management Act of 1976, which established a
management scheme for the U.S. Forest Service).
181. Id. §§ 668dd-668ee (creating the National Wildlife Refuge Administration Act of 1966,
which established a management scheme for the national wildlife refuge system).
182. Id. §§ 1131-1136 (creating the Wilderness Act of 1964, which established the scheme for
management of the national wilderness preservation system).
183. Robin Winks suggests that "[tlhe agency spends 90 percent of its budget servicing visi-
tors (building roads and paving trails, for example) rather than protecting resources. This is the
wrong ratio." Robin W. Winks, National Parks Aren't Disneylands, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1993, at
A19.
184. Dwight Rettie reviews many of the efforts to apply comprehensive blueprints for man-
agement of the national park system. RETTIE, supra note 173, at 16-37.
185. See CHARLES F. WILKINSON, THE EAGLE BIRD: MAPPING A NEW WEST 132-86 (1992).
186. See Dave Foreman, Wilderness: From Scenery to Nature, WILD EARTH, Winter 1995/96,
at 8; Keiter, supra note 2, at 75.
187. THE VAIL AGENDA, supra note 15, at 108-11.
188. SAX, supra note 177, at 80.
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maintenance of national symbols." Choosing among these goals will be im-
portant and will instigate a long-neglected national debate. However, choose
we must in order to realize the potential of the vast majority of national park
system lands which ought to be valued not simply for their individual attrib-
utes but also for their contribution toward a larger systemic goal.
Congress will need to amend the Organic Act to incorporate a comprehen-
sive systemic goal and perhaps to create new agencies. Some commentators
call for a supplemental, recreation-oriented agency, 9" others for an indepen-
dent park service.' The institutional structures must await the definition of
substantive goals.
Professor Wilkinson has coined the term "lords of yesterday" to describe
the "battery of nineteenth-century laws, policies, and ideas that arose under
wholly different social and economic conditions but that remain in effect due
to inertia, powerful lobbying forces, and lack of public awareness."'93
Wilkinson has in mind laws, such as the prior appropriation doctrine allocating
water in western states'94 and the General Mining Law of 1872,' 95 that pro-
mote resource extraction and are rooted in the allocation of property rights. In
this respect, the 1916 Organic Act is not a "lord of yesterday" because it re-
flects twentieth-century ideas of public administration. Additionally, it contains
the seed of modem notions of sustainable conservation. Indeed, all of the
plausible goals for a systemic management philosophy implement some vision
of this sustainable mandate, conservation of the parks and only such use as to
leave them unimpaired for future generations.' Abolition of the sustainable,
conservation mandate would disconnect the national park system from its no-
ble and innovative history and destroy the potential for further progress.
Nonetheless, the Organic Act's systemic management mandate, enacted
when only thirty-five composed the national park system 9 7 and clarified only
slightly in 80 years, begs for reform. But, we must learn the lessons of the
unfulfilled preservationist promise of the 1978 amendments to the Organic
Act. Actual park unit management will not automatically shift direction, like a
compass exposed to a new magnetic field, with the enactment of Organic Act
reform legislation. Before any changes can be felt on the ground, Congress
will have to lift the establishment legislation mandates that shatter the
189. See generally Michael McCloskey, Essay, What the Wilderness Act Accomplished in
Protection of Roadless Areas within the National Park System, 10 J. ENVrL. L. & LrrlG. 455
(1995) (discussing the history and protection of the National Park System under the Wilderness
Act); Michael Frome, Protecting Park Values, DIFFERENT DRUMMER, Winter 1995, at 42.
190. Mark Sagoff, On Preserving the Natural Environment, 84 YALE LJ. 205, 206 (1974).
191. Winks, supra note 183, at A19.
192. Lockhart, supra note 3, at 3; Editorial, Serving Two Masters: Park Service's Dilemma,
ARIz. REPuBUC, OcL 15, 1991, at A12.
193. CHARLES F. WILINSON, CROSSING THE NExT MERIDIAN: LAND, WATER, AND THE
FUTURE OF THE WEST 17 (1992).
194. See, e.g., Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882); Owen L. Anderson, et al.,
Prior Appropriation, in 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 65-446 (Robert E. Beck, ed. 1991).
195. 30 U.S.C. §§ 21-42 (1994).
196. 16 U.S.C. § 1.
197. RErlE, supra note 173, at 47.
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Service's vision and divert the Service's resources.
Once Congress enacts a modem, comprehensive mandate that not only
describes how park lands are to be managed but also sets out a purpose for the
system, then the task of sorting through existing and potential units for suit-
ability in the system may begin. Organic Act reform, by itself, will not suc-
ceed in the face of Service management primarily driven by establishment
statutes. The 104th Congress acted prematurely in considering legislation to
create a commission to recommend termination or modification of existing
NPS management of park units.'98 However, reform of the national park sys-
tem must ultimately examine the issue of whether park units themselves or
statutory details dilute and detract from integrated management to achieve
systemic goals. In the meantime, Congress should resist entangling the Service
in more statutory detail, which impedes progress toward better park adminis-
tration.
CONCLUSION
In addition to the recommendations for systemic reform of the statutory
basis of national park system management, the lessons of this Article are two-
fold. First, establishment legislation plays a critical role in driving NPS man-
agement and deserves more attention from commentators. Drafting decisions
for establishment legislation are the most important choices that are made for
the national park system. Therefore, it is critical that legal commentators direct
their attention to Congress. A conceptual framework for statute drafting, pro-
vided by a systemic mandate, is likely to have a much more profound effect
than refined judicial doctrines. As a "white hat" agency, the Service has not
faced the intense scrutiny by environmental groups as have other public land
managers, especially the U.S. Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Manage-
ment, which operate massive commodity extraction programs for minerals,
timber, and range. Even where the Service has taken controversial steps,
potential plaintiffs rightly hesitate to litigate against an agency with an image
of purity that represents cherished American values. In those few instances of
litigation, judicial review of proprietary decisions generally, and national park
system management in particular, is exceedingly deferential to the agency. So,
courts play a relatively insignificant role in national park system management,
other than ensuring that the Service adhere to specific directives of Congress.
And, of course, those specific directives are found in the establishment legisla-
tion.
Second, the relative insularity of legal scholarship in the natural resource
management and pollution control fields obscures important connections. A
comparative examination of trends in statute-drafting reveals parallel develop-
ments in pollution control (widely noted) and national park system administra-
tion (not widely noted). Congress has assumed a more active role in both
areas of environmental law as it addresses second-generation problems where
198. H.R. 260, 104th Cong., § 103 (1995).
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the stakes involved are greater (and the potential benefits relatively smaller)
than in earlier lawmaking. The literature studying the trend of more pollution
control statutory detail proves helpful in describing different types of
congressional mandates, in understanding the reasons for the trend, and also in
evaluating whether the trend is a constructive development for environmental
law. The consensus in the literature that Congress has gone too far in micro-
managing the EPA offers applicable wisdom for criticizing the similar
behavior in park establishment legislation. More scholarship that applies les-
sons from the pollution control area to natural resources management'" and
vice versa2"u will strengthen the foundations of environmental law.
199. See, e.g., Hope M. Babcock, Dual Regulation, Collaborative Management, or Layered
Federalism: Can Cooperative Federalism Models from Other Laws Save Our Public Lands?, 3
WEST-NORTHWEST 193 (1996) (applying federalism lessons from pollution control law to natural
resource management).
200. See, e.g., Fischman, supra note 26, at 439 (addressing biological resource protection
through the use of EPA authorities).
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REPAIRING THE WATERS OF THE NATIONAL PARKS:
NOTES ON A LONG-TERM STRATEGY
ERIc T. FREYFOGLE*
INTRODUCTION
For years, the National Park Service (the "Service") has worried about the
condition of its various waterways and water sources, and with" abundant rea-
son. Dams block many rivers. Pollution diminishes aquatic life. Diversions
disrupt original flow regimes. Groundwater pumping lowers water tables. The
particulars in many settings are poorly studied and thus poorly known, but the
general shape of the problem is as familiar as it is disheartening.' Too many
waters are impaired, and despite well-intended and sometimes effective efforts,
the overall situation worsens.
The old way of attacking the water problem-the analytic, bureaucratic
way-was to divide the whole into its parts and then divide the parts further,
separating and dissecting until the pieces became something an individual
scientist or lawyer could hold on to. Thus, we isolated the issues of water
rights (reserved and nonreserved), discrete pollution sources, run-off pollution,
flooding, low-flow regimes, stream obstructions, declining water tables, endan-
gered species, reservoir siltation, and so on. These issues, in turn, were some-
times divided by state or region, by the particular legal regimes implicated,
and by the bureaucratic unit charged to deal with them. Some of this division
grew out of our ignorance: we did not know how surface water and ground
water were connected, so we addressed them discretely. For this and other
reasons we ended up with a multitude of little pieces, hard to address coher-
ently and hard to resolve before they became intractable.
What the Service needs today to repair its waters is less analysis and
more synthesis. The legal issues are many and complex, but they are well
known and well studied.' The basic scientific knowledge is also in place, even
* Max L. Rowe Professor of Law, University of Illinois. B.A., Lehigh University, 1973;
J.D., University of Michigan Law School, 1976. Barbara Kube, Class of 1997 at the University of
Illinois College of Law, provided valuable research help on this article. My thanks go to her. I am
also grateful to H. Ross and Helen Workman, for a generous Workman Research Grant that aided
my research and writing.
1. See generally NATIONAL PARKS AND CONSERVATION ASS'N, PARK WATERS IN PERIL
(1993) [hereinafter PARK WATERS IN PERIL] (summarizing the most pressing problems associated
with the protection of park waters).
2. See generally ROBERT W. ADLER ET AL., THE CLEAN WATER ACT: TWENTY YEARS
LATER (1993) (discussing the successes and failures of the Clean Water Act); MANAGING PARK
SYSTEM RESOURCES: A HANDBOOK ON LEGAL DuTiEs, OPPORTUNITIES, AND TooLS (Michael A.
Mantell ed., 1990); OUR COMMON LANDS: DEFENDING THE NATIONAL PARKS (David J. Simon
ed., 1988) (detailing the scope and application of the varying legal protections available for na-
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while extensive data collection remains needed. The next step, the urgently
needed step, is to articulate a long-term goal for the Service's water-repair
efforts, a goal that provides focus and polestar for the day-to-day work of
hundreds of lawyers, scientists, educators, community relations specialists, and
managers. That goal should tie into the Service's charter, particularly and
emphatically its legal obligation to manage its resources without impairment.3
If the strategic goal for park waters is set as high as it ought to be, its
achievement will take decades of effort, which means a strategy is needed-a
strategy that guides budgets and work and employee evaluations, not just a
report to stick on a shelf. The strategy needs to bring firm pressure to bear on
the many forces of waterway degradation, moving step by step toward the
repair of park waters while recognizing and respecting the constraints on quick
action. A realistic water strategy will inevitably entail compromises; to think
otherwise is to invite political disaster. Yet, compromises come in various
shapes, some acceptable, some much less so. A sound strategy needs to identi-
fy and pursue the more attractive compromises, the temporary ones that avoid
irreversible harm while leaving open the opportunity to revisit issues as public
values shift, as scientific data is accumulated, and as technical and economic
developments make repair efforts more appealing and affordable. Parts of the
Service's water strategy will necessarily require new resources, mostly in re-
search, data collection, legal representation, training, and relations with state,
local, and private parties. Every part of the strategy will take sustained com-
mitment and political will.
Except in the case of extinct species, the repair of waterways is largely
achievable in scientific terms. That is the good news, and it is heartening news
indeed. The repair of park waters does not need to be a five-year or ten-year
goal; it can be extended over a longer period, and realistically must be. The
danger, plainly, is that the effort will drift off course, or seem insufficiently
urgent to warrant the resources and political capital it needs, or otherwise
suffer from some debilitating strain of bureaucratic inertia. Without devoted
leadership, park waters will remain in peril. No legal strategy can cure that ill.
tional parks); Michael C. Blumm, Unconventional Waters: The Quiet Revolution in Federal and
Tribal Minimum Streamflows, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 445 (1992) (discussing the federal and tribal
governments' protection of instream flows); James D. Crammond, Leasing Water Rights for
Instream Flow Uses: A Survey of Water Transfer Policy, Practices, and Problems in the Pacific
Northwest, 26 ENvTL. L. 225 (1996) (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of leasing
water rights to improve instream flows); Brian T. Hansen, Reserved Water Rights for Wilderness
Areas: Current Law and Future Policy, 9 VA. ENVrL. LJ. 423 (1990) (analyzing federal reserved
rights for wilderness areas); Robert B. Keiter, The Old Faithful Protection Act: Congress, National
Park Ecosystems, and Private Property Rights, 14 PuB. LAND L. REV. 5 (1993) (discussing the
Yellowstone geothermal controversy and the ramifications on national parks); Bennett W. Raley,
Chaos in the Making: The Consequences of Failure to Integrate Federal Environmental Statutes
with McCarran Amendment Water Adjudications, 41 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 24-1 (1995) (ad-
dressing the manner by which federal agencies obtain water rights for use for federal purposes);
Teresa Rice, Beyond Reserved Water Rights: Water Resource Protection for the Public Lands, 28
IDAHO L. REV. 715 (1991-92) (discussing the protection of water sources on public land); A. Dan
Tarlock, Protection of Water Flows for National Parks, 22 LAND & WATER L. REV. 29 (1987)
(examining water use conflicts involving the park service).
3. See 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). See Robin W. Winks, The National Park Service Act of 1916:
"A Contradictory Mandate"?, 74 DENY. U. L. REv. 575 (1997).
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The comments below draw heavily upon several of the good studies al-
ready done of park waters and ecological restoration. Many of the recommen-
dations mimic, or reshape only modestly, comments that the Service has al-
ready heard, sometimes repeatedly. Any sound strategy is likely to contain
many already-familiar pieces, and include ideas the Service has picked up and
worked with, half-heartedly or seriously, for years. A few new pieces need
crafting, to be sure, but the chief task is synthesis-setting the goal, construct-
ing the strategy, identifying the initial steps, and mustering the money and
motivation to move things forcefully ahead.
I. SETTING THE GOAL
One of the chief legal obligations of the Service is to manage its lands
and waters without impairment.4 Its tandem obligation is to make those re-
sources available for public recreational use.5 Public use sometimes rubs
roughly against the nonimpairment standard, causing managerial challenges. In
the case of water, however, conflicts like this are uncommon. In a few park
settings, to be sure, water is so scarce that even minimal consumption by park
users can threaten waterway integrity. In other settings, sewage treatment and
roadway run-off create pollution problems that are solvable but not yet solved.
For the most part, however, public uses of water do not conflict with manage-
ment for impairment, a happy reality that eases the goal-setting task. Park
visitors use waters simply by viewing them. They use them indirectly whenev-
er they enjoy the natural areas that waters help sustain. Rafters and canoeists
are equally well served by original flow regimes, and rarely call for intentional
changes.
In some manner, the Service needs to decide what it means for park wa-
ters to be unimpaired, which is to say it needs to translate its legal charter into
an expressed vision of ecological well being. Waters, of course, are compo-
nents of larger natural mosaics, and it is not possible for waters to remain
vibrant unless other components of the mosaic are vibrant. Water quality is
directly linked to land uses, inside and outside the parks. Riparian vegetation
is an important part of the water picture, and so is drainage. Given this inte-
gration, the goal of water policy needs to be something larger than water. It
needs casting in terms of the health or integrity or natural productivity of the
larger communities of which the water is an indispensable part.
One useful source on this issue, as on many other park issues, is the re-
cent report, National Parks for the 21st Century, known as the Vail Agenda.6
The Vail Agenda presents, as its first strategic objective and as the Service's
"primary responsibility," the protection of park resources from internal and
4. 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1994) (stating that the service has a duty to manage parks "in such man-
ner and by such means as will leave them unimpaied for the enjoyment of future generations").
5. Id. (stating that the service shall "provide for the enjoyment of [parks, monuments, and
reservations]").
6. NATIONAL PARKS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: THE VAIL AGENDA (1992) [hereinafter VAIL
AGENDA].
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external impairment.7 The Vail Agenda elaborates upon that objective at some
length, although it does not quite translate the term impairment into a single
ecological phrase. Protecting park resources, the Vail Agenda states, means
managing them "under ecological principles that prevent their impairment."8
Ecological management, the Vail Agenda states,
requires the maintenance or restoration of native ecosystems and
resistance to the establishment of alien organisms. Where possible,
ecosystem management should attempt to preserve natural processes,
operating at a scale consistent with the evolution of the ecosystem
being managed. Preserving the evolutionary matrix of environment
and organisms is the overarching task of managing ecosystem pro-
cesses, and in those instances where the ecological balance is under
threat or is uniquely fragile, this task may require that access be lim-
ited.9
Readers of the Vail Agenda familiar with conservation biology will understand
what a lofty goal this is, calling as it does not just for the preservation of
species, but their preservation in such numbers, and with sufficient habitat,
that they can continue their evolutionary processes.' ° The restoration of "na-
tive ecosystems" and the management of "ecosystem processes" presumably
require the restoration or mimicry of original disturbance regimes like fires,
floods, and disease infestations. The Vail Agenda shies away from any partic-
ular phrase to capture this vision of unimpaired land; it does not speak directly
in terms of ecosystem health, or ecological integrity, or sustainability, or any
other now fashionable phrase. Yet, the aim of the recommendation is as clear
as it can be, given the limitations on our science; it is the maintenance "of
functioning natural systems that are not characterized by human domina-
tion .... i
A second useful source in setting a long-term goal is the Report of the
Interagency Ecosystem Management Task Force,'2 prepared by representa-
tives of many federal agencies (including the Interior Department) and re-
leased in June 1995. The Interagency Ecosystem Report is a political docu-
ment, aimed mostly at audiences outside the federal government and designed
to quell fears that ecosystem management will mean a surge in intrusive feder-
7. See id. at 17.
8. Id. at 18.
9. Id. at 105.
10. See generally GARY K. MEFFE & C. RONALD CARROLL, PRINCIPLES OF CONSERVATION
BIOLOGY (1994) (examining conservation issues); REED Noss & ALLEN Y. COOPERRIDER, SAVING
NATURE'S LEGACY: PROTECTING AND RESTORING BIODIVERsrrY (1994) (providing management
guidelines and techniques for maintaining biodiverity); Judy L. Meyer, The Dance of Nature: New
Concepts in Ecology, 69 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 875 (1994) (discussing how emerging concepts in
biology may affect environmental management, legislation, and regulation); Reed F. Noss, Some
Principles of Conservation Biology as They Apply to Environmental Law, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
893 (1994) (offering principles and concepts relating to conservation biology that may assist eco-
system management).
11. VAIL AGENDA, supra note 6, at 105.
12. 1 REPORT OF THE INTERAGENCY ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT TASK FORCE, THE ECO-
SYSTEM APPROACH: HEALTHY ECOSYSTEMS AND SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIES (1995) [hereinafter
INTERAGENCY ECOSYSTEM REPORT].
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al power. Like most political documents, this one contains inconsistencies,
calculated inconsistencies in this case, intended to make the document palat-
able to readers with differing views. The Interagency Ecosystem Report's
inner tensions are nowhere more plain than in its expressed goal for ecosystem
management. The ecosystem approach, we are told at one point, is merely "a
process,"3 the neutral aim of which is to achieve the "desired ecosystem out-
come" 4 that has been set collectively by the people and entities (including
federal agencies) whose lives and activities are bound with and to the ecosys-
tem. Federal agencies interested in the ecosystem are encouraged "to play the
role of facilitator and assistant in the development of a [desired, shared] vi-
sion; they should avoid imposition of a solely federal vision upon local com-
munities."' 5 The shared ecosystem vision that comes out of this "process" is
expected to "take[] into account existing social and economic conditions in the
ecosystem, and identify ways in which all parties can contribute to, and bene-
fit from, achieving ecosystem goals."' 6
This soothing language is aimed, evidently enough, at calming the fears of
critics of expansive federal power. It allows them to hope that ecosystem man-
agement, in practice, might be just a modified version of business-as-usual
exploitation. Here and in other places, the Interagency Ecosystem Report sug-
gests that affected ecosystem members are free to set whatever goals they like,
whether or not consistent with lasting ecological health. Elsewhere, however,
the Report contains far different language, intended probably for consumption
by the agencies themselves and revealing much more about the real hopes of
the people who did the drafting. Notwithstanding the process language, the
ecosystem approach, we are told, is a "goal driven" enterprise; it is "a method
for sustaining and restoring natural systems and their functions and values"; it
has an established, background goal--"to restore and sustain the health, pro-
ductivity, and biological diversity of ecosystems . '. . ."  Federal agencies are
instructed to "[ulse ecological approaches that restore or maintain the biologi-
cal diversity and sustainability of the ecosystem."'8 They are to generate
"protocols establishing ecological indicators for monitoring ecosystem
sustainability,"' 9 as if ecosystem sustainability were an assumed element of
every "desired ecosystem outcome." Volume One of the Interagency Ecosys-
tem Report draws to a close with a further critical point, quietly slipped in: the
"shared vision," we are told, "should be consistent with the overarching goal
of sustaining biological diversity of the ecosystem .... ""
On first reading, the Interagency Ecosystem Report seems inconsistent,
pushing both a process model that allows local people to set their own goals
and an alternative management method that comes with a goal already out-
13. Id. at 26.
14. Id. at 6, 9-10, 19, 31.
15. Id. at 9-10 (emphasis in original).
16. Id. at 19.
17. Id. at 3.
18. Id. at 20.
19. Id. at 13.
20. Id. at 49.
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lined-a quickly sketched goal that includes not just the maintenance but the
restoration of the "health" and "biological diversity" of ecosystems.2 Is it
possible to bring these sentences together, to reduce or eliminate the seeming
inconsistency? Are they more artfully written than first meets the eye? Is there
a lesson here for the Park Service, as it sets out to construct its own water
strategy?
What the authors of the Interagency Ecosystem Report knew all too well
is that many people across the land know little about matters of ecological
health and, for that reason and others, value it rather little. They are out to
make a living, whether meager or opulent, and want little interference from a
meddling, distant government. Vast numbers of businesses are adamantly op-
posed to environmental protection and to anything that smacks of land-use
regulation, without regard for long-term communal well-being. For people
concerned about land health, these are tough nuts to crack; they are potent
obstacles that have to be dealt with, and cannot simply be bypassed.
They cannot be bypassed, but they can be pushed and cajoled and educat-
ed and encouraged to reflect on the long-term good of the land and its human
inhabitants; they can, that is, be moved along, step by step, lesson by lesson,
in the direction of valuing the land more highly and considering longer-term
perspectives. In the short term, resistant voices need to speak out, or the resis-
tance and backlash can bring everything to a halt. In the long-run, there is less
need to accept views inconsistent with land health. Short-term planning pro-
cesses largely take people as they are, hoping to educate them a bit and draw
upon their more virtuous natures, but in the end letting them express and act
upon their antecedent, exogenous views. Over time, more flexibility is possi-
ble. A well-constructed strategy has more room to maneuver, more chances to
accentuate some views over others and shape public understanding and values.
It offers the opportunity, that is, to lead.
The surface inconsistencies in the Interagency Ecosystem Report exist
largely because the Report deliberately consolidates the long term with the
short term, to the confusion of both. In the short term, ecosystem management
is a process-based system of communal decisionmaking, aimed at getting peo-
ple together, sharing ecological data with them, and hoping that as a group
they can think and act more virtuously than they would as individuals. But as
the process continues, federal agencies are expected to keep pushing and
working to promote the substantive parts of the Report, the parts that speak to
land health as an established goal and to biodiversity maintenance as a central
element of that goal. These, it seems, are the goals that the federal actors are
to promote in the many ways listed in the Report-by gathering and dissemi-
nating data, by making research capabilities available, by convening study
groups, by issuing reports, by public education measures, by working closely
with nonfederal groups with similar ecological aims, and so forth.22
Over time, this effort is expected to pay off in the form of increased in-
21. Id. at 3.
22. See id. at 8-15.
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fluence in the ecosystem management process. Step by step, the journey to-
ward land health is expected to continue, as people become more familiar with
the environmental degradation around them and more aware of the causes of
that degradation; as they see the costs and limitations of old ways of living; as
people out for quick exploitation move to other places, taking their destructive
attitudes with them; and as the people who stay see the benefits, to them and
their children, of a land that is healthy and aesthetically pleasing.
Written as it was for broad applicability, the Interagency Ecosystem Re-
port includes compromises and vague phrasings that a Park System document
need not and should not contain. Unlike most federal agencies, the Service by
law is obligated to manage its resources without impairment.23 It has no
choice but to vest that important term with meaning, and it can rightly do so
in ecological terms. Just as important as the legal charter is the favorable reali-
ty of a public that expects the Service to promote natural well-being; the Ser-
vice is not in the tree-cutting or mining or grazing business, and people do not
want it to start. Setting aside the cranky few, people hold the Service in high
esteem and support it enthusiastically. It can be more bold than other agencies
in its push for ecological health. It can take-it simply must take-a vigorous
leadership role within the federal system.
Setting a goal for park water policy would be a good deal easier if ecolo-
gists and other scientists could offer a settled and useable definition of land
health. Given the vagaries of nature and our sizeable ignorance of it, there is
no such definition, nor is there likely soon to be such a definition. Land man-
agers have to live with uncertainty on issues of land health, and the sooner
they become comfortable with this plight the sooner they can get to work. In
the end, terms like land health and ecological integrity are more metaphor than
scientific state. And yet they are the best terms that we have, and are as useful
as any. The time has come for the Service to announce, as its goal, that its
waterways will regain their ecological health; that they will return, not neces-
sarily to their flow profiles before humans arrived, but to some rough approxi-
mation of original flows and water quality, sufficient to maintain their sur-
rounding ecological communities. However it is exactly phrased, this goal
ought to be viewed as an elaboration of the legal commitment to unimpaired
resources. It should become the guiding light of water policy, and remain as
such until it is ultimately achieved.
As the Service goes about articulating its long-term water goal, it has a
sizeable scientific literature to draw upon, all aimed at giving meaning to the
suggestive but ultimately vague ideas of ecosystem health and ecological in-
tegrity. One of the urgent agenda items for scientists today is to give more
concrete meaning to these ideas, or at least to develop practical measures for
23. See supra text accompanying notes 3-4. The BLM and Forest Service also have charters
with nonimpairment clauses. Their charters also include responsibilities relating to mining, graz-
ing, and timber harvesting that are far less consistent with nonimpairment than the Park Service's
recreational responsibilities. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 529, 531 (1994) (codifying Forest Service: man-
agement "without impairment of the productivity of the land"); 43 U.S.C. §§ 1702(c), 1712(c)(1),
1732(a) (1994) (codifying BLM: management "without permanent impairment of the productivity
of the land").
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estimating whether a natural community is or is not in good condition. The
Interagency Ecosystem Report recognized this need in its particular call for
federal agencies to generate ecological indicators for monitoring ecosystem
health.2 4 In the area of water, Professor James Karr's work stands out as par-
ticularly useful.' The work now being done on biological water-quality stan-
dards also shows near-term promise.26 At a more general level, writings by
environmental policy specialists have considered the ecological bases of com-
munity stability, exploring the various meanings of the term "stability" and
considering whether, given our knowledge, it even makes sense to claim that
we can do anything more than estimate the relative health of alternative eco-
system states." Taken as a whole, this literature is more suggestive than it is
conclusive, and it is best used, as many scholars have noted, by mixing it with
a liberal dose of humility so that we might protect ourselves from the errors of
our ignorance. The sensible way to deal with the current limits of sci-
ence-aside from pushing hard to learn more-is to mix our knowledge with a
guiding land ethic, a holistic ethic that admits the reality of the larger natural
whole and that recognizes and respects the moral value of that whole.'
Once the Service articulates an overall goal-a simple goal, in plain Eng-
lish, easily repeated by Service employees everywhere-it needs to augment
that goal with key management parameters.' Some parameters are likely to
derive from measures of water quality. Others, the most important ones for
many parks, will likely come from studies of threatened and endangered aquat-
ic species. Across the nation, aquatic species-mussels, fish, amphibians-are
under assault, to a greater extent than terrestrial species. 0 The management
of a resource to promote only a single species is fraught with dangers, but
there is the opposite problem of managing at such a high level of generality as
to lose the essential connection with scientific defensibility.3 ' Nonimpairment
24. INTERAGENCY ECOSYSTEM REPORT, supra note 12, at 13 (Recommendation 23).
25. See generally James R. Karr, Biological Integrity: A Long-Neglected Aspect of Water
Resource Management, 1 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 66 (1991); James R. Karr, Ecological Integ-
rity: Protecting Earth's Life Support Systems, in ECOSYSTEM HEALTH: NEW GOALS FOR ENvI-
RONMENTAL MANAGEMENT 223 (Robert Costanza et al. eds., 1992); James R. Karr, Clean Water
is Not Enough, 11 ILLAHEE 51 (1995); James R. Karr & Ellen W. Chu, Ecological Integrity: Re-
claiming Lost Connections, in PERSPECTIVES ON ECOLOGICAL INTEGRITY 34 (Laura Westra &
John Lemons eds., 1995); James R. Karr, Defining and Assessing Ecological Integrity: Beyond
Water Quality, in 12 ENVTL. TOXICOLOGY AND CHEMISTRY 1521 (1993).
26. See generally BIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT AND CRITERIA: TOOLS FOR WATER RESOURCE
PLANNING AND DECISION MAKING (Wayne S. Davis & Thomas P. Simon eds., 1995); E.P.A.,
BIOLOGICAL CRITERIA: NATIONAL PROGRAM GUIDANCE FOR SURFACE WATERS (April 1990).
27. See, e.g., STUART L. PIMM, THE BALANCE OF NATURE (1991); K.S. SHRADER-
FRECHErFE & E.D. MCCOY, METHOD IN ECOLOGY: STRATEGIES FOR CONSERVATION (1993); J.
Baird Callicott, Do Deconstructive Ecology and Sociobiology Undermine Leopold's Land Ethic?,
18 ENVTL. ETHICS 353 (1996).
28. See Callicott, supra note 27, at 368-69.
29. One problem with both the VAIL AGENDA, supra note 6, and the INTERAGENCY ECo-
SYSTEM REPORT, supra note 12, is that they do not offer clear, single phrasings of the desired
state of ecological well-being. Alternative phrasings might well be equally good, but the practical
needs of implementation are better met by a single phrasing, easily remembered and suitable for
endless repetition.
30. See ADLER Er AL., supra note 2, at 59-69.
31. Problems with management at a high level of generalization are considered in Richard
Haeuber, Setting the Environmental Policy Agenda: The Case of Ecosystem Management, 36 NAT.
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ought to mean the protection of all species, and the health of particular water-
ways is often best approximated by studying carefully and putting to practical
use the particular needs of selected imperiled species.32 Managing resources
for thousands of species is an impossibly complex job; managing for a handful
of key species is more tractable, and is a useful managerial approach in the
absence of something better.33
Once the Service formulates an overall goal and puts at least minimal
flesh on the goal, it needs to consider how best to use it. Given the impair-
ment of many waterways, particularly old diversions and obstructions, the
repair of all waters makes sense only as a long-term endeavor. For many riv-
ers, restoration will require steps that lose their feasibility as time passes. For
these rivers, which present frequent and nagging problems, the goal needs to
remain on the horizon, guiding the short-term efforts that move slowly toward
it. Those short-term efforts, as the Interagency Ecosystem Report artfully
notes, need to arise from consensus, from processes that bring local people
together and give them a voice in the future of their home ecosystems.34
Measures implemented in a given place simply must enjoy support by local
landowners, local communities, and the like, particularly when those measures
disrupt existing economic activities.35 Nonetheless, it is not just appropriate
but legally essential that the Service become an active player in such discus-
sions, always expressing its own legally based goal and doing what it can to
move people toward that goal. It should not-as the Interagency Ecosystem
Report warns-impose its own goal on a recalcitrant or uncomprehending
citizenry. It can do a lot of pushing and persuading.
II. A STRATEGY FOR IMPLEMENTATION
Once the Service articulates its long-term goal, it needs to develop a strat-
egy for implementation that will guide budget decisions, hiring practices, em-
ployee evaluations, and other real-life decisions. The goal needs to become
part of the general management plans of all major park units, with responsi-
bility for promoting the goal vested in the superintendent or other site manag-
er.
A. General Elements
An effective strategy to repair park waters will need many elements, all
linked by the contribution they make to the overall goal. As it puts together a
strategic plan, the Service has many good reports and studies to draw upon,
REsouRcEs J. 1 (1996).
32. See ADLER ET AL., supra note 2, at 127-28, 245-47.
33. Id.; see generally Noss & COOPERRIDER, supra note 10.
34. See INTERAGENCY ECOSYSTEM REPORT, supra note 12, at 19, 21, 31-39.
35. There is a lesser yet still weighty need to gain public consensus for measures that restrict
options for future economic development, particularly development that has progressed to the
point of specific proposals that have gained public attention and supporL
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including the Vail Agenda,36 the Interagency Ecosystem Report,37 reports by
the National Parks and Conservation Association 38 and The Conservation
Foundation,39 The Keystone National Policy Dialogue on Ecosystem Manage-
ment,4 analyses by prior Service leaders,4' studies of particular legal issues
(including watershed planning),42 and reports on successful, community-based
ecosystem management efforts.43 The Service could draft a solid strategy
simply by drawing upon these sources. An even better strategy would arise by
adding to those sources the considerable expertise of Service employees, who
know more than anyone else about the conditions and needs of park units. The
Service's ultimate strategy needs to come largely from within the Service, and
needs to make sense and prove effective within the bureaucratic structures of
the agency. Nonetheless, it is possible to identify a number of elements that
ought to become.part of that strategy:
Monitoring and Research-Although Service employees know a good
deal about park units, they do not possess anything like the technical data that
they need on hydrological flows and the types and sources of water-quality
degradation. A massive increase is needed in water monitoring, undertaken at
far more locations and done with greater regularity. Along with simply gather-
ing more data the Service needs to increase many-fold its scientific research
efforts. Many of those efforts will focus on water-quality issues, particularly
related to biological water criteria. Other efforts will focus on the exact needs
and recovery options of imperiled aquatic species. Still other work needs to
36. VAIL AGENDA, supra note 6.
37. INTERAGENCY ECOSYSTEM REPORT, supra note 12.
38. NATIONAL PARKS AND CONSERVATION ASS'N, INVESTING IN PARK FUTURES - THE NA-
TIONAL PARK SYSTEM PLAN: A BLUEPRINT FOR TOMORROW (1988).
39. THE CONSERVATION FOUND., NATIONAL PARKS FOR A NEW GENERATION: VISIONS,
REALITIES, PROSPECTS (1985).
40. THE KEYSTONE CR., THE KEYSTONE NATIONAL POLICY DIALOGUE ON ECOSYSTEM
MANAGEMENT (1996).
41. See, e.g., DWIGHT F. RETrIE, OUR NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM (1995); JAMES M.
RIDENOUR, THE NATIONAL PARKS COMPROMISED: PORK BARREL POLmTCS AND AMERICA'S
TREASURES (1994).
42. See, e.g., Robert W. Adler, Addressing Barriers to Watershed Protection, 25 ENVTL. L.
973 (1995); David S. Baron, Water Quality Standards for Rivers and Lakes: Emerging Issues, 27
AIz. ST. LJ. 559 (1995); Federico Cheever, The Road to Recovery: A New Way of Thinking
About the Endangered Species Act, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1996); Debra L. Donahue, The Untapped
Power of Clean Water Act Section 401, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 201 (1996); Robert L. Glicksman,
Pollution on the Federal Lands II: Water Pollution Law, 12 U.C.L.A. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 61
(1993); Oliver A. Houck, The Regulation of Toxic Pollutants Under the Clean Water Act, 21
ENVTL. L. RPTR. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10528 (1991) [hereinafter Houck, Regulation of Toxic Pol-
lutants]; Oliver A. Houck, The Endangered Species Act and Its Implementation by the U.S. De-
partments of Interior and Commerce, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 277 (1993) [hereinafter Houck, En-
dangered Species Act]; Robert B. Keiter, Beyond the Boundary Line: Constructing a Law of Eco-
system Management, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 293 (1994); John Charles Kunich, The Fallacy of
Deathbed Conservation Under the Endangered Species Act, 24 ENVTL. L. 501 (1994); Daniel R.
Mandelker, Controlling Nonpoint Source Water Pollution: Can It Be Done?, 65 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 479 (1989); J.B. Ruhl, Section 7(A)(1) of the "New" Endangered Species Act: Rediscovering
and Redefining the Untapped Power of Federal Agencies' Duty to Conserve Species, 25 ENVTL.
L. 1107 (1995); see also sources cited supra note 2.
43. See, e.g., W. WILLIAM WEEKS, BEYOND THE ARK: TOOLS FOR AN ECOSYSTEM AP-
PROACH TO CONSERVATION (1997); STEVEN L. YAFFEE Er AL., ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES: AN ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT EXPERIENCE (1996).
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reach well beyond park boundaries to identify, quantify, and study significant
diversions, pollution sources, and flow disruptions, all with the aim of protect-
ing waters against further degradation and otherwise moving toward the goal
of repairing park waters. Much of this work ought to entail collaboration with
others, as noted below." All of the data and studies need widespread dissem-
ination.
Water Rights-The Service needs a clear strategy on the assertion of wa-
ter rights, particularly reserved water rights, and the acquisition of other types
of water rights.' The water rights issue is a sensitive one, given that the as-
sertion of federal rights is often viewed as disrupting vested private property
rights-a particularly onerous act. An effective strategy needs to recognize this
political reality and somehow deal with it. Yet, there are ways of dealing with
it that do not require the Service to roll over and lie mute, as the government
has largely done in the case of water rights for wilderness areas. A good strat-
egy will reduce antagonism while protecting future options for progressing
toward the overall goal. An important part of the Service's water strategy
ought to entail a push for reform of state water laws, particularly on the issues
of beneficial and reasonable use.'
Water Quality-More important than water quantity is water quality, and
the Service needs to work harder on this issue than any other.47 Its efforts
should link directly with the work of state water-quality officials, both helping
them do their work and encouraging them to do it well-that is, to do it in
such a way as to progress further toward the goals of the Clean Water Act.'
State water-quality offices ought to become important allies of the Service in
its efforts to repair park waters, given their similar goals. The Service also
needs to work with the federal EPA, another underused ally.
Biodiversity-One reason for repairing park waters is to sustain and re-
store populations of native species, particularly animal species. Aquatic species
are under assault everywhere and their survival is of popular interest. The
Service's water strategy needs to include biodiversity preservation as a major
element, focusing not just on species now federally listed as threatened or
endangered but on species proposed for listing, candidate species, and species
identified by scientific groups as declining or at risk.49 In some park settings,
the needs of key species might furnish the central management criteria for
defending park waters against further degradation; they might also serve to
give sound scientific bases to particular repair goals, in terms of desired flow
regimes, water-quality levels, and the like. The Service needs to become more
involved in the administration of the Endangered Species Act. It also needs to
look forward to increased state roles in the administration of that Act.
Education-No strategy has much chance of success without a significant
44. See infra text following note 57 and text accompanying notes 60-62.
45. See infra text accompanying notes 63-69.
46. See infra text accompanying notes 70-73.
47. See infra text accompanying notes 77-101.
48. See ADLER ET AL., supra note 2, at 6-10.
49. See infra text accompanying notes 102-17.
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education component, aimed at promoting the long-term water goal and edu-
cating the public and local decisionmakers on the benefits of ecologically
healthy waterways. ° Education is already an important Service task. That
work needs to expand and become focused on ecological restoration, ecosys-
tem planning, imperiled aquatic species, and similar issues related to the
Service's legally based goal.
Technical Help--As the Service upgrades its scientific data collection and
its technical expertise on such issues as water flows, water quality, and conser-
vation biology, it needs to reach out to its neighbors with generous offers of
technical help.5 The data that it collects and the studies that it performs
must, of course, gain wide distribution. Beyond that, the Service needs to help
states perform their water-quality tasks. It needs to help local governments
conduct studies of local activities and needs, whether they have to do with
water supply, sewage disposal, water conservation, erosion control, irrigation
return flows, recreation, or waste disposal.
Gaining Support-As it does the above tasks, the Service will find itself
working more closely with state and local governments and private groups of
various types, each of which is more or less supportive of park goals. The
Service cannot achieve its water goal without help from other groups and a
liberal measure of popular support. In many cases the steps needed to repair
park waters are ones that are best done, or can only be done, by actors other
than the Service. Intergovernmental relations need a dramatic increase in park
budgets, particularly if present political trends continue and states assert more
independence with regard to water-quality and endangered-species issues. The
Service also needs to identify and cultivate groups that are likely to support its
efforts, like river-recreation groups, fishing groups, and tourist and travel orga-
nizations, in part to bolster its claim that healthy waters make economic sense.
Visibility-Finally, the Service's strategy needs to keep the long-term goal
front and center, not just in the minds of Service employees but at the fore-
front of all discussions about surrounding ecosystems and watersheds. The
Service should present its goal primarily as a desirable end state for all com-
munity members, as a goal good for local human communities as well as na-
tive wildlife, not just as a requirement of federal law. It should not shy away
from discussing the goal in ethical and even religious terms, nor should it
avoid calmly criticizing more exploitive approaches to land use by pointing
out their unsustainability, their hidden economic costs, and their deleterious
community impacts.
B. Getting the Science Right
For decades the park ranger has stood as the paradigm of Service profes-
sionalism---the dedicated employee, at home in the outdoors, helpful to visi-
tors and learned in natural lore. Without downgrading the prestige of that job,
the Service needs to find ways to upgrade markedly its technical scientific
50. See infra text accompanying notes 58-60.
51. See infra text accompanying notes 60-62.
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expertise so that it can generate the kind of data and studies that are essential
if park waters are going to revive. Critics of the Service, internal and external,
have long noted the Service's trouble in putting together a credible program of
first-class science.52 Some of the troubles have had to do with funding issues,
although Service budgets over the past decade have done better than the bud-
gets of most federal agencies.53 Other troubles are internal ones, having to do
with the aura of the all-purpose ranger and resistance to bringing in specially
trained employees at high civil service levels.54
In recent years the Service has made steps toward more strategic planning,
and has begun pooling its meager scientific resources with other federal agen-
cies to create the National Biological Service. These steps could help, but
more funding is urgently needed. In addition, any shared research office needs
to remain responsive to the particular needs of individual park units. Much of
the needed scientific work includes data collection on stream flows, water-
quality levels, and species populations. This work requires professional over-
sight and ultimate reporting to the park superintendent or site manager, but
chiefly entails tasks that nonscientists can perform.
One of the top research tasks, once existing conditions are known at a
given park, is to identify scientific measures that give particular, local meaning
to the general goal of waterway health. These measures would serve as
benchmarks or goals-minimum standards for a waterway to remain or be-
come healthy. In most cases, these measures would have to do with water-
flow regimes (particularly low flows), water-quality levels, riparian vegetation,
and habitat for sensitive aquatic species. This work will not be easy, to say the
least. It can be done only upon completion of extensive background research,
particularly on the needs of imperiled or otherwise sensitive aquatic life. In the
case of many waterways, the most useful water-quality criteria will be biologi-
cal ones, developed not just in the abstract-using common fish and crusta-
ceans-but with attention to the particular needs of the actual species that
inhabit local waters.55 This work on biological criteria will likely fit closely
with studies of threatened and endangered species and the preparation of mul-
ti-species recovery plans under the Endangered Species Act.
When Service officials put together their education programs and public
ecosystem study centers, and when they attend meetings with state and local
government officials or local citizen groups, they need to have their science
done correctly. Service officials need to carry in their briefcases scientifically
sound studies of particular waterways and aquatic species. They need scientif-
ically justified models of alternative flow regimes so that they can predict the
impacts of diversions, drainage activities, wetlands restoration efforts,
stormwater control measures, water conservation measures, and other alter-
52. See VAIL AGENDA, supra note 6, at 31 (stating that "the National Park Service is ex-
traordinarily deficient in its capacities to generate, acquire, synthesize, act upon and articulate to
the public sound scientific research and scientific information"); RETrE, supra note 41, at 114-15,
220-21.
53. RETrIE, supra note 41, at ch. 9, App. 5.
54. Id. at 152-59.
55. See ADLER Er AL., supra note 2, at 127-28; see also sources cited supra note 25.
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ations, for better or worse, of existing hydrological conditions. Additionally,
good science is essential whenever the Service shows up in court, as plaintiff
or defendant, particularly when water rights are involved or imperiled species
are at risk.
This research work, it must be understood, will not happen once and then
be done. Monitoring will become a perpetual undertaking, and models will
require constant tinkering and testing. Any action taken within a watershed
will need follow-up study to determine its actual impacts and to compare these
impacts with predicted results. Water management, that is, will entail a great
deal of trial and error; it will require what has come to be called adaptive
management, management that regularly monitors results and makes corrective
changes in plans and operations.56 Adaptive management, everyone seems to
agree, is an essential part of ecosystem and watershed management, and the
Service needs to embrace it.5 The Service can do so, however, only with a
dedicated research effort and a constantly engaged planning team empowered
to redirect research efforts and to revisit resource management plans whenever
data arrive that call into question present ways of doing business, and not just
on specified multi-year schedules.
Aside from doing its own research and working with the National Biolog-
ical Service, the Service needs to encourage affirmative work on park proper-
ties by other federal agencies, particularly the Fish and Wildlife Service and
the EPA. To the extent that these agencies have research tasks to perform, the
Service should invite them (and their contract researchers) to research within
park units. The Service's water strategy should also bring in as many nonfed-
eral researchers and data collectors as possible. On major installations, the Ser-
vice might establish ecosystem study centers with multiple aims-educating
park visitors (particularly local visitors), providing a reading or research center
for interested parties, and coordinating research efforts by nonfederal parties.
University researchers should receive enthusiastic invitations, and Service
officials should draw upon university expertise through grants and research
contracts when possible. Other groups should find warm welcomes as well,
including volunteer environmental groups such as Riverwatch, the Audubon
Society, and even high-school science classes and clubs and scout troops. Par-
ticular efforts should aim at bringing local people into the data-collection pro-
cess, to learn more about park properties and become comfortable with tech-
nical data that otherwise appear esoteric and threatening.
C. Responding to Ecological Ignorance
One of the sobering realities that the Service faces in implementing a
water strategy is the public's considerable ignorance on matters of ecological
56. A good examination is KAI N. LEE, COMPASS AND GYROSCOPE: INTEGRATING SCIENCE
AND POLmCS FOR THE ENVIRONMENT (1993).
57. YAFFEE ET AL., supra note 43, at 37-38; THE KEYSTONE CTR., supra note 40, at 15-16;
INTERAGENCY ECOSYSTEM REPORT, supra note 12, at 46-47; see also R. Edward Grumbine, What
is Ecosystem Management?, 8 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1 (1994) (summarizing studies of ecosys-
tem management and noting common embrace of adaptive management).
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health.58 Activities that a trained scientist can readily spot as harmful are of-
ten not seen that way by ordinary citizens. The gains of economic activities
are usually apparent and readily grasped; the associated ecosystem costs are
often hidden, and their long-term impacts underappreciated or missed entirely.
Americans often rsent it when governments preach to them about "doing
good." Citizens are far more receptive when actions cause palpable harms to
themselves or to their social communities and local lands. We understand that
we should not cause harm, and are more likely to change our ways and rethink
competing options when harms are brought to our attention.
One of the main aims of a water strategy is to enlist public support for
the attainment and maintenance of healthy waterways. This aim will take a
great deal of patient, well-orchestrated work spread over decades. and perhaps
continuing forever. Ordinary people need not become ecologists, but they
deserve more than vague generalizations. An important few will want to look
closely at the scientific details. Far more of them will want the sense that the
conclusions they hear are grounded in scientific fact, and they will listen when
Park Service critics line up to challenge what the Service says. Education
needs to take many forms, and needs to be directed toward diverse audiences
from casual visitors to knowledgeable state officials.
As it pieces together an education program, the Service needs to aim high,
realizing that it is not out for quick gains. Recent experiences with the Endan-
gered Species Act ("ESA") offer some useful lessons. When the ESA came
under attack, supporters felt pressed to respond with arguments that made
immediate sense and that accepted the broad public audience as it was, in all
its ecological ignorance. The chief arguments supporting the Act focused on
the direct value of species to individuals, including their potential medicinal
value. The arguments were utilitarian and anthropocentric. They did not re-
quire the listener to digest the concept of an ecological community, nor did
they seriously press claims of intrinsic worth in the nonhuman sphere. A sepa-
rate line of argument was aimed at conservative Christian voters, who were
asked to link the ESA to biblical duties of stewardship for all parts of God's
creation. As a whole, the pro-ESA argument did not promote ecological litera-
cy because there simply was not time, or so it seemed.
Unlike defenders of the ESA, the Service is not under the gun to avert a
looming legislative disaster. It can aim higher with its educational programs,
and needs to do so. It needs to explain to people how their lives and fates are
intertwined with the land around them. If people want healthy lives, if they
want to leave a sound legacy for later generations, they need to promote the
ecological integrity of surrounding natural areas. Little-known species are part
of nature's fabric, playing roles that we little understand but contributing in
some way, small or large, to the well being of the whole. The Service need
not cover up valid debates on scientific issues, but it also need not be so "bal-
anced" as to repeat every relevant view, regardless of merit.59 Educational
58. A good critique, focused on the failings of our educational system, is DAVID W. ORR,
ECOLOGICAL LITERACY: EDUCATION AND THE TRANSITION TO A POSTMODERN WORLD (1992).
59. The Service ought to be particularly aggressive in challenging anti-environmental views
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programs should talk often about ecosystem management and watershed plan-
ning, with specific examples of what it can mean and how the lack of such
planning and management has caused problems for the land and its human
inhabitants. Scientific information needs translation into plain English, but the
detail is important, too. A discrete but influential group of people will want to
see it.
One of the most promising educational steps could be the creation of
watershed or ecosystem study centers at key park facilities, aimed at public
education and at the more focused educational and community planning needs
of local people. An ecosystem study center might have public display rooms
with maps, graphs, species distribution information, and samples of monitoring
data, all aimed at getting people to understand how components of the land-
scape interrelate. Separate rooms might bring together data on local ecosys-
tems, and serve as reference centers and meeting places for local people inter-
ested in working on the issue, including environmental groups, students, local
government officials, developers, farmers, and others. Information, of course,
is a potent tool. In this instance, information furthers the goals of the Service;
ignorance, by and large, has the counter effect.
One final element on the matter of education: the Service would err huge-
ly if it avoided or shortchanged matters of ethics and aesthetics and assumed
that economics and self-interest alone rule the popular mind. It would err also
by embracing a short-term perspective, as if people were solely interested in
the here and now. People do care, of course, about economic options, and so
should the Service. They do care about whether they can make ends meet
tomorrow. Yet, when people get together to talk about their homes and consid-
er the legacies they want to leave, they are quick to speak in terms of right
and wrong and to lengthen their planning time-frames. In calm moments they
talk about the beauty of the land and the hold it has on their imagination.
American culture took a sharp turn against nature a number of generations
back, and it has had trouble reversing its course. Sometimes we still view
nature as a stockpile of resources awaiting the human call to serve. We still
divide animals into those we can eat or otherwise use directly, and the many
others that are just part of the scenic background, enjoyable to watch so long
as they stay out of the way. Many of us ask why a particular mussel or crusta-
cean ought to hold up an otherwise appealing construction project. This strand
of thought is both familiar and potent. Yet, it does not represent our only
thought. With many people, these views reflect not so much disinterest in the
environment as a desire to see proof; it is the popular show-me mentality.
Ethics change over time, and a land ethic has begun to take root in the United
States, shallow though it may be. Aesthetic sensibilities also change, and we
are slowly coming to value the natural more than ever before. Ecological
knowledge remains elementary, yet most of us do know that chemicals move
based on an unrealistic and ethically misguided burden of proof-views that assume humans can
reshape nature at will unless and until there is irrefutable proof of imminent harm. See generally
ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, JUSTICE AND THE EARTH: IMAGES FOR OUR PLANETARY SURVIVAL (1993)
(assessing possible responses to our ignorance of the nonhuman natural realm).
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around, that waste does not disappear when the garbage truck leaves, and that
erosion destroys reservoirs. The idea of interconnection is not an alien one.
This common, though elementary, understanding offers a foundation for
educators to build on, scientifically, ethically, and aesthetically. With prodding
and chances to think and speak, people can and do lengthen their planning
horizons. They do let ethical judgments creep in. They know what humility is
all about and why it is our prime virtue. They know that by acting together
they can often do more than when they go their separate ways.
D. Becoming a Responsible Neighbor
Aside from talking and promoting its own cause, the Service needs to
listen well and take seriously what it hears.' Local people degrade their natu-
ral homes with particular goals in mind. If the Service wants them to act dif-
ferently, it can do so by helping them find less damaging ways of achieving
their goals. Some alternatives will require technical help--finding alternative
water supplies, developing water-conservation measures, or constructing new
wetlands. Other alternatives will require money, and the Service can alleviate
that need, not be putting up money itself (at least as a regular matter), but by
lending support for money requests aimed elsewhere. On this general issue,
the Interagency Ecosystem Report offers good advice.6 Local people need a
say in shaping the future of their natural home. The Service needs to help
them do that, working as hard as it can to encourage ends and means that are
consistent with sound water flows.
As it ventures more often into local communities, the Service needs to
exercise caution. People soon look to it for every answer and blame it for all
failed hopes. It should not promise what it cannot- deliver. If local economic
activities are simply unsustainable, the Service should not prop them up. If a
waterway development project is unacceptably destructive, the Service needs
to say so. Being a responsible neighbor does not mean acting as servant of
local interests or endorsing every local desire; it means considering the well
being of the whole and working to promote that well being, to the extent that
this furthers the Service's water goal. Clashes are inevitable, particularly with
irrigation projects and extraction operations that bring private gain at massive
communal cost. The Service should not shy away from conflict. It should
respond with compassion, sound science, and a clear articulation of values. It
should seek common ground when feasible, and encourage others to do the
same. Daniel Kemmis's much-cited book offers good insight on this issue.62
It belongs on the shelf of every park superintendent and every community-
relations employee.
60. DANIEL KEMMIs, COMMUNITY AND THE POLrnCS OF PLACE (1990) (providing a
thoughtful critique of the typical government "hearing" process); Jonathan Poisner, A Civic Re-
publican Perspective on the National Environmental Policy Act's Process for Citizen Participa-
tion, 26 ENVTL. L. 53 (1996) (calling for reform in the context of the National Environmental
Policy Act).
61. See INTERAGENCY ECOSYSTEM REPORT, supra note 12, at 34-39.
62. KEMIUS, supra note 60.
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Two local needs will likely be so common that Service officials every-
where need to stand prepared to deal with them. Many communities will want
to know about economic development, particularly how to deal with job losses
in extractive industries and irrigated agriculture. Even more communities will
need help with nonpoint-source pollution problems, including abandoned waste
dumps and mining sites. If the Service can help deal with local problems like
these, it will smooth considerably its own path.
Um. WATER RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILIrmS
Years ago, when scholars talked about the water problems of the national
parks, they began with the subject of water rights, and often traveled little
beyond it. That mentality does more harm than good today, given how it
shortchanges many matters and how it pushes so many problems onto the
most contentious of terrains. Still, water rights count for a good deal today.
The Service needs to think more about both its own water rights and those of
others.63
The anti-government rhetoric that has arisen recently reaches its peak on
matters of private property rights. Given this sensitivity, the Service needs a
well-considered strategy for dealing with the matter. The centerpiece of the
strategy, without question, ought to be the avoidance of framing an issue in
terms of water quantity and priority whenever possible. A second element of
the strategy, when quantification is unavoidable, should be a push for tempo-
rary deals and arrangements instead of specifications of perpetual water rights;
a push, that is, for ad hoc truces that give the Service more time to progress
on other parts of its strategy.
The Service's main concern is not with who owns water so much as with
how water is used. The Service need not own massive water rights. Others
may own them, so long as they use the water in ways consistent with the
Service's long-term water goal. That outcome, to be sure, is more easily stated
than achieved, and water rights problems will long prove annoying. Still, there
is a useful distinction between ownership and use, just as there is a useful
distinction between short-term compromises and long-term settlements. A
focus on water use turns discussions to matters of water quality, biodiversity,
flooding, and recreation. It turns the issue from abstract entitlements to real-
life impacts of particular water uses-often damaging impacts, which current
water users ought to explain.
In one form or another, the following elements should fit into the
Service's water rights strategy:
Vigorous Assertion, only when needed-Given the sensitivity of property
rights issues, the Service should rarely go out of its way to bring up the matter
of water rights. Nonetheless, when dragged into court it ought to fight hard,
asserting its rights vigorously. As it does so, it ought to make clear its own
63. Two useful studies are Charles F. Wilkinson, Water Rights and the Duties of the Na-
tional Park Service: A Call for Action at a Critical Juncture, in OUR COMMON LANDS: DEFEND-
ING THE NATIONAL PARKS, supra note 2, at 261; and Tarlock, supra note 2.
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preference for other solutions, for temporary deals that do not require litigation
and that leave room for later renegotiations. At present, the government does
not enjoy the reputation of being a tough litigator on water rights issues. It
needs to earn that reputation, if only to reduce the occasions when people
challenge it.
Linkage to Goal-When the Service asserts its reserved water rights, it
should claim ownership of water flows of sufficient quantity and quality to
achieve its long-term water goal-the ecological health and integrity of water-
ways that flow through park units. Nonimpairment is a primary purpose of
national parks, set forth clearly in the Service's charter. To the extent possible,
the Service should tie its water rights directly into its charter language, and
make little use of the individual statutes that gave rise to particular park
units.' Rights based on the nation-wide charter are simpler to explain and lit-
igate. Resulting precedents from one park unit are more readily applied to
other park units. The exact quantity and quality of water needed to achieve
nonimpairment will vary from unit to unit, and the Service today is far from
having the scientific data in place to specify that quantity and quality, much
less defend it against attack. One reason to prefer temporary deals rather than
permanent quantifications is so that the Service might get its homework done.
A few years from now it might be better able to defend itself.
Litigation Strategy-Service lawyers already know well the law on re-
served water rights.' They are familiar with the many gaps in that law. The
few reported appellate rulings addressing park waters hardly begin to provide
a full picture of where things stand. Almost nothing is known about reserved
water rights in wilderness areas and on waterways protected as wild or scenic
rivers.' Little more is known about the water rights of park units not classi-
fied as national parks and national monuments.67 Even in the case of true
parks and monuments, the case law is modest and still subject to question.
One particular need is to build precedents that counteract the damaging Colo-
rado opinion dealing with Dinosaur National Monument.'
One of the Service's strategic aims should be to fill in the gaps in this
law, and to do so by way of well-planned test cases. Outside the criminal
64. This approach was embraced in the important Solicitor's Opinion, Water Rights of the
National Park Service, Fish and Wildlife Service, Bureau of Reclamation and the Bureau of Land
Management, 86 Interior Dec. 553, 595-602 (1979).
65. Id.; Federal Reserved Water Rights in Wilderness Areas, 96 Interior Dec. 211 (1988).
66. See Blumm, supra note 2, at 456, 458; see generally Brian E. Gray, No Holier Temples:
Protecting the National Parks Through Wild and Scenic River Designation, in OUR COMMON
LANDS: DEFENDING THE NATIONAL PARKS, supra note 2, at 331; Federal Reserved Water Rights
in Wilderness Areas, supra note 65. Existing federal policy may be under reconsideration. See
Water Rights Under the Wilderness Act, 58 Fed. Reg. 68,629 (1993) (requesting public comment
as to whether federal agencies should begin asserting reserved water rights for wilderness areas).
67. Blumm, supra note 2, at 460. The leading case on national monuments is Cappaert v.
United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
68. United States v. City and County of Denver, 656 P.2d 1, 27-29 (Colo. 1982) (rejecting
instream flows for timber and watershed protection purposes; rejecting a 1960 priority date, based
on the Multiple Use-Sustained Yeild Act, for nonconsumptive uses in a national forest; and reject-
ing flows for whitewater rafting in a national monument); see also Blumm, supra note 2, at 457;
Wilkinson, supra note 63, at 267.
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enforcement area, the federal government rarely mounts the kind of long-term
litigation strategies that nonprofit groups have used to great effect. In this
setting, it should do so. Given the hostility of many state courts to federal
reserved rights, litigation should typically occur in federal courts, in districts
where judges do not have known hostilities to either environmental protection
or assertions of federal power. Federal courts are also preferable because their
rulings are more persuasive to state courts around the country. The scope of
reserved water rights is a question entirely of federal law; it is only proper that
federal courts have a chance to explore that law.
Test cases should be brought with care. The background science and data
must go beyond the ample to the unassailable. Water uses that are challenged
should, ideally, be ones that can end without major losses of employment.
They should also be ones involving pollution and uses of the waterways that
otherwise disrupt ecosystems; the harm in such cases is easier for everyone to
see. For years the Service has taken a relatively passive approach to water-
rights issues, defending itself when necessary but rarely addressing the issue
with vigor. That attitude needs to change. The Service needs to become, to use
the word of the day, more pro-active; 9 it needs to fight hard in court, even
while crafting a conciliatory, sympathetic face outside the courtroom.
Redefining Beneficial Use-Aside from protecting its own water rights,
the Service needs to take a serious interest in state water law, particularly on
the issue of beneficial use. Perhaps the most grave problem today in western
water law is that it allows water owners to exercise their rights in ways that
cause grave communal harm, by polluting, draining, and obstructing water-
ways to the detriment of aquatic life and human users.7" The root problem is
the out-of-date definition of beneficial use, which remains altogether too vig-
orous. By law, all water uses must be beneficial; in many states they also must
be reasonable.7 When diversions occurred a century or more ago, nearly ev-
ery economic use of water was deemed beneficial. Today, many water uses
are under siege, and rightfully so. Urban areas have higher priority uses for
the water. More to the point, instream-flow values have risen sharply in pre-
vailing value schemes; harms to these values have made many longstanding
water uses appear patently unreasonable.
The Service needs to become involved in this issue. It needs to become a
leader in the push to get "beneficial use" linked to water quality, aquatic life,
and ecosystem integrity. Somehow, the idea of beneficial use has drifted away
from any clear vision of communal well being. In practice, it is defined as
beneficial to the user of the water, or beneficial in the abstract, without regard
for its impacts on the stream. This kind of reasoning needs to find its way to
the trash heap, and soon. Beneficial use needs to mean, overtly, beneficial to
69. See VAIL AGENDA, supra note 6, at 26-30.
70. See Eric T. Freyfogle, Water Rights and the Common Wealth, 26 ENvTL. L. 27, 39-42
(1996).
71. A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTs AND REsouRcEs § 5.16 (1996). For an as-
sessment of the beneficial-use doctrine in its early manifestation up to the advent of the age of
environmentalism, see Frank J. Trelease, The Concept of Reasonable Beneficial Use in the Law of
Surface Streams, 12 Wyo. LJ. 1 (1957-58).
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the community, taking into account all ecological impacts." It should link
directly to state water-quality standards and to control measures aimed at re-
ducing nonpoint-source water pollution. Beneficial use should also link to
biological diversity and the implementation of recovery plans for threatened
and endangered species. A common situation on many streams, of course, is to
have numerous water users whose actions become deleterious only in combi-
nation, with no single user to blame. The better solution in such cases is for
all users to make changes, yet the prior appropriation system already has a
built in solution: when problems exist, junior users are the ones that get the
blame; they are the ones who must change, absent another agreed-upon solu-
tion.
Although Service water rights are framed by federal law, the Service is
directly and greatly affected by state water law. It cannot ignore the issue, as
if it were someone else's business. By pushing hard on the issue of beneficial
use-not alone, but together with environmental groups, recreational groups,
cities, and others-it can help clean up rivers generally, thereby benefiting it-
self. The Service, to reiterate, does not need to own the water that flows
through its units so long as the water does flow and is clean. The more water
conservation and pollution reduction that occurs by dint of a tightened benefi-
cial-use requirement, the less water the Service needs to own. As part of its
water-rights litigation strategy, Service lawyers should prepare top-notch briefs
on the issue of beneficial use, arguing for new definitions and backing their
arguments with both sound science and opinion-poll evidence of shifting pub-
lic values.
Softening Forfeiture Rules--One particular aspect of the beneficial-use
issue is sufficiently knotty to merit special attention. One problem that state
courts face when asked to redefine beneficial use is that they can do so only
retroactively, or so they think. Under established precedent, an owner can only
use water in ways that are beneficial, and any nonbeneficial use is illegiti-
mate."' Under forfeiture and abandonment laws, a water user who has en-
gaged only in a nonbeneficial use has lost his or her water right 74-it simply
does not exist, and the water owner has no chance to change to other uses.
That outcome is harsh, and courts are understandably reluctant to impose it.
That reluctance quickly turns into a reluctance to alter definitions of beneficial
use, and so the old ideas linger on.
The Service should give courts a more attractive option. It should not
insist that a finding of nonbeneficial use lead immediately to forfeiture. 7' The
Service's argument instead should go something like this: (i) ideas of benefi-
72. Freyfogle, supra note 70, at 42-46; David H. Getches, Changing the River's Course:
Western Water Policy Reform, 26 ENvTL. L. 157, 161-63, 169-71 (1996). Thoughtful proposals for
the reform of western water law are set forth in SARAH F. BATES ET AL., SEARCHING OUT THE
HEADWATERS: CHANGE AND REDISCOvERY IN WESTERN WATER POLICY (1993); see generally
America's Waters: A New Era of Sustainability: Report of the Long's Peak Working Group on
National Water Policy, 24 ENVrL. L. 125 (1994).
73. Freyfogle, supra note 70, at 43, 51 n.56.
74. TARLOCK, supra note 71, § 5.18.
75. Freyfogle, supra note 70, at 43, 51 n.56.
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cial use change over time, and rightfully so; (ii) if a particular water use is
now nonbeneficial, than the use must come to an end as soon as possible; (iii)
the finding that a water use is nonbeneficial today, however, is not the same
as saying that it was nonbeneficial in the past nor does it not mean the water
owner has gone years without using the water beneficially; and (iv) given that
no forfeiture has occurred, the water owner still controls the flow, and still has
the chance to do something else with it-sell it, lease it, or shift to a use that
is deemed beneficial.
The virtue of this approach is that it allows courts to change the law pro-
spectively-a more palatable option, particularly when private property is at
risk. By employing this strategy the Service can make clear that it is not out to
grab water rights from private owners. It is out instead to end damaging water
uses, for the common good; it is out to restore the health of waterways that
many people share. As a side benefit, this approach could stimulate water
markets, including water leasing, thereby aiding other elements of the
Service's water strategy.
Keeping Options Open-In many settings, the Service's long-term goal
will require significant changes in current water-use practices, changes that
will not come quickly. In such settings, the Service needs to plot its course
carefully, always striving for forward steps and avoiding settlements that en-
danger later progress. When disputes remain outside the courtroom, more
flexibility is possible than when a matter comes down to a decision about
perpetual private rights in precisely defined quantities. To be sure, even high-
priority rights are subject to shifting definitions of beneficial use. Yet, the
imprimatur of a court ruling, upholding a particular water use, gives it an aura
of respectability. To avoid that problem and preserve future options, the Ser-
vice ought to push for out-of-court deals, preferably temporary arrangements
that nudge things along at a pace consistent with continued support from the
local public.
An important part of such negotiated deals could well be leases of water
flows, with the Service more likely a lessee but conceivably on either side. 6
Leases sit better with local communities than outright sales of water. Even
when a private owner is willing to sell, water transfers can engender hostile
reactions of a kind that the Service does not need. Leases might prove attrac-
tive as a way of avoiding protracted litigation. When the Service acquires
water by way of a lease, the status quo changes. People get used to having the
water left in the stream. Proponents of instream values become accustomed to
the better conditions. The power of inertia shifts from the opposing side over
to the Service, making more likely a permanent arrangement that improves a
waterway's health.
For somewhat similar reasons the Service ought to become a strong pro-
ponent of water rights in the form of term permits. Although permits that last
for twenty or forty or more years seem long, the Service is in business forev-
er; it can be patient as long as progress is being made and irreversible harms
76. See generally Crammond, supra note 2 (discussing leasing possibilities and strategies).
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(like species extinctions) do not happen in the meantime.
IV. WATER QUALrrY
In the long run, water-quality issues are likely to prove more important
for the Park Service than issues of water quantity. If states can clean their
waters to the point where they support aquatic life and come somewhere close
to the Clean Water Act's goal of zero discharges of pollutants,77 the Service
will be quite close to its own goal.
The literature on water-quality issues is extensive and useful, particularly
the recent study of the Clean Water Act by key principals of the Natural Re-
sources Defense Council." Even more so than with water quantity, the
Service's task today is to sift through the literature, identify potential courses
of action, and put together a coherent strategy for improving water quality that
makes scientific as well as political sense. Water quality is largely the domain
of the states; little local regulation exists, and the federal role chiefly takes the
form of providing guidance for implementation by the states. Except in coastal
areas, the main legal engine for improving waterways is the Clean Water Act,
which divides pollution-generating activities into point sources (mostly discrete
pollution outfalls) and everything else-known as nonpoint sources." The
latter category is vast and includes such things as farm-field runoff, construc-
tion site runoff, timber harvesting, and atmospheric deposition. The rules that
states put together to implement the Clean Water Act apply more or less in
full to federal lands, including the National Parks. ° Thus, water quality with-
in the parks, and sources of water pollution within park boundaries, are fully
subject to state law.
Prior scholarly discussions of water-quality issues have tended to focus
disproportionately on the EPA's antidegradation policy, particularly the provi-
sions in that policy aimed at protecting high-quality waterways-what the
policy terms Outstanding National Resource Waters." That issue is an impor-
tant one, but so are many others. Attention to it should not undercut work on
other matters that hold as much or more promise in reducing pollution loads
and mitigating damaging land uses.
77. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1994); see ADLER ET AL., supra note 2, at 6-9.
78. See generally ADLER Er AL., supra note 2.
79. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (1994) (setting forth the definition of point source); 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342 (requiring permit for point source discharges but not nonpoint discharges). Nonpoint
source pollution issues are considered in Mandelker, supra note 42.
80. See 33 U.S.C. §§1323, 1370 (1994); Glicksman, supra note 42. Under the Clean Water
Act, Indian tribes can also set water quality standards to the same extent as states. Those standards
bind not just polluters on t'ribal lands, but upstream polluters as well. See City of Albuquerque v.
Browner, 97 F.3d 415, 421-23 (10th Cir. 1996) (upholding tribal water quality standards that are
more stringent than federal standards, including a standard protecting ceremonial uses of waters).
Although the discussion in the text refers only to states, the Service should pay similar attention to
water-quality work by tribes, which in particular settings could be even more useful allies than
states.
81. See Barbara West, The Clean Water Act and Other Tools for Managing Water Resourc-
es, in MANAGING PARK SYSTEMS RESOURcEs: A HANDBOOK ON LEGAL Dutrrs, OPPORTUNITIES,
AND TOOLS, supra note 2, at 67, 71-76; PARK WATERS IN PERIL, supra note 1, at 37-38.
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In the Service's strategy for working with states to improve water quality,
the following elements are likely to arise:
Monitoring by States-States need to increase considerably their monitor-
ing of water flows and water quality, as well as their testing of effluent from
key point sources.82 Monitoring in many states is shockingly incomplete.
Without more data, it simply is not possible to understand existing problems
and bring polluters into account. The Service ought to push states on this is-
sue. It can also help by improving its own monitoring, and piping results di-
rectly to state water-quality offices.
Screening NPDES Permits-The Service needs to identify major point
sources of pollution that degrade park waters, and take an interest in the terms
of their National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits.
Many states are subject to considerable pressure from major polluters, and
issue permits with unduly favorable terms. The Service can work with state
officials on this point, collaboratively where possible but holding out the pos-
sibility of challenging a permit that is unduly lax. Given resource limitations,
the Service cannot do this with many polluters, but it is a useful tool in se-
lected settings. More broadly, the Service can push states to employ whole
effluent testing (WET) methods 3 which more accurately and quickly deter-
mine the adverse biological impacts of particular effluent flows."
Redefining Point Source-Most of the pollution reduction that has oc-
curred across the country is traceable to tough limits on point sources. The
control of nonpoint sources remains leisurely and haphazard." One way of
dealing with certain nonpoint-pollution generators is to reclassify them as point
sources. The point-nonpoint line is a thin one, and precedent exists for phasing
in point-source controls on former nonpoint polluters. In selected cases, the
Service can take an interest in this project and encourage action by states and
the federal EPA.
Water-Quality Standards-Every three years states revisit their water-
quality standards and have the opportunity to amend them." The Service
needs to become involved in this process, both the designation of protected
uses for particular waterways and the development of criteria and standards to
protect those uses. The Service plainly has an interest in the quality of park
waters, and it hardly seems out of line for it to encourage a state to designate
the full range of possible uses, and set the highest water-quality standards, for
waterways that flow through parks. Much of the most interesting work today
on water-quality issues deals with biological criteria, used as supplements to or
82. See ADLER ET AL., supra note 2, at 129-35 (criticizing spotty records by states on water-
quality monitoring). States are obligated to undertake monitoring by 40 C.F.R. §130.4 (1996).
83. Houck, Regulation of Toxic Pollutants, supra note 42, at 10555-58.
84. ADLER ET AL., supra note 2, at 162 (noting limitations on whole effluent testing).
85. See generally Mandelker, supra note 42 (noting the poor record of states in dealing with
nonpoint source pollution); Brian Weeks, Trends in Regulation of Stormwater and Nonpoint
Source Pollution, 25 ENVTL. L. RrR. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10300 (1995). Nonpoint source pollu-
tion now represents "the dominant fraction of the Nation's remaining surface water pollution prob-
lem." E.P.A., NONOI " SouRcEs: AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE 2 (1989).
86. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(1) (1994).
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even replacements for chemical and physical criteria.8 7 Biology-based stan-
dards come in many forms. The Service ought to push for standards that take
into account the particular needs of sensitive local aquatic species. Biological
standards have many virtues, not the least being that they make more sense to
ordinary people. Chemical standards expressed in numeric terms come across
as abstract and arbitrary. It is easier to understand whether a particular river is
or is not clean enough for fish and other aquatic species. The Service ought to
become a leader in the development and implementation of biological water-
quality standards, supplemented as needed with numeric limits on toxic pollut-
ants.
Antidegradation-State water-quality standards include, as an important
element, some version of the federal EPA's antidegradation policy, which
states are obligated to embrace.' That policy protects all waterways, includ-
ing those that meet or exceed prevailing water-quality standards. An important
part of that policy is the strict protection of waterways designated as Outstand-
ing National Resource Waterways (ONRWs). 9 As implemented, the federal
policy gives states discretion in deciding whether a particular waterway does
or does not deserve protection as an ONRW. Read literally, however, the
EPA's regulations are much less clear; one obvious interpretation is that park
waterways are automatically protected, without need for individual evaluation.
The antidegradation issue has drawn enough attention to need little com-
ment at this point, except to reiterate its considerable potential. The Service
ought to develop its own guidelines for identifying waterways that qualify for
protection as ONRWs. Having done this, the Service can give the guidelines
to the EPA for comment, and encourage the EPA to add the guidelines to its
own antidegradation policy. Given that the antidegradation policy is a federal
one, and given particularly that the ONRW designation is intended to protect
waterways of national significance, it makes little sense to leave the matter to
the discretion of each state. In the alternative, the Service ought to compile the
needed data and studies and push states to designate its major waterways.
Nonpoint-Source Pollution-Many water-quality problems in park water-
ways are caused by nonpoint sources of pollution. Most states have done little
to address this problem, largely because the federal government has not
pushed them. Area-wide plans under sections 208 and 319 of the Clean Water
Act often yield little more than demonstration projects and sporadic public
education.9 Congress remains worried about the problem, and has put the
87. See Robert W. Adler, Filling the Gaps in Water Quality Standards: Legal Perspectives
on Biocriteria, in BIOLoGICAL ASSESSMENT AND CRITERIA: TOOLS FOR WATER RESOURCE PLAN-
NING AND DECISION MAKING, supra note 26, at 345 (discussing legal and scientific aspects);
Houck, Regulation of Toxic Pollutants, supra note 42, at 10558-59.
88. See 40 C.F.R. § 131.12 (1996). The application of the policy to the Park Service is ably
considered in WEST, supra note 81, at 71-76.
89. 40 C.F.R. § 131.12(a)(3) (1996).
90. See ADLER ET AL., supra note 2, ch. 6; Mandelker, supra note 42, at 498-501. As-
sessments by the EPA include: MANAGING NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION: FINAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS ON SECTION 319 OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT (1992); SUMMARY OF CURRENT STATE
NONpoINT SOURCE CONTROL PRACTICES FOR FORESTRY 6 (1993); E.P.A. SECTION 319 SUCCESS
STORIEs: A CLOSE-UP LOOK AT THE NATIONAL NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION CONTROL PRO-
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item high on its legislative agenda. Current law pushes states to develop and
promulgate best management practices (BMPs) for a wide range of chiefly
land-use pollution-causing activities, but BMPs are largely voluntary and often
inadequate.9 The Service needs to push states to take more serious steps, in-
cluding the development of enforceable BMPs. Useful sources for guidance
are the plans being developed for coastal areas under the 1990 amendments to
the Coastal Zone Management Act.' Those amendments direct states to im-
plement the "best available nonpoint pollution control practices, technologies,
processes, siting criteria, operating methods, or other alternatives." '3 These
new control practices will apply directly to park waters in coastal areas. Else-
where, the amendments could serve as models for tightening control methods
under sections 208 and 319 of the Clean Water Act.94
In recent years the EPA, prodded by environmental groups, has taken a
different tack on nonpoint-source pollution issues. Section 303(d) of the Clean
Water Act requires states to identify stream segments that cannot, without
further action, meet water-quality standards."' Once designated, these water-
quality limited segments (WQLSs) are studied further to calculate the total
amount of a given pollutant that each segment can handle each day and still
comply with applicable standards, including (significantly) antidegradation
standards. These calculations of total maximum daily loads (TMDLs), once
made, become legal limits on the maximum amount of pollution that can enter
into the waterway. Once it completes a TMDL calculation, the state then must
make a tough allocation decision: who gets to keep polluting, and who must
cut back. Under current EPA guidance, the place to begin the cutbacks is with
point-source polluters." A state cannot plan on cutbacks from nonpoint
sources-thereby allowing point sources to continue polluting at higher lev-
els-unless the nonpoint sources are subject to enforceable BMPs or other
pollution-control limits. In states where limits on nonpoint sources are merely
voluntary, point-source polluters are in serious danger.
Environmental groups and the EPA have taken a strong interest in the
GRAM (1994).
91. See Mandelker, supra note 42, at 483-85.
92. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1994).
93. 16 U.S.C. § 1455b(g)(5).
94. ADLER ET AL., supra note 2, at 191-93; see generally Perrin Q. Dargan III, Staking Out
New Territory: CZMA Reauthorization Amendments, 9 Nat. Resources & Env't 32 (1995) (dis-
cussing the nonpoint pollution control programs required by the 1990 Amendments).
95. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1) (1994). The EPA's power to enforce this provision against
the states was upheld in Scott v. City of Hammond, 741 F.2d 992, 996-98 (7th Cir. 1984). An
illustration of recent interest in the provision by environmental groups is Sierra Club v.
Hankinson, 939 F. Supp. 865 (N.D. Ga. 1996) (successfully forcing EPA to disallow Georgia's lax
schedule for making TMDL calculations and compelling the EPA to intervene).
96. See 40 C.F.R. § 130.7 (1996) (setting forth general procedures for TMDL calculations);
E.P.A., GUIDANCE FOR WATER QUALITY-BASED DECISIONS: THE TMDL PRocEss 2, 15, 24
(1991) (allowing reduced allocations for nonpoint sources only if there are "specific assurances"
that such sources will reduce their pollution). Aside from this rule, the EPA has given little guid-
ance on the highly political act of determining which pollution sources will reduce, and by how
much. 2 LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION § 12.05(3)(c)(i)(B), at 12-116 (Sheldon M.
Nozick et al. eds., 1996). A recent decision involving TMDL calculations on a waterway travers-
ing federal land is Idaho Conservation League v. Thomas, 91 F.3d 1345 (9th Cir. 1996).
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TMDL calculation and allocation process because it holds out the promise of
accomplishing what has long remained elusive-putting real pressure on states
to deal with nonpoint-source pollution. If a state does not designate its
WQLSs, the EPA can and must do so instead. If a state does not then proceed
to calculate TMDLs for each section, the EPA again can act. If, once a TMDL
calculation is made, a state fails to divide the overall load among the various
pollution sources, thereby identifying which pollution types must cut back, the
EPA can intervene. As cutbacks become imminent, a decidedly potent force is
likely to join forces against nonpoint sources: the point-source polluters them-
selves.97 Faced with the prospect of drastic cutbacks, point-source polluters
will have an incentive to push state officials on this issue. If a state does not
get tough with nonpoint-source polluters, the point-source polluters themselves
will inevitably suffer.
The Service has good reason to become involved in this entire process,
and soon. It can do so by starting with its own waters-identifying those that
have water-quality violations and making, on the states' behalf, the needed
TMDL calculations. This information should all go to the state for incorpora-
tion into state water-quality plans. TMDL calculations are also needed on
waterways that satisfy basic water-quality standards, given that the same pro-
cess is used to implement antidegradation policies. Once the Service has exact
information on existing pollution loads for its waterways, it can step forward
and comment or complain when a new pollution source, including a nonpoint
source, threatens to diminish existing water quality to any appreciable degree.
Other State Laws-Some states have dealt with nonpoint-source pollution
problems more selectively, by adopting laws that address particular pollution
sources or that attempt to buffer pollution once it is generated. Streamside-
protection laws provide examples of this approach, as do forestry practices
statutes. 98 State laws like these hold considerable promise for improving wa-
ter quality. As part of its overall water strategy, the Service ought to encour-
age states to consider them.
Section 401 Power-A final tool states have to improve water quality is
their power to veto any federal license or permit if the action being authorized
is inconsistent with state water-quality standards. This power, contained in
Section 401 of the Clean Water Act,99 has gained heightened attention as a
result of the Supreme Court's decision in PUD No.1 v. Washington Depart-
ment of Ecology,"m which interpreted the statute so as to give states broad
powers over federal actions, including federal licenses governing dams and
97. Oregon is one state in which point-source polluters have begun to awaken to the poten-
tial impacts of the TMDL allocation process, and to their consequent need to pay attention to
limits on nonpoint sources of pollution. Tom Alkire, Final 303(d) CWA List Released; Next Step
is Development of TMDLs, STATE ENV'T DAILY (BNA), July 18, 1996.
98. See Montana Streamside Management Act, MoNT. CODE ANN. §§ 77-5-301 to -307
(1995); Oregon Forest Practices Act, OR. REv. STAT. §§ 527.610 to 527.770, 527.990(1), 527.992
(1994). Another category of limited-purpose statutes is illustrated by North Carolina's Sedimenta-
tion Pollution Control Act of 1973, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113A-50 to -66 (1994).
99. See 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a) (1994).
100. 114 S. CL 1900 (1994). A thoughtful consideration is Donahue, supra note 42.
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other hydropower projects. 'i The statute has gained additional visibility be-
cause of a recent federal district court ruling that applied the section to a graz-
ing permit issued by the Forest Service."n If that ruling stands, states could
exercise broad powers over a wide variety of pollution-causing activities on
federal lands, including timber harvesting, grazing, mining, and oil and gas
development.
Most federal agencies will likely react with concern or alarm to this en-
largement of state power under section 401. The Service, on the other hand,
has good reason to smile. Working with state water-quality officials it can
challenge pollution-generating activities undertaken by other federal agencies
and press them to make changes aimed at protecting water flows. Some of the
worst pollution problems in western waterways come from federal lands, and
the Service to date has had no good way to deal with them. Section 401 offers
new hope, albeit hope that depends on the policy decisions of state officials
who will often favor the very activities that give rise to the pollution.
V. BIODIVERSITY
The final prong of the Service's water strategy should focus on the pro-
tection and recovery of imperiled aquatic species, particularly species listed
under the Endangered Species Act.'0 3 Many species are imperiled because of
alterations to their habitats-disruptions of flow regimes, diversions, changes
in sedimentation, alterations of stream vegetation and obstructions, changes in
temperature, and other forms of pollution. Legal protections for such species
provide a potent tool for the Service in achieving its long-term goal. Indeed, if
all native species were protected to the point of flourishing, the goal would
likely be met.
Like the other legal regimes that implicate park waters, the Endangered
Species Act (ESA) is a well-known, well-studied body of law. Service lawyers
and biologists are already familiar with the ESA and rightfully so, given that
the nonimpairment duty in the Service's charter plainly has a great deal to do
with the protection of native plant and animal species. Under section 7(a)(1) of
the ESA,' the Service is obligated to use its powers to further the purposes
of the ESA, which are the "conservation" of listed species and the protection
of the ecosystems on which those species depend.0" Conservation means the
recovery of a species to the point where it no longer needs protection under
the ESA." The general duty to conserve, set forth in section 7(a)(1), is
vaguely phrased yet potent, particularly as applied to an agency like the Ser-
vice that has few if any obligations in conflict with the goals of the Act. The
101. PUD, 114 S.Ct at 1914.
102. Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n. v. Thomas, 940 F. Supp. 1534, 1541 (D. Or. 1996) (con-
cluding that cattle grazing that resulted in water pollution amounted to a "discharge" of pollution
within the meaning of the CWA, hence triggering duty of permit applicant to get certification
from state under Section 401).
103. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
104. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1).
105. See 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b).
106. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3).
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breadth of this language and its mandatory tone have led one scholar to call
Section 7(a)(1) the "sleeping giant" of the ESA, a provision that "has the
potential to eclipse all other ESA programs.""7
An important step in clarifying and implementing section 7(a)(1) was
taken in 1994, when various federal agencies (including the Service) entered
into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) covering their responsibilities
under the ESA. There, the Service agreed to carry out programs for the
conservation of listed species, including implementing appropriate recovery
actions specified in the plans for listed species."° The MOU called upon
agencies to work cooperatively, through regional working groups, and to de-
velop and implement recovery plans on an ecosystem basis. According to one
commentator, this MOU appears to translate the section 7(a)(1) duty of each
signatory agency into an affirmative obligation to implement recovery plans
and other conservation agreements." ° Another scholar has argued that sec-
tion 7(a)(1), even aside from the new MOU, is best understood as imposing
such an affirmative obligation directly, along with a more broad obligation to
engage in multi-jurisdictional, cooperative planning based on sound ecological
science."'
The Service ought to draw upon this MOU not just to bolster the authority
underlying its own species conservation efforts, but to call other federal agen-
cies to task, principally the Forest Service and BLM, since they too have
pledged to perform the same work. Recovery plans for aquatic species will of-
ten amount to recovery plans for park waters.
As it works vigorously on endangered species issues, the Service needs to
take an interest in all aspects of the ESA process, from the identification and
study of individual species considered for listing to the monitoring and revi-
sion of recovery plans. The Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) has too few
resources to study promptly all species that are candidates for listing. The
Service ought to help do that work in the case of species on or near park
lands, particularly aquatic species. When it gains evidence about a species, it
should not delay in bringing that evidence to the attention of the FWS (or
National Marine Fisheries Service, in appropriate cases), and pushing for
prompt listing. It should also encourage the FWS to designate park lands and
park waterways as critical habitat under the ESA-a move that, in practice,
increases its protection against direct and indirect degradation." 2 Private and
public landowners, by and large, resist critical habitat designations, but des-
ignation can help the Service considerably, and it has good reason to support
it.
107. Ruhl, supra note 42, at 1109-10.
108. Memorandum of Understanding Between Federal Agencies on Implementation of the En-
dangered Species Act Signed Sept. 28, 1994, [July-Dec.] Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 188, at E-I
(Sept. 30, 1994) [hereinafter MOU]. See also Ruhl, supra note 42 (discussing the MOU).
109. MOU, supra note 108, § Il.A.1.
110. See Ruhl, supra note 42, atl 11, 1145.
111. See Cheever, supra note 42, at 59-60.
112. The role of critical habitat is considered in Katherine Simmons Yagerman, Protecting
Critical Habitat Under the Federal Endangered Species Act, 20 ENVTL. L. 811 (1990). A partic-
ularly penetrating critique of the implementation of the ESA, including the significant
underprotection of critical habitat, is Houck, Endangered Species Act, supra note 42.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Under section 7(a)(2) of the ESA, federal agencies must avoid actions that
jeopardize the continued existence of listed and proposed species, and they
must consult with the FWS about the likely impacts of a proposed course of
conduct before undertaking it." 3 Such consultations are not public affairs,
which grieves environmental groups considerably. Yet, the Service ought to
have sufficient influence to become actively involved in any consultation, by
any agency, that could affect park properties, including its waterways. It
should stick its nose in, even if uninvited. The 1994 MOU expressly calls for
interagency cooperation, as does the recent Interagency Ecosystem Report. The
Service has a legitimate interest that needs protecting.
Aside from monitoring and participating in ESA consultations, the Service
ought to take an interest in the enforcement of the ban against takings of listed
species"4 by federal agencies and private parties, particularly in the form of
water diversions, flow disruptions, riparian habitat destruction, and pollution.
Takings can occur by way of habitat alterations."5 The Service need not be-
come unduly confrontational, filing suit whenever it spots potentially damag-
ing conduct; it should be quick to knock on doors and express its desire for
modifications that are less damaging to waterway integrity.
The implementation of the ESA in recent years has come to focus increas-
ingly on area-wide conservation planning activities aimed at protecting multi-
ple species, including proposed and candidate species."6 Some of that plan-
ning is done by federal agencies under section 7(a); other planning is conduct-
ed by private parties under section 10 in an effort to avoid takings of listed
species and to gain permission to engage in incidental takings of species."
7
The section 10 planning work-known as habitat conservation planning-has
become particularly popular as the FWS has streamlined processes in an at-
tempt to give the ESA greater flexibility."' Area-wide planning offers per-
113. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
114. See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B).
115. The definition of "take" includes actions that "harm" listed species. 16 U.S.C. §
1532(19) (1994). The term "harm" includes "significant habitat modification or degradation when
it actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, includ-
ing breeding, feeding or sheltering." 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1996). The validity of this regulation was
sustained against a facial challenge in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great
Oregon, 115 S. Ct. 2407, 2412-16 (1995). A case that extends the regulation to its limit, if not
beyond, is Forest Conservation Council v. Rosboro Lumber Co., 50 F.3d 781, 788 (9th Cir. 1995)
(taking occurs where timber harvesting would disrupt breeding of a single pair of endangered
owls).
116. See generally U.S. C.E.Q., LINKING ECOSYSTEMS AND BIODwERsrrY (1992); U.S. Dept.
of Interior, Protecting America's Living Heritage: A Fair, Cooperative and Scientifically Sound
Approach to Improving the Endangered Species Act, March 6, 1995; MOU, supra note 108.
117. See MICHAEL BEAN Er AL., RECONCILING CoNFLICrs UNDER THE ESA: THE HCP Ex-
PERIENCE (1991); TIMOTHY BEATLEY, HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANNING (1994); Christopher
H.M. Carter, Comment, A Dual Track for Incidental Takings: Reexamining Sections 7 and 10 of
the Endangered Species Act, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 135 (1991); Lindell L. Marsh, Conser-
vation Planning Under the Endangered Species Act: A New Paradigm for Conserving Biological
Diversity, 8 TUL. ENVTL. LJ. 97 (1994).
118. See, e.g., U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE, HANDBOOK FOR HABITAT CONSERVATION
PLANNING AND INCIDENTAL TAKE PERMIT PROCESSING (1996); Eric Fisher, Comment, Habitat
Conservation Planning Under the Endangered Species Act: No Surprises & the Quest for Cer-
tainty, 67 U. COLO. L. REv. 371 (1996); Albert C. Lin, Comment, Participants' Experiences with
[Vol. 74:3
1997] REPAIRING THE WATERS OF THE NATIONAL PARKS 845
haps the greatest hope for the protection of species. The Service ought to be
right in the middle of this work, helping bring parties together, giving them
technical support and encouragement, and reviewing draft plans to ensure that
they make enough progress toward the relevant goals. Aside from the
Service's direct interest in the species themselves, habitat conservation plan-
ning can greatly aid waterway integrity; it deserves a central spot in the
Service's long-term strategy.
One of the chief complaints against the ESA in recent years has been its
allegedly harsh impact on private lands. That complaint could lead Congress
and the executive branch to look even more closely at federal lands for the
promotion of imperiled species. Indeed, the protection of such species could
well become one of the most vital ecological functions of many categories of
federal lands, including the parks. The Service ought to welcome such a
shift-not just because it would give heightened value to the Service and its
activities but because it could lead agencies like the Forest Service and BLM
to give the matter high priority, to the ultimate benefit of parks.
Finally, no species protection effort is likely to get far without a well-
funded education program, and no federal agency is better equipped to do than
work that the Service. People who visit parks are often interested in learning
about nature, and the public has a particularly strong interest in stories about
rare species. Efforts to promote waterway health can play upon this interest,
explaining the needs of particular species in terms of water flow, water quali-
ty, temperature, instream habitat, and the like, and describing efforts to protect
those species. The stories of individual species can bring a waterway protec-
tion plan to life. It can give a plan faces-albeit nonhuman faces-that will
benefit immediately if a waterway regains its health.
VI. A CONCLUDING WORD
The above suggestions, broad and costly as they are, do not cover all
matters that need attention in a well-crafted water strategy for park system
waters. Other matters, more narrow yet vital, also need a place-like a plan
for dealing with the relicensing of hydropower projects, a plan for gaining
greater say in dredge-and-fill permits issued by the Corps of Engineers under
section 404 of the Clean Water Act, and the definition of reasonable use under
riparian water-rights schemes. These subjects and others have natural places in
the strategy, once the Service puts together its long-term goal and gets serious
about promoting it. The nonhuman natural realm has great resilience to it, and
park waterways can recover much of what they have lost. The Service's stra-
tegic plan need not rely on quick action; it can spread work out over time,
thereby softening economic impacts and allowing public knowledge and values
to advance. Yet, time is an ally only if the Service becomes far more serious
than it has been about protecting park waters. The legal tools for moving
Habitat Conservation Plans and Suggestions for Streamlining the Process, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 369
(1996).
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ahead are many; vast new statutes are not needed. More than legal change, the
Service needs courage and vision. Without that, park waters will continue their
slide.
NATIONAL PARKS AND THE RECREATION RESOURCE
JAN G. LArros*
National Parks are a favorite destination of American tourists and interna-
tional visitors. The popularity of the National Parks of America is an out-
growth of the rising popularity of recreation in general, and outdoor recreation
in particular. Recreation is a significant industry in the United States,' and the
National Parks have reflected America's interest in outdoor recreation by re-
cording a steady increase in recreational visits over the past few decades
National Parks are also a category of land within the public lands owned by
the United States, which themselves have become areas where recreation is the
most popular, and dominant, federal land use.
This recreational pressure on National Parks has important implications
for the long-term management of park resources. If the recreation resource is
dominant within National Parks, then the competing use for these lands-pres-
ervation-is jeopardized." If human recreation is overwhelming the Parks'
infrastructure, then the case for biocentric ecosystem management within the
National Parks is weakened.' If the United States Congress provides neither a
fee structure nor an annual appropriation amount that keeps up with recre-
ational demands for National Parks, then the very viability of these parklands
is threatened. This essay examines how recreation has grown as a use of lei-
sure time, how the public lands (and National Parks) have increasingly become
the prime destination of those wishing to enjoy an outdoor experience, and
how the resulting dominant recreation resource will shape fundamental man-
agement policies for national parklands.
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I. THE RECREATION RESOURCE
By the end of the twentieth century, public willingness to use leisure time
for outdoor recreation had reached an all-time high. The North American tour-
ism industry was among the fastest growing in the world. Americans were
spending more of their disposable income on leisure pursuits and recreation
activities.6 Recreation was increasingly seen not as a luxury, but as a neces-
sity of modem life.7 Such widespread interest in recreation will obviously
have an effect on our National Parks.
A. The Preconditions to Recreation
Before recreation can become popular, certain preconditions must be pres-
ent. If these do not exist, recreation will be a relatively unimportant feature of
a society's activities. At the turn of the twentieth century, all these precondi-
tions were present in America, and recreation was thriving.
For recreation to establish a foothold in a society's consciousness, the
people of that society must have the time to spend on recreational activities
Economic, technological, and social progress have all increased the amount of
leisure time that Americans enjoy.9 The average American worker has as
much as forty hours of free time every week.'0 This time is not spent on sec-
ond jobs, but on leisure. One of the most popular leisure pursuits is recreation
during vacationing."
A second precondition is sufficient discretionary income to spend on rec-
reation. By the latter half of the twentieth century, the United States enjoyed a
large middle class. 2 This segment of the population was able to afford home
ownership, food, clothing, and schooling, and still have disposable income
available for recreation.'" This income has been largely devoted to recreation-
al spending. 4 Interest in recreation is not confined to America's middle class.
Upper income families spend much of their disposable income on more expen-
sive activities, such as skiing, while lower income groups spend money on less
expensive recreational activities, such as hiking. 5 Better retirement plans and
6. MIECZKOWSKI, supra note 1, at 78; KNUDSON, supra note 1, at 70-72. See Jim Spring,
Seven Days of Play, AM. DEMOGRAPHiCS, March 1993, at 50 (breaking down how Americans
spend their duty free hours on a daily basis).
7. MIECZKOWSKI, supra note 1, at 80.
8. MIEczKoWSKi, supra note 1, at 81-82.
9. Id. at 83.
10. Spring, supra note 6, at 50. See generally KNUDSON, supra note 1, at 72 (documenting a
dramatic growth in the amount of leisure time in America, following the turn of the century).
11. ZINSER, supra note 2, at 3-4. See generally Mi.mzOwSKI, supra note 1, at 97-98 (dis-
cussing trends in vacation time).
12. MiECzKowSKI, supra note 1, at 77-78.
13. See MffiZ=OwSKI, supra note 1, at 78; KNUDSON, supra note 1, at 70-71.
14. Elia Kacapyr, Jumping for Joy, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, June 1996, at 10. See CHARLES J.
CIccHETr, FORECASTING RECREATION IN THE UNITED STATES 80 (1973) (finding a correlation
between family income and income-related variables, such as home ownership, and participation
in certain recreational activities).
15. ZINSER, supra note 2, at 5. See generally CicCHETrI, supra note 14, at 80, 86 (discussing
the correlation between family income and income related variables).
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pensions also allow the elderly to spend their money on recreation.16
Better education and access to medical care enhance the opportunities for
a society to pursue recreation. Education opportunities are more available to
American citizens, and educated workers are more likely to engage in outdoor
recreational activities, particularly those considered strenuous." Healthier life-
styles and better medical care allow individuals to enter the outdoors and par-
ticipate in sports that require fitness, such as skiing, backpacking, hiking,
swimming, and river rafting. Good health permits older persons to enjoy recre-
ation for a longer time span."
Another precondition to recreation is good, efficient, affordable, conve-
nient transportation. 9 When such transportation exists, people will travel
great distances to enjoy recreation.'m The ubiquitous automobile and interstate
highway system provide this transportation to the American public.2 So too
does the airline industry.22 Every year millions of Americans drive their cars
or fly in airplanes to their recreation destinations.23
Finally, for outdoor recreation to become a preferred use of leisure time,
individuals must appreciate the aesthetic and environmental qualities of nature.
By the latter half of the twentieth century, Americans had a strong environ-
mental awareness and a love for unspoiled nature. For example, in one poll,
most westerners stated that they enjoyed outdoor recreation because of "an ap-
preciation of nature."24 Concern for the natural environment extended to wild-
life. For many communities, the economic impact of wildlife viewing may
even surpass consumptive uses of wildlife, such as hunting and fishing.'
B. The Growing Popularity of Outdoor Recreation
Since all the preconditions to recreation have been met, it is not surprising
that Americans believe that recreation is a necessity of life, and that recre-
ational opportunities should be provided to the general public.26 Outdoor rec-
reation is particularly popular, especially among persons living in the Wes. 27
Indeed, nearly three-fourths of all Americans consider outdoor recreation to be
a priority in their lives,'m and two-thirds of all Americans participate yearly in
16. MtEczxowsKI, supra note 1, at 160.
17. Id. at 165; KNuDSON, supra note 1, at 77.
18. See MMCZKOWSKI, supra note 1, at 160.
19. Id. at 100.
20. Id. at 108.
21. ZINSER, supra note 2, at 5.
22. MiEczKowsKI, supra note 1, at 108.
23. Id.
24. Paul McHugh, Outdoor Recreation Participation is Up, S.F. CHRON., May 4, 1995, at
D7.
25. MIEczKOWSKI, supra note 1, at 239.
26. See David E. Gray & Seymour Greben, Future Perspectives, in LAND AND LEISURE:
CONCEPTS AND METHODS IN OuTDOOR RECREATION (Carlton S. Van Doren et al. eds., 2d ed.
1979) [hereinafter Gray & Greben].
27. McHugh, supra note 24.
28. Mary Klaus, Group Says Campers on the Rise, HARRISBURG PATRIOT & EVENING NEWS
(Pa.), March 26, 1995, at Fl.
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outdoor recreational activities.' The Outdoor Recreation Coalition of Ameri-
ca confirms that there has been an enormous increase in outdoor recreation in
30 3recent years, caused in part by an influx of international visitors.31
Several outdoor recreational activities tend to be preferred by the public.
General hiking is the fastest growing form of outdoor recreation.32 Bicycling
is quite popular, too, particularly mountain biking.33 Nearly one-third of
Americans consider camping a favorite recreational activity.34  Even
birdwatching is cited by one in five Americans as an enjoyable outdoor
sport.
3 5
I. NATIONAL PARKS AS A RECREATION DESTINATION
A. Recreation on the Public Lands
Recreation is a permissible use of all federally owned land. Applicable
federal statutes permit recreation as the only human use in wilderness areas,'
and recreation is deemed to be an important secondary use of national wildlife
refuges.37 Recreation is a coequal multiple use of national forests, 3 and a
principal multiple use of Bureau of Land Management (BLM) lands. 9 Within
National Parks, recreation and preservation are the two dominant park system
purposes.' On public lands, recreation is by statute a preferred value. It has
also become, by actual use, a resource equivalent to the more conventional
commodity resources (timber, minerals, water, rangeland) found there.4
Since outdoor recreation is experiencing unprecedented growth, one could
ask where all this activity is taking place. Those who are responsible for this
growth wish to travel to locations where their recreational time will be spent
on lands with a relatively pristine natural environment.' Public lands, espe-
cially National Parks, wilderness areas, National Forests, and BLM lands, pro-
vide such an environment. Americans interested in outdoor recreation are in-
29. Daybreak-Recreation & Fitness, SALT LAKE TRIB., May 21, 1995, at G3.
30. Michael Levy, Environment, Public Land Laws Under Attack, BUFFALO NEWS, May 9,
1996, at F5.
31. 2 WORLD TRAvEL AND TOURISM REVIEW: INDICATORS, TRENDS AND ISSUES 74 (J.R.
Brent Ritchie et. al. eds., 1992). In 1991, the United States received more international visitors
than any country, with the exception of France. Id. The United States tourist/travel industry is a
$417 billion business. COGGINs & GuCKSMAN, supra note 3, at 17-2 n.4.
32. See John Harmon, Building the Outback, ATLANTA CONST., Sept. 10, 1995, at H5.
33. Catherine Salfino, Outdoor Sports Having a Field Day, DAILY NEWS REc., Aug. 16,
1993, at 25.
34. Klaus, supra note 28.
35. Lyn Dobrin, Friends on the Wing, NEWSDAY, Nov. 10, 1995, at B5.
36. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(5) (1994).
37. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd (1994).
38. 16 U.S.C. § 528 (1994).
39. 43 U.S.C. § 1702(c) (1994).
40. 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). Cappaert v. U.S., 426 U.S. 128 (1976) (stating that preservation is
a primary purpose of the national parks).
41. See CoGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 3.
42. RONALD A. FORESTA, AMERICA'S NATURAL PARKS AND THEIR KEEPERS 97 (Ruth B.
Hass ed. 1984).
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creasingly turning to these federal lands as their recreation destination."'
These lands are located primarily in the Intermountain West." It is in the
West that recreational opportunities are in large part responsible for the eco-
nomic and population growth experienced there over the past few decades.'
B. Recreation in National Parks
There are over forty million acres of National Park lands available for
recreational opportunities.4' Americans and foreign visitors, who are certainly
aware of the availability of these opportunities in National Parks, have collec-
tively decided to spend much of their outdoor leisure time there.47 As a re-
sult, there is much demand for recreation on national park lands. ' Recre-
ational visits to the National Parks have increased steadily and dramatically. In
1904, the first year accurate records were kept, 121,00 people visited National
Parks.4' In 1950, the number of visitors had reached 33 million,' and by
1995 the National Parks were experiencing nearly 270 million recreational
visits per year.5'
People participate in virtually every outdoor recreational activity imagin-
able on federal park lands.52 Perhaps because National Parks provide a pris-
tine environment relatively unaffected by civilization, recreationalists go to
them to enjoy largely natural conditions. They visit the deserts, rainforests,
grasslands, canyons, and mountains of National Parks in order to more fully
appreciate a truly natural environment." Since the Park Service is also re-
sponsible for the preservation of historic and cultural values, some
recreationalists at National Parks are amateur archaeologists or historians.54
For many persons, recreation in federal parks is a way to regenerate "spiritual
and emotional well-being."55
Whether the recreation is based on a back-to-nature desire, or scientific
43. American Survey, ECONOMIST, Dec. 23, 1995 - Jan. 5, 1996, at 31, 33; Harmon, supra
note 30; Federal Lands Concessions Reform: Hearings on H.R. 1527 & 2028 Before the
Subcomm. on Nat'! Parks, Forests, and Lands of the House Comm. on Resources, 104th Cong. 32
(1995) (testimony of David G. Unger, Associate Chief, Forest Service).
44. See ZINSER, supra note 2, at 85-89.
45. See generally Raymond Rasker, A New Look at Old Vistas: The Economic Role of Envi-
ronmental Quality in Western Public Lands, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 369 (1994) (examining the
economic role that public lands play in the Western United States).
46. DYAN ZASLOWSKY & THE WILDERNESS SOcIETY, THESE AMERICAN LANDS 10 (1986)
[hereinafter ZASLoWSKY].
47. See Edward 0. Wilson, The Environmental Ethic, 3 HASTINGS W-N.W.J. ENvTL. L. &
PoucY 327, 331 (1996).
48. See FORESTA, supra note 42, at 29.
49. ZINSER, supra note 2. at 89.
50. Id.
51. Nat'l Park Serv., U.S. Dep't Interior, National Park Service Recreation Visits (1995) (in-
tern document from the Nat'l Park Serv. Socio-Econ. Studies Div.) [hereinafter Recreation Visits).
52. LILLIAN B. MORAVA & MIcKEY LrriTL, CAMPER'S GUIDE TO U.S. NATIONAL PARKS:
VOLUME 1: WEST OF THE ROCKIES 1 (1993).
53. FORESTA, supra note 42, at 97.
54. See KNUDSON, supra note 1, at 239, 270.
55. ZASLOWSKY, supra note 46, at 35.
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curiosity, or a semireligious need to better understand oneself amidst beautiful
surroundings, people are coming to National Parks in greater numbers. The
effects of this surge in recreational demand are not insignificant.
III. RECREATION IN NATIONAL PARKS: IMPLICATIONS AND NEGATIVE
CONSEQUENCES
All this recreational pressure on the nation's park system has yielded
severe consequences for park lands, which in turn may require a rethinking for
how National Parks should be funded and managed. Increasing numbers of
tourists and recreationalists in National Parks have produced three important
issues that must soon be addressed by policy-makers: (1) Is there sufficient
funding to permit the National Parks to cope with the rising tide of recreation-
al interest? (2) Has recreation overwhelmed preservation as the dominant use
in National Parks? (3) What implications does a dominant recreation use have
for ecosystem management within National Parks?
A. National Parks: Overused but Underfunded
Without sufficient funding, heavily used federal park lands will likely
deteriorate irreparably. Yet, despite this reality, current federal policy not only
encourages excessive use, it has also failed to pay for the costs incurred by the
Park Service as a result of this increased pressure put on National Parks.'
Indeed, access to park system lands is intentionally made easy by federal law.
Access to such lands is even subsidized.57 But, as will be seen below, the
logical consequence of this effort by the federal government to lure people
(and recreationalists) to National Parks-overuse-is not being taken into
account when the federal government makes funding decisions.
1. Easy Access
Two developments have facilitated easy access to Park System lands:
private vehicle use and a liberal concessions policy. Although the Park Service
has statutory power to limit and regulate motorized use anywhere in the park
system,58 it is loathe to do so. The Park Service simply does not want to in-
convenience recreational visitors." It is true that some national parks, such as
Yosemite, have by necessity prohibited private vehicle access to the most
popular regions of the park except by government shuttle bus.' Nonetheless,
56. See James M. Ridenour, Our National Parks: The Slide Towards Mediocrity 2, Paper
Presented at the Conference on Challenging Federal Ownership and Management Public Lands
and Public Benefits, Natural Resources Center, Univ. of Colo. School of Law, (Oct. 11-13, 1995)
(transcript available in the University of Colorado Law School Library ).
57. Dale A. Oesterle, Public Land: How Much is Enough?, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 521, 564-65
(1996).
58. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1994).
59. CoGGINs & GLucKsMAN, supra note 3, at 17-13.
60. See ALFRED RuNrE, NATIONAL PARKS: THE AMERIcAN EXPERIENCE 158-79 (2d ed.
1987).
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such draconian means of alleviating congestion remain the exception. For most
units of the Park System, the rule is unrestricted private vehicle access to the
park, unrestricted access to all the roads in the park, and intensive road devel-
opment within the park.6'
If recreationalists are attracted to National Parks in part because they can
easily drive their private cars there, they can comfortably stay in a park be-
cause of the Park Service's concessions policy. While the National Park Ser-
vice Concessions Policy Act of 1965 specifically subordinates concessions
facility development to the Park Service's preservation mission, this statute
also gives the National Parks (through the Secretary of Interior) the discretion
to decide whether to permit visitor amenities and accommodations on park
lands.62 This discretion has generally been exercised to make the nation's
parks more attractive to visitors. As a result, National Parks often are domi-
nated by facilities that are antithetical to a preservationist or environmentally
natural condition-restaurants, shops, lodges, campgrounds, ski areas, grocery
stores, and commercial enterprises.63
When the Park Service has exercised its discretion to permit concessions
that encourage recreational use at the expense of preservation, the courts have
rarely halted the construction of the recreational facility.' For example, one
court refused to require the Park Service to restrict a concessionaire's adver-
tising campaigns, even though the advertising was causing overuse of the
park.' Another court rejected an attempt by an environmental organization to
close a campground, despite arguments that overuse of the campground was
preventing grizzly bear recovery.'
2. Subsidized Access
Another reason for the popularity of National Parks is that it is so inex-
pensive to visit them. Moreover, those who take advantage of the recreational
amenities offered by National Parks rarely pay for them. Rather, the entrance
fee to gain admission to federal park lands represents a tiny percentage of the
budget needed to maintain these lands. The American taxpayer makes up the
difference, and park users are thereby subsidized.
61. See generally ALSTON CHASE, PLAYING GOD IN YEL.OwSTONE 204-10 (1986); JOSEPH
SAX, MOUNTAINS WrrHouT HANDRAILS (1980) (discussing the politics of tourism).
62. 16 U.S.C. § 20 (1994).
63. CoGGINs AND GLIcSMAN, supra note 3, at 17-24.
64. See Conservation Law Found. v. Secretary of Interior, 864 F.2d 954 (lst Cir. 1989);
Sierra Club v. Watt, 566 F. Supp. 380 (D. Utah 1983). But see Sierra Club v. Lujan, 716 F. Supp.
1289 (D. Ariz. 1989) (holding that Congress authorized leasing of locatable minerals at Lake
Mead National Recreation Area; and that the regulations established by the Bureau of Land Man-
agement and National Park Service, with respect to mineral leasing, do not violate the organic
legislation establishing the National Park Service).
65. Friends of Yosemite v. Frizzell, 420 F. Supp. 390, 395 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
66. National Wildlife Fed'n v. National Park Serv., 669 F. Supp. 384 (D. Wyo. 1987).
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The National Park System consists of 369 parks, monuments and historic
sites.' Of them, only 186 collect an entrance fee.' These fees totaled $80
million in 1995, which represents just five percent of the Park Service's $1.4
billion annual budget.' The Park Service has been frighteningly slow to raise
entrance fees. At Yellowstone National Park, the world's first national park, a
five dollar car fee was authorized in 1915, and remained at that level for sev-
enty-three years, until it was grudgingly raised to ten dollars in 1988. The
1996 Omnibus Parks and Public Lands Bill (HR 4236) contained provisions
that would have permitted expanded entrance fees, but at President Clinton's
insistence, these provisions were deleted before the bill became law.70
One can surmise that it is politically unpopular to make more expensive
the opportunity to visit public lands "owned" by the taxpayers of the United
States. Consequently, visitation fees are rarely raised, and there is no financial
disincentive preventing overuse of park lands.7
3. Increased Use But Reduced Funding
Although the American taxpayer subsidizes the recreational visitor that
uses a National Park, this subsidy has declined over the past two decades,
while recreational use of these lands has increased. As a consequence, the
units of the National Parks have suffered from decreased public funding at the
same time that the public is overrunning the parks with sheer numbers. If the
American public is encouraged to visit National Parks, if those who do go to
the parks are not charged a fee which reflects the true cost of their visit to the
parks, and if public spending on park lands is declining in real dollars, then
park managers will not have the financial ability to maintain, repair, or protect
our National Parks.
The table below presents data from the 1977-1995 period which demon-
strates that recreational use of the National Parks has been increasing (Column
1),72 while overall funding for the Park System has declined over the same
period (Column 2)."




70. Congress Approves Omnibus Parks Bill, Drops 13 Sections, FED. PARKS & RECREATION,
Oct. 19, 1996, at 1.
71. The Omnibus Public Lands Act that was enacted into law on Oct. 3, 1996, Public Law
104-208, does contain a four year pilot program that permits entrance fees to rise in selected na-
tional parks and other public lands. National Forests Sprouting Fees, DENVER POST, Nov. 27,
1996, at A2.
72. Column 1 in the Table shows that recreational visits to National Parks rose from 210.6
million in 1977 to 269.6 million in 1995, amounting to a 28% increase.
73. All budget figures have been converted to real 1994 dollars using the Consumer Price
Index.
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Year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NPS All Accounts Operation of Construction NPS Land
Recreation to National the National ($ million) Acquisition
Visits Park Service Park System & State
(million)74  ($ million) ($ million) Assistance
($ million)
1977 210.6 2,287 722 320 1,065
1978 222.2 2,945 776 367 1,549
1979 205.4 2,555 792 242 1,287
1980 198.0 2,171 703 202 849
1981 210.1 1,454 748 71 516
1982 213.7 1,184 801 147 205
1983 216.9 1,597 896 237 352
1984 218.1 1,299 879 94 290
1985 216.0 1,273 863 153 233
1986 237.1 1,117 826 152 127
1987 246.4 1,193 921 115 144
1988 250.5 1,126 916 117 76
1989 256.1 1,222 920 190 87
1990 263.2 1,225 871 224 99
1991 267.8 1,467 954 294 i49
1992 274.7 1,518 1,031 317 111
1993 273.1 1,422 1,009 234 121
1994 268.6 1,452 1,062 215 97
1995 269.6 1,330 1,047 158 71
% Change 28.0% -41.9% 45.1% -50.79% -93.3%
1977-95
B. Recreation Dominant Over Preservation
The Organic Act of 1916 made preservation of wildlife and scenery the
primary purpose of the National Parks."' That preservation was intended to be
the goal of the nation's parks reflects the context during which the Organic
Act was enacted. During the World War I period, Americans were concerned
about the conservation of natural resources, and National Parks were a logical
response to this fear. 6
Since the Organic Act's adoption, the United States Congress has given
recreation management priority with respect to several categories of park sys-
tem lands.77 This congressional direction, plus the growing demand for the
74. Recreation Visits, supra note 51; Nat'l Park Serv., U.S. Dep't of Interior, National Park
Service Current Budget Authority Requested and Enacted Since FY 1977 (1996) (internal docu-
ment from Budget Team-Operations Formulation Branch); U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATIS-
TICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1995, at 492 (115th ed. 1995); Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Monthly Labor Review, July 1996, at 88, 88.
75. 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1994); William Andrew Shutkin, The National Park Service Act Revisit-
ed, 10 VA. ENVTL. LJ. 345, 345 (1991); see also Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
76. FORESTA, supra note 42, at 12.
77. Scott M. Meis, The Socio-Economic Function of the Canadian Parks Service as a Model
for the U.S. National Parks Service and Other Agencies: An Organizational Framework for Man-
aging Natural Recreation Research, in SOCIAL SCIENCE AND NATURAL RESOURCE RECREATION
MANAGEMENT 35 (Joanne Vining ed., 1990) (emphasizing the importance of management to ac-
commodate a diverse collection of visitors); J. William Futtrell, Parks to the People: New Direc-
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recreation resource within National Parks, has caused recreation to dominate as
the principal use of national park lands.7" Preservation has been largely shunt-
ed aside, recreational facilities and concessionaire have been supported, and
protection of park resources from recreationalists has been jeopardized.79
The Park Service's shift in emphasis from preservation to recreation has
been furthered by congressional and judicial acquiescence. Congress has dele-
gated to the National Park Service the authority to resolve recreation versus
preservation conflicts to Park Service managerial discretion.' When the Park
Service exercises its discretion in favor of recreational interests and facilities,
which it often does,8 the courts generally defer to these decisions.82 Courts
tend to use the arbitrary and capricious standard when reviewing exercises of
Park Service discretion.83 When this standard is applied to a case where there
is an allegation that the Park Service is erring too much in favor of recreation
at the expense of preservation, the judicial attack on the Park Service typically
fails. 4
Of course, judicial deference cuts both ways. Reviewing courts have up-
held the Park Service when it has decided that visitors might overwhelm the
recreational carrying capacity of a given park system unit, and as a result has
either refused to issue visitation permits," or restricted access." Courts have
also sustained the Park Service when it refused to allow exploitative use of
park wildlife. However, despite the willingness of courts to uphold Park
Service actions that are inconsistent with a dominant recreation use policy,
preservation will never become a primary Park Service mission until park
managers decide that rising recreational demand is threatening, or has already
damaged, the scenic and ecological resources of the National Parks."8
tions for the National Park System, 25 EMORY LJ. 255, 272 (1976); 16 U.S.C. § 460n-3(b)
(1994); Idaho v. Hodel, 814 F.2d 1288, 1294-96 (9th Cir. 1987).
78. See ZASLOWSKY, supra note 46, at 35 (relating National Park policy not only to the
reservation of resources, but also the recreational needs of society); W.IJAM C. EVERIART, THiE
NATIONAL PARK SERvIcE (1983); COGGINs & GLiCKSMAN, supra note 3, at § 14.01.
79. See FORESTA, supra note 42, at 28 (noting that development of recreation facilities and
concessionaire to accommodate recreational use was a priority in the 1950s and 1960s). See gen-
erally Gray & Greben, supra note 26, at 3, 6 (proposing that recreation is a basic need that should
be provided to the public).
80. 16 U.S.C. § 3 (1994).
81. FORESTA, supra note 42, at 54.
82. See Conservation Law Found., 864 F.2d at 957; National Wildlife Fed'n v. National Park
Serv., 669 F. Supp. 384 (D. Wyo. 1987).
83. Wilkins v. Secretary of Interior, 995 F.2d 850, 852 (8th Cir. 1993).
84. See Sierra Club v. Andrus, 487 F. Supp. 443 (D.D.C. 1980), affd on other grounds, 659
F. 2d 203 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
85. Clipper Cruise Line, Inc. v. United States, 855 F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 1994).
86. Christianson v. Hauptman, 991 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1993); Wilderness Pub. Rights Fund v.
Kleppe, 608 F.2d 1250 (9th Cir. 1979).
87. NRA v. Potter, 628 F. Supp. 903 (D.D.C. 1986).
88. See FORESTA, supra note 42, at 28.
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C. Implications for Ecosystem Management
Many federal agencies are exploring whether (or how) to integrate the
concept of ecosystem management into their management decisions.' Each
major land and natural resource management agency, including the National
Park Service, has drafted policy guidelines regarding ecosystem management
approaches.' Although the Park Service is at this point more interested in
ecosystem management as a general concept, rather than as a defined strate-
gy,91 the dominance of recreation over preservation in the National Parks will
have important implications if the Park Service were eventually guided by an
ecosystem management policy.'
While ecosystem management has come to mean different things to dif-
ferent people, the term generally encompasses the idea of an ecological and
systemic approach to managing natural resources at a nonboundaried, regional
scale.93 For federal managers, an ecosystem management policy requires inte-
gration of decisionmaking with respect to both federal and nonfederal land-
holders. There are also two basic ecosystem management schools--one advo-
cates a natural "biocentric"94 approach, while the other is "anthropocentric,"
which assumes that inevitable human activity must be a critical part of man-
agement decisions about natural resources.95
The tentative definition of ecosystem management adopted by the Nation-
al Park Service takes the approach that a park management philosophy "re-
spects all living things and seeks to sustain natural processes and the dignity
of all species." If this definition assumes (as it should) that humans are
"living things" and "species," then the Park Service has correctly adopted the
anthropocentric school of ecosystem management. With human recreation
dominating park lands, park management must proceed on the basis that hu-
mans are ecosystem components, whose activities cannot be separated from
nature. Human recreational uses of the National Parks are increasing and
threaten to impact (if not overwhelm) ecological systems. These uses must be
taken into account when developing management policies.
89. Cf MORRISSEY, supra note 5 (stating that eighteen federal agencies demonstrated ecosys-
tem management activities).
90. Richard Haeuber, Setting the Environmental Policy Agetida: The Case of Ecosystem
Management, 36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1, 2 (1996).
91. CooGINs & GLICKSMAN, supra note 3, at 14-7.
92. See Robert B. Keiter, An Introduction to the Ecosystem Management Debate, in THE
GREATER YELLowsToNE EcosYsTEM 3, 10-11 (Robert B. Keiter & Mark S. Boyce eds., 1991).
93. MARGARET A. MOOTE ET. AL., PRINCIPLES OF ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT 2 (1994).
94. The "biocentric" approach "considers human use of resources to be constrained by the
primary goal of maintaining ecological integrity." Thomas R. Stanley, Jr., Ecosystem Management
and the Arrogance of Humanism, 9 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 255, 256 (1995).
95. Id. at 255, 256.
96. Haeuber, supra note 90, at 25; MORRiSSEY, supra note 5, at CRS-91.
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CONCLUSION
The recreation resource is fast becoming a dominant use on all public
lands. On National Park lands, it has already outpaced preservation as the
predominant use. There are important budgetary, ecological, and management
consequences of a national park system that is catering primarily to tourists
and recreationalists. The pressure of recreation on sensitive park lands and
sometimes fragile park ecosystems is mounting, and is unlikely to decline in
the near term. Federal policy-makers and National Park officials cannot ignore
the effect this widespread interest in recreation is having throughout the Na-
tional Park System. They must address and plan for this dominant use in their
budget and park management decisions.
ANILCA: A DIFFERENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR
MANAGING THE EXTRAORDINARY NATIONAL PARK
UNITS OF THE LAST FRONTIER
DEBORAH WILLIAMS*
Alaska's National Park units can be characterized by a long list of super-
latives. Alaska contains the most acres of national parks-over 54 million
acres, representing 66% of the total park land base in the entire United
States.' The largest park unit, Wrangell-Saint Elias National Park and Pre-
serve, is in Alaska.2 Denali National Park and Preserve features Mt. McKin-
ley, the tallest mountain in North America.3 There are over 32 million acres
of national park wilderness in Alaska, compared to approximately 6 million
acres in the remainder of the United States.' And, of particular significance to
the legal profession, national parks in Alaska are governed by laws unlike
those found anywhere else in the United States.
On December 2, 1980, President Jimmy Carter signed into law the Alaska
National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA), which created or en-
larged 13 of Alaska's 15 national park units.5 ANILCA represented an ex-
traordinary and unprecedented physical expansion of national park units. Fur-
thermore, ANILCA sets forth a substantially different management scheme for
the national parks in Alaska.
The purpose of this essay is to highlight the most important aspects of the
* Special Assistant to the Secretary for Interior for Alaska. B.A., Pomona College, 1975;
J.D., Harvard Law School, 1978. The author wishes to thank Lauri Adams for her assistance on
this paper. The author also gratefully acknowledges the patience and diligence of Ginny Kalbach
in preparing this manuscript. The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not neces-
sarily represent those of the Department of the Interior or the United States.
1. Interview with Diane Ross, Division of Realty, Alaska Field Office of the National Park
Service (Aug. 19, 1996).
2. Wrangell-Saint Elias National Park and Preserve is over 13 million acres in size. Id. This
makes it larger than the combined acreage of Maryland, Massachusetts and Delaware. Bureau of
Land Management, U.S. Dep't. of the Interior, Public Land Statistics 5 (1993).
3. The other national park units in Alaska are: Aniakchak National Monument and Pre-
serve, Bering Land Bridge National Preserve, Cape Krusenstem National Monument, Gates of the
Arctic National Park and Preserve, Glacier Bay National Park and Preserve, Katmal National Park
and Preserve, Kenai Fjords National Park, Kobuk Valley National Park, Lake Clark National Park
and Preserve, Yukon Charley National Preserve, Klondike Gold Rush and Sitka Historical Park.
Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-487, 94 Stat. 2371
(partially codified in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C. and 43 U.S.C.) [hereinafter ANILCA].
4. Interview with Diane Ross, supra, note 1.
5. ANILCA, supra note 3. Prior to ANILCA, Alaska contained only five national park
units-Glacier Bay, Katmai, Mt. McKinley, Klondike Gold Rush, and Sitka Historical Park.
ANILCA expanded and redesignated Glacier Bay, Katma and Mt. McKinley, and renamed ML
McKinley as Denali National Park and Preserve. 16 U.S.C. § 410hh-i (1994).
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unique statutory framework pertaining to national parks in Alaska.6 The au-
thor urges legal scholars and others to scrutinize and assess ANILCA's legis-
lative structure further to determine whether certain components of ANILCA
should be exported to parks outside of Alaska, either nationally or internation-
ally, particularly if major expansions are being considered. Additionally, the
author opposes the amendments to ANILCA that would eviscerate ANILCA's
carefully balanced approach.7
I. HUNTING
There are many dramatic management differences between national parks
in Alaska and national parks in the remainder of the United States, but one
difference stands out most starkly. Hunting is allowed on most of the acreage
managed by the National Park Service (NPS) in Alaska.' This is accom-
plished through two statutory mechanisms: the creation of "national pre-
serves," and the authorization of subsistence uses on most park and preserve
lands.
A. National Preserves
ANILCA created approximately 9.4 million acres of a distinct type of
park unit known as national preserves.' Pursuant to ANILCA, "hunting shall
be permitted in areas designated as national preserves."' 0 ANILCA further
provides that:
A National Preserve in Alaska shall be administered and managed as
a unit of the National Park System in the same manner as a national
park except as otherwise provided in this Act and except that the
taking of fish and wildlife for sport purposes and subsistence uses,
and trapping shall be allowed in a national preserve under applicable
6. From a Congressional perspective, Alaska's model is important to understand because of
the unprecedented leadership positions of Alaska's Congressional delegation. Senator Ted Stevens
is Chair of the Appropriations Committee; Senator Frank Murkouski is Chair of the Senate Energy
and Natural Resources Committee (the Senate Committee that oversees the National Park Service);
and Congressman Don Young is Chair of the House Resources Committee (the House Committee
that oversees the NPS).
7. Senator Murkowski introduced a package of amendments during the 104th Congress:
S.1920. The Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act Amendment Act of 1996: Hearings
on S. 1920 Before the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 104th Cong. (1996)
(statement of Sen. Murkouski on June 27). The Committee held one hearing on the bill very late
in the session, and neither the Senate nor the House took further action on the legislation. It is
likely that amendments to ANILCA will be pursued in the 105th Congress.
8. 16 U.S.C. § 410hh-2.
9. In most instances, preserve lands are part of a combined park/preserve unit or national
monument/preserve unit. For example, Wrangell-St. Elias National Park and Preserve contains
approximately 8,147,000 acres of national park and 4,171,000 acres of national preserve. Other
combined units include Aniakchak, Gates of the Arctic, Lake Clark, Glacier Bay, Katmai and
Denali. But in three instances, ANILCA created a stand alone preserve: Bering Land Bridge Na-
tional Preserve (2,457,000 acres), Noatak National Preserve (6,460,000 acres), Yukon-Charley
Rivers National Preserve (1,713,000 acres). ANILCA, supra, note 3.
10. 16 U.S.C. § 410hh-2 (emphasis added).
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State and Federal law and regulation."
The public, particularly outside of Alaska, often has a difficult time
accepting that hunting is permissible in National Parks in Alaska. For
example, there have been numerous letter writing campaigns decrying
wolf trapping in Denali National Park and Preserve. Since 1990, ap-
proximately four wolves a year have been legally killed in, or near, the
preserve portion of the unit."2 For floral and faunal protection and oth-
er prescribed reasons, however, the Secretary may designate zones
where and periods when no hunting or trapping may occur in pre-
serves.13
B. Subsistence
Subsistence hunting and fishing activities are authorized on all
national preserve lands and on a large portion of national park lands
where such uses are traditional. 4 The term "subsistence uses" is de-
fired as:
[T]he customary and traditional uses by rural Alaska residents of
wild, renewable resources for the direct personal or family consump-
tion as food, shelter, fuel, clothing, tools, or transportation; for the
making and selling of handicraft articles out of non-edible byproducts
of fish and wildlife resources taken for personal or family consump-
tion; for barter, or sharing for personal or family consumption; and
for customary trade. 5
"Subsistence [by rural Alaskans is] accorded [a] priority over the taking... of
fish and wildlife for other purposes."' 6
As evidenced in the Purposes section of ANILCA, subsistence was sin-
gled out as a critical component of the Act. The third, of only four purpose
statements, declares:
It is further the intent and purpose of this Act consistent with man-
agement of fish and wildlife in accordance with recognized scientific
principles and the purposes for which each conservation system unit
is established, designated, or expanded by or pursuant to this Act, to
provide the opportunity for rural residents engaged in a subsistence
11. 16 U.S.C. § 3201.
12. Alaska Department of Fish and Game Sealing Records. Memorandum from Ken
Stahinecker (Sept. 9, 1996) (on file with author). It is not currently possible to specify the num-
bers trapped solely within the Preserve because the reporting units include lands both within and
outside the Preserve.
13. 16 U.S.C. § 3201.
14. 16 U.S.C. § 410hh-2. There are a few parks areas in Alaska where subsistence hunting is
explicitly not authorized, e.g., Kenai Fjords, Glacier Bay, Katmai, a portion of Denali, and the
Klondike Gold Rush and Sitka Historical National Parks. The Secretary has the authority to pro-
hibit subsistence activities for several reasons, including to assure the continued viability of a fish
or wildlife population. 16 U.S.C. 3126(b).
15. Id. § 3113.
16. Id. § 3114.
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way of life to continue to do so."
There is no other provision in ANILCA that has aroused, and continues to
arouse, more controversy and litigation than subsistence.'" When Congress
passed ANILCA, both the State of Alaska and the federal government antici-
pated that the State would be able to manage fish and wildlife consistent with
a rural subsistence priority. 9 Unfortunately, nine years after the passage of
ANILCA, the Alaska Supreme Court, in a 3-2 decision disagreed, concluding
that a rural subsistence priority is unconstitutional under Alaska's state consti-
tution.2" As a result, the Departments of Interior and Agriculture created a
federal subsistence board, and have been managing subsistence hunting on
public lands since 1989.2
For several reasons, subsistence provides tremendous challenges and op-
portunities for the National Park Service. Subsistence oversight requires con-
siderable time and resources (which in Alaska are scarce, particularly for the
NPS), and creates in Alaska a disfavored dual management regime for fish
and wildlife.22 On the positive side, however, subsistence provides the NPS
an opportunity to work closely with rural Alaskans on a matter of tremendous
importance 23 and underscores the critical role of parks and preserves in sus-
taining Alaska Native physical, economic, traditional and cultural existence
and non-Native physical, economic, traditional and social existence. 24 The
Department of Interior continues to work with the State of Alaska on achiev-
ing the preferred resolution, State resumption of an excellent, responsive sub-
sistence management program.
17. 16 U.S.C. § 3101(c) (1994).
18. See e.g., Alaska v. Babbitt, 72 F.3d 698 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1672
(1996); Native Village of Quinhagak v. United States, 35 F.3d 388 (9th Ci. 1994); United States
v. Alexander, 938 F.2d 942 (9th Cir. 1991); Kenaitze Indian Tribe v. Alaska, 860 F.2d 312 (9th
Cir. 1988); Bobby v. Alaska, 718 F. Supp. 764 (D. Alaska 1989); Totemoff v. Alaska, 905 P.2d
954 (Alaska 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2499, 135 L.Ed.2d 190 (1996); Alaska v. Kenaitze
Indian Tribe, 894 P.2d 632 (Alaska 1995); Alaska v. McDowell, 785 P.2d I (Alaska 1989).
19. This expectation is embodied in 16 U.S.C. § 3115(d).
20. McDowell, 785 P.2d at 1.
21. The federal subsistence board regulations are set forth at 50 C.F.R. § 100.1-100.27
(1996). Currently the federal subsistence board does not manage fish in navigable waters. The
Ninth Circuit recently ruled that the Title VII subsistence priority applies to waters in Alaska in
which the United States has a reserved water right. Alaska v. Babbitt, 72 F.3d at 703-04. The
Department has published an advance notice of proposed rulemaking to define its expanded juris-
diction. Subsistence Management Regulations for Public Lands in Alaska, 61 Fed. Reg. 15,014
(1996) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 242 and 50 C.F.R. pt. 100) (proposed Apr. 4, 1996). Be-
cause of continuing Congressional moratoria, the Department is precluded from publishing final
regulations. 142 CONG. REc. HI 1,704 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1996). (to be Omnibus Appropriations
Act § 317 when a Public Law number becomes available).
22. The State of Alaska has tried on several occasions to formulate and place on a ballot a
State constitutional amendment. Each attempt has failed in part because the threshold for placing a
constitutional amendment on the ballot is so high: a two-thirds vote of the State House and State
Senate independently.
23. In implementing the subsistence priority, the NPS works with two sets of councils: the
regional advisory councils established by 16 U.S.C. § 3115, and, for park issues only, the subsis-
tence resource commissions, 16 U.S.C. § 3118. The purpose of the park-specific advisory com-
missions is to "devise and recommend to the Secretary and the Governor a program for subsis-
tence hunting" within the park unit. The regional advisory councils address subsistence issues on
all Federal public lands in their areas and report to the Federal Subsistence Board. Id. § 3115.
24. 16 U.S.C. § 3111.
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II. ACCESS; WILDERNESS MANAGEMENT AND PREFERENCES
There are many other important differences found in the statutory struc-
ture for national parks in Alaska. 5 The following discussion focuses on three
significant differences: access, wilderness management and preferences.
A. Access
Recognizing that Alaska's transportation network in 1980 was largely
undeveloped, Congress devoted an entire title of ANILCA to the issue of ac-
cess, seeking to create "a single comprehensive statutory authority" for access
concerns.26 In Title XI, three primary types of access are discussed: special
access, 27 access to inholdings, 28 and access associated with transportation or
utility systems.29 This note will briefly address the first two.3"
From a day-to-day management perspective, the special access provision
has the broadest implications. ANILCA allows certain transportation based
uses of park land unless there is a determination that such uses would be detri-
mental to the resource values of the park.3' Specifically, ANILCA provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act or other law, the
Secretary shall permit, on conservation system units, [including Park
Units] . . . the use of snowmachines (during periods of adequate snow
cover, or' frozen river conditions in the case of wild and scenic riv-
ers), motorboats, airplanes, and nonmotorized surface transportation
methods for traditional activities (where such activities are permitted
by this Act or other law) and for travel to and from villages and
homesites. Such use shall be subject to reasonable regulations by the
Secretary to protect the natural and other values of the conservation
system units ... and shall not be prohibited unless, after notice and
hearing in the vicinity of the affected unit or areas, the Secretary
finds that such use would be detrimental to the resource values of the
unit or area. Nothing in this section shall be construed as prohibiting
the use of other methods of transportation for such travel and activi-
ties on conservation system lands where such use is permitted by this
Act or other law.32
There are very few instances in which park lands have been closed,33 but
25. For example, the NPS is prohibited from charging entrance fees to any park in Alaska
except Denali. Id. §§ 4601-6a(a)(12); Id. § 410hh-2.
26. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3173.
27. Id. § 3170(a).
28. Id. § 3170(b).
29. Id. §§ 3164-3173.
30. The provisions governing access associated with transportation and utility systems are
worth reviewing, particularly for scholars in this area. However these provisions have been applied
only infrequently in Alaska, since capital project budget constraints have minimized the possibili-
ties for building major new systems.
31. 16 U.S.C. § 3170(a).
32. Id.
33. For example, NPS recently closed certain areas to Glacier Bay National Park to motor-
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those instances are the exception. Virtually all of Alaska's park units are open
to the types of special access described above. On the whole, Alaskans have
vigorously defended and continue to vigorously defend their ability to use
boats, airplanes, and snowmobiles on park units to engage in hunting, berry
picking, camping and other activities.
Insuring adequate access to inholdings within parks has been the second
major access issue in the implementation of ANILCA. ANILCA specifies that
inholders "shall be given by the Secretary such rights as-may be necessary to
assure adequate and feasible access for economic and other purposes. 34
However, such rights shall be subject to reasonable regulations issued by the
Secretary to protect the natural and other values of such land.35 There are
sizable "inholdings" in national park units, particularly lands owned by Alaska
Native Corporations created by the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act
(ANCSA).36
Achieving access to these lands while minimizing environmental damage
will be one of the most important management issues facing parks in the fu-
ture as development of these Native lands becomes more economic.37
A. Wilderness Management
ANILCA explicitly establishes different rules with respect to wilderness
management.3 Perhaps most significantly, the provisions in ANILCA govern-
ing special access apply to wilderness areas.39 In other words, IANILCA au-
ized access. See Glacier Bay National Park, Alaska: Vessel Management Plan Regulations, 61 Fed.
Reg. 27,008 (1996) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 13).
34. 16 U.S.C. § 3170(b).
35. Id. One of the more interesting questions presented by this provision is known as the
Denali lemonade stand quandary. Currently, there is a single developed road into Denali, Alaska's
most popular and famous park. Measuring approximately 90 miles in length, this road not only
serves as the basis of most visitor's wildlife and mountain viewing experience in Denali, but it
also leads to the Kantishna area, an area of private property in the middle of the park. To protect
wildlife resources, the Park carefully restricts the number of vehicles on the road and requires
virtually everyone to ride a bus. The demand for spots on the buses exceeds the supply. Addition-
ally, the Park must allow reasonable access to inholders in Kantishna, including lodge owners.
Here is the dilemma: what if someone sets up the equivalent of a lemonade stand in Kantishna
and provides a day trip over the Denali Road, featuring the wildlife viewing opportunities and
views of North America's largest peak, serves the bus passengers a glass of lemonade on their
inholding and turns around to spend the remaining time watching wildlife and the mountain.
Should the NPS under § 3170(b) be required to provide access for this purpose?
36. Passed in 1971, the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) created two primary
types of Alaska Native owned corporations: Village Corporations and Regional Corporations. 43
U.S.C. §§ 1601-1629 (1994). As a result of ANCSA, Alaska Native Village and Regional Corpo-
rations are entitled to receive approximately 44 million acres of land, a significant amount of
which is within the boundaries of Alaska's national park and refuge units.
37. The regulations implementing these special access provisions are found at 43 CFR
§§36.10 (access to inholdings); 36.11 (special access); see also 36 CFR Part 13 (Closure Proce-
dures found at §13.30).
38. In recognizing the differences, Congress clearly provided that "[tihe provisions of this
section are enacted in recognition of the unique conditions in Alaska. Nothing in this section shall
be construed to expand, diminish, or modify the provisions of the Wilderness Act or the applica-
tion or interpretation of such provisions with respect to lands outside of Alaska." 16 U.S.C. §
3203(a) (1994). The extensive park wilderness areas created by ANILCA are in eight park units.
See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
39. See 16 U.S.C. § 3170. This section of ANILCA applies to all "conservation system
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thorizes the use of snowmachines, motorboats, and airplanes for traditional
activities in wilderness study areas in Alaska, unless, after a notice and a hear-
ing process, the Secretary finds that such use "would be detrimental to the re-
source values of the unit or area."' Encountering motorized vehicles in a
wilderness area, together with encountering a hunter on park lands, are the two
most publicly apparent differences between authorized human activity on park
lands in Alaska versus park lands in the rest of the nation.
Recently the Department established several motor-free zones in Glacier
Bay National Park wilderness area as part of a larger rulemaking.4 ' The re-
source value being protected was natural quiet, and was balanced against in-
creases in motorboat and cruise ship traffic in the rest of Glacier Bay. This
rulemaking represents the first time a closure has occurred for wilderness
value reasons in a park unit in Alaska.
There are other ANILCA specific wilderness provisions that affect man-
agement. The Secretary can construct new cabins in wilderness areas '2 and
hunters and fishermen can continue to use "temporary campsites, tent plat-
forms, shelters, and other temporary facilities and equipment directly and nec-
essarily related to such activities.""3 More generally, wilderness designations
do not preclude subsistence hunting and fishing, or sport hunting and fishing,
where such activities are otherwise permitted by statute.
4
B. Preferences
Because ANILCA vastly expanded parks and refuges, many Alaska Na-
tive groups feared that their economic opportunities would be jeopardized. To
address this concern, and related concerns, Congress established three prefer-
ence provisions that affect national parks. These involve administrative and
visitor facilities, visitor services, and local hire.
Unlike in the continental United States, the Park Service in Alaska has the
explicit authority to establish administrative sites and visitor facilities "outside
the boundaries of' the park unit.4 In fact, Congress went one step further
and directed the Park Service in Alaska "[t]o the extent practicable and desir-
able" to "attempt to locate such sites and facilities on Native lands in the vi-
cinity of the unit." This provision not only protects the natural integrity of
Park lands within the boundaries of a unit, but also encourages partnerships
with local Alaska Natives.
units" and public lands designated as wilderness study. Id. "Conservation system unit" is defined
to include "any unit in Alaska of the ... National Wilderness Preservation System," including
park system units. Id. § 3102(4).
40. 16 U.S.C. § 3170(a). Neither ANILCA nor departmental regulations define "traditional
activities." See id. § 3102 (defining other applicable terms).
41. 61 Fed. Reg. 27,008 (1996) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 13).
42. 16 U.S.C. § 3203(d).
43. Id. § 3204.
44. See definition of "public lands" at 16 U.S.C. § 3102(3), which includes lands designated
as wilderness. See also id. § 3114.
45. Id. § 3196(a)(2) (emphasis added).
46. Id. § 3196(a).
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Recently the Park Service published binding guidelines on how to imple-
ment this preference.47 Since the publication of these guidelines, several pro-
jects have been initiated which have successfully used the preference. It is
important to continue to utilize fully this preference when more administrative
sites and visitor facilities are built to accommodate the growth of visitorship to
Alaska's Parks. By this means, the economic benefits accompanying this
growth will be proactively shared with adjacent Native land owners.
Pursuant to ANILCA, the Park Service in Alaska also has a two-tiered
preference system for the awarding of visitor services." Visitor Services are
defined as: "any service made available for a fee or charge to persons who
visit a conservation system unit [including parks], including such services as
providing food, accommodations, transportation, tours, and guides excepting
the guiding of sport hunting and fishing."'49
The highest preference is awarded to historic operators-persons who
were previously engaged in providing the service within an area established as
or added to a park unit by ANILCA. ° The next highest preference goes to
the Native Corporation most directly affected by the establishment or expan-
sion of the park unit under ANILCA, and a co-equal preference goes to per-
sons who are local residents.5 In October 1996 the Park Service published its
first set of regulations implementing the visitor service preference provi-
sions."
It is hoped and expected that the Section 1307 regulations will be enthusi-
astically applied as new visitor service opportunities arise, particularly in the
less well known parks. For example, there are many guided sight-seeing op-
portunities to world class attractions, such as the Kobuk Sand Dunes, that,
once initiated, would benefit the Park, the public, nearby Alaska Native Cor-
porations, and local residents. It will be important, however, to insure that new
visitor services are designed in such a manner that the underlying park values
are protected, and that Alaska's unparalleled and unreplaceable wild, scenic
and biological grandeur is sustained for future generations.
The third provision in ANILCA that recognizes the value of involving
local residents in the future of parks is Section 1308, which authorizes local
hire. 3 Specifically, this section provides that the Secretary shall:
[E]stablish a program under which any individual who, by reason of
having lived or worked in or near [a conservation system unit, includ-
ing park units], has special knowledge or expertise concerning the
natural or cultural resources of [such unit] and the management there-
47. United States Department of the Interior Guidelines for Implementing Section 1306 of
the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act Relating to the Establishment of Administra-
tive Sites and Visitor Facilities in Alaska Conservation System Units (Aug. 22, 1995). Unfortu-
nately there were no guidelines published during the first 12 years of ANILCA's implementation
under the Reagan/Bush administrations.
48. See 16 U.S.C. § 3197(b).
49. Id. § 3197(c).
50. See id. § 1397(a).
51. See id. § 3197(b)(1)-(2).
52. 61 Fed. Reg. 54,334 (1996) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 13).
53. 16 U.S.C. § 3198.
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of... without regard to... formal training [requirements] ... [any
other] ... employment preference[s] ... and any numerical limita-
tion on personnel otherwise applicable.54
To further reinforce the Congressional directive that local hire employees are
not to be counted against "FTE ceilings," the section underscores that
"[ilndividuals appointed under this subsection shall not be taken into account
in applying any personnel limitation[s] . . . ."' In this era of downsizing, and
omnipresent FTE ceilings, this exemption is significant.
The local hire program in Alaska boasts many successes and demonstrates
the value of incorporating into the ranks of the Park Service people who know
and love the area in which the park unit is located. The full implementation of
the program has been hampered, however, by static or declining budgets,
precluding much new hiring.56
The Park Service, nevertheless, is implementing new initiatives such as
hiring on site at the widely attended Alaska Federation of Natives Conven-
tion." Developing an effective and equitable way to convert local hires into
permanent employees, after a certain length of meritorious service, is also a
priority. This is necessary to attract, retain and promote good local hire em-
ployees.
Ill. CONCLUSION
The management structure for park units in Alaska represents a historic
and delicately balanced compromise. When ANILCA was initially debated, the
tradeoff was clear: if Alaska and the nation were to obtain over 35 million
acres of new national park land in Alaska with the stroke of a pen, then there
would have to be numerous compromises in how the land was to be adminis-
tered. In 1980, many interest groups were dissatisfied with the compromises
contained in ANILCA, feeling they went too far or not far enough in liberal-
izing traditional park management practices. Many still are disgruntled.
For over a decade, Congress intentionally refrained from re-opening
ANILCA's provisions on park management, likening a Congressional re-exam-
ination to opening the proverbial Pandora's box. Unfortunately, the truce was
broken with the introduction of S. 1920. Among other amendments, this bill
proposed to significantly alter ANILCA's carefully achieved balances on ac-
cess, cabins and wilderness-study management.
In each instance, the changes proposed by the amendments in S. 1920
lessened the protections afforded on-the-ground park resources. This is unac-
ceptable. The park units in Alaska represent one of the earth's most extraordi-
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Although the NPS in Alaska manages over 66% of the nation's park land, it only em-
ploys 2% of NPS's total work force. Communication from Paul Anderson, Deputy Field Director
(Oct. 21, 1996). Most parks in Alaska are woefully understaffed. This will present an ever-greater
problem as visitorship in Alaska increases and budgets remain static or decline in actual or real
dollars. Id.
57. Over 3,000 Alaska Natives from throughout Alaska attend this annual convention. Id.
1997]
868 DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:3
nary legacies. As trustees of that legacy, we must continue to respect the in-
tegrity of the law that created these national park units. These are, after all,
national parks and were created for the entire nation to cherish. Attempts to
weaken their protection must be met with a resounding "No." The children
and grandchildren of the twenty-first century and beyond must be given the
opportunity to enjoy, learn from and cherish the incomparable beauty and
biological richness of the parks of the Last Frontier.
LAWYERING FOR THE NATIONAL PARK SERVICE
GINA Guy*
I. ORGANIZATIONAL SETIING
The Office of the Solicitor, or General Counsel, of the Department of the
Interior, provides "in-house" legal services to all the constituent bureaus of the
Department, including the National Park Service (NPS), which nearly every-
one has heard of, while public awareness of the Department itself is quite
limited. Established on March 3, 1849, Interior is the fifth-oldest cabinet de-
partment.
The Solicitor is a Presidential appointee and the third-ranking official in
the Department after the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary. Attorneys spe-
cializing in NPS legal issues are located in Washington, D.C. and various
locations within the seven Solicitor's Office Regions. Since 1946, the Solicitor
has been charged by statute' with responsibility for all the legal work in the
Department, and neither the NPS nor other bureaus may employ lawyers in
legal positions. The legal work in the Department continues to grow in volume
and complexity without equivalent increases in staffing or funding. Sometimes
NPS managers feel short-changed because of inadequate legal resources to
assist them.
The NPS is a large (about 20,000 employees) and diverse organization
operating in all 50 states, the Virgin Islands, the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico, and the Pacific Trust Territories, and, in an advisory capacity, in various
foreign countries. The sheer size and diversity of the workforce mean that the
Office of the Solicitor must be prepared to provide advice in labor law and
increasingly, in all areas of employment discrimination law. It also has a size-
able budget each fiscal year for contracting for the construction of visitor
facilities and infrastructure projects, which generates the need for expertise in
federal procurement law counseling and, sometimes, litigation in which mil-
lions of dollars are at stake.
Attorneys often spend their entire careers in the Office of the Solicitor,
and develop highly specialized legal knowledge. In the NPS, there is a fair
amount of mobility throughout the country, which results in turnover of man-
agers at nearly all levels. Most attorneys have the most significant attorney-
client relationships with park superintendents and their immediate staffs, fol-
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lowed by Washington office managers and staff of the seven geographic Re-
gions. The turnover rate requires some adjustment on both sides, as the statio-
nery lawyer may have related in a particular way with the prior manager,
while the new manager may have the done the same with a particular attorney.
Decisions often have to be made quickly, and by telephone or e-mail between
people who have never met each other in person. The distance between lawyer
and client can make it very difficult for a park manager to identify a legal
problem or for the lawyer to interact sufficiently with clients. For example,
counsel for Glacier National Park is in Billings, for Everglades in Atlanta, for
Grand Canyon in San Francisco, for Big Bend in Santa Fe, for Yellowstone
and the Gateway Arch (St. Louis) in Denver.
Many NPS properties are located in remote and thinly-populated areas.
Employee housing is sometimes substandard, and resources for families limit-
ed. Interaction with the local community can present particular problems in
these situations, such as pressure to provide improved, but perhaps more dam-
aging access or to grant special use permits which may be questionable from a
resource protection perspective. Even in metropolitan areas, the NPS staff may
be the only federal employees many people in the area deal with on a regular
basis. In most cases, relationships are cordial, but park staff must often walk a
fine line between meeting park needs and local interests. In some cases long-
time NPS employees develop close family or personal connections with the
community, which can result in conflict-of-interest situations in procurement
or land acquisition and even careless talk that can prejudice law enforcement
operations. In a few places NPS contributes much of the funding for the local
school district, which can be the source of numerous legal problems as well as
disagreements between NPS parents and the community about curriculum or
how the schools should be managed. Legal problems with local law enforce-
ment and social service agencies often need to be worked through, particularly
in parks such as Yellowstone in which jurisdiction is exclusively federal con-
cerning such questions as jurisdiction over juvenile offenders and child protec-
tion proceedings. Geographic proximity, human relationships, and genuine
institutional efforts to be responsive to local needs mean that the NPS may,
unwittingly and after having acted in total good faith over time, find itself in a
situation that may suddenly require decisive, and perhaps unpopular legal
action. Our attorneys must be prepared to analyze the application of the Feder-
al Advisory Committee Act with respect to efforts by NPS to involve non-
federal entities in management and planning decisions.
II. BROAD AuTHORITIEs
All units of the National Park System, whether called national parks,
national monuments, national recreation areas, or otherwise, are subject to the
broad mandate of the National Park System's Organic Act of 19162 which
requires a high level of deference to the preservation of natural values.
Each park unit was created by Congress through enabling legislation or
2. 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
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Executive Order, which may specifically provide for uses the NPS would
otherwise prohibit, such as hunting or livestock grazing. All NPS discretionary
decisions that are not categorically excluded require compliance with the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act, which means attorneys must have expertise
in that area.
The Antiquities Act of 1906' authorized the President to create, by public
proclamation (Executive Order) historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric
structures, and other objects of historic or scientific interest "that are situated
upon the lands owned or controlled by the Government of the United States."
The statute also requires that the reservation be confined "to the smallest area
compatible with the proper care and management of the objects to be protect-
ed." The Antiquities Act was passed ten years before the Park Service was
created, and only the passage of the Organic Act cited above vested manage-
ment authority for "national parks, monuments, and reservations" in the NPS.
Once the boundaries for a monument have been established, land use and
management decision tend not to differ significantly from those for parks
because the Antiquities Act charges the NPS with "proper care" and the
protections afforded by the Organic Act also apply. On occasion, such as the
quantification of reserved water rights or expansion of a road easement, ques-
tions have arisen about the purposes for which a monument was established
and what is needed to effectuate the intention of the Executive Order.
III. LEGAL SERVICES PROVIDED
The types of legal services to NPS can be broadly categorized as dealing
with:
(1) organizational and institutional support (employment, contracting,
land and water acquisition and management, admiralty law, environ-
mental compliance and environmental quality), and
(2) external affairs and visitor-generated issues.
Organizational/Internal Issues. Lands become part of the NPS system in
three major ways: (1) reservation from the public domain by Congress or by
Executive Order, (2) acquisition by purchase (including exchanges) or (3) by
condemnation, all of which require varying degrees of legal assistance. Ease-
ments and rights-of-way are also routine, both as to NPS as grantor and grant-
ee. In parks within which there are significant amounts of lands held privately
(inholdings), these issues can become quite complex, and may present many
questions about the nature and extent of valid existing rights. Another varia-
tion occurs when lands are owned by a non-federal entity and managed for
park purposes, such as the trust holding much of the land in the newly-estab-
lished Tall Grass Prairie National Preserve in Kansas. Water rights in the West
may be either reserved or appropriative; both can require intense legal work at
times by lawyers familiar with the needs of the particular park and the water
law system of the state in which the park is located.
3. 16 U.S.C. § 431 (1994).
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Historic preservation law issues arise from time to time, both because the
NPS must comply with the National Historic Preservation Act, and also be-
cause the "keeper" of the National Register of Historic Places in an NPS
employee, who acts on the findings of each state's Historic Preservation Offi-
cer with respect to National Register listings. All too frequently, other federal
agencies and the public at large are simply not aware of the requirements of
Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act, and legal advice must
be furnished quickly and informally.
Environmental compliance laws in which the Congress has waived sover-
eign immunity for federal agencies and delegated enforcement authority to
states have generated considerable legal work and sometimes, confusion,
among both state and federal agencies, including the NPS, in such matters as
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act) permits, landfills, and
underground storage tank permitting. The NPS also owns some sites which are
subject to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act (CERCLA) on which it is seeking to conduct or participate in the
remediation. The Office of the Solicitor also provides assistance to the NPS
concerning air quality issues and hydropower licensing actions by the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission.
External/Visitor-Service Issues
Controversy abounds relative to the duty of the NPS to preserve the areas
charged to its care vis-a-vis the duty to make those areas accessible to the
increasing numbers of visitors, including access for those with disabilities. As
more than one observer has noted, "Americans are loving their parks to
death". Some of the most significant visitor-generated legal issues arise from
the fact that the National Park Service includes both rangers who hold federal
law enforcement commissions and the Park Police. Several attorneys provide
essentially full-time support to the Park Police, principally in the National
Capital Region, and other attorneys who advise NPS on law enforcement mat-
ters must work closely with the Department of Justice and local law enforce-
ment authorities. Major, often violent crimes occur every day in national
parks, and some areas, because of geography and market proximity, are the
location of choice for drug shipments and sales. Wildlife poaching is also a
serious problem in some parks.
Each year visitors to the national parks suffer a variety of personal inju-
ries and fatal accidents. Congress, in enacting the Federal Tort Claims Act,
has partially waived sovereign immunity for the negligence of federal employ-
ees under certain circumstances. Tort claims (a jurisdictional prerequisite to
suit) have been received (and denied) in many cases in which the claimant
seemed to have alleged that the United States was an insurer of visitor safety,
especially in claims involving injuries from wildlife (bears, moose, and bison),
climbing accidents, rescue operations, and falls off clearly visible cliffs or into
signed thermal areas. Sometimes the liability of United States is also affected
if the state where the claim arose has enacted a type of recreational use statute
which generally absolves a landowner from liability if the injured party has
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not paid an entrance or use fee.
In recent years some parks have become the focal point for First Amend-
ment cases involving freedom of speech and the free exercise of religion. The
NPS has attempted to address the speech issues by allowing each park to des-
ignate a "free-speech" or designated area where individuals may speak, dis-
tribute leaflets or sell published materials. More recently, several groups have
asserted a Constitutionally-protected right to sell message-bearing Tshirts,
which has received mixed reviews from courts. The most noted cases have
involved the Mall in Washington, D.C., which the NPS asserts would become
a "flea market" if all groups wishing to sell T-shirts could do so at will. Some
of cases involving T-shirt sales, speaking and leafleting, and even begging for
alms also present free-exercise issues if the group claims that its religious
beliefs require the conduct.
The final major group of legal issues relating to visitor use and presence
in parks relate to concessions management and contracting. The activities of
concessioners providing lodging, campgrounds, restaurants, shopping, and
recreational activities such as canoeing, rafting, scenic flights and riding are
governed by the Concessions Policy Act. The policy of the Congress is that all
development for visitor services "shall be limited to those that are necessary
and appropriate for public use and enjoyment of the national park area... and
that are consistent to the highest practicable degree with the preservation and
conservation of the areas."4 The concession businesses often involve very
large operating budgets with hundreds of employees. The negotiation and
review of concession contracts consumes a significant amount of attorney time
each year both in Washington and elsewhere. The concession operators are
always represented by counsel, and this work requires expertise in contract
law, accounting practices, and sometimes, knowledge of business practices in
the hospitality industry. The review and renewal of concession contracts some-
times falls behind schedule, and attorneys can be faced with convincing both
the client NPS manager and the concessioner that changes may be needed
either to address changed circumstances or to assure contract compliance over
time.
CONCLUSION
The legal issues confronted by attorneys in the Solicitor's office dealing
with the National Park Service are unfailingly interesting. Some are fleeting;
others are of monumental and lasting importance, such as the transfer of the
Presidio of San Francisco from the Army to the NPS as part of the Golden
Gate National Recreation Area or the multilateral effort to restore the Ever-
glades after decades of dewatering and contamination from agricultural runoff.
Our concerns are twofold: first, to be as effective and responsive as possible
in our day-to-day legal tasks, and secondly, in spite of distance and resource
limitations, to assist the NPS in all appropriate ways in its efforts to arrive at
4. 16 U.S.C. § 20 (1994).
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often difficult and controversial decisions about how these precious natural,
historic and cultural resources should be managed for the present and con-
served for posterity.
EDITOR'S NOTE
The Denver University Law Review's 1997 Symposium Conference, enti-
tled "Coercion: An Interdisciplinary Examination of Coercion, Exploitation,
and the Law," brought together doctors, law professors, philosophers, and
attorneys. The Conference, the culmination of several months of weekly group
discussions, consisted of two days of panel presentations and debate in an
informal setting. This format permits the free exchange of ideas between pro-
fessionals and academics, across disciplines and often across ideological gulfs.
Past Symposia have concentrated upon new trends in the law. The topic
of coercion, at the intersection of law, psychology and philosophy, is our first
truly interdisciplinary topic. It is therefore appropriate that this issue open with
a paper that attempts to identify and resolve the problems raised by interdisci-
plinary efforts. Professor Catherine Kemp writes:
subject matters, controversies, and strands of theoretical development
located in one discipline often appear out of context to scholars
trained in another.... (D]egrees and types of abstraction form a
notable instance of this phenomenon, especially for interdisciplinary
work in law and philosophy.'
Thus forewarned, we proceed to the remarks of Professor Alan Wertheimer, a
philosopher whose books Coercion and Exploitation were central to this year's
Symposium.
Our first topic centers on coercive and exploitative bargaining. Professor
John Lawrence Hill offers an overview and critical analysis of Professor
Wertheimer's moralized theory of coercion. Professor Penelope Bryan's com-
mentary on the coercion of women in divorce settlement negotiations discusses
concrete examples of systemic coercion. David Kaplan and Lisa Dixon provide
the practitioner's viewpoint on coerced waiver and consent in the context of
criminal procedure.
Professor Albert Alschuler opens the section on coerced confessions,
arguing that in order to determine whether a confession is "voluntary," one
need look no further than the conduct of the government employees who ex-
tracted that confession. As the exchange that follows indicates, not all com-
mentators are prepared to accept that analysis. An unexpected benefit of our
Symposium format is that it permits discussions that begin at the Conference
to continue in print. Professors Richard Leo and Richard Ofshe resume their
dialogue on coerced confessions with Professor Paul Cassell in our pages. We
hope you will find their spirited exchange informative.
Dr. Robert Miller and Professor Bruce Winick debate involuntary commit-
1. Catherine Kemp, The Uses of Abstraction: Remarks on Interdisciplinary Efforts in Law
and Philosophy, 74 DENv. U. L. REV. 877, 877-78 (1997).
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ment in the next section. Dr. Miller's novel analysis examines both internal
and external coercion as it relates to all aspects of the mental health care pro-
fession. Professor Winick examines the interplay of legal rules and therapeutic
values.
We close the issue with a series of trans-substantive themes. Professor
Wertheimer discusses exploitation and commercial surrogacy. Professor Ian
Ayres relates a fascinating account of coercion, extortion, and judicial corrup-
tion in Cook County, Illinois. The paradox described by Professor Jennifer
Brown challenges a fundamental assumption of the foregoing papers: that
choice itself is always preferable. Finally, Professor Nancy Ehrenreich treats
the analytical approach employed by Professor Wertheimer as it reflects the
interaction between theoretical perspectives in legal academia. She issues a
warning against the formalist analysis of sociolegal issues.
The faculty of the University of Denver College of Law, especially Pro-
fessors David Barnes and Roberto Corrada, Nancy Ehrenreich, and Martha
Ertman, were generous with their time. This Symposium would not have been
possible without their participation and guidance. Dean Dennis Lynch, a main-
stay of the Symposium from its inception, has provided invaluable assistance
over the last three years. We are indebted, as ever, to the Hughes Research
and Development Fund for their sponsorship of the Symposium Conference.
Dean Robert Yegge provided the unusual and enjoyable forum for the
Conference's second day, high in the Rocky Mountains atop Yegge Peak.
With this issue, Volume 74 of the Denver University Law Review draws
to a close. It has been a pleasure editing the most thematically varied (and
largest) volume in recent memory. Chad Henderson, Editor-in-Chief of Vol-
ume 75 of the Review, has been indispensable to the production of this Sym-
posium issue. We leave the Review in his capable hands and wish him the best
of luck.
S. Tarek Younes
Editor-in-Chief
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